“Rhodes Must Fall”: South Africa’s Ongoing University Student Protests Against Contemporary Globalization’s Neoliberal Violence

By

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Abstract

Despite apartheid’s 1994 *de jure* abolition, contemporary university students in South Africa transgressively protest for ongoing, radical, *de facto* “decolonization” that they allege, and I agree, has not occurred. My thesis historicizes and analyzes the Rhodes Must Fall (RMF) and Open Stellenbosch (OS) protests at University of Cape Town (UCT) and Stellenbosch University (SU), respectively. I analyze how university students’ protests drive counter-hegemonic social movements locally, regionally, and potentially globally. I highlight marginalized students’ imagination and articulation of alternatives to global neoliberalism, which is transgressive and perceived as radical.

I contextualize this case study of contemporary counter-hegemony in South Africa through a theoretical-conceptual approach, and a deep, colonial, historical approach. I present three critical premises: (1) neoliberalism is de-democratization and covert authoritarianism; (2) universities are potential sites of critical democratization; and (3) marginalized university students drive a radical, transgressive imagination of alternative worlds.

I provide critical historical background to situate South Africa within Contemporary Globalization before chronicling the emergent themes of ongoing protests. Following my South Africa case study, I briefly compare RMF and OS to other university student protests around the globe, including California and Germany. I suggest that under Contemporary Globalization, apparently dissimilar social movements share much in common, including universities’ simultaneous assimilation into, and potential for resistance against, the new, covert authoritarianism and de-democratization of global neoliberalism.

Title

“Rhodes Must Fall”: South Africa’s Ongoing University Student Protests Against Contemporary Globalization’s Neoliberal Violence

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Key Words

Social Movements, Protests, Transgression, Radicalism, Universities, Education, Pedagogy, Hegemony, Counter-Hegemony, Decolonization, Colonialism, Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, Democracy, Democratization, Capitalism, Authoritarianism, Authority, Legitimacy, Violence, Global Capital Crisis, Global Studies, Globalization, Transnationalism, International Relations, Stellenbosch University, University of Cape Town, UCT, South Africa, University of California, United States, Germany, CA, UC, USA, UCT, ZA, RMF, FMF, OS, HEIs
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Committee Members and University Guidance

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Organizations with Whom I Participated

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Personal Biases, Involvement, and PAR Methodology

Academic freedom, or the freedom to study whatever one pleases and is equipped to study, is a foundational quality of Global North and West concepts of the university. I have observed many individuals’ backgrounds influencing their university studies, both in physical and in social sciences. This often manifests as a young student whose parents were astronauts, and who now studies astronomy, or as a young student of color who dives into critical race theory via Chicanx or Black Studies. I entered my MA in Global and International Studies program thinking I would study a top-down issue, like states’ use of human rights in their foreign policies, and then work in government after graduation. However, I realized that after this MA, six years of my life would have been spent studying in the UC amidst massive austerity and protests against such policies. The ongoing destruction of the University of California (UC) system would remain on my mind. As I
spent more and more of my energy supporting student activism while studying human rights from a top-down statist perspective, and realizing how slow and ineffective such approaches historically were, I could not justify contradictory studies.

So, I followed the same path as many of my peers and studied an inextricable part of my identity: politics and student activism. I acknowledge that I was involved with social movements on the side of vocal student protesters with UCSA, UCSB GSA, and OS/UCT:RMF for my short time in South Africa. Growing up in California’s Central Valley, I was made aware of racialized class and labor divisions, though I lacked the understanding of these matrices of domination until this program. Some critical theorists seemed only to obfuscate and equivocate in their attempts to explain violence and inequality. Others clarified how the poorest and dirtiest part of California produced a majority of the state’s food. I learned the academic analyses of how my hometown in the regional periphery was exploited to serve the interests of California’s consuming capitalist core in the major metropolises of San Francisco and Los Angeles, and wealthy coastal communities like Santa Barbara.

In formally studying the Global Capital Crisis and the artificial housing market’s contribution to the implosion of the globalized economy, I gained new understanding of how so much Central Valley farmland was developed into cheap McMansions, sold on subprime mortgages to those who couldn’t afford them, and then wound up as acres of empty suburbs repossessed by banks. I finally could articulate how Mexican- and Central-American migrant laborers were exploited by property developers literally paving over the most fertile soil in the world, all so that developers could collude with banks to profitably sell McMansions to the petty bourgeois. Clearly seeing how my California community helped prime the entire American economy, and indirectly the global economy, for a catastrophic collapse armed me
with newfound knowledge of my own history and global positionality. It seemed fitting to now apply this critical theory to my own life as a student in the formerly-public University of California (UC) system.

I avow that I am biased, and acknowledging this bias is fundamental to my research. Ignoring bias is a perpetuation of Eurocentric fallacies of assuming complete objective and apolitical neutrality. As a researcher I attempt to minimize my bias as much as possible. However, my critical pedagogy of empathy and my use of Participatory Action Research (PAR) aimed to deliberately challenge the established myths that our neoliberal, quantitative, positivist, unemotional, Eurocentric, colonial approach to education can be objective or unbiased - something that a great many disciplines still insist is true as of 2016, at the cost of sacrificing self-reflexive critique of their own work. If I am to move beyond this initial MA Thesis, I want to ensure I do my best not to fall into the trappings of academia’s privileged delusion of total confidence in Eurocentric methodologies that fail to critique their own implicit epistemologies and ideologies. Ultimately, many of the academic theories reviewed in this program are prematurely prescriptive and/or broad, and attempted to generate a sweeping “theory of everything.” The great majority of this academic literature, and academic literature in general, came from the Global North and West, and reflected Eurocentric epistemologies and ideologies. Oftentimes, investigations continue to perpetuate conventional boundaries and remain trapped in a single context, often national or methodological, thus undermining their contribution to an integrated global perspective.

Additionally, it seems that subconscious or covert ideological biases within academia and academic arguments are rarely explicitly acknowledged, implying there is no bias within the argument. This seems especially true within strictly quantitative and econometric
approaches, as my theory review of Global Studies (GS) addresses. This thesis employs a mixed methods approach, in line with the post-/inter-/trans-disciplinary nature of Critical GS. This thesis also complements a broad survey of different components of the primary case study, from a “deep history” to a brief econometric analysis, with a close, detailed, “thick description,”-style (Geertz, 1973) qualitative analysis of the case study itself: the university student protesters who drive university social movements. In this way, I acknowledge the impossibility of any one discipline or methodology to adequately capture the presumably objective “truth” about an issue, while seeking to investigate it to the full extent of epistemological and other constraints allow.

I acknowledge that I am an immensely privileged and biased individual raised in the West. I cannot completely de-link myself from my embedded Eurocentric, liberal, secular, Global North and West, individualistic human rights-based values and perspectives. Furthermore, the 3 nation-states and societies highlighted in my case studies are liberal, constitutional representative democracies with close connections to colonialism. While doing this research, I encountered many cultural, gender, and political power differences, not the least of which was the fact that my own participation in the actions being researched was voluntary, compared to those who felt they had no other choice but to protest. Multiple times, while discussing the issue of Eurocentric and colonial educational practices that continue in today’s academy, I was made even more aware of my privilege as a White American man conducting research on political dissidents.

I endeavored to utilize “decolonizing methodologies” (Smith, 2012) as often as possible, primarily relying on Participant Action Research (PAR) with various political groups (Ragin, 1989; Adelman, 1993) for field research. Because my research focuses on
how globally powerful actors influence the less powerful, I understood extensive care had to be given to analyzing and researching such power asymmetries. I acknowledge that my research, and publication of its results, may harm humans and communities in ways unforeseeable to myself or other academics.

I took all available precautions. This research did not identify private individuals, except a small number of those already active within a public research and/or academic institution, who were identified in publicly-accessible documents, and who spoke with me as a complement to my research, who I do not quote directly. The primary methodologies for this thesis were qualitative analyses of protest groups’ rhetoric, via primary sources published on conventional and social media. I also employed qualitative and quantitative discourse analysis via secondary sources and established theorists, with especial focus on the global, colonial history of South and Southern Africa, as well as its contemporary poli-socio-economics. I also participated in student protests for one month of PAR in Cape Town in 2015 August, and for 18 months in Santa Barbara, California, from 2015 January through 2016 June.
**Introductory Iteration of My Thesis**

Throughout this lengthy document, I strive to maintain a consistent style, and to bookend each chapter with concise reiterations and clarifications. I begin with critical, theoretical overviews, in order to contextualize subsequent specific examples and historical events; these, I present in chronological breakdowns of critical historical events. Following my first chapter’s introductory iteration of my thesis, I proceed through a self-reflexive and critical review of Global Studies (GS) theories, in order to explicate my approach to GS. This theory review focuses on divergent perspectives of mainstream GS and critical GS, as the field emerged within academia from the 1980s and 1990s through the early 2000s. I then present chapter two, my densest critical chapter. Chapter two explicates my three critical premises on contemporary globalization, focusing on: (1) contemporary globalization as defined by global neoliberalism, violence, de-democratization, and covert authoritarianism; (2) the relationship of critical education to authority; (3) the relationship of contemporary universities and university students to counter-hegemonic social movements.

Following these two critical theory-heavy chapters, which provide both the critical-theoretical and the global-colonial context for my approach, my third chapter summarizes South Africa’s history. My third chapter focuses on the role of violence, students, and education in counter-hegemonic, anti-apartheid, and post-apartheid power struggles. My fourth chapter is my thesis’s primary case study: South Africa’s contemporary university student protests, with a focus on Rhodes Must Fall’s necessarily transgressive, radical imaginary, which was driven by marginalized university students, and in turn drove nationwide protests that culminated in the 2011 “Fees Must Fall” protests that caused a
national shutdown. My fifth chapter offers a qualitative comparison of South Africa to other ongoing instances of university and university student-driven counter-hegemonic social movements. My sixth chapter and its two Appendixes, A and B, provide my references, timelines of South Africa’s protests, and a list of all of my charts, figures, and tables, respectively.

My fourth chapter describes in detail and historicizes the dominant themes of South Africa’s contemporary protests in an attempt at a “thick description” based on my PAR, whereas my fifth chapter provides an analysis of South Africa’s protests in a global context. Analyzing the ideologies and rhetorics of university-driven social movements and university student-driven protests around the globe reveals simultaneous counter-hegemonic protests that share many similarities despite apparent dissimilarities. These convergences present a potential set of global university- and student-driven counter-hegemonic social movements against the contemporary hegemonic globality of neoliberal capitalism, and what I theorize as its inherent, covert authoritarianism. This ideological and rhetorical convergence is evidenced through the similar focuses of each social movement, and especially on the issues prioritized by the university students driving the protests and/or social movements. Generally speaking, the more transgressive and radical protests were, the more they influenced policy and other protests and social movements - especially for Rhodes Must Fall. Furthermore, the more marginalized the students leading a group, the more transgressive and radical was their imagined alternative to global neoliberalism.

I identify the following five themes in Rhodes Must Fall, an exclusively Black-led social movement on behalf of students, South Africans, and all Pan-African and Afro-diasporic peoples:
Renewed visibility of identity politics, respectability politics
Marginalized university students’ “leadership”
Ostensibly radical demands, strategies, and tactics
Performative and artistic protest re-centering narratives
Use of both social and conventional media

RMF radically and transgressively resisted the contemporary hegemonic globality through visibilizing racial, sexual, and financial violence against students, who they categorized as amongst the historically colonized. RMF and most other ongoing university-driven social movements under contemporary globalization share the following similarities:

1. Visibilization of, through the prioritization of, issues of racial, sexual, and financial violence and exclusion of students;
2. Prioritization of access to education as something to which humans are fundamentally entitled;
3. Communication of demands in ways described as radical, transgressive, and criminal;
4. Contestations of their legitimacy by right-wing students and civil society agents.

Each university-driven social movement differs in terms of preferred terminology, geographies, global-colonial histories, and political, social/cultural, and economic (poli-socio-economic) systems. Despite disparities, the university-driven social movements’ and the university students protests’ strikingly similar substantive issues and tactics represent a potential global convergence of core issues impacting most public tertiary education systems around the global under contemporary globalization. To analyze this potentially global-in-scale unit of analysis, this thesis is founded upon the following three critical premises.

1. “Contemporary Globalization” is a distinct and complex post-Cold War time period and process that is USA-driven, advanced, neoliberal capitalism, on a global scale, which is a form of “New Authoritarianism” that de-democratizes societies through what I term “covert authoritarianism” or “governance by capital.”
2. Universities are potential sites of critical democratization, where imaginaries of “the public,” participation, critical thought, and critiques of authority were more likely to occur than elsewhere in society; as such, public universities have been targeted by neoliberalism and covert authoritarianism.
3. As universities are destroyed by covert authoritarianism, counter-hegemonic resistance may potentially be articulated, but it is likely led by marginalized students who must perform in ways perceived as radical and transgressive.
Global Studies Theory Review

My thesis begins with an introduction of global studies (GS), ideologies, and powers, both in academia generally, and in terms of my thesis’s specific focus. To do so, it reviews both mainstream and marginalized GS theories in order to deconstruct and differentiate critical and marginalized GS from Mainstream GS, and as such situate my thesis uniquely within Critical GS. I then present the temporal focus of my thesis by reviewing the time periods historicized in this thesis, with especial focus on Contemporary Globalization c. 1988-2016, and the 2007-present Global Capital Crisis.

I then present my first premise on contemporary global democracy, authority, and hegemony, with especial focus on covert processes of (de-)democratization under global neoliberalism. I then focus on my second premise of universities as sites of democratization, and the multivarious local contexts of tertiary educational institutions under global neoliberalism. I then finally review theories relevant to my final premise, on counter-hegemonic social movements, with especial emphasis on suitable case studies for university-driven social movements, and within those, university student-driven protests.

Situating Global (and International) Studies

Implicit in this thesis, and any argument made within academia’s emergent global (and international) studies, is the existence of something truly super- or post-national, or approaching a globality: a world-system that is global in scale, design, and/or impact. Global Studies (GS) as a formal academic field, practice, and/or possibly a discipline or department, continues to rapidly transform, and so remains a dynamic and contested subject in academia that requires clarification. Steger and Nederveen-Pieterse provide broad surveys of major theorists of globalizing processes, which are reviewed here in order to contextualize my own
thesis’s interpretation and application of GS to my focus on university-driven counter-hegemonic social movements, and university student-driven protests. The primary units of analysis in my thesis and its case studies are systems, particularly education systems, which are in turn founded upon political, social-cultural and economic (poli-socio-economic) systems. Within these systems, as explained later in terms of hegemony, power, legitimacy, and authority, I focus on national-level counter-hegemonic social movements, and their subsidiary protests, which have sub-national, super-national, regional, and/or global influences.

Before I present my specific case studies, in order to contextualize these units of analysis as a true GS thesis, I review the possibly contentious theories of a macro, global context. This review is necessary in order to clarify and justify my own particular lens I use to “zoom in” and “zoom out.” I do this in a particular way because of my own interpretation that GS has the potential to be transgressive, radical, and counter-hegemonic, but remains constrained by the academic privilege of historically colonial, Global North and West institutions. This privilege must be constantly critiqued, lest colonial “savior” practices are reified and perpetuated.

Meta and Macro Post-National Analyses

Steger (2010) provides examples ranging from quantitative, pro-capitalist, economic theories of Levit (1983) and Stiglitz (2003) to qualitative, conceptual theories by Appadurai (1996), Giddens (1991), and Hardt and Negri (2000), highlighting the consistent theme of temporally and spatially accelerating change on a larger, possibly planetary scale. This theme of macro-scale transformation persists, even if few specifics of that change are agreed-upon by a cacophony of theories and theorists. Within my own department at UC, Santa Barbara,
GS began to be academically formalized in the early 1990s, by the academic procedure of establishing one of the first graduate-level programs in the field of what was then titled Global and International Studies. The recent adjustment of our department’s name to remove “and International” and leave only Global Studies speaks to the shifting focuses of different universities, departments, disciplines, professors, pedagogies, methodologies, and ideologies - some of which seek to transgress existing epistemological boundaries of post-(inter-)nationalism.

Multiple different theorists reviewed below have framed GS as a field that transgresses conventional academic boundaries by being both multi-/inter-/trans-disciplinary, as well as centering research on justice and human suffering more than conventional, stand-alone academic disciplines and departments. Despite some common themes, after over 30 years of formal academic discussion, “What is Global Studies?” is still widely asked, and still lacks an academically agreed-upon answer. Juergensmeyer answers this titular question by pointing out that the Global Studies Consortium, consisting of over 40 GS formal academic graduate programs worldwide, and was "originally proposed at a workshop in Santa Barbara in 2007," has agreed that Global Studies have the following 5 "key defining characteristics":

- "transnational";
- "interdisciplinary";
- "contemporary and historical";
- "postcolonial and critical";
- "aim[ing] at global citizenship". (Juergensmeyer, 2011: 1-3)

Two years later, in their Mainstream GS textbook Thinking Globally, which explicates how GS represents a way of thinking as well as a perspective or a unit of analysis, Juergensmeyer offers another answer that prompts further questions:

[GS] can mean a lot of different things, both the hard and the squishy. It is usually defined as the analysis of events, activities, ideas, processes, and flows that are
transnational or that can affect all areas of the world. These global activities can be studied as one part of the established disciplines of sociology, economics, political science, history, religious studies, and the like. Or global studies can be a separate course or part of a whole new program or department. As an academic field, global studies is fairly new. It blossomed largely after the turn of the twenty-first century. But the intellectual roots of the field lie in the pioneering work of the many different scholars who have thought globally over many decades. These thinkers have attempted to understand how things are related and have explored the connections among societies, polities, economies, and cultural systems throughout the world. (Juergensmeyer, 2013: 1)

Juergensmeyer outlines Global Studies as a still-emerging field that is interdisciplinary and largely dependent upon the perspective of the social scientists executing a particular study from their own particular perspective or discipline. This variety of interpretations of GS makes it both very flexible and dynamic, as well as vaguely-defined. Despite vague boundaries, some themes tend to permeate all GS theories. A post-boundary, non-conventional way of thinking is embedded in much Global Studies scholarship, as Juergensmeyer suggests in closing, with the notion that GS is defined by "one of the most hopeful trends in modern history—the reconnection of societies, economies, and minds that political borders have kept apart for far too long." (Juergensmeyer, 2013: 27) This notion of "reconnection," as opposed to simply "connection," implies a political act of remedying previously-disconnected "societies, economies, and minds," with emphasis on how "political borders" functioned in disconnection.

