This dissertation aims at defending animalism---the view that human beings such as you and I are numerically identical to animals. However commonsensical this thesis appears to be, many philosophers have denied such a claim. Although various arguments have been offered in favor of animalism, the "master argument" for animalism is the Thinking Animal Argument (henceforth, the TAA). The TAA employs only three premises, each of which are plausible at first glance. However, recent objections to animalism (or materialism more broadly) target each premise of the TAA. In this dissertation, I defend each premise from such objections. I begin with an introductory chapter that presents several arguments for animalism, followed by a defense of each premise of the TAA in the next three chapters. Chapter 2 deals with the Overdetermination Argument for compositional nihilism, which claims that there are no composite objects (and hence, no animals). Chapter 3 deals with challenges that go against the claim that the animal in my chair is the literal subject of my thoughts. In Chapter 4, I respond to a criticism which claims that the defense of premise three of the TAA relies on a dubious epistemological principle. Finally in Chapter 5, I show that several anti-animalists arguments can be condensed to a single, general worry, which I label "the Too Many Candidates Problem". I briefly present the standard animalist solution to the problem, which requires adopting a strict version of restricted composition. Given the way in which I formulate the problem, it is evident that the animalist has another approach of resolving the Too Many Candidates Problem. I conclude with several possible ways of developing this latter strategy of resolving the problem. Since we can maintain the premises of the TAA, I believe we should accept the conclusion that follows: we are animals.