This dissertation examines the negotiation processes of financial and monetary cooperation in East Asia since the 1997--1998 Asian financial crisis, which have been understudied. The purpose of this study is to explore the various strategies and tactics that helped to shape particular agreement details, in order to provide more insight to our understanding of the dynamics of international economic negotiations. Since the conventional three levels of analysis of International Relations cannot tell which specific outcome may be selected, a problem of multiple equilibria results. I contend that negotiators' bargaining strategies and tactics can solve a multiple equilibria problem as they help explain the specific details of outcomes. This research uses the recent agreement to multilateralize the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMIM), with particular emphasis on the issues of members' financial contributions and vote shares, to analyze negotiation processes.

Due to data inaccessibility problems and financial constraints, I chose to focus on five of the most influential players in the CMIM negotiations---Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. It should be noted that China, though it was an important actor in the CMIM negotiations, is not included in my analysis due to a lack of direct access to Chinese sources. Extensive archival research and in-depth interviews were employed to collect data. Process tracing was a method of analysis. My investigation of the CMIM negotiations reveals that the member states employed several bargaining elements to alter final outcome. States with a lower discount rate (a lower sense of urgency) and a more attractive best alternative to no agreement (batna) were able to walk away with more favorable terms than those with a higher discount rate and less attractive batna.

Also, possessing knowledge about other actors' preferences or about issues being discussed (expertise) enhanced states' relative bargaining leverage. Countries took advantage of being a co-chair of the negotiation to turn the agreement terms in their favor. In some circumstances, countries strategically linked issues under negotiation to reap concessions from the others. Additionally, forming a coalition or preventing a coalition of other states from forming sometimes helped states achieve their objectives.