Nederveen-Pieterse “examines global studies and whether and how it differs from the earlier wave of globalization studies” because “studies of globalization are anchored in social science and humanities disciplines while global studies are, in principle, conceived on a different footing.” (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2013: 799) At this more meta level of dissecting what “different footing” constitutes studying globalities versus processes of globalization, transnationalization, or localization, Nederveen-Pieterse usefully “distinguishes two accounts
of global studies: an empirical account, i.e. a description of actual existing global studies, and an analytical or programmatic account, which refers to what global studies can or should be for theoretical or other reasons.” (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2013: 799) This thesis strives to be the latter, with acknowledgment of the former. Nederveen-Pieterse then goes on to outline different approaches to studies of globality and globalization, with a great many disparities existing between different, and sometimes politically- or historically-opposed groups. They conclude by touching on the “cognitive problems of global thinking, in particular the challenges of multicentric and multilevel thinking.” (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2013: 799) Writing directly in response to Nederveen-Pieterse, Steger critiques such a broad approach to defining GS, and insists that “globalization” is “the master concept at the heart of GS.” (Steger, 2013: 771) From this contention, and the broad array of contradictory and contentious sources briefly reviewed below, it is clear that GS remains unclearly bounded. This lack of clear boundaries may empower or frustrate theorists, depending on their biases, and demands clarification of said biases for any emergent Critical GS theory.

**Formalized, Mainstreamed Academic Methodologies, Pedagogies, and Ideologies**

With my thesis's focus on post-Cold War Contemporary Globalization beginning around the late 1980s, it’s prudent to highlight Harvey’s Marxist *The Condition of Postmodernity* and contrasting mainstream academic global and globalization studies methodologies. (Harvey, 1989) Harvey helped keep in academic discourse Marxist dialectical materialism and its critiques of capitalism and Eurocentric modernity, during a time of increasing marginalization of Marxism, including mainstream academia’s abandonment of it. Harvey even helped highlight and popularize the academically marginal Gramscian notions of hegemony and resistance under (post-)Fordism regimes. Harvey helped
establish in academia theories of global-scale post-Fordism, centering analysis on financialization and the concomitant 1987 capital crisis as global inequality and insecurity increased. (Harvey, 1989: 357) However, the collapse of the USSR and simultaneous rise of pro-capitalist policies and theories, both within and beyond academia, further marginalized Marxist and Gramscian theory, as detailed below.

As “the end of history” became a common-sense assumption about poli-socio-economic systems, uncritical academic discourse reified the system of capitalism, for which there was no longer any viable alternative. (Fukuyama, 1989, 1993) Analyses became centered on the role, power, and sovereignty of nation-states that were assumed to be liberal democracies. Critiques of capitalism became considered largely in econometric theories and capitalist language, thus reifying the notion that “there is no alternative” to capitalism. (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Bond, 2014: 121) Even Hobsbawm wrote that the experiments of Soviet-style state socialism were fundamentally flawed in the contemporary global system, and shifted to a more general analysis of “globalization,” rather than their earlier, more politicized, and more accurate, terms. (Hobsbawm, 1998)

Around this time period in the late 1980s through 1990s, common concepts and discussions in powerful academic institutions began to center theories around the notion of “globalization” as a totalizing process. In 1992, Barber’s approach partly satirically and partly seriously conceptualized globalization as a contest between “McWorld, or the globalization of politics,” which is problematic in its own way, and which is opposed by the Islamophobic concept of “Jihad, or the Lebanonization of the world.” (Barber, 1992: 30) Barber noted that in 1991 “there were more than thirty [hot] wars in progress, most of them ethnic, racial, tribal, or religious in character.” (Barber, 1992: 32) Barber sadly concludes
their analysis with a “darkening future of democracy” and notes “McWorld does manage to look pretty seductive in a world obsessed with Jihad.” (Barber, 1992: 33) Barber fails to consider how capitalist McWorld is in fact a driver of Jihad and nationalist violence, despite noting that “the free market flourished in junta-run Chile, in military-governed Taiwan and Korea…” and so apparently possessed the capacity to recognize capitalism’s relationship with militarism. (Barber, 1992: 31)

Much like Barber, other widely-influential, mainstream academic critiques and theories failed to critique accepted notions of what constitutes “liberal democracy.” Ultimately, c. 1990s GS tended to reinforce Eurocentric notions of the supremacy of their own nationalism, with uncritical perspectives of the formerly colonized world’s “tribalism.” Such focuses on capitalist realism and economic imperatives, without necessary engagement with deep histories of racism, sexism, capitalism, and colonialism, are reflected in pieces like The Retreat of the State: the Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Strange, 1996) and in “Power Shift: The Rise of Global Civil Society” published by the highly influential right-wing Council on Foreign Relations, and embracing the Washington Consensus. (Matthews, 1997)

No article better represents the Global North and West biases of mid-1990s emergent GS academic theory than the highly politically influential, Harvard-based, mainstream GS academic Huntington. Their “Clash of Civilizations” thesis was the master concept behind their theory of a post-Cold War, post-1988 “New Era in World Politics.” Notions of a “Clash of Civilizations” uncritically supported and perpetuated the near-arbitrary colonial disconnection of the global map into racist Others. Huntington’s widespread influence exemplifies mainstream academia’s and policy-makers’ persistent ignorance and
marginalization of critical race and gender theories, from Feminist to Queer to Black to Chicanx Studies, and beyond. Such totalizing “civilization”-based global studies remained fixed in nationalism, focusing on how many wars might burden so-called liberal and democratic, and superior, Western nation-states. Over time, post-9/11 academia and Critical GS was increasingly able to dismiss such ignorant theories. Many theorists on the leftist margins and in the mainstream now acknowledge Huntington’s work as a “clash of ignorance” more than anything. (Said, 2001) Unfortunately, many Mainstream GS theories produced at Ivy League institutions went on to significantly influence global policy beyond the circles of those with the academic privilege to know better, and with lasting ramifications for global epistemology pedagogy, methodology, and governance.

While Harvey produced critical, anti-capitalist theories, work such as Dicken’s *Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Contours of the World Economy*, now in it’s 7th edition, became mainstream academic texts, and their theories also became influential on governance policies. Dicken’s and others’ similar theories became and remain essential tools to understand globalization and GS. Dicken’s analyses provided an easy-to-understand model of a “globalizing… transnationalizing… [and] regionalizing” economy comprised of “multiple dimensions” of “vertical…transnational production networks” and “horizontal…territorial systems at different geographical scales” resulting in a complex global system of “markets and peoples” that “have to operate within multi-scalar regulatory systems.” (Dicken, 2003a: 7-8) This argument is strikingly similar to Nederveen-Pieterse’s multi-dimensional analyses, but Dicken uses only standard capitalist-realist econometrics. Dicken exemplifies econometric analyses that dissect in limited but conventionally useful ways the simultaneous “new geo-economy” and the ongoing persistence of the capitalist-
realist economic map due to the “territorial embeddedness” of production networks post-
Cold War. (Dicken, 2003b) While Dicken makes global complexity relatively accessible to
mainstream academics and students located in the Global North and the West, their pedagogy
and approach to GS is not centered on critiques of hegemonic poli-socio-economic systems.
Instead, Dicken et. al.’s largely econometric, quantitative, nation-state-based, zoomed-out
methodology relies on International Relations (IR)-derived ideal types, what I term
“capitalist-realist”. Combined with a pedagogy of British colonial-style reliance on the
authority of prestigious universities, this ideology of Mainstream GS perpetuated
Eurocentrism, and only shallowly critiques without self-reflexivity.

There are many other examples of similarly-aligned and -influential Mainstream GS
that center nation-states and capitalist markets as the primary actors and units of analysis
within globalization. I argue these theories covertly support the ongoing power of established
authorities, at least through the constant centering of their narratives and theories on existing
authorities, especially states and capitalist-realist epistemology. One of the best examples
would be Keohane and Nye’s theory of “complex interdependence.” Complex
interdependence is ostensibly “the opposite of realism” insofar as it assumes that post-Cold
War there is a “minor role of military force,” and that a nation-state’s use or threat of force
will vary depending on the issue and the nation-state at hand, versus realist theories that
military force is always the most important option. (Keohane, 1984; Keohane and Nye, 2001:
71) They argue this is because in a highly inter-/trans-nationalized, regionalized, or
globalized economy, “employing force on one issue against an independent state with which
one has a variety of relationships is likely to rupture mutually profitable relations on other
issues...the use of force often has costly effects on non security goals.” (Keohane and Nye,
Thus we see that through nation-states and their sub-state capitalist firms’ desire to maintain predictable profitability, there is decreased incentive to use force, but still centers on the concern for “security” of the nation-state. Perhaps the most critical part of their theory is admission that over-reliance on an “ideal type” is too reductive - much like ideal types of free-markets are too reductive to understand global capitalism - so a more complex, pluralistic, and multi-centered theory is necessary. (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 71) Perhaps most egregiously, though, complex interdependence grossly neglects sub-state conflict, massively overgeneralizing that “fears of attack in general have declined” with a perspective explicitly noted as limited to “industrialized, pluralist countries,” thus excluding the majority of the world population - especially residents of historically colonized regions. (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 75)

While at first glance such theories about complexity appear to transgress against notions of capitalist-realist ideologies by ostensibly centering on peace or security, they covertly further the interests of nation-states that are already powerful enough to be perceived as legitimate, global-scale authorities. Such analyses fail to recognize that unequal economic power and other advantages are securitized through military force and other types of violence. They fail to realize that sanctions, embargoes, or currency (de)valuation, are weapons that are the privilege of nation-states with economic power. They fail to realize this economic power constitutes another type of force: financial violence that may be used or threatened against others. They also fail to recognize how the production and legitimization of knowledge, such as theories produced in influential Global North and West academic institutions, represent an epistemological and ideological soft power over Global South theories. That this is largely unconsidered by complex interdependence theorists and other
capitalist-realist-confined Mainstream GS academics demonstrates how apparently peace-centered, apparently left-wing methodologies and pedagogies are in fact covertly right-wing in their underlying and often invisible ideology.

It should be noted that by the time of the Obama Regime, Clinton State Department, and 2007-Present Global Capital Crisis, influential academics such as Professor Ikenberry at Princeton University were promoting revised “complex interdependence” theories. These revisions prioritized ostensibly peaceful “predictability” between nation-states, in order to overtly justify ongoing USA global hegemony and authority as a so-called *Liberal Leviathan* that decides what behavior should be predicted. (Ikenberry, 2011) What was predictable for a great many humans residing in non-USA-aligned nation-states was wretchedness and violence, something not considered by Ikenberry. The closest Ikenberry comes to criticality of the current international order in their analyses is an assumption that “liberal democracy” and capitalist development would incrementally lessen said wretchedness and violence - in a way palatable to established authorities in the Global North and West.

There have also been overtly right-wing theorists that, throughout the establishment of the formal academic GS field in the 1990s, overtly, uncritically, and polemically reinforced the rhetoric, methodology, and ideology of both the first and second Bush Regimes. In line with the preachings of the first Bush Regime’s “new world order,” theorists in powerfully-connected institutions, like Princeton University’s Professor Slaughter, furthered the abandonment of Marxist / development / dependency theory in favor of a statist and capitalist analysis that largely ignores the people of diverse races, genders, abilities, and historical backgrounds bearing the brunt of “crises” threatening state power. (Slaughter, 2004: 1-4) Again, Huntington’s racist, Islamophobic, and xenophobic “clash of civilizations”
is exemplary, given its ongoing ideological influence today with the USA-driven Global War on Terror, initiated during the neoconservative second Bush Regime, but expanded under the neoliberal Obama regime.

An exemplar of overtly right-wing GS theorizing, Micklethwait and Woolridge present a disturbingly upbeat overview of “globalization” that stands in starkest contrast to more critical and contentious theories offered below. By juxtaposing Marx’s *Communist Manifesto* and early critiques of capitalism’s inherent globalizing tendencies as “intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations.” (Marx and Engels, 1848, 1906 trans.) Micklethwait and Woolridge contemporarily reiterate Smith’s reductive “rising boats” analogy by arguing: “globalization makes us richer - or makes enough of us richer to make the whole process worthwhile.” (Smith, 1776; Micklethwait and Woolridge, 2000: 11) They assert that “power lies increasingly in the hands of individuals rather than governments...the world is nevertheless a lot freer today than it was just a few decades ago, before globalization got into high gear,” without any serious consideration that correlation may not equal causation, or that there exists widespread repression within and by ostensibly free, liberal, democratic, capitalist nation-states. (Micklethwait and Woolridge, 2000: 12)

Micklethwait and Woolridge, and other similar theorists, argue reductively and uncritically that capitalism equals democracy and individual liberty. Similar so-called theories are more accurately categorized as politically right-wing polemics. Such arguments are academically unsound due to a lack of critical engagement with the ideology they are promoting, as well as failing to imagine ecological, social, cultural, or other issues due to an embarrassingly limited understanding of what constitutes liberty: “the freedom to define our own identities...[through consuming] books, movies, even potato chips that reflect their own
identities.” (Micklethwait and Woolridge, 2000: 14, 13) Despite this lack of imagination and academic rigor, these overtly right-wing theories are neither isolated nor unpopular, within and beyond academia. Fourteen years after such absurdly ignorant assertions, the same theorists proselytize the same reductive theories about unrestrained capitalism equaling democracy, while serving as editors-in-chief of the highly-influential media products *The Economist* and *Bloomberg Businessweek*. (Micklethwait and Woolridge, 2014) Unfortunately, as addressed throughout this thesis, reductive and (c)overtly right-wing methodologies, pedagogies, and ideologies have become common-sense on a global scale, and this reification and mainstreaming was led by powerful and privileged academics throughout the 1990s and 2000s.

**Transgressive Theories and Critical Academic Projects**

Within global and international studies, academics’ aspirations to influence descriptions of the contemporary globality are a point of contention, as earlier examples evidence. Older and newer variations of a theory of a global-scale “world order” or “world system” have been offered in some form by both mainstream theorists, as well as marginalized academics. Many of these various descriptions transgressed existing formal boundaries and informal common-sense assumptions about Eurocentric worldviews. Even early, policy-oriented, IR- and economics- based assertions about global-scale changes and transformations of state power (Strange, 1996; Matthews, 1997; Held, 1999) threatened established knowledge, despite not significantly critiquing notions of “liberal democracy,” nation-states, and capitalism, like Harvey. (1989) More transgressive GS theories challenge common-sense assumptions of what constitutes “globalization,” and argue that use of such an absolute and all-encompassing term is dangerous by disregarding risks of convergent, path-
dependent logic. (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2014) A more explicitly politicized approach to GS highlights both the implicit ideologies and biases of purportedly objective, neutral, or apolitical approaches to GS. Such critical academic endeavors, oftentimes labelled a Project of some sort, tend to try and answer in creative, interdisciplinary, divergent, and non-path dependent ways the question “What is globalization?” in addition to “What is global studies?” McNeill has long theorized that what most call globalization, and what I term “Contemporary Globalization”, is simply one more era in human history marked by many long-term processes of disruptive convergences between the local and super-local, since the beginning of human consciousness. (McNeill and Kindleberger, 1989; McNeill, 2008; McNeill and Christian, 2011) Wallerstein theorizes that globalization "has been happening for 500 years" and that specific “transitions” should be referenced instead of a totalizing, term like "globalization" generally. (Wallerstein, 2000: 249)

Globalization is a misleading concept, since what is described as globalization has been happening for 500 years. Rather what is new is that we are entering an 'age of transition'. We can usefully analyze the current world situation using two time frames: 1945 to the present and circa 1450 to the present. The period since 1945 has been one long Kondratieff cycle...The economic and political developments of the last 50 years are easy to place within this framework. The period from 1450 to the present is the long history of the capitalist world-economy. (Wallerstein, 2000: 249)

For a critical, zoomed-out, meta-analysis, Nederveen-Pieterse suggests that global histories and histories of globalization can range from notions of pre-historic to Classical Western to c. 1450-present capitalist world-systems histories, like those of Wallerstein.

