This dissertation consists of three separate papers in experimental and environmental economics, each demonstrating the benefits of effective communication and the detrimental effect of present-biased preferences on the environment. As a result of policy makers' bias for the present, they may struggle to resolve their conflict between current resource consumption and resource conservation. This is often exhibited through inconsistent and constantly changing environmental and natural resource management policies. In chapter one, I discuss the results of my laboratory experiment which was developed to determine the impact of information uncertainty and lack of policy enforcement on the lifespan of threshold Common-Pool Resources (CPRs). I found that providing individuals with reliable information and allowing individuals to develop beliefs results in both economic growth and preservation of the Common-Pool Resource (CPR). Based on these experimental results and in combination with real-world policy observations, I recommend not revealing a true threshold for a CPR. Since policy makers are faced with a bias for the present and their policies are likely to change, a firm policy today is likely to become one that will be readjusted tomorrow. In the best case of announcing a policy target, there was no gain over letting an individual develop their own beliefs. In the worst case, individuals faced a significant loss of earnings and a shorter CPR lifespan. The findings of this study have implications for many CPR and environmental management policies around the globe, as well as other areas of government regulation where we see changing targets.

Little is known about how heterogeneity in users with varying stakes in a resource impacts withdrawal behavior. To address this gap in knowledge, chapter two presents a CPR game incorporating heterogeneous agents as individuals facing different penalties when a threshold is crossed. The experiment was structured to determine how different types of individuals respond to varying levels of information and enforcement. Results determined how this heterogeneity impacts withdrawal behavior and specify whether it requires us to modify previous policy recommendations for the management of a threshold CPR given heterogeneous withdrawal behavior. I determined that the absence of coherent approaches to natural resource use resulted in a sub-optimal economic outcome, lower earnings and a shorter CPR lifespan. I found that punishment can be an effective tool in reducing resource use and increasing common-pool longevity, but has the opposite effect when announced targets or policies are unenforced.

In chapter three, I address the "Challenges to Measuring, Monitoring, and Addressing the Cumulative Impacts of Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining (ASGM) in Ecuador." Mercury and other waste from ASGM in the environment create many environmental health and economics costs, the future impacts of which are not fully known. These are discussed in the context of ongoing, unresolved issues including efforts to address trans-boundary water pollution, management of mining waste, and conflicts regarding enforcement of existing regulations and policies. There is often discrepancy over how best to calculate future costs, largely over how to weight the present costs versus the future costs (the discount rate). Due to the nature of the fragmented and difficult to regulate ASGM market, I advocated for information-based strategies including educating miners regarding the risks they face and helping to identify and avoid inefficient processing plants.