Alexandria Digital Research Library

Group Agency, Moral Agency, and Moral Patiency

Author:
Gee, Quentin Philip
Degree Grantor:
University of California, Santa Barbara. Philosophy
Degree Supervisor:
Christopher McMahon
Place of Publication:
[Santa Barbara, Calif.]
Publisher:
University of California, Santa Barbara
Creation Date:
2013
Issued Date:
2013
Topics:
Ethics and Philosophy
Keywords:
Moral Agency
Moral Patiency
Lobbying
Collective Intentionality
Group Agency
Corporate Theory
Genres:
Online resources and Dissertations, Academic
Dissertation:
Ph.D.--University of California, Santa Barbara, 2013
Description:

This dissertation focuses on the phenomenon of group agency and its moral and social implications. I begin by examining the history of collective intentionality and addressing some of the early criticisms. While I admit to many problems associated with original theories, I discuss more nuanced approaches in theories of intention that have relevance for a narrower conception group intentions (and thereby group agency), particularly theories developed by Peter French and Philip Pettit and Christian List. I then defend the basic features of these views against several current and likely critics. These are the main emphases of Chapters 1 and 2.

Despite the plausibility of group agency, the concerns regarding group moral agency remain, which I address in Chapter 3. Group agents, particularly exemplified by the large modern business corporation, exert a tremendous amount of power over the direction of the economy and society, some of which are problematic and present key challenges for members of a polity. Without proper administrative structure, such group agents are unlikely to be responsive to moral reasons. I present and defend two key structural features of group agents that should help to make a group agent more likely to be responsive to moral reasons, elements of the grant theory of incorporation and Christopher McMahon's theory of managerial democracy.

I finally explore the limitations of group moral agency in Chapter 4. While it is possible that a moral agent is capable of acting and having intentions in a way that is generally responsive to moral reasons, I point out that there are arguments against the view that a group moral agent can also be a group moral patient. If group agents are not moral patients, they cannot be accorded moral rights. The implications for this view are that corporations and other highly structured organizations have no moral right to engage in lobbying practices to affect government policy. I point out other avenues of rights for group agents, but they cannot serve as the basis for a right to lobby the government directly.

Physical Description:
1 online resource (191 pages)
Format:
Text
Collection(s):
UCSB electronic theses and dissertations
ARK:
ark:/48907/f3ms3qtw
ISBN:
9781303731150
Catalog System Number:
990041152860203776
Rights:
Inc.icon only.dark In Copyright
Copyright Holder:
Quentin Gee
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