The article outlines the analytics and criteria that inform periodizing globalization. It criticizes presentist and Eurocentric views on globalization, the contemporary view, the modernity view (1800 plus) or the capitalism view (1500 plus). It discusses approaches to world history and how globalization fits in. Understandings of globalization, such as multicentric and centrist perspectives, and units of analysis affect how timelines of globalization are established. Taking into account global history going back to the Bronze Age and oriental globalization, these require
inserting the Greco-Roman world as part of globalization history. It concludes by outlining phases of globalization in the (very) longue durée. (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2012b: 1)

McNeill, Nederveen-Pieterse, and Wallerstein all offer critiques that interrogate their own Eurocentric biases and situations within capitalism, but maintain such a zoomed-out perspective that they consider multiple disciplines. Even by claiming overt apoliticism, they continue to be academically transgressive by highlighting the shortcomings of each discipline and approach to “globalization,” including their own issues of “Eurocentrism” and “presentism.” (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2012: 2) Unfortunately, even with self-reflexivity and ideological transgression, when producing GS knowledge within Global North and West academia, academia’s systemic self-service and the issue of inevitably creating a “Northern Theory of Globalization” arises. In this way, the limitations of academic theories alone for highly-influential transgression emerge.

Producing theories and knowledge of globalization that favor the Global North and West depends in part upon theorists and texts that are “almost totally embedded in metropolitan academic routines of citation and affiliation” that ignore non-metropolitan or non-university produced and legitimized knowledge, therefore excluding hums of the Global South. (Connell, 2007: 379) With an emphasis on how non-Global South, and especially African, knowledge is excluded from legitimate sites of knowledge production, like Global North and West academia, Professor Kamola argues the following:

Today, the heated globalization debates of the 1990s and early 2000s have quieted to a murmur. A growing number of scholars even voice skepticism about whether globalization theory has any lasting relevance, some declaring it “by and large defunct” (Leander 2009:110) and in need of a “postmortem” (Rosenberg 2000; see also Rosenberg 2005; Kamola 2012). Some evidence even suggests that the volume of academic work on globalization is declining, down from its high-water mark in the late 1990s (Guillen 2001:241). However, as the globalization debate quiets, it becomes possible to observe its lasting legacy. This legacy lies less with particular conclusions about whether globalization
is new or old, good or bad, whether it undermines the nation-state, or differs substantially from modernity or postmodernity. Rather, in the nearly two decades spent debating these and other questions, scholars repeatedly made assertions about what does (and does not) count as “global.” Even as globalization theory wanes, “the global” this literature produced continues to pervade the social sciences, providing the foundation for numerous offshoot literatures currently shaping academic and public debates...

Many scholars in Africa now find themselves disconnected from the centers of knowledge production and dependent upon international agencies for funding. Much of the research conducted in African universities is commissioned by “foreign institutions, agencies, or individuals” who “determine and control its content and gain credit for it,” a practice that creates serious hierarchies among African academics and materially constrains the kind of intellectual work that can be produced (Federici 2000:19–21). This “intellectual recolonization” (Federici 2000:19) follows a general pattern in which “non-metropolitan thought” remains almost “totally unreferenced” within a globalization literature “almost totally embedded in metropolitan academic routines of citation and affiliation” (Connell 2007:379). In this context, academic “picture[s] of global society” are often created by merely “projecting traits already recognized in metropolitan society” (Connell 2007:379).

Because the largest and most productive academic processing zones exist in the West, Africa and other non-Western locations often become sites of “unprocessed data” and “reservoirs of raw facts” rather than “sources of refined knowledge” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012:1). This tendency results in a lack of “epistemic diversity” within the globalization literature resulting in a “monoculture” of social scientific knowledge (Santos, Arriscado Nunes and Paula Meneses 2008; see also Cooper 2005, 2010; Ferguson 2006). (Kamola, 2013: 53, 52)

Throughout their career, Kamola uses influential Global North and West academics such as Professor Ferguson’s Global Shadows (2006) to support critical and academically-marginalized critiques of how mainstream and influential GS academics such as Fukuyama (1992), Huntington (1996), Held et. al. (1999), Sassen (1996), and Stiglitz (2003) “each produces a concept of globalization in relation to the absence of Africa...[so] Africa’s invisibility within the globalization literature is actually symptomatic of a structure of academic knowledge production that marginalizes African scholars.” (Kamola, 2008: 184) Kamola specifies influential and prestigious USA and UK universities as central to how a “global imaginary is socially produced...within deeply embedded material practices, such as
those taking place within the university.” (Kamola, 2012: 2) What material practices are
taking place within USA and UK universities, that influence how the global and globalization
is imagined?

Kamola asserts, and I agree, that Global North and West academic claims to
legitimate knowledge production, which is usually produced through empirically measurable,
quantifiable measurements of objective reality as a key methodology, “effectively disables
potentially emancipatory projects that might arise from imagining the world differently.”
(Kamola, 2012: 2) So, on the one hand, GS is situated within academia as an
interdisciplinary field combined of IR, economics, and cultural studies. Its relatively
emergent epistemology transgresses some boundaries, such as academic disciplines and
obedience to the authority of capitalist-realist epistemologies. On the other hand, northern
theories of globalization still abound in GS, especially amongst Mainstream, not
marginalized or Critical, GS. Despite being academically, or departmentally, or disciplinarily
transgressive, Mainstream GS reifies Global North and West hegemonic epistemologies,
methodologies, and pedagogies.

University of Manchester Professor of Economics Dicken best exemplifies
Mainstream GS theory. Their approach is relatively new, and relatively divergent from
established IR and economics, but ultimately offers only an incremental change from
mainstream USA- and UK-derived capitalist-realist theories that invisibilize much of the
world through reducing all analyses to econometrics. Dicken exemplifies attempts to
apolitically offer a uni-disciplinary approach to critiquing assumptions and definitions of
“globalization,” which they consider “one of the most used...most misused...confused
words...In the last 25 years it has entered the popular imagination in a big way, although it is
a concept whose roots go back at least to the nineteenth century, notably in the ideas of Karl Marx.” (Dicken, 2007: 1) Dicken emphasizes that their “primary focus is the global economy,” also noting that such a global economy “is deeply embedded in social, cultural, and political processes and institutions [that] are themselves often substantially imbued with economic values...in the kind of capitalist market economy that now prevails throughout most of the world.” (Dicken, 2007: 5) In other words, Dicken’s subjective perspective on what is central to a uni-disciplinary GS practice is, in fact, the capitalist-realist economy, though they insist they are not subjective.

Dicken contrasts their approach to that of “‘hyper-globalists’ to the right and to the left” who, they argue, both have unrealistic theories of globalization equating de-nationalizing global neoliberalism. Dicken starkly denies global neoliberalism through the following: “This hyper-globalist view of the world is a myth. It does not - and is unlikely to - exist.” (Dicken, 2007: 6) In this way, through their assertion of methodological and epistemological superiority through quantitatively-derived objectivity, which academia mandates as a matter of its individualist competition, Dicken, self-identifies as moderate, apolitical, and neither on the left nor on the right - and yet, superior to other forms of knowledge.

They do concede that the global economy is at the center of their theories, that capitalism is the de facto poli-socio-economic system now, and even that qualitative analysis is a necessary complement to quantitative analysis - but without any overt political engagement on the matter. In the next revised edition of their major text Global Shift, their “Introduction: Questioning Globalization” only mentions the “many casualties in the
financial system in 2008.” (Dicken, 2010: 1) However, Dicken does use stronger language in categorizing the type of globalization leading up to the 2007-Present Global Capital Crisis.

Neo-liberal, free market ideology (sometimes known as the ‘Washington Consensus’) dominated the global economy for the past half century.

Question: does the economic turmoil that began in 2008 herald ‘the end of globalization’? Well, it all depends on what we mean by ‘globalization’. It helps if we distinguish between two broad meanings of globalization.

One refers to the actual structural changes that are occurring in the way the global economy is organized and integrated. The other meaning refers to the neo-liberal, free-market ideology of the ‘globalization project’. Of course, the two are not separate. As a result, confusion reigns. It is too early to say whether the free-market ideology has been irrevocably changed by the global financial crisis. Many think it has. Others believe that, once the dust settles, it will be business as usual.

(Dicken, 2010: 1)

But how does such an econometric approach to GS “move beyond the rhetoric, to seek the reality?” What if, as I argue, as South Africa’s students have argued, “the reality” for the majority of the world is wretched, inhumane violence, which econometrics invisibilizes, and of which qualitative descriptions are dismissed as “a myth” or just “hyper-globalist” rhetoric? Such assumptions of one’s apolitical and unbiased, objective view of reality at best reflect the academic privilege of the theorist and their position within both academia and the world. At worst, they perpetuate dangerous assumptions and ignorance of a great deal of information and theories available to - and ignored by - those with academic privilege and power.

GS as an emerging field is purportedly inclined towards political activism and justice, and derives from multiple disciplines in both the humanities and the social “sciences.” Unfortunately, all disciplines have varied histories of existing within, resisting against, and contributing to oppression. Academia has a long history of contributions to oppression, from pseudoscience like phrenology, to pervasive abuses of medical sciences on historically colonized peoples. Academic self-reflexivity and recognition of the biases of one’s own
department, discipline, and academic systems is essential to critically “zoom out” to a global perspective without forgetting local perspectives. Such critical global studies must seek, as Sachsenmaier argues, to incorporate and re-integrate into emergent global theory the historically excluded local majority.

This book is centered on the idea that the debates about the possibilities and dangers of global history cannot just be conceptual in a narrow, methodological sense. They also need to address factors such as the international academic settings underlying the field, for these doubtlessly influence the ideas of historians. As scholars experimenting with hitherto unusual spatial paradigms, historians involve institutional, local, and global spaces within which they operate...

If global historians fail to consider their own sociologies of knowledge, as well as the multivarious social, political, and cultural contexts framing their activities, the conceptual debates in the field will only be a pale reflection of what they potentially could be. In other words, the skills of global historians need to include an exceptionally high degree of professional self-reflexivity...

Paying due attention to local peculiarities in the project of global history, however, requires some caution not to exoticize scholarship in different parts of the world. (Sachsenmaier, 2011: 3-4)

I contend that Mainstream GS, particularly that established during the early phases of Contemporary Globalization c. 1988-2001, effectively failed to consider its “own sociologies of knowledge,” has failed “to pay attention to local peculiarities,” has demonstrated a low “degree of professional self-reflexivity,” and as such became, and mainly remain, “only a pale reflection of what they potentially could be.” (Sachsenmaier, 2011: 3-4) Fortunately, counter-examples to mainstream academia exist within Critical GS.

Darian-Smith consistently and sharply self-reflexively critiques the field they and their department at UCSB has helped to pioneer, by insisting that GS must not become “the handmaiden of neoliberalism.” (Darian-Smith, 2014) Darian-Smith argues that many purportedly neutral academic disciplines have thus been co-opted by their very nature of being constrained by Global North and West academia. (Darian-Smith, 2015: 2-3) Darian-
Smith additionally argues "that [development] indicators are producing and privileging certain kinds of knowledge over other kinds of knowledge that may not be so easily “captured” by nationally structured numerical reductionism," reiterating the need for units of analysis that go beyond capitalist-realist econometrics and nation-states as the be-all, end-all unit of analysis. They clarify that “Rather than summarily rejecting the quantitative approach...we use indicators more judiciously and critically, and counter-balance them with other forms of qualitative and local knowledge” as opposed to the current “veneration of numerical indicators offers a seductive illusion of control...a cult of quantification.” (Darian-Smith, 2015: 2-3) This challenges the ostensibly apoliticism, neutrality, and consequent superiority of many quantitative IR, Economics, Political Science, and Mainstream GS theorists, a la Dicken.

I am not uncritically, “summarily rejecting” absolutely quantitative epistemologies, and arguing that the binary opposite - absolutely qualitative epistemologies - are the only viable analytical lenses. I am necessarily, critically reviewing the structural power imbalances of academically-produced knowledge that, under Contemporary Globalization, is now rarely perceived as legitimate unless predicated on ostensibly objective quantitative analysis. I recognize that the rise of post-modern scholarship, qualitative analyses, and “the subjective turn” of academia helped transgressively birth new critical fields such as Feminist, Black, Chicanx, and Queer Studies. (Boghassian, 2006: 713) Similarly situated within the margins of academia, I argue it is necessary for GS generally, Critical GS, and my thesis specifically to reaffirm why qualitative and subjective components must critique the “illusion of control,” neutrality, and objectivity - in order to avoid succumbing to a hegemonic “cult of quantification” and convergence with neoliberal epistemologies.
Older critiques of globalization, global processes, emergent globalities, and mainstream capitalist-realist academia can be found in the avowed leftist’s Hobsbawm’s Cold-War era, pre-Contemporary Globalization theories. Their definitions of global “ages” represent one form of an overtly political academic project - albeit one that has been extensively marginalized within and beyond academia due to its explicit Marxist and socialist perspective. (Hobsbawm, 1994; 1989; 1975; 1962) New critiques abound as well. Foran, combining critical sociology with Critical GS, has issued an urgent “manifesto” (2010) and calls to action (2011) while supporting counter-hegemonic student groups (2015), organizing within academia for a rapid shift to “global crisis studies” centered on “global justice work.” (2010) Foran rather effectively within their own constraints of academia facilitates "merg[ing] our efforts here [in academia] with the scientists, the parties, the movements of every color who are saying – or better, screaming – NO!” to impending global crises.” (2010: 3) The Critical GS theorist Steger, too, offers a sharply different take than Dicken on the centrality of capitalist economics. One of their highly-accessible introductory texts centers globalization on politicized inequality and conflict, not an ostensibly neutral “business as usual” perspective. (Steger, 2003) Steger’s scholarship beyond introductory texts is both highly accessible and sharply critical of what my thesis focuses on: the militarism and violence inherent in neoliberal capitalism, and the role the USA plays in perpetuating that violence. (Steger, 2005) However, even with their relative accessibility, Hobsbawm’s, Steger’s, Foran’s, and Darian-Smith’s visibility and influence beyond academia on policy-making remains marginalized.

Recently-published “possible histories of the Global South” that focus explicitly on the “Third World Project” and its violent submission by “the Atlantic Project,” both of which
are tied to knowledge production by opposing political groups, is overtly aligned with leftist projects across the Global South. (Prashad, 2014; 2008) The most useful Critical GS theories to this thesis, in addition to later-reviewed critical pedagogy and radical social movement theories, will be that of Nederveen-Pieterse (2004) and Robinson (1996). They focus on “neoliberal globalization” and “low-intensity democracy” called “polyarchy...in which a small group actually rules, on behalf of capital...in tightly controlled electoral processes,” respectively. Unfortunately, as I critically review and analyze academia’s approaches to globalization(s), the majority of highly Critical GS remains marginalized both within academia, and within society. As I review throughout this thesis, academia’s relevancy to contemporary radical democracy is questionable.

**Complex, Intersectional, and Practical Tools?**

Discussing the spread of GS to different groups inside and outside of academia, my thesis embraces the critiques McCarty levies against absolutely academic, perspectival, or philosophical GS meta-theories, whose outcomes tend to be “extreme levels of abstraction...a kind of analytical paralysis.” (McCarty, 2014a: 28) McCarty insists that “The question ‘What is Global Studies?’ is more than a purely academic question because formal, academic GS ‘programs are not developing in a vacuum’ but rather in a context of inequality, unfairness, and competition, from which academia is not exempt.” (McCarty, 2014a: 29) This argument that academia is not a zone of exception from society is central to my thesis and its case studies.

Global Studies programs must earn a place within existing institutions, established fields of inquiry and faculties that are already under pressure from shrinking budgets and increasing student demand. As with any new interdisciplinary field, our programs must be able to hold their own against traditional disciplines such as economics, history, political science and sociology that offer their students coherent analytical frameworks, clear issues that
are framed in ways that can be understood, questions that can be answered, and powerful methodological tools with which to answer them. This is not to say that Global Studies should ask simplistic questions or offer simplistic explanations for the complex issues we deal with. However, if Global Studies programs are to establish legitimacy and compete for resources, they do need to offer some clarity...

[GS] scholars need to convey the power that global perspectives have to address pressing global issues. We need to demonstrate that we can provide practical real-world solutions. We need to communicate this potential not only to our students and to each other, but to scholars in other disciplines that are rapidly adopting global perspectives.

(McCarty, 2014a: 28-30)

McCarty’s critique of GS’s ongoing, comparative lack of “coherent analytical frameworks,” need to “earn a place within existing institutions,” and need to “establish legitimacy and compete for resources,” we see the ongoing need for critical epistemologies to practically address inequality, if only for their own self-preservation. Critical GS has struggled to be perceived as legitimate within academic institutions thus far, unless they align themselves with capitalist-realist epistemologies. A core focus of GS is "dealing in complexity" at a "global scale," offering the potential of "powerful analytical tools" and "new solutions to old problems" that existing epistemologies have also failed to provide. What I see as Critical GS’s most important concept, highlighted by McCarty and other theorists in GS and academia focused on recognition and engagement, is the following idea of “recovering critical perspectives”:

Global perspectives are important because they have the potential to recover critical voices that are too often pushed out of the discourse of globalization. A focus on the economic processes of globalization can overemphasize the dominant processes of capitalism, global markets, international trade, development and regional trade agreements. A macroeconomic analysis displaces the local and further marginalizes voices from the periphery of the global economy. Global perspectives that encompass the entire local/global continuum necessarily encompass the voices of women, minorities, the unemployed, postcolonial subjects, people in the global south, people living in poverty, immigrants, refugees and other displaced persons, among others. By definition then, global perspectives include multiple intersectional dimensions...

