Chapter I, "Strategic Voting and Nomination": Using computer simulations based on three separate data generating processes, I estimate the fraction of elections in which sincere voting will be a core equilibrium given each of eight single-winner voting rules. Additionally, I determine how often each voting rule is vulnerable to simple voting strategies such as 'burying' and 'compromising', and how often each voting rule gives an incentive for non-winning candidates to enter or leave races. I find that Hare is least vulnerable to strategic voting in general, whereas Borda, Coombs, approval, and range are most vulnerable. I find that plurality is most vulnerable to compromising and strategic exit (causing an unusually strong tendency toward two-party systems), and that Borda is most vulnerable to strategic entry. I use analytical proofs to provide further intuition for some of my key results.

Chapter II, "Four Condorcet-Hare Hybrid Methods for Single-Winner Elections": This essay examines four single-winner election methods, denoted here as Woodall, Benham, Smith-AV, and Tideman, that all make use of both Condorcet's pairwise comparison principle and Hare's elimination and reallocation principle used in the alternative vote. These methods have many significant properties in common, including Smith efficiency and relatively strong resistance to strategic manipulation, though they differ with regard to the minor properties of 'Smith-IIA' and 'mono-add-plump'.

Chapter III, "Individual Location Preferences and Tax Competition Equilibrium": This paper models revenue-maximizing tax competition between two countries over mobile individuals with exogenous wealth, with an emphasis on examining how the equilibrium taxes are affected by the distribution of individuals' location preferences, and the shape of their utility of consumption function. We find that if the location preference distribution function is continuous and log-concave, a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists. We find also that a more concave utility of consumption function leads to a more progressive tax structure, as richer people are willing to give up more wealth in order to live in their preferred country---in this model, a risk aversion coefficient of one is the boundary between progressivity and regressivity.