Group Agency, Moral Agency, and Moral Patiency
- Degree Grantor:
- University of California, Santa Barbara. Philosophy
- Degree Supervisor:
- Christopher McMahon
- Place of Publication:
- [Santa Barbara, Calif.]
- Publisher:
- University of California, Santa Barbara
- Creation Date:
- 2013
- Issued Date:
- 2013
- Topics:
- Ethics and Philosophy
- Keywords:
- Moral Agency,
Moral Patiency,
Lobbying,
Collective Intentionality,
Group Agency, and
Corporate Theory - Genres:
- Online resources and Dissertations, Academic
- Dissertation:
- Ph.D.--University of California, Santa Barbara, 2013
- Description:
This dissertation focuses on the phenomenon of group agency and its moral and social implications. I begin by examining the history of collective intentionality and addressing some of the early criticisms. While I admit to many problems associated with original theories, I discuss more nuanced approaches in theories of intention that have relevance for a narrower conception group intentions (and thereby group agency), particularly theories developed by Peter French and Philip Pettit and Christian List. I then defend the basic features of these views against several current and likely critics. These are the main emphases of Chapters 1 and 2.
Despite the plausibility of group agency, the concerns regarding group moral agency remain, which I address in Chapter 3. Group agents, particularly exemplified by the large modern business corporation, exert a tremendous amount of power over the direction of the economy and society, some of which are problematic and present key challenges for members of a polity. Without proper administrative structure, such group agents are unlikely to be responsive to moral reasons. I present and defend two key structural features of group agents that should help to make a group agent more likely to be responsive to moral reasons, elements of the grant theory of incorporation and Christopher McMahon's theory of managerial democracy.
I finally explore the limitations of group moral agency in Chapter 4. While it is possible that a moral agent is capable of acting and having intentions in a way that is generally responsive to moral reasons, I point out that there are arguments against the view that a group moral agent can also be a group moral patient. If group agents are not moral patients, they cannot be accorded moral rights. The implications for this view are that corporations and other highly structured organizations have no moral right to engage in lobbying practices to affect government policy. I point out other avenues of rights for group agents, but they cannot serve as the basis for a right to lobby the government directly.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (191 pages)
- Format:
- Text
- Collection(s):
- UCSB electronic theses and dissertations
- Other Versions:
- http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqm&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3611986
- ARK:
- ark:/48907/f3ms3qtw
- ISBN:
- 9781303731150
- Catalog System Number:
- 990041152860203776
- Copyright:
- Quentin Gee, 2013
- Rights:
In Copyright
- Copyright Holder:
- Quentin Gee
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