Any global analysis must include marginalized voices, many which bear witness to unfairness in the global system...
It is only by deliberately making room for these critical voices that Global Studies gains the potential to **recognize and engage** with the many facets of the most serious global issues facing the world today.” (my own emphasis added) (McCarty, 2014a: 31)

McCarty’s closing critique is in line with my premises on institutions and pedagogies that support radical activist-scholars within and beyond academia. If Critical GS is a tool, what is its purpose? My thesis, as Critical GS theory, demands academia realize its “potential to **recognize and engage**” in problem-solving that moves beyond “rather small academic circles.” I later outline how this demands more politicized and less formally academic approaches, given historical and contemporary constraints upon academia. The next question arising from this transgressive definition of GS is: how can “complexity” theories that are not just about abstract “globalization” be practically applied, in a global poli-socio-economic system centered on over-simplifying complex issues, and governed by reductive logics rooted capitalist-realism? This notion of recognition and reconnection is paralleled in theories like those of Wolf, introduced as far back as the early 1980s, in work like *Europe and the People Without History*, where they question a dis-integrated academic and conceptual approach to the world rooted in Eurocentric practices that “persist in turning dynamic, interconnected phenomena into static, disconnected things” and therefore necessitating reconnection. (Wolf, 1982: 25)

I close this review of GS theories much like how I close my critical premises and, ultimately, my entire thesis: with a question connected to my query above, but one that may be even more pessimistic. Wolf’s theories on the necessity of re-connection have existed for almost forty years, alongside similar theories from other marginalized fields, such as intersectionality and Black Feminist Thought, or Black Feminism. (Crenshaw, 1991; Collins, 1986, 1990, 1998, 2000) Hobsbawm’s and Wallerstein’s ideas fermented in the margins of
society, within academia, for even longer. How can transgressive and radically democratic theories practically move beyond academia to influence political action?

    Recounting the convoluted history of the field of Global Studies and the complexity of multifaceted global problems is intellectually satisfying, but it often doesn’t help us communicate beyond our own rather small academic circles. (McCarty, 2014: 33)

    It is fitting that the end of a thesis’s theory review self-reflexively critiques itself as almost entirely an “intellectually satisfying” act. Such strictly intellectually satisfying performances are required of an overwhelming majority of students within academia, prior to their engaging in political activism beyond “the rather small academic circles” that marginalize most Critical GS theorists - especially those in the Global South, who lack the privilege, power, and influence of Global North and West academics.

    **Definitive Theme: Post-Colonial, Post-Modern, Global-Scale Transformation**

    Both many of the more conservative, capitalist-realist, “right” wing academics, and many of the more progressive, Marxist / development / dependency, “left” wing academics now accept as factual a global history wherein the mid-1400s through the mid-1900s constituted modernity, defined by global Western European dominance and the authority, or legitimate power, of nation-states. Most academics agree this European dominance was complemented by c. 1850s-1950s ascent of the USA as a regional power in Latin America, and then as a global superpower, which I and other Critical GS theorists define as a global hegemon or empire.

    The beneficial and detrimental causes and effects of the modern international system remain hotly debated by the right and left within and beyond academia, with an ongoing marginalization of Marxist academics, politicians, and policy-makers. Within both mainstream and marginalized GS, all argue that global-scale changes of some sort are
occurring. GS theory consistently argues that this change is from an established, colonialism-based, Europe-driven, inter-nation-state system that was the world order from roughly 1450-1950, to an emergent and different world order. As Juergensmeyer noted, “postcolonial” tends to be one of the foundations of GS theories. Below I outline distinct theories critical to my case study: post-colonialism and decolonization.

Stuchtey outlines the overarching themes of colonialism and imperialism, and how various European powers, monarchies, firms, industries, and states “decisively shaped world history,” arguing that “globalisation has a critical background in the world historical involvement of the non-European sphere from the Early Modern Period up and into the period of decolonisation” for 500 years. (Stuchtey, 2011) Stuchtey continues:

The Treaty of Tordesillas (1494)...the independence of India in 1947...mark the start and decline of a key problem in the history of Europe, perhaps even its most momentous, that the always precarious colonial rule caused complex competitions among Europeans just as much as among the indigenous population in the colonies, that it was able to simultaneously create cooperation and close webs of relationships between conquerors and the conquered, and that it was never at any time free of violence...

(Stuchtey, 2011: 3)

Stuchtey charts global processes of Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, French, British, and Russian colonizations, as well as "the independence of the North American colonies in 1776 [marking] one of the most important turning points - from the Atlantic to the Asian aspect of the British empire." Stuchtey further outlines foundational events in "informal imperialism," Scramble for Africa, and post-WWII decolonization across Africa and Asia. Through these dates and other major declarations and actions of multiple European powers, Stuchtey provides a broad understanding of empire-building and imperialism, and the territorial conquest and colonialism required by such terrible acts at a global scale. Stuchtey also highlights how over time, colonialism became not only a project by and for elites, but a
totalizing process with positive and negative economic and political participation by effectively all sectors of society.

There are various definitions of colonialism and processes of colonization, which I distinguish from imperialism, like how I distinguish critical-conceptual theories from historical examples. For the purposes of this thesis, the focus is less on imperialism as a general concept of extending authority. Instead, I focus more on colonialism as a specific ideology of how to extend authority, and on colonization as a set of specific resource-controlling processes derived from that ideology. A 2011 “typological reappraisal” that reinterprets for the 21st century Finley’s “Colonies: An Attempt at a Typology” highlights how 4 decades of academic research and discussion of colonialism “demonstrates how complex and manifold seemingly straightforward ideal types” remain. Sommer provides an accessible and basic overview of what a colony is and is not: “Essentially...a collectivity of people...[taking] into account a vast array of variables: resources, the labour force, demography and the socio-political framework in which colonisation occurs.” (Sommer, 2011: 183-184) Sommer maintains that such a broad ideal type is not useful without more specifics, arguing a “true typology needs to establish some sort of hierarchy.” (Sommer, 2011: 185) They then present a hierarchy that my thesis uses as a guideline: “a colony” is a fixed object; “colonisation” is a process of creating one or more colonies; and “colonialism” is an ideology driving multiple processes, including colonization.

Colonies established by few or some migrants tend to be peripheries of strong political centres (‘empires’). Almost invariably, they are imperial colonies politically depending on the motherland (British India, Africa...Extinguished or shrinking local populations often require the importation of labour from third parties...Immigration in strong numbers usually results in the assimilation, marginalisation or extinction of the original population...

Another factor, largely independent of the other variables, is the driving force behind the establishment of colonies. We need to distinguish between individual and
collective motivations. Individuals settle away from home because they seek adventure or freedom...Collectivities also use colonies to improve their wealth; but they serve political and strategic ends, as well.
(Sommer, 2011: 186-187)

This definition is then divided into 4 types of colonies, which are the following, with my own bold emphasis added for clarity:

1. **Pure imperial colonies** (‘provinces’), established through conquest for the purpose of tributary exploitation; low influx of colonial immigrants….: British India….African colonies…
2. **Imperial settlement colonies**, established through massive settlement colonisation flanked by military power with the purpose of exploiting local labour and/or exporting excess population. Colonisation may involve extinction or marginalisation (New England…Southern Rhodesia, South and South West Africa, French Algeria…) Colonies are dependent on imperial centres (‘motherland’) but ties tend to be looser than in the case of pure imperial colonies….
3. **Pure settlement colonies**, established through massive settlement colonisation, often flanked by violence, with the purpose of land seizure. This type of colonisation tends to result in local populations being marginalised (…the American West…)
4. **Outpost colonies**, established through conquest or peaceful agreement...for the purpose of gaining (strategic or commercial) access to a hinterland…
(Sommer, 2011: 187-188)

Using Sommer’s typology, the hierarchy of colonies is clearly ordered in terms of what is overtly militarized and focused on conquest and power imposition, versus covertly militarized and ostensibly focused on immigrant land seizure for private commercial gains. I argue that South Africa and California both have fit the definition of “Type 1, Pure imperial” colony in the modern period, albeit with wide variability between both case studies in terms of time and space. California best fits the Type 3, “Pure settlement” colony definition for the majority of its post-Mexico history - but a colony within the “American West” region nonetheless. South Africa would be Type 1 in the 1600s-1700s, a Type 2 “Imperial settlement,” in terms of the Anglo-British colonialism, as well as Type 3, in terms of the colonial Dutch-Afrikaaner colonialism. Sommer summarizes processes of colonization as:

The most general definition of colonisation could be ‘invasion’ or ‘seizure of land’. There is colonisation without colonies (frontier colonisation like in the Russian East
and the American West or ‘internal’ colonisation...)... and there are colonies without colonisation (the case of pure imperial colonies above). The common theme is expansion: societies exporting people to distant places, creating networks of outposts or pushing forward their boundaries into ‘barbarian’ peripheries...
(Sommer, 2011: 185-190)

With the notion of expansion and penetration of others seen as inferior or alien to the superior colonizer, Sommer closes with a specific re-iteration of colonialism as an ideology that builds upon Osterhammel’s theories. They contrast Iron Age European and Mediterranean colonialism to modern, European nation-state-driven colonialism. The bolded emphasis has been added for this thesis.

[Colonialism] has been defined as ‘domination of people from another culture’. But this definition is too inclusive to be of analytical value; it embraces all forms of imperial rule, colonial or not, which by definition include cultural difference between the rulers and the ruled. To sharpen the ideal type, J. Osterhammel has added three attributes: colonialism implies
(1) that one society completely deprives a second one of its potential for autonomous development; that an entire society is ‘remote controlled’ and reconfigured in accordance to the colonial rulers;
(2) that the ruling and the ruled are permanently divided by a cultural gap;
(3) the intellectual ‘yoke’ of an ideology whose purpose it is to legitimise colonial expansion.

According to Osterhammel, colonialism is the rule of one collectivity over another, with the life of the ruled being determined, for the sake of external interests, by a minority of colonial masters, which is culturally ‘foreign’ and unwilling to assimilate; this rule is underpinned by missionary doctrines based on the colonial masters’ conviction of their being culturally superior.

[Iron Age] Greek ethnocentrism and its discourses of barbarian ‘otherness’ do not fit into this category. The ‘spirit of colonialism’ (Osterhammel) requires more: Namely the translation of such discourses into a consistent ideology serving the colonisers’ practical needs. It further requires the persistent unwillingness on the part of the colonisers to accommodate...the culture of the colonised...¹
(Osterhammel, 2005: 21)

Osterhammel’s 1997 texts have been updated, revised, and translated into English in 2005 and 2015 versions.
Osterhammel’s other theories further exemplifies what I term Eurocentric, academic analyses of colonialism. They aggressively critique the brutality of colonialism, while simultaneously crediting European global conquest as the primary driver of “the transformation of the world” for hundreds of years, using Global North and West academic languages, and speaking mostly to other academics - largely because academia forces them to do so. Along with Stuchtey, Sommer, and many Global North-situated Marxist-development-dependency theorists, these theories and critiques of colonialism remain incredibly zoomed-out, macro analyses, that often lack first-person testimony of non-academic products of colonized peoples themselves. Additionally, their practical application beyond “small academic circles” is debatable.

Frantz Fanon, one of the most widely-recognized and seminal Black African academics, who wrote and worked in France-occupied northern Africa, is still widely regarded as exemplary of decolonization theory, not Eurocentric (post-)colonial theory. Even in 2016, Fanon is central to understanding colonialism, to my own thesis, and to university student protesters across South Africa. That said, Fanon’s appeal to blunt descriptions of colonial violence, such as the title of their magnum opus, *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963), is dismissable by much of academia and the Global North and West, in Dicken’s terms, as “misused...confused...a myth.“ Fanon’s work is and was highly problematic and marginalized by contemporary academia and when it was published in the 1950s and 1960s. On the one hand, Fanon fails many contemporary measures of intersectional inclusivity, particularly the mainstream academic insistence on any form of violence being illegitimate, unless it is undertaken by the state.
Black Skin, White Masks (1952) internalized highly sexist Freudian analyses, and Wretched of the Earth embraced highly masculist, binary gender roles. A Dying Colonialism (1965) was a proudly subjective narrative of Algeria’s War of Independence. Much like Marx, Fanon provides a useful critique and method to deconstruct a system, rather than to re-construct an entirely new system. On another hand, Fanon overtly rejects Eurocentric academia. As such, the Global North and West’s for-profit use of Fanon may be cultural appropriation. Whatever the interpretation of Fanon, the fact remains that they invited Sartre to write the preface to their groundbreaking text, including the direct, mocking challenge:

> Europeans, you must open this book and enter into it. After a few steps in the darkness you will see strangers gathered around a fire; come close, and listen, for they are talking of the destiny they will mete out to your trading centers and to the hired soldiers who defend them. They will see you, perhaps, but they will go on talking…
> (Fanon, 1963: 13)

The magnum opus of another central figure in decolonization, Steve Biko, contains in its very title a defiance of the Eurocentric prescription of capitalist-realist insistence that Black South Africans and other colonized people conform to the ideologies of White liberalism: “I write what I like.” (Biko and Stubbs, 1978; 2002) Whatever the interpretation by contemporary academics, Biko and Fanon clearly articulated their highly unpopular and marginalized views, despite the fact that their social positionality ultimately led to the logical end of the extreme marginalization of their already-colonized bodies: premature death. Fanon wrote while serving the Front Liberacion Nacionale (FLN) during the Algeria’s War of Independence, and struggling within France-occupied Algeria and Tunis between 1955-1960:

National liberation, national renaissance, the restoration of nationhood to the people, commonwealth: whatever may be the headings used or the new formulas introduced, decolonization is always a violent phenomenon...is quite simply the replacement of a certain ‘species’ of men by another ‘species’ of men...[is] a social structure being changed from the bottom up...decolonization, which sets out to change the order of the world is, obviously, a program of complete disorder...The naked truth of
decolonization evokes for us the searing bullets and bloodstained knives which emanate from it...

The colonial world is a world cut in two. The dividing line, the frontiers are shown by barracks and police stations. In the colonies it is the policeman and the soldier who are the official...the policeman and the soldier, by their immediate and their frequent and direct action maintain contact with the native and advise him by means of rifle butts and napalm not to budge…

The violence with which the supremacy of white values is affirmed and the aggressiveness which has permeated the victory of these values over the ways of life and of thought of the native mean that, in revenge, the native laughs in mockery when Western values are mentioned in front of him. In the colonial context, the settler only ends his work of breaking in the native when the latter admits loudly and intelligibly the supremacy of the white man’s values. In the period of decolonization, the colonized masses mock at these very values, insult them, and vomit them up. (Fanon, 1963: 35-36, 38, 43)

On the one hand, Fanon’s focus on “complete disorder...a world cut in two...searing bullets and bloodstained knives...rifles butts and napalm…” may be categorizable by Dicken et. al. as hyperbole or myth. On the other hand, 300,000 - 2,000,000 northern Africans died directly as a result of Algeria-France combat. Those numbers equalled at least 2%, and up to around 15%, of Algeria’s total recorded population c. 1960. (Horne, 2012) That one in fifty to one in eight residents of a state could be killed by combat direct seems like it would be enough to evidence the nearly totalitarian scope of colonialism and decolonization, given the fact that Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), indirect deaths, wounded civilians, and the residual effects of PTSD were not included in c. 1960 data. And yet, causes and effects of colonialism as a totalizing, absolutely violent concept remain debated, or diluted if they are recognized.

Further evidence of how real, and not hyperbolic or mythical, the totalitarian impact of colonization and European conquest-driven globalization, is evidenced by the death tolls in Belgian King Leopold’s - later the Belgium nation-state’s - colony of the Congo. There, the best-researched casualty estimates from colonization range from 10% to as high as 50%
of the pre-colonization residents. The non-proportional, absolute value of up to 10 million
dead by colonization in one state alone denotes a genocide that far surpasses the most
infamous Global North and West example: Hitler’s Nazi regime and the Jewish holocaust.
However, unlike the genocides of Europe, King Leopold’s Ghost remains one of the only
influential or widely-read texts on Congo’s colonial genocide - a term its title still avoided.
(Hochschild, 1998) As of 2016, academia, civil society, and governmental institutions
increasingly make decisions based on data derived from quantitative methodologies.
Inadequate or nonexistent data, both past and present, testifies to just how low a priority
colonies were, given failures to implement even basic state services, such as census-taking,
birth, and death records.

Fortunately for my thesis at least, within the UC, Santa Barbara, Critical GS project,
Professor Lezra focuses significantly on colonialism. They focus in particular on the totality
and severity of colonization as simultaneous political, social, economic, and cultural
ideologies and processes - and their connection to pedagogies. Their text The Colonial Art of
Demonizing Others: A Global Perspective specifically analyzes modern colonialism and
imperial consolidation on a global scale, c. 1750-1850. (Lezra, 2014) Lezra argues that
during this time, Eurocentric interpretations of colonized peoples’ emancipatory struggles
were dehumanized through literal demonization - or representation as monstrous and
demonic figures - in visual and textual media. In this way, even articulate expressions of
resistance by the colonized were ultimately distorted by the colonizers, within a larger
context of ongoing, constant, global-scale dehumanization of people of color by European,
and American, colonial powers. Throughout this time period, the teaching of freedom dreams
became itself another form of colonization, whereby privileged citizens of empire were
largely taught to identify the colonized and their struggles as sub-human, disgusting, and
deserving of punishment. For this reason, the transgressive power of even the most radical
work, like Fanon’s *Wretched of the Earth*, remain debatable, if they lack impact beyond
academia, where they have historically been misrepresented by large swaths of mainstream,
Global North and South academics.

