This project examines the dynamic of domestic politics and foreign policy through a case study of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign of the 1980s. The Freeze campaign emerged in 1980 with a simple proposal addressed at both the United States and the Soviet Union: mutually freeze the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons. As the Reagan Administration openly spoke of limited and survivable nuclear war, the movement caught on like wildfire, garnering support and endorsements from professionals across society. The highest levels of the Reagan Administration privately conceded that the antinuclear revolt was potentially the most important national security challenge facing the Administration.

Through extensive archival research, I measure the sway of public opinion and antinuclear activism across several dimensions to demonstrate how politics, religion, and culture shaped the national dialogue surrounding nuclear weapons and the arms race during the 1980s. With the political importance of the Freeze movement taking shape by 1982, I argue that the Reagan Administration strategically co-opted the movement, ultimately culminating with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or "Star Wars"). On the campaign trail in 1984, Reagan toned down his harsh rhetoric and championed arms control, thus, avoiding the label of nuclear risk-taker while diminishing the criticisms emanating from the Freeze campaign. Although the Freeze campaign ultimately failed in its primary objectives, I conclude the Reagan Administration was forced to abandon hostile rhetoric and make substantive proposals on arms control---or continue to face a domestic backlash with potential electoral repercussions. The result of this work forces historians to reconsider the importance of peace movements in relationship to the end of the Cold War. It challenges traditional Cold War historiography, while bridging the growing gap between the historiography of the Reagan presidency and the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign.