This dissertation considers how law, ecology, and economics interface in the context of rights-based fishery management. The findings are presented in three chapters, each structured as an independent journal article. Each chapter begins with a general overview of the ecological and economic incentives for rights-based fishery management, followed by an in-depth discussion of the particular approach under consideration.

Chapter one focuses on "territorial use rights in fisheries" (TURFs), a spatial, property rights-based fishery management technique. I analyze the viability of instituting TURFs in California state waters under existing law, including the Marine Life Protection Act and the Marine Life Management Act. I conclude that while the policy rationales undergirding existing law and regulation support the idea of TURF management, they do not expressly provide for TURF implementation.

Given that California lacks TURF-specific policy, I consider in chapter two what such a policy might look like and what the effects of that policy might be. To address these questions, my collaborators and I developed an ecosystem service tradeoff analysis model for the southern California red sea urchin fishery. Our model compares the tradeoffs between fish biomass and fishery profit under four management regimes: a fleet model, a TURF system without revenue sharing, a TURF with revenue sharing, and optimal spatial management. We find that a TURF system's performance depends upon the degree of revenue sharing among fishermen. Our goal in this chapter is not to identify the "best" management option for this fishery; rather, we seek to introduce ecosystem service tradeoff analysis to a new audience---the law and policy community---and demonstrate how this tool can help decision-makers gauge the costs and benefits of various regulatory regimes.

The third chapter considers how antitrust law affects the formation and operation of fishery cooperatives. I conducted a synthetic literature review of past research, new case law, and emerging statutory guidance. I conclude that antitrust law continues to exert a chilling effect on fishery cooperatives. Most problematic from both conservation and economic standpoints is the constraint antitrust law places on a cooperative's ability to voluntarily restrict harvest below a governmentally-defined total allowable catch.