In their article *A Pedagogy of Empathy for a World of Atrocity*, Lezra concisely
theorizes a Critical GS update to Fanon’s notion of global-scale wretchedness, with the term
“a world of atrocity.” (Lezra, 2014) Lezra contextualizes contemporary notions of atrocity
with recognition of both an initial act of violence, as well as its later representation and ideas.

In times of escalating acts of global violence and chaos, visual and narrative
representations of discrete acts of violence interlock in a deeply interdisciplinary
social text of multiple media and modes of transmission. Representations of atrocity
— photographs and documentary accounts as well as creations of imaginative culture,
such as songs, art, and story-telling — record and transmit a social text that Frederic
Jameson once eloquently termed the hurts of history...

An act of atrocity is an act of violence that is perceived to exceed the boundaries of
what a legitimate punitive measure — either against an individual or a collective
group of people — would be for retribution for the unjust infliction of an injury.
Atrocities never stay in the past. They are enacted, experienced, witnessed, and
translated. They take multiple forms.
What makes an act of violence an act of atrocity (rather than a pain-ridden event such
as a death by accident, sudden disease or other uncontrollable natural events) is not
only the element of deliberation behind it, but also the affective horror and the poetics
of disavowal that the act generates in its documentation and dissemination. Such acts
do not disappear with mourning or grief, but exceed any sort of narrative of closure or
containment.
(Lezra, 2014a: 1, 4)

Lezra provides two visual representations of atrocity that evidence how little has
changed over hundreds of years of colonialism. “Figure 1, Lynndie England and Iraqi man in
Abu Ghraib prison” (Lezra 2014b: 2) is juxtaposed against “Figure 2, John Stedman,
Surinam, late eighteenth century. Frontispiece of Narrative of a Five Years Expedition
Against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam.” (Lezra 2014b: 3) Both figures represent a
military-uniformed White person who appears relaxed and bemused, while pointing at and standing in a position of dominance over a defeated and humiliated person of color. Lezra’s lens is especially relevant given my social positionality as a White man operating within the constraints of Global North and West academia, who frequently confronts the paradoxes of studying and teaching the terrors of colonialism and neoliberalism. Many students, especially those within Global Studies, Chicanx Studies, Black Studies, and other critical Social Sciences, Humanities, and Fine Arts (SS HFA) learn about centuries of previously-denied genocide and ongoing atrocity in a formal colonial institution: the university. Many of these students are themselves survivors of intergenerational and/or interpersonal trauma. Within academia, and exemplified by the contrasting tactics of Californian and South African university-driven social movements, the question of confronting and recognizing violence without perpetuating violence remains omnipresent - and as yet unresolved by Global North and West academia, or Global South.

Lezra’s proposed method of navigating a world of atrocity is neither explicitly non-violence / non-violent resistance, nor explicitly violent revolution / decolonization. Instead, they theorize that because teaching is potentially transgressive and radical, and violence is omnipresent in our poli-socio-economic systems and social movements, education offers a way to engage violence without denying or perpetuating violence. They focus on understanding and deconstructing violence through conscious, decolonizing pedagogies that are empathetic and emotional, not only interdisciplinary.

How do we create a pedagogical narrative around the social text of hurt that doesn’t dwell so much in grief or blame that we cause violence to our students? How much discourse and disciplinary packaging can we responsibly use to keep our students at a safe distance from the very real hurt of the social text they inhabit?
The continued recurrence of human atrocity, and the proliferation of the spectacle of unbounded organized power (both today and in the past; state and non- or counter-state) require a new kind of pedagogy...

Times of acute and escalating global atrocity require highly creative forms of thought…

To address the self-critical paralysis and disengagement from acts of violence that are themselves so harmful to our students, a comparative cultural study of the notion of complicity is necessary. (Lezra, 2014b: 1, 2, 3, 7)

It is with this critical lens which my thesis seeks to align itself, demonstrated in my analysis of the performance art and protests in my case study. Empathy and decolonization are two critical components of what my thesis identifies in Rhodes Must Fall, which both embraces Fanon’s rhetoric of necessarily violent resistance, while intentionally “dwell[ing] so much in grief or blame” to elicit emotional responses from other populations. Therefore, these qualities are what my thesis embraces to distinguish itself as Critical GS:

- focusing on self-reflexive analyses of academic complicity in violence;
- referencing the work of colonized peoples in a non-appropriative manner;
- understanding the limitations of academic products;
- extensively drawing upon non-academic work and non-rational, emotional texts that are marginalized by academics in the Global North and West
- aligning with and supporting the perspectives of the historically colonized subjects, rather purporting to be neutral.

As noted above, my thesis relies on an epistemological notion of global-scale events and changes contextualized by non-presentist, non-Eurocentric deep histories of colonialism and violence. Generalizations inevitably occur as a result of the privilege of a zoomed-out global perspective. Having acknowledged those limitations, though, the detailed analysis and “thick description” of the South Africa case study should provide an appropriately zoomed-in, micro perspective to counterbalance broad spatial and temporal generalizations implied by any global perspective. Below, the temporal constraints and time periods used in my thesis
are outlined, with an emphasis on my thesis's definition of “Contemporary Globalization” c. 1988-present.

**Definitive Time Period: Contemporary Globalization c. 1988-2016**

The primary deep historical time periods utilized by GS and relied upon throughout my thesis are the following, presented in chronological order, which is also the order that analysis occurs throughout this thesis. First, the period of Europe’s global hegemony, articulated primarily through colonialism c. the late 1400s to the late 1900s. Second, and more specifically, a Long 19th Century, as first conceptualized by Hobsbawm, c. the late 1700s through the early 1900s, and ending with the collapse of several empires upon the conclusion of World War I. (Hobsbawm, 1962, 1975, 1987) Third, a Short 20th Century, c. WWI through the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the global Cold War. (Hobsbawm, 1994; Westad, 2007)

I argue that “Contemporary Globalization” is the most useful specific term to denote the post-Cold War time period, running from the late 1980s - early 1990s collapse of the USSR, through at least 2016, during which time “a new [development] era” where “pluralism is here to stay” has broken more than just temporally with “the globalizations of the twentieth century”. (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2012a: 1) This is due to the massive shifts in global nation-state and non-state power that occurred from 1988 onward, and during which the USA became firmly established as the global hegemon that drove or led most political, social, economic, and cultural thought around the world.
It is this period of Contemporary Globalization, which is connected to deep histories of earlier globalization, especially colonialism, which my thesis focuses on. My thesis conceptualizes Contemporary Globalization as best summarized through the following:

1. post-Cold War global-scale changes in politics, economics, societies, and cultures, with consistent trends emerging in each local example of globalization;
2. driven by ideologies originating or refined in the USA, and therefore establishing the USA’s global hegemony; and,
3. establishing neoliberal capitalist poli-socio-economics on a global scale.

Within Contemporary Globalization, my thesis conceptualizes three specific contemporary historical time periods to analyze ongoing global and local processes. The first part of Contemporary Globalization is the long decade of the 1990s. This spans from the 1988-92 collapse of the USSR through 2001, which is the beginning of the next historical period of Contemporary Globalization: the Post-9/11 USA-driven Global War on Terror (GWOT). The Post-9/11 GWOT spans from 2001 through 2007, which is the beginning of the next contemporary historical period: the 2007-Present Global Capital Crisis. Third, the 2007-Present Global Capital Crisis, which runs from 2007 through 2016, during the writing of this thesis.

While this approach potentially reifies and perpetuates a hegemonic concept of time periods, it uses these temporal and spatial logics because of the ongoing hegemony of Eurocentrism and over-determination of the world by the Global North and West. Again, this thesis, like all Critical GS theories, both exists both within, and in resistance to, global over-determination under Contemporary Globalization. By acknowledging and critiquing the Eurocentric, Global North and West authority which so over-determines human society, it does not reify these logics, but rather resists and critiques them.
2007-present Global Capital Crisis

The year 2007 delineates the ongoing time period within Contemporary Globalization as of 2016. This is due to the persistence of the unstable and precarious global poli-socio-economic order of neoliberalism, which was made undeniably visible due to the financial- and housing-induced global crisis of capitalism that began in 2007-2008. It is difficult to overstate the importance of what I refer to as the Global Capital Crisis, which is colloquially referred to as the Global Financial Crisis or The Great Recession. These events and processes, which are both causes and effects of ongoing Contemporary Globalization, marked several global-scale shifts in the poli-socio-economic systems of the planet, on a scale comparable to the USA- and Europe-driven Great Depression of the 1920s-1930s, almost a century earlier.

The global financial systems leading up to 2007 were predicated on advanced capitalism, extensive financialization, and high-risk, high-profit stock market behavior, ultimately inflating most nation-states’ GDPs and industries’ values into precarious bubbles. Despite some technological innovation and labor productivity advances, mostly driven by information technology, the global economy under Contemporary Globalization remained dominated by Global North and West firms and nation-states. As it had for centuries prior, this dominance relied on military securitization of access to inexpensive raw materials, especially hydrocarbon energy sources. The post-Cold War USA dominance also depended upon inexpensive consumer goods, largely provided by China and East Asia, in order to continuously grow a consumer-oriented, advanced capitalist system. This dominance also relied upon the USA-driven Post-9/11 GWOT, invasions, occupations, and neo-colonizations of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other still-exploitable regions colonized by Europe and the USA.
Beginning in 2007 and continuing through 2009, driven by the USA’s housing and concomitant stock market collapses, the global economy that was almost entirely dependent upon the USA’s ever-increasing consumption began to collapse, too. At the same time, the neoconservative and neoliberal policies of the Second Bush Regime were electorally exchanged for the Obama Regime. Barring radical or revolutionary change before 2017, the Obama Regime will have only incrementally reformed policies begun by the Bush Regime. There has been a re-implementation of an official ban on torture, and reduction in overt military occupations. Despite this, little systemic poli-socio-economic change occurred since the Global Capital Crisis. The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act adjusted financial practices, but the USA’s continuous GDP, and by proxy the world’s financial stability, growth remains largely dependent on high-risk, high-profit financialization. The effectiveness of trickle-down Reaganism is still considered common sense. USA courts incrementally reduced violence against some communities, like LGBTQ people, while further legitimizing violence against others. Single-payer healthcare failed; a mandate for private, for-profit insurance company-driven insurance plans was implemented. Privatized and covert drone warfare somewhat replaced overt “boots on the ground” warfare. Combat gamified. The most common injuries on USA soldiers and non-USA civilians shifted from shrapnel and gunfire to PTSD and smart bombs, respectively.

Unfortunately, the Great Recession did not significantly or rapidly abate. There were few significant structural changes to the USA’s, or the world’s, poli-socio-economics. Instead, during the Global Capital Crisis, existing institutions more or less resumed “business as usual” (Dicken, 2007) albeit with reduced profits and increased levels of violence. In the USA and around the globe, from 2007 onward, established economic indicators such as
unemployment, GDP growth, FDI, overall market stability, and inequality remained at
dangerous levels. Conservative econometrics indicated at least low predictability of profits,
and at the worst impending revolutions. Additionally, other sub-state indicators embraced by
most of civil society, such as under- and mal-employment, election turnout and transparency,
and Inequality-Adjusted metrics like the Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index
(HDI), all remained unincorporated into the USA’s or into the most powerful multilateral
institution’s development indicators. (Darian-Smith, 2015)

The regime change of elected officials in the USA c. 2008-2010, Bush to Obama in the
USA’s executive branch, and Democrats to Republicans in its legislature, were not incidents
isolated from the Global Capital Crisis. After the frustration of a “business as usual” electoral
system, and fueled by the never-resolved racial and other tensions in the USA, 2010 midterm
elections saw the far right-wing Tea Party faction rise to power within the Republican Party.
A growing polarization also grew within the Progressive and Moderate factions within the
Democratic Party, the other half of the USA two-party duopoly, as this 2-party electoral
system failed to significantly protect society from the fallout of Contemporary Globalization.
Despite this, in 2012 the incumbent Obama Regime was re-elected, the sluggish economic
growth persisted, and consumer and national debt continued to increase. Only in China and
select other parts of the world did widespread national economic growth occur - and
alongside state repression and tension with competing nation-states.

Elsewhere in the world, where elected change was less permissible, business as usual
did prompt attempts at revolution, such as the Arab Spring c. 2011-present. With the
persistence of existing authorities’ hegemony and influence, despite the Global Capital
Crisis, regime change ultimately stagnated nearly everywhere. In Libya, protests escalated
into social movements that became armed revolution, which the UK, France, Italy, and the USA supported through UN-approved intervention. For Libya, the Global North and West bombed Gaddafi under the auspices of human rights, while Europe- and USA-based energy companies secured profitable oil contracts after the Gaddafi regime was overthrown. As disarmament and reconciliation of post-Gaddafi powers went unresolved, Libya accelerated towards state collapse, while the oil firms continued their usual profitability. In Syria, protests escalated into social movements that yielded mass slaughter by the Assad Regime, in some of the most visible suppression of the 21st century. In Egypt, the elected and so-called Islamist Morsi Regime was deposed and replaced by the USA-friendly, military-supported Sisi Regime. Similarly, in Saudi Arabia, the theocracy persisted, thanks in part to massive financial support from the USA that allowed bribing protest leaders, with the blessing of the USA, in those states, business as usual continued. In Iraq and Afghanistan, however, the USA-driven occupation and planned handover to a USA-friendly regime continues to collapse, as the rise of Daesh threatens calamity by justifying increased state militarization alongside its own crimes against humanity.

In Europe, austerity regimes and financial collapses destabilized ostensibly sustainable social democracy models of capitalism. Tensions between the Russian Federation and the USA escalated, with protests in Ukraine becoming militant social movements, and then near civil war by mid 2014. Ultimately, armed conflict in Ukraine became a new proxy war between NATO and Russia. The downing of a commercial airliner, killing over 200 passengers in the first such shoot-down in Europe since the 2001 Siberia Airlines incident, was the deadliest such incident since the 1982 Pan Am Flight 103 bombings. USA- and EU-Russia tensions reached unprecedented post-Cold War levels. Questions of the EU’s and
Euro stability, democracy, and potential future dissolution were and continue to be raised. As of 2016, there were more per-capita IDPs and refugees than ever before. Almost a decade after the Global Capital Crisis began, almost all of Northern Africa, the Middle East, and Europe continues to struggle with political, social, economic, and cultural instability, as well as crises of identity and conscience, exacerbated by xenophobia and racism.

It is difficult to overstate the impact of the 2007-present Global Capital Crisis. Its multivarious collapses and shifts of power are too vast a topic for several research institutes to publish in a multi-series volume, let alone my thesis to summarize. Suffice it to say, this period is an escapable part of any global or local analysis of a poli-socio-economic system, and is the primary temporal backdrop for my case study of South Africa’s counter-hegemonic, university-driven social movements and university student protests.
Three Critical Premises

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    Neoliberalism’s De-Democratization and Ruination of HEIs

Universities’ and Students’ Counter-Hegemonic, Radical, Transgressive Potential
  Radical Transgression, Counter-Hegemonic Social Movements, or “Revolution”? (How) Could Universities Drive Social Movements?
    Can Universities Drive Social Movements Now?
    Marginalized University Students’ Protests Actualize Prefigurative Politics
Contemporary Globalization, De-democratization, and Covert Authoritarianism

My thesis’s first major premise is that, despite the Global Capital Crisis, as of 2016 the contemporary globality remains USA-driven, global, neoliberal capitalism, and this is because neoliberalism is fundamentally a “new” form of covert authoritarianism. Though thoroughly defined and theoretically conceptualized throughout this first critical premise, in simplest terms, I argue the following. Neoliberalism is fundamentally a covert form of governance by capital, which was, under Contemporary Globalization, imposed on a global scale by the USA through violence. I agree with the majority of Mainstream and Critical GS theorists that after the collapse of the USSR, the USA’s variety of advanced capitalism became the foundation for a unipolar, USA-driven, post-Cold War global order. I argue that this variety of advanced capitalism was neoliberal capitalism, or “neoliberalism,” for short. This neoliberalism was imposed at a global scale through neoliberal globalization, which necessitates violence, militarization, and securitization; this neoliberal globalization was the definitive process of Contemporary Globalization from after the collapse of the USSR and the Cold War through the present.

Defining Hegemony, Regional and Global

Modern hegemony (Greek; English: leader) theories originate with northern Italian theorist Gramsci and their anti-capitalism work in a counter-Fascist, early 1900s context. (Hoare and Smith, Gramsci, 1999; Forgacs, Gramsci; 2000) Much of Gramsci’s theories on hegemony, collusion, control, history, materialism, and capitalist-realism are filtered through translations and academic theorization about Gramsci’s own theories. Their work was in their own time a translation and filtering of Marxist and Leninist theories about the bourgeoisie and
proletariat. (Cox, 1983; Gill, 1993) Much of Gramsci’s most influential writing and theories, like that later cited by Fanon and Biko occurred while he was detained by the state. As such, hegemony is often nebulously defined, given that it is a translation of a translation, which has survived within the margins of the margins of society - in marginalized academia.

Gramsci’s theories provided groundbreaking lenses for assessing interregna between dominant powers, the assumed objectivity of intellectuals, the relationship between urban and rural power dynamics, as well as local and national authorities. Perhaps most useful was Gramsci’s problematization of an overly-reductive ideal type approach to state power, which they achieved by emphasizing how cultural and social non-state agents influenced the state, laws, and legality. Gramsci theorized that “basic changes in international power relations…can be traced to fundamental changes in social relations,” insisting that culture or society within a state exerts significant influence, or cultural power, over both that state and, potentially, other states. (Cox, 1983: 168-169) In fewer words, “to be meaningful, the notion of the state would also have to include the underpinnings of the political structure in civil society,” (Cox, 1983: 164) which today remains an assertion that transgresses against common sense ideas held by many: most find meaning in ostensibly apolitical social acts.

Although focused on inter-nation-state exchanges and IR, Gramsci’s ideas about international relations asserted that politics, sociology, and economics all intersected. This is most relevant to my later analysis of neoliberalism’s global hegemony, which originated within The South culture, economics, and history within the USA.

The complexity and multivarious applicability of hegemony is part of its appeal, much like Critical GS as “complexity” studies is very appealing. Much like GS, hegemony is more flexible than reductive capitalist-realist notions of the state, and may be interpreted and
applied to multivarious case studies, thus allowing broader understanding than previous
theories did, as well as increasing possibly wider adoption by critical theorists. In Gramsci’s
time, this was especially useful in discriminating between various ideas of revolution, such as
a “war of movement” or “war of position” regarding entrenched, state and non-state forces
that could oppose or facilitate radical change. (Cox, 1983: 164-165) It was also especially
useful to recognize “a dialectic of revolution-restoration which tended to become blocked as
neither the new forces nor the old could triumph,” problematizing simple revolutionary ideals
into a complex plurality of victories and losses, advances and retreats, over a longer period of
time history previously suggested. (Cox, 1983: 165-166) Gramsci’s most relevant idea
regarding hegemony for my thesis’s first and second critical premises is how:

Gramsci’s variant of philosophical realism...identifies the intellectual process as a
creative, practical, yet open-ended and continuous engagement to explain an
apparently intractable social reality. This process is, like the processes of change
within a given necessity, a dialectical one, and is thus a part of the historical process;
it does not stand outside it. Indeed, Gramsci developed the unique concept of the
'organic intellectual' to show how the processes of intellectual production were
themselves in dialectical relation to the process of historical change…
(Gill, 1993: 23)

Gramsci, imprisoned in Fascist Italy in the early 1900s, argued much how Freire and
other critical pedagogists imprisoned by absolute poverty under the Cold War would later
argue: the individual subject is always a part of, and potentially complicit in, a historical
process that cannot be objectively separated from the subject. Additionally, Gramsci’s
concepts of hegemony, and later Marxist and Gramscian academics’ radical theorizing,
provide excellent foils to Global North and West methodologies, epistemologies, and
ideologies.

This Gramscian viewpoint can be contrasted with the technocratic assumptions which
inform the outlook of most professional economists in the West…
The Gramscian approach provides a general critique of methodological individualism,
and methodological reductionism...for Gramsci, it is the ensemble of social relations
configured by social structures ('the situation') which is the basic unit of analysis, rather than individual agents, be they consumers, firms, states or interest groups... the approach insists upon an ethical dimension to analysis, so that the questions of justice, legitimacy, and moral credibility are integrated sociologically into the whole and into many of its key concepts. This is reflected in Gramsci's dual conception of politics and the state...as a class-based apparatus of rule...[and also as] something akin to the Aristotelian view of politics as the search to establish the conditions for the good society, where the state is able at least potentially to be transformed from an apparatus based upon social inequality into an ethical public sphere.

In contrast to the tendency in much of the (American) literature to prioritise systemic order and management, from a vantage point associated with the ruling elements in the wealthy core of the global political economy, the historical materialist perspective looks at the system from the bottom upwards, as well as the top downwards, in a dialectical appraisal of a given historical situation: a concern with movement, rather than management. This highlights the limits of a narrow political economy approach to the analysis of IR.

(Gill, 1993: 24-25)

In my thesis, I attempt to build on these notions of a dialectic approach that is both globally zoomed out and formally academic, as well as locally zoomed in and transgressive against academia’s ostensible neutrality. I additionally draw on the theories of Laclau and Mouffe regarding how to translate concepts of hegemony into actual politics and policies that, hopefully, can yield a sort of ethical public sphere - rather than an amoral private marketplace. In my case study of South Africa’s university students’ radical rhetoric, I aim to be “grounded in privileging the moment of political articulation….for [my] analysis, a notion of the social conceived as a discursive space...becomes of paramount importance.” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: x) Most useful from the theories of Laclau and Mouffe are their recognition of the inherently antagonistic nature of both hegemony and radical leftist resistance to right wing domination, and radicals’ antagonistic propensity towards fracture.

(Carroll and Ratner, 1994; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001)

My simplest summary of hegemony is that it is a more complex notion of power, legitimacy, and authority - or governance - that is based not exclusively on overt state power and direct, physical violence. Instead, hegemonic governance is collusion between state and
non-state powers, to create not only a legal, but also a cultural “normalcy” or set of common sense assumptions that are expected to be followed - or else. The “or else” may or may not include direct, physical, state violence. It may or may not include social, cultural, and/or economic exclusion - a soft power form of violence, or softer violence. Through hegemony, society is ordered not exclusively on what is legal and enforced by state authorities, but rather additionally on what is cultural and enforced by powerful non-state agents, who also possess significant authority. Their authority, or legitimate power, is maintained through a dialectic between the state, civil society, agents of capital, and even the proletariat. With this nuance, Gramscian notions of hegemony provide a more complex way of understanding violence and governance beyond “legal” and “illegal,” beyond the state as the sole source of control, and beyond a binary bourgeoisie versus proletariat lens. With this nuance, governance systems that appear to have “small government” may be understood to actually impose stricter forms of control - as I argue is the case with neoliberalism. With this nuance, it is easier to understand how conformity to certain norms is not overtly conforming to an authority and enforcing the laws of the state, because the state’s dialectic with not-state agents makes its enforcement covert.

A hegemonic lens focuses analyses on more informal, culturally-created norms that are effectively non-state, de facto, socially-constructed rules that govern human behavior in a dialectic with state, de jure, legally-constructed laws, which are perceived as formal legitimization mechanisms. In a hegemonic system, when actors conform to or follow the lead of whatever the non-state authority legitimizes as “normal,” they are not apparently succumbing to the authority of the state. In their widely-cited text on the "propaganda model" of a hegemonic but non-totalitarian state, like the USA, Chomsky outlines how direct
physical violence is replaced by collusion with corporate media to encourage obedience as normal, common sense. For-profit media replicates nation-state interests, which are themselves subservient to logics of profitability, in order to create "necessary illusions," like the concept that advanced, neoliberal capitalism is common sense.

The point is that in a ... totalitarian state, it doesn't much matter what people think because ... you can control what they do...

But when the state loses the bludgeon, when you can't control people by force and when the voice of the people can be heard...you have to control what people think…

And the standard way to do this is to resort to what in more honest days used to be called propaganda. Manufacture of consent. Creation of necessary illusions. (Chomsky, 1992: 51-53; Chomsky, 1999)

An example of this would be a society where the majority of humans assume that it is “common sense” for an ideal type, such as an ostensibly “free market,” to absolutely explain politics, society, and economics. The exemplar of this is the post-Cold War, widespread acceptance, to the point of it being common-sense, that an “invisible hand” guides “free markets” to ensure “all boats rise.” Within this common-sense, “free markets” are collections of equally-informed, equally-powerful, and rational individuals, who almost all behave of their own free will to pursue their own self-interest. This logic is perceived as common-sense without significant critical thought about how legal and/or social laws structure and constrain a capitalist “free market” and vice versa. Such a logic also dismisses critiques that many assumptions about actors within that society, such as their inherent objectivity, or rationality, may be false.

In simpler terms, if oppressed people can believe that conforming to oppression is in fact common sense, normal, and not oppressive, then that may be a more pervasive, more subtle, and less overt way to maintain control. Of course, under colonialism, when overt racism was both cultural common sense, and legal state policy, “the policeman and the
soldier...maintain[ed] contact with the native and advise[d] him by means of rifle butts and napalm…” (Fanon, 1963) To exemplify this idea of hegemony specific to this thesis, Biko is most concise: “The most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed.” (Biko and Stubbs, 1978; 2002: 68)

**Hegemony at the National and Regional Level**

Of course, this concept of subtle state-and-non-state collusion is a less useful analytic lens when the state is very visibly exercising authority through outright dictatorship and dominance, and applied at a national scale. Unlike a conventional IR capitalist-realist lens, using hegemony to analyze oppression rapidly grows more complex and problematic when zooming out from a strictle nation-state unit of analysis to a regional or global perspective. However, this complexity and problematization is an essential quality of a post-/inter-disciplinary analysis which transgresses beyond reductive nation-state units of analysis maintained by IR, Political Science, and/or Economics. So, hegemony tends to be more useful in critiquing post-inter-/trans- capitalist politics, societies, and economies, compared to a society with a more visibly authoritative state.

During the Cold War, the visible, overt, direct violence of Soviet states lent significant weight to pro-capitalist arguments that critiquing capitalism’s covert, and less visible, authoritarianism was not a priority, compared to the USSR’s overt authoritarianism. In the post-Cold War time period, however, advanced capitalism is now commonly conflated with democracy by nation-states, agents of capital, and civil society. Discourse about how “there is no alternative” to capitalist-realism is now the norm, *de facto* and *de jure*, if not by all academics, then by the majority of politicians and other policy-makers, who impose this mindset onto each subsequent generation. (Fisher, 2009; Rheingans and Hollands, 2013)
Because of the invisibilization of the authoritarianism of the advanced capitalism of the USA, as well as the way in which transgressive anti-oppression both resists and replicates oppression, my thesis relies largely upon notions of hegemony. Below, I justify focusing on “hegemony” to describe complex power dynamics on regional and global scales under Contemporary Globalization.

In Gramsci’s time, focus would have been on the Italian bourgeoisie’s management of the proletariat, and movement of state versus non-state forces, or the bourgeoisie actions in an inter-national, multiple nation-state way. Under Contemporary Globalization, my focus is global and regional hegemony. As regional integration increases under Contemporary Globalization, hegemony may be also understood through the way that a single nation-state or authority leads other nation-states or authorities within a region towards policies that benefit the regional hegemon, with the technically legal, but actually manufactured, consent of others in the region.

In this thesis, a region is a contiguous geographical territory and space, usually with the sharing of political borders of the collection of nation-states within that space. Common interest associations of nation-states do not necessarily constitute a region, although they may be a trading bloc, free-trade area, or otherwise aligned or allied around common concerns. (Söderbaum, 2009; Paasi, 2009; Makgatlaneng, 2013) There has been significant attention in recent years to the BRIC(S), or the 4-5 nation-states with the largest economies after the G7: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and sometimes South Africa, depending on the theorist. (Armijo, 2007; Robinson, 2015; Néderveen-Pieterse, 2015b; Bond, 2016) While collectively the BRIC(S) may someday constitute a regional hegemon or a even global hegemon, currently they would not be what my thesis considers a “region,” despite how BRIC(S)
policies may impact their constituent nation-states and, in turn, other nation-states that follow their lead. My thesis considers Southern Africa a critical region for counter-hegemony. I alternately use the term “South(ern) Africa,” denoting how South Africa as a concept and political actor is at times synonymous with an entire region, given its significant power in the region.

It includes, but is not limited to, the political boundaries of the nation-states which comprise the regional trading bloc the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Southern African region could alternately be everything on the continent south of the equator - which SADC almost now includes. The African region itself could be tied to the continental land mass, and the African Union (AU) could be a continentally-scaled region in and of itself - as well as a common interest association of nation-states. In the case of Southern Africa or the African region, South Africa could easily fit the definition of a regional hegemon exercising regional hegemony, as it leads or drives neighboring and nearby states and peoples, influencing state policies and laws, as well as social and cultural norms. (Makgatlaneng, 2013)

The result of this regional exercise of authority and contest for legitimacy about what is “normal” is sometimes seen as a blend of complex interdependence and hegemony, or “interdependent hegemony,” when regional powers challenge and rely on one another, but also on the global hegemon. (Xing and Augustin, 2016) Alternatively, the notion of “sub-imperialism,” or a regional hegemon acting as a regional imperial power, while it is also subordinated to a global hegemon, is a recent concept. However, I reject it in this thesis, as it centers the narrative on a regional hegemon as imperial, rather than on the fact that the

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regional hegemon is internalizing the oppression imposed upon it by the global hegemon. (Taylor, 2011; Bond, 2016)

Western Africa would also be a region, which includes but is not limited to the nation-state collection known as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), wherein Nigeria would be considered the regional hegemon. (Babatunde, 2006; Iwilade and Agbo, 2012) However, South Africa may or may not have more influence than Nigeria in the region of western Africa, depending upon the specific issue at hand. Because of South Africa’s significant influence over the region of Africa and the region of southern Africa, but not necessarily the region of western Africa or the globe, South Africa is herein referred as a regional hegemon, but not a global hegemon. An example of what would likely not be able to be considered regionally hegemonic would be Botswana, a relatively wealthy and respected nation-state in the southern Africa region, but a nation-state which ultimately has a much lower measure of economic, cultural, and military state power, or the ability to influence norms, compared to South Africa.

Another example relevant to my thesis is Germany. (Bulmer and Paterson, 2013; Bulmer, 2014) Within the continental territory of Europe, and within the nation-state association of the EU, Germany’s economic, cultural, and military power may significantly influence policies, behaviors, and norms across the region. An example of what would likely not be able to be considered a regional hegemon is Italy, which ultimately has significant cultural power and influence across the region of Europe, but lacks economic and military power, is less influential than Germany or other nation-states or authorities within the region of Europe and/or the EU, and ultimately follows the lead of other authorities. A final example relevant to my thesis would be the USA’s sub-national state of California as a
regional hegemon, within both the USA and North America as regions. This premise lacks extensive academic and theoretical support. California’s only recognized hegemony is its influence on racializing immigration, language, and education policies. (Lowenthal, 2006; Cobas, Duany, and Fagin, 2015) However, I assert that the economic, cultural, and even military power of California leads other sub-national states within the USA. California significantly influences other nation-states in North America and the Pacific Rim, especially Mexico, through immigration, drug, incarceration, and financial policies. The California Democratic Party also drives policies within the USA’s Democratic Party, thereby impacting other states governed by it.

An example of what would likely not be able to be considered a regional hegemon in the context of North America or USA as a region region would be the USA state of Oregon, or the nation-state of Canada. Both Oregon and Canada, while possessing some influence over politics and cultural norms, ultimately are much less influential than California. I feel compelled to clarify that one of the USA’s sub-national states is not the same as a nation-state within a region, insofar as the national authority of the USA would legally override the authority of a sub-national state. Similarly, in a global context, the global hegemon overrides the influence of the regional hegemon in most areas most of the time. As such, it is important to remember that the changing context for a regional hegemon may reduce its hegemony, and this is almost always true when a regional hegemon encounters a global hegemon. (Taylor, 2011; Bond, 2016) To return to the context and region most relevant to this thesis, Southern Africa, it must be noted that the policies and behaviors pursued by the regional hegemons of Germany or California or even South Africa will generally not have as much influence or
power as those pursued by the global hegemon of the USA as a nation-state and assemblage of capitalist agents.

**Defining Global Hegemony, Past to Present**

Global hegemony is, in the simplest terms, hegemony operating at a global scale, and impacting less powerful regions, nation-states, and sub-state forces. (Gill, 1993) A global hegemon is an actor that possesses significant authority on a global, super-international scale, and which exerts influence in almost every region and nation-state in terms of simultaneous economic, cultural, and military power. (Gilpin, 1981; Keohane, 1984; Modelski, 1987; Gill, 1993; Robinson, 1996; Arrighi and Silver, 1999; Nederveen-Pieterse, 2004) A global hegemon exerts its authority in an ostensibly consensual exchange, perceived as legally and socially legitimate or normal, and in which multiple different actors around the globe, within a region, and at the local level of the nation-state or below, all collude with the global hegemon in way that legitimizes its leadership and dominance. (Gill, 1993; Nederveen-Pieterse, 2004, 2011)

Most theorists agree that throughout the modern era, select European nation-states were globally hegemonic, empowered through empires of colonies and wielding significant capitalism-derived economic, cultural, and military state power. It is generally understood that in discussing global hegemons, during the early modern period, Portugal, the Dutch United Provinces, Spain, and then Britain were the primary global hegemons. (Gilpin, 1981; Modelski, 1987; Wallerstein, 1979, 2000; Osterhammel, 2005, 2015; Stuchtey 2011) Portuguese, Dutch, and Spanish influence around the globe was expansive c. 1500s-1800s, with the Portuguese colonizing and controlling vast parts of South America. This control was dependent upon a powerful navy and an intercontinental plantation economy based on
slavery, raw resource extraction, agricultural production, navy-facilitated global distribution of commodities, and financialization of early modern capitalist systems. (Hartz, 1969; Flynn, 2002; Coniff and Davis, 2002; 2003; Peterson, 2011; Baptist, 2014) The Dutch United Provinces maintained arguably one of the most powerful and expansive global economies, driving the expansion of for-profit firms and modern capitalism’s dependence on colonization. As reviewed in the following chapter, the impact on South Africa remains, to this day, devastatingly violent.

Beginning in the 1500s, Spain arguably became the first truly global hegemon. Following the late 1400s Reconquista of the Iberian peninsula, Spain controlled significant territory and resources, and wielded ideological power over darker-skinned races and Islamic, animist, or otherwise non-Catholic cultures. Consequently, with massive growth in naval and military power, and colonization of much of the Americas and parts of southeastern Asia, Spain succeeded other European powers. Spain colonized expansive portions of the Americas and established a Pan-Atlantic, Pan-Latin America, Pan-Pacific economic empire based on slavery and extractivism, expanding on existing Dutch and Portuguese practices. It additionally created the strongest naval force up to that point in human history. Spain’s control of the Philippines and silver trade from the Americas to China drove major monetary changes across both the Atlantic and the Pacific, and into Europe. (Peterson, 2011)

Spain globally spread European economic practices, especially slavery, plantation economics, and gold- and silver-based currencies. Spanish cultural practices, from religion to food to architecture and shipbuilding, became known across Europe, South America, North America, and eastern Asia. Within this culture of violence, colonialism, enslavement, and
domination, so too did culture of resistance by both the colonized and within the colonizers emerge. The common exemplar of this would be the Catholic priest Bartolome de las Casas, who was anti-indigenous slavery, but pro-African slavery. (Castro, 2007) Within Catholicism and Spanish imperial circles, de las Casas was marginalized and his political action was attacked by the mainstream authorities - but at the same time, their politics, transgressive as they were at the time, ultimately led to “ecclesiastical imperialism” rather than decolonization.

Although the power and reach of Spain’s global hegemony did not operate with the same speed and intensity of later global hegemons, it was for most intents and purposes one of the lead drivers of the Eurocentricization of the planet c. the 1500s to the 1800s. Regionally, in Latin America following the USA’s decolonization from the British Empire, and through the 1800s indigenous Americans’ decolonization struggles against Spain and Portugal, the USA succeeded Spain as the regional hegemon. (Robinson, 1996; Grandin, 2007; Guardiola-Rivera, 2010; Gonzalez, 2011) Globally, as the Spanish Empire collapsed, the British Empire succeeded Spain as the global hegemon. In both cases, the ascending power reiterated the historical violence of colonization, maintaining violence against, and profitable exploitation of, colonized peoples.

The British Empire expanded upon the Eurocentric global order established by Spain’s global hegemony, which Wallerstein termed the “modern world-system,” and which Hobsbawm termed as signalling “an age of revolution,” an “age of capital,” leading to an “age of empire”. (Hobsbawm, 1962, 1974, 1989) This Eurocentrism was predicated on notions of a European identity of lighter-skin, the Protestant Work Ethic, technological innovation, and dominance of both natural environments and less-powerful peoples. During
the 1900s, as the British Empire, and slightly less powerful empires, warred and collapsed, “the age of extremes” unfolded, with the emergence of all-consuming, industrialized, total war that killed the highest absolute and relative, per-capita numbers of combatants and non-combatants. (Hobsbawm, 1994) World Wars I and II were driven by Eurocentric politics and European imperial aggression, and as such relied upon colonial human and material resources to be fought and to be justified.

It is generally accepted that World War I marked the massive curtailment of the German empire, the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, and the end of the Russian Tsarist empire, once the Russian Revolution implemented the Soviet system. By the end of World War II, the British and French Empires were unravelling, and the rise of the USSR and the USA established a “bipolar” post-Europe global order, contested globally throughout global Cold War. (Westad, 2007) Seen in this global, hegemonic lens, most of the 1900s were defined by wars of hegemonic succession, where first fascist Nazi Germany and imperial Japan, and then Soviet-socialist USSR and capitalist USA, waged global-scale wars to succeed the British Empire as the global hegemon. (Gilpin, 1981; Modelski, 1987; Wallerstein, 1979, 2000, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Arrighi and Silver, 1999; Ferguson, 2005; Westad, 2007) By the end of 1992, the USSR had collapsed, and the USA eventually emerged the victor as the collapse of the USSR heralded the official end of the Cold War.

The significantly different, and unequally-distributed, but average higher-per-capita development indicators, of the USA resulted in the widespread conclusion that the USA and its poli-socio-economic ideologies “won” the Cold War. This perspective is neatly summarized by UK Prime Minister Thatcher’s assertion “There is no alternative” (TINA) perspective, which was adopted widely by UK, USA, and other Global North and West
politicians, policy-makers, and corporate media. (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Bond, 2014: 121)
TINA, however, and its Cold War-era anti-communist, pro-capitalist Cartesian dualism, was
conformed to by mainstream academics. Fukuyama’s sweeping generalization of “the end of
history” (Fukuyama, 1989; 1992) exemplifies academia’s abandonment of Marxist /
development / dependency critiques even better than the popularity of Huntington’s
Islamophobic “Clash of Civilizations.” (Huntington, 1996) As a review of (c)overly right-
wing Mainstream GS theory reveals, it is path dependent, reductive, uncritical, and
unimaginative to take as factual the teleology of the Global North and West’s version of
“liberal democracy” and capitalist-realism. The post-USSR ascent of the USA should be
described: in terms of neoliberalism, authoritarianism, and violence.

**Defining Global Neoliberalism and Authoritarianism**

Neoliberalism is a term long-used by marginalized academics. It has recently become
a mainstream academic buzzword used by both the right and the left within academia, to
support and to challenge its ongoing use, respectively. As detailed below, neoliberal
capitalism, or neoliberalism for short, is generally agreed-upon by academics and many
policy-makers as a problematic or controversial variety of advanced capitalism that varies
significantly from varieties with more visible market regulations. (Jackson and Deeg, 2006;
Robinson, 2015)

Under neoliberalism, many governmental regulations on capitalist firms are reduced,
ranging from those intended to mitigate environmental impacts, to maintain fair labor
practices, and to maintain national sovereignty and a skilled national labor force. This
decrease in nation-state ability to regulate firms, which spreads across regions and the globe
as states attempt to out-compete one another, creates a shift towards a “globalized economy”,
wherein capital, commodities, information, and, to an extent, labor moves more quickly across territorial boundaries, space, and time. (Levitt, 1983) Poorer people are generally denied the same increased legal freedom of movement afforded to capital, unless it is for the purposes of becoming laborers in a new context. (Held, 1999; Harvey, 2005; Steger, 2003) One result of this globalized economy is an increase in transactions and competitiveness amongst firms, producers, consumers, and laborers, as well as an increase in the amounts of and the powers of multi- and trans-national corporations (MNCs and TNCs).

MNCs and TNCs are for-profit capitalist firms that maintain operations and taxable headquarters in more and more diverse geographies around the globe, rather than staying within a single national market or tax system. (Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Hirst, Thompson, and Bromley, 2015) Under Contemporary Globalization, few Global South MNCs or TNCs emerged to rival the existing power or market capitalization of Global North and South firms, which maintained absolutely and relatively higher profitability and stock valuation year-to-year, decade-to-decade, from the 1980s to the present. (Dunning, 2007) As the space and time required for firms, producers, and consumers to engage in transactions compress, spatial and temporal marketization occurs, too, as formerly non-transactional human social and physical infrastructure must prioritize transactions to maximize efficiency. (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Harvey, 2005) What this yields is both a massive increase in the complexity of the world and a shift in the type of complexity, alongside a decrease in the ability to understand the world - except in terms of individual marketplace transactions.

Under neoliberalism, what is perceived as a legitimate source of power and authority shifts away from notions of states that ostensibly represent the will of the majority with beneficial intervention in markets. Instead, legitimacy depends on notions of markets that
will better serve consumers with less state interference. A result of this is the rise of the power of non-state actors, both for-profit firms and ostensibly not-for-profit NGOs and civil society. Neoliberal civil society is comprised of multivarious actors, but the institutions, and networks of institutions and individuals, are a fundamental part of neoliberal civil society. As corporations became multi- and trans-national and centered on notions of marketplace transactions, so too does civil society. Transnational networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Castells, 2008) of NGOs, which are often legally categorized as “non-profit” oriented, become significant sources of influence on state policies (Evans, 2000a, 2000b). Neoliberal civil society attempts to fill in “the democracy deficit” created by neoliberalism, defined by Weiler et al. as the “gap between formal legitimation and material democratic deficiency”. (1995: 11) The policies that NGOs largely over-determine, without electorally-determined public support (Bond, 2000) cover all topics, from religion (Yates, 2002) to trade (Carroll and Carson, 2003) to environmental protections (Wapner, 1996; Keck and Sikkink, 1998) to security. (Oudraat and Haufler, 2008) On the one hand, decreasing state authority somewhat provides an increased ability of humans to collectivize through transnational networks and rally around “counter-hegemonic globalization,” or “globalization from below,” due to better information flow across historical boundaries of space and time. (Evans, 2000a; 2000b) This is the optimistic, marketization-as-democratization view of neoliberal civil society.

On the other hand, all NGOs benefit from this increased ability to collectivize, including those dedicated to promoting capitalist-realism, and yet legally classified and overtly-identified as non-profit NGOs. As marketization of space, time, and the state occurs, pro-capitalist institutions and networks increase their influence on the state, relative both to historic levels of capitalist influence, and relative to contemporary levels of influence by anti-
capitalist institutions that possess less power, authority, and legitimacy within neoliberalism. (Carroll and Carson, 2003) Because neoliberal poli-socio-economics prioritize profit and efficiency above all, transnational networks of businessmen, corporate executives, and pro-capitalist NGOs are better able to establish revolving doors between their executives. This is because new neoliberal common sense, as well as good old fashioned corruption, encourages closer integration between pro-capitalist, for-profit agents and markets and states.

Whereas many mainstream GS theorists within academia and beyond argue that decreasing state power relative to market power ultimately yields more freedom, I align myself with marginalized and critical theorists that argue the opposite. Under neoliberalism, most of society remains excluded from controlling capital or the state, and the result is less freedom, decreased power, and an increasingly precarious survival. (Wacquant, 2009; 2010) The marketization processes that neoliberalism imposes upon society, and that spread across state boundaries, yields what I detail later as “governance by capital.” This is similar to conventional Marxist-development-dependency theories of “oligarchy,” or rule by a small group, or what Robinson terms “polyarchy,” which means rule by many, but not the majority. Robinson’s term specifically refers to the control of the state by a select population that controls significant capital, and it is closer to my theory. (1996, 2000)

In line with similar theories of oligarchy and polyarchy, I argue that as state power decreases relative to market power, select parts of the state, those which secure for-profit transactions, increase their power. Additionally, select parts of society, such as pro-capitalist NGOs and for-profit firms, become more powerful because of their ever-increasing control of capital, and its consequent ever-increasing ability to influence state laws legitimizing the rule of capital, perpetuating an endless circle, or a revolving door, of a state that serves
capital, and a capital that serves the parts of the state that serve capital. This “cycle of neoliberalism” is roughly visualized in Figure 1.1 below. While it is based upon “enforcement” of securitization of surplus labor, I argue that “enforcement” can refer to any process of the state applying force, under the auspices of securing profitability, and legitimized by the common sense of a society unable to imagine alternatives to capitalism. (Golash-Boza, 2012; 2015)

**FIGURE 2.1:** The Neoliberal Cycle: “Privatization” Yields Increasing State Enforcement

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**Text Description(s):**
Graphic visualizing “The Neoliberal Cycle,” with five main phases: (1) Privatization yields (2) Global inequality and outsourcing, yields (3) Low wage work, yields (4) Cutbacks in social services, yields (5) Enhanced enforcement arm [of the state.]

**Source(s):**
Given these theories and processes, my thesis defines neoliberalism as:

- **An ostensibly economic model** that overtly identifies itself as a re-interpretation of Europe’s modern liberalism and classical economics models for the post-modern world;
- **An actually political, social, economic, and cultural (poli-socio-economic) ideology**, or way of imagining the world, with covert qualities in addition to its overt qualities;
- **Founded on notions of Eurocentric hyper-individualism**: a masculine individualism that fails to consider super-individual social structures, except the classical idea of the nation-state, and that posits all human individuals are equally powerful, rational actors, who behave in their own self-interest and, consequently, benefit all of society;
- **Founded on notions of the superiority and greater “efficiency” of “privatization”**: the transition away from “public” provisions of goods and services to private, individual capital transactions that are more “efficient” and therefore superior;
- **An ostensibly smaller-government model overtly identified as “de-regulation”** of nation-state governance; and,
- **An actually bigger-government model covertly re-regulating society** through increased selective policing, militarism, and securitization of society to ensure select capital transactions are more likely to occur than others.

Throughout Contemporary Globalization, and especially since the Global Capital Crisis, some neoliberal policies have been proven by even conservative economic indicators to be abject failures in their respective areas, such as privatizing healthcare (Fisk, 2000) or urban water. (Spronk, 2007) Other policies have proven to be at best highly precarious and unstable in a globalized economy, such as energy or financial booms and busts, which a majority of academics will now term “crises”. (McNally, 2009; Bruff, 2014) Despite its academically-identified problems and the immensity of the Global Capital Crisis, neoliberal capitalism continues to govern the existence of most nation-states, state associations, regions, and sub- / non-state agents, including individuals.

This “strange non-death of neoliberalism,” (Crouch, 2011) and the fact it simply will not “die” has earned it the moniker of a “zombie” ideology which persists despite the near-consensus of academics and theorists denouncing its instability, inhumanity, and violence. (Harvey, 2009; Peck, 2010; Springer, 2015) Despite this majority of academics’ consensus
on neoliberalism, including mainstream academics and even some previously conservative theorists, after almost ten years of the Global Capital Crisis, neoliberalism persists as the *de facto* world order. My thesis argues that, if such an inhumane and violent governance logic endures in an international community of ostensibly free, humane, just, legal, liberal, democratic nation-states, one of the following must be true:

A. The near-consensus of extensive, rigorous, often self-reflexive and -critical, democratic academic research that condemns neoliberalism is factually incorrect, and as such it is understandably ignored by receptive, democratic nation-states that incorporate legitimate knowledge produced by universities; or,

B. The contemporary, nation-state-based global order is in fact not free, humane, just, legal, liberal, and democratic, and the knowledge produced in academia is only considered legitimate and incorporated into state policies when it benefits the state and/or capitalism.

My research suggests B., given the greater democracy, systems of checks and balance, prevalent self-reflexivity, and encouragement of critical thought within academia, relative to the lack of democracy, checks and balances, self-reflexivity, or critical thought in Contemporary Globalization’s poli-socio-economics. Below, I outline how we arrived at neoliberalism on a global scale, and then address how the legitimacy and authority of knowledge, historically produced by universities, intersects with the violence of neoliberalism’s covert authoritarianism: governance by capital.

**Contemporary, Neoliberal Globalization Yielded Global Neoliberalism**

Neoliberal globalization has impacted almost every facet of everything on planet earth. Non-human animal species and environments across the globe; non-living chemistry of the planet’s atmosphere; effectively all human economic interaction; nearly all human cultural norms and practices; the economic and legal structures underpinning those practices - since Contemporary Globalization, neoliberalism has at least impacted, if not decided, all of these. My thesis understands “global neoliberalism” largely in terms of the global theories of Nederveen-Pieterse, Robinson, and Bond. It later uses the critical pedagogy work of
Giroux and the political science work of Brown to specify its authoritarian qualities. With that in mind, to reiterate, I use Contemporary Globalization to denote:

- Post-Cold War, 1988-present, global-scale changes in politics, societies, economics, and cultures, with consistent trends emerging in each local example of globalization;
- driven by ideologies originating in or refined by the USA, and therefore establishing the USA’s global hegemony; and,
- establishing neoliberal capitalist poli-socio-economics on a global scale

Again, to re-iterate and clarify, neoliberalism is:

- Ostensibly an economic model overtly tied to Eurocentrism;
- Actually a poli-socio-economic logic with additional covert qualities;
- Hyper-individualistic;
- Founded on notions of the superiority and greater “efficiency” of “privatization”;
- Ostensibly smaller-government overtly identified as de-regulation;
- Actually bigger-government that covertly re-regulates society through increased selective policing, militarism, and securitization

Because I understand the world in terms of hegemony, or collusion and coerced consent, not outright domination, I recognize that processes of globalization, and local encounters with and articulations of globally hegemonic ideas, exist and are maintained as a dialectic between the local and the global. I also recognize that there may be something of a plurality or variety of neoliberalisms globally, much as there is a plurality or variety of capitalisms. Neoliberalism in the USA differs from neoliberalism in Chile, in Congo, in China, in the UK, and in South Africa. However, I maintain that global hegemonic authority has an overwhelming power advantage over local actors, in terms of economy, culture, and military. As such, a global plurality of multivarious local neoliberalisms around the globe means that while there are varieties of assimilation and resistance that remain dynamic and unique, as of 2016, nearly all local poli-socio-economic systems are still effectively constrained by the fundamental logics of neoliberalism more than they are defined by a
successful alternative. In the words of Robinson, "‘varieties of capitalism’ produce varieties of integration into global capitalism" and consequently varieties of exploitation. (2015: 16)

As the Cold War ended and the USSR collapsed, the USA-UK variety of advanced capitalism that had incubated during the Cold War was able to be imposed on a global level. Nederveen-Pieterse historicizes neo-liberalism as occurring in “waves” throughout the short 20th century, beginning in the USA with “proto” neoliberalism in the 1940s-1960s, “roll-back” neo-liberalism in the 1970s and 1980s, and “roll-out” neo-liberalism from the 1990s to the present. (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2004) An example of the USA’s proto phase of neoliberalism is the Cold War era development of “the infrastructure of neoliberalism...ideology (free market), think tanks...and economic policy (the “Chicago boys” in Chile and Indonesia)” which became increasingly legitimate within the political and economic elites of the USA, and then imposed upon the lower classes as common sense. (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2004: 3)

An example of the USA’s roll back phase of neoliberalism is the c. 1970s-80s shift in monetary and fiscal policies, such as floating currency exchange rates, and the integration of the most conservative smaller-government ideas of Hayek and Friedman into the Republican Party’s “Reagonomics,” into the UK’s “New Labour”, and into the USA’s “Third Way” Democrats. Their question of “could we consider neoliberalism as the sequel to the Cold War?” would appear to be answered economically and ideologically through understanding that: “if modernization theory was state-centered and part of the postwar governmental Keynesian [and Fordist] consensus...the Washington consensus turns another leaf, to government rollback and deregulation.” (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2004: 10) “Roll-out” neoliberalism, the primary focus of this thesis due to its fundamental role in Contemporary
Globalization, is the Washington Consensus “elevated from domestic policy to international program...implemented through IMF stabilization lending and World Bank structural adjustment programs...the combination of Dixie capitalism and Wall Street financial engineering has been extrapolated on a global scale.” (Nederveen-Pieterse, 2004: 10-11) Specific examples of this concept of the “role out” neoliberalism and its necessary violence and collusion with knowledge systems are detailed later.

Nederveen-Pieterse’s early 2004 theory was not just that post-USSR globalization was a USA-driven project to establish neoliberalism at a global scale. Rather, their sub-state scale of analysis argued that neoliberalism derives from the poli-socio-economics of The South, within the USA. What they term “Dixie capitalism,” Beckford terms “plantation economics” (1999), which I consider now to be “global plantation economics.” I term it as such to emphasize its abuse of labor and propensity towards slavery. Contemporary, global plantation economics’ history lies with Anglo-British and USA colonialism and enslavement of Africans and indigenous peoples. Nederveen-Pieterse highlights how Dixie capitalism/plantation economics on any scale depends on racialized state violence, and a racist culture which supports it, to control inexpensive labor for capitalist exploitation. How this inexpensive labor is maintained has varied throughout history, from chattel slavery to Jim Crow to prison industrial complexes. (Wood, 2003; Nederveen-Pieterse, 2004; Baptist, 2007)
As such, while neoliberalism’s overt logic is that of “privatization,” which ostensibly yields smaller-government and market deregulation, it is in fact covert re-regulation of society as a whole, with the following priorities:

- Decreasing real wages and rights for labor;
- Decreasing real taxes and other costs, such as labor costs, for capitalists and firms;
- Decreasing state or “public” spending and delivery of most social services; and,
- Increasing state violence in the form of selective incarceration and policing.

(Nederveen-Pieterse, 2004)

Today, as the state legitimizes these priorities through laws influenced by agents of capital, governing human behavior is executed in a subtler form of hegemony compared to Fanon’s “rifle butts and napalm” of explicit state authoritarianism, but neoliberalism’s end goal of free labor, enforced through incarceration and policing, remains. Like most knowledge of neoliberalism, this theory is not widespread beyond academia, but it is supported by multivarious other theories recognizing the USA’s foundation as an efficiency- and profit-oriented society that relied first on chattel slavery, then on Jim Crow, then on mass incarceration, and now on the post-9/11 security-surveillance state. (Hall et. al., 1978; Wood, 2003; Baptist, 2007; Alexander, 2012; Amar, 2013; Gill, 1995, 2015; Gunn, 2013) With each social movement-induced legal transformation of the state, select populations continued to be racialized and governed through decreasingly visible state application of different types of legitimate violence, but at an increasingly complex global scale. Understanding the origins of Contemporary Globalization, neoliberal globalization, and the establishment of global neoliberalism based upon the USA’s South helps clarify the global order’s colonial origins and history of racialized authority. Later, this helps to understand the brutality of its manifestation in South(ern) Africa.

This supports my thesis's focus on historical colonialism and ongoing decolonization against contemporary colonialism in South Africa and elsewhere around the world. Despite
hundreds of years of violence, the end of the Cold war, and multivarious power shifts, there has been little change in the fundamental logics governing human behavior, or in the lived experiences of most human beings. When using this deep historical-colonial lens to analyze the contemporary world system, it is unsurprising that global neoliberalism, both theoretically and actually, perpetuates highly racialized forms of global imbalance between the North and West and the South. Under neoliberalism, aggressive governance of human behavior actually increases, just not overtly by the state, in order to maintain the authority of profitable non-state capitalist authorities, who in turn influence ostensibly legitimate state authorities, who in turn legitimate and legalize pro-capitalist policies.

As agents of capital require collusion with the state, so too does the state require collusion with academia and media to legitimize production and consumption of the necessary illusion that it is common sense that there is no alternative to neoliberalism. Although media plays a key role, much has already been written on corporate media’s collusion with the state to maintain profitable neoliberal capitalist hegemony, and the focus in my thesis is education. Academia colluded in this oppression through legitimizing such logics, given their status as epistemological authority figures.

*Global Neoliberalism’s Covert Authoritarianism: Hegemonic Governance by Capital*

As noted above, the hegemony, collusion, covert increase of state violence in the name of individual freedom, and other qualities of neoliberalism increase the likelihood of violence. I argue that neoliberalism is fundamentally an ideology of authoritarianism, here titled “governance by capital.” As outlined below, this governance by capital in the ideology of neoliberalism is authoritarian at its core, in that it gives more authority to those that already possess it, and delegitimizes attempts by other actors to increase their own authority,
unless they conform to the logic of for-profit, private, capital transactions. But, in an ostensibly free and democratic system, with routine elections, how can so severe an ideology as authoritarianism persist? The simple answer is that the system is neither free nor democratic, despite formal electoral institutions. The security of select groups’ profitability necessitates selective application of state violence to regulate markets in a way that maintains those groups power.

This is executed by an anti-democratic and bureaucratically insulated “deep state” that is largely unresponsive to elections. The last portion of my thesis’s first critical premise focuses on specifics of militarization, securitization, and violence. Before that, I review the critical theories of how de jure electoral systems only ostensibly provide citizens the ability to freely choose their governments. The de facto policies governing behavior, however, tend to be determined outside of state elections - ultimately resulting in a system that is fundamentally authoritarian.

The influence of agents of capital upon the state is a familiar critique of Marxist / development / dependency theory. Though marginalized within academia under Contemporary Globalization, these anti-capitalist critique remain increasingly relevant due to the Global Capital Crisis. (McNally, 2009; Bruff, 2014) Several Marxist theorists’ consistent use of the term “authoritarian” to describe neoliberalism have been consistently-ignored beyond academia for decades. This is yet one more example of how, under Contemporary Globalization, transgressive arguments against the common sense of the superiority of “privatization” and capitalist-realism are seen as illegitimate, even when articulated by civil society actors that were once powerful, such as universities. Bruff revisits Gramsci, Poulantzas, and Hall to understand state and market authority in Contemporary
Globalization. Their analysis asserts that, like universities, the formerly robust democracy of the European style “social democracy” variety of capitalism has been de-democratized by global neoliberalism. (Bruff, 2014) As such, by the time of the Global Capital Crisis, nearly all poli-socio-economic models worldwide, even relatively stable and therefore preferential varieties of capitalism, or models proposed by academics, have been rendered illegitimate by states that deem them impossible to implement, amongst a populace unable to articulate alternatives.

“De-Democratization” and “Governance by Capital”

“Governance by capital” is slightly different than “oligarchy,” or what Robinson terms “polyarchy,” which specifically refers to the control of the state by a select population that controls significant capital. (1996, 2000) Governance by capital refers to not only state governance mechanisms, but rather to all political, social, cultural, and economic governance logics. Governance by capital refers to the fact that at every level of human existence, the market dominates the narrative. States remain relevant, though they increasingly seem to only exist because of, and in service to, markets and profitability. States continue to legitimize markets and agents of capital under the auspices of “democracy.” However, under neoliberalism, governance is no longer only about the state being controlled by the market. Instead, everything, everywhere, at every time, is about the market - a totalizing notion of everything as transaction. The market is life, everything, everywhere. Morality, emotion, connection, and nearly every decision made under neoliberalism is about efficiency and maximizing resource consumption in search of profit. Humans are no longer humans, or citizens, or residents - they are renters, reduced to purely transactional entities, nothing more than consumers of commodities, produced in another place that, like home, can only be
capitalist. (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Brown, 2003; 2006) They have gone from being *homo sapiens* to *homo economicus*. (Brown, 2015) In more concrete terms, neoliberalism’s governance by capital simply means that agents - be they state, non-state, for-profit, or non-profit - with more capital have more power. Powerful agents then influence state legal structures to further profit themselves or their capital interests by increasing their profitability, thus maintaining or expand their authority. Essentially, there is the degradation of both *de jure* legal democratic checks and balances - an elected government - or *de facto* social democratic checks and balances - a community valuing people above profit.

This expansion of the authority of capitalists occurs simultaneously as, and as a result of, denying anti-capitalist actors the ability to legitimately, through elections or institutions, increase their already-limited authority. Their lack of authority is constantly legitimized by the overriding, totalizing ideology of capitalism, transactions, and profits being the most or the only important behavior for humans. This authority system is legitimized by hyper-individualism as the cultural norm. The ability to consider the complexity of a state system, such as its electoral process, is not present in a discourse that is entirely focused on individuals as free agents. Neoliberalism is the manifestation of it being “common sense” that poor people are poor. and rich people are rich, because each individual poor or rich person has earned that status free of super-individual forces.

A neoliberal society ridicules whoever would vote for a person who likes poor people, like a socialist. The French voted for Hollande, but France’s Eurocentric, pro-capitalist deep state, unaffected by elections, precluded this ever having any real impact. The USA showed some support for Sanders, a self-described democratic socialist, who ultimately lost before general elections began. A neoliberal society also lacks the ability to
analyze this social system, due to over-emphasis of individuals, under-emphasis of systems or structures, and the degradation of any education system to institutionalize understanding of these issues. Collusion, critiques of capitalism, and hegemony are all critical theories and concepts not taught even in much formal education, and especially not in secondary education - which is the highest level of compulsory formal education in the USA, and in most industrialized nation-states. Furthermore, neoliberal society’s anti-systemic discourse furthers covert governance by capital emphasizing the idea that non-state authorities cannot be oppressive, because only the state, and never markets, can oppress humans. Markets equal democracy, after all.

As such, if elections are held, and neoliberal common sense dictates the reductive conclusion that if there are elections, then there is democracy, and anti-capitalist candidates will always lose, then agents of capital simply need to covertly manipulate lawmakers within the state, and/or manipulate elections in order to yield compliant lawmakers. This hegemony of neoliberalism effectively invisibilizes an actual lack of choice or access in electoral systems, invisibilizes elected officials’ responsiveness to citizens, and/or invisibilizes the many un-elected positions which significantly influence policy, but remain subject to influence by agents of capital. This hegemony of neoliberalism also effectively invisibilizes the oppression of a massive state apparatus that colludes with non-state capitalist authorities to sustain a “free market,” which is in fact a system of global plantation economics, whereby powerful actors use force to secure access to less costly raw materials and other capital, including human labor.

Giroux and Brown both summarize neoliberalism’s inevitable end process as “de-democratization” through its reduction of legal protections for individual rights, except the
right to consume if one has capital. Giroux and Brown both highlight how individual freedom to participate in institutions or to engage in non-transactional or anti-capital cultural behavior is labelled as transgressive, dangerous, or terrorist. The “erosion of liberal democratic features,” according to Brown (2003), is predicated on merging the state with the market, so that they are one and the same. What Brown terms “the end of liberal democracy” (2003) and a “stealth revolution” that results in “undoing the demos” (2015) would of course be dismissable by Dicken as “hyperbole” or “myth”. Consider how Brown, a political scientist at the prestigious UC, Berkeley, has almost no influence on the actual policies of a system; her theories have not been, and are unlikely to ever be, incorporated into mainstream discourse, institutional practices, or state policies. However, John Yoo, another UC, Berkeley professor, was contracted by the Bush Regime to legitimize and legalize post-9/11 torture. This exemplifies how only select populations of universities may have any impacts beyond academia, and usually only when in service to the dominant ideology.

Beyond Brown and UC, Berkeley, Giroux in Canada, along with many other critical theorists who are constrained by SS/HFA departments within academia, have for many years highlighted the dual imposition of labels of “terror” on populaces in order to legitimize state violence against them. (Giroux, 2008) Such a deep state is characterized through extensive, intersecting state apparatuses responsible for maintaining surveillance, intelligence, policing, incarceration, and overall fiscal/monetary financial stability for powerful capitalists - frequently summarized as “securitization,” expanded upon in the next section. Maintenance of these policies and processes are executed by various bureaus and agencies with no electoral oversight, and negligible legislative oversight. This has been theorized by O’Donnell as a form of “delegative democracy,” (1994) whereby “democratization” into an
ostensibly liberal democratic, but actually capitalist-realist, government requires consolidation and formalization of institutions, such as electoral systems, that fail to implement the will of the majority while respecting the rights of minorities. (O’Donnell, 1994, 1996) This form of delegative democracy allows “informal institutions,” such as pro-capitalist or otherwise anti-democratic networks between state and non-state authorities, to do the majority of governing, either in terms of legislating or implementing laws. (Soyler, 2013) Because of the presence of at least democratic procedures and some institutions, such as an elected legislature, ostensible separation of powers, routine elections, but a lack of governmental responsiveness to the will of the majority, or violation of the rights of minorities, or extensive collusion between the state and non-state agents of capital, the Robinson’s simple term “low intensity democracy” seems apt.

“Governance by Capital” Is Covert Authoritarianism

“Polyarchy” and “low intensity democracy” themselves lack the malicious underlying ideology that I believe USA-driven neoliberalism possesses. For that reason, I prefer Giroux’s and Brown’s “new” “authoritarianism.” Levitsky and Way’s technical theories on authoritarianism, which, like Robinson, rely on Dahl to deconstruct the misused term “democracy,” articulate how exactly systems with elections may remain fundamentally authoritarian. Per Dahl’s 4 essential components of “procedural democracy,” all procedures must be present for a system to be democratic. Furthermore, even if all procedures are present, the system may only be considered procedurally democratic.
Dahl’s 4 “procedural minimum” components of democracy are:

- Free, fair, and competitive elections
- Full adult suffrage
- Broad protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, and association
- Absence of non-elected ‘tutelary’ authorities...that limit elected officials’ power to govern.
  (Dahl, 1974)

To this, Levitsky and Way add the following requirement:

“The existence of a reasonably level playing field between incumbents and opposition.”
  (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 6, 7)

Whereas “full authoritarianism [is] a regime in which no viable channels exist for opposition to contest legally for executive power,” Levitsky and Way theorize a middle ground of “competitive authoritarianism,” (2010) or, in simpler terms, “elections without democracy.” (2002) A competitive authoritarian system maintains Dahl’s essential components of democracy on paper, but challengers to the authority have no real chance of winning elections in which they compete. Unfortunately, Professor Levitsky is a professor privileged by their position in a Global North and West institution of exceptional prestige: Harvard University’s Department of Political Science. As such, they conveniently failure to analyze any states in the Global North and West. Systemic violations of civil liberties, voter suppression, and other actions they use to identify authoritarianism in the Global South is not applied to the USA. I, however, do believe this analysis should occur. By their above-mentioned qualifiers, if the USA is not “fully authoritarian,” than it is definitely a “competitive authoritarian regime” where the status quo is one where “Competition is thus real, but unfair.” (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 5, 12)

My thesis considers the USA’s electoral system and poli-socio-economic systems overall as “competitively authoritarian” at best, and invisibly, and therefore covertly,
authoritarian at worst. Given the overwhelming prevalence of governance by capital, histories of gross abuses of power, and increasing institutionalization of formal oligarchy and polyarchy, combined with a hyper-individualist, hyper-nationalist narrative post-9/11 that invisibilizes authoritarianism under the auspices of “counter-terrorism,” I prefer “new” or “covert authoritarianism” to describe the post-Cold poli-socio-economics the USA imposes. Understanding the USA’s imposition of its own authoritarian systems on a global scale, where colonialism entrenched definitive authoritarian power structures over hundreds of years, and the “roll out” of covert authoritarianism in a world with no viable alternative to the USA is particularly terrifying.

One example of governance by capital on at least a local, national, and regional level is the sweeping regulatory power of the USA’s Federal Reserve bank and Department of the Treasury. This financial authority is almost entirely led by powerful capitalists tied to prestigious banking and finance complexes, and/or the executive boards of TNCs. Princeton, Harvard, and LSE-educated Paul Volcker’s 1970s-80s tenure exemplifies this. So too does NYU- and Columbia-educated Alan Greenspan’s tenure from the 1980s almost up to the Global Capital Crisis. Academia’s collusion in governance by capital, through powerful and ostensibly legitimate epistemological authorities, such as Ivy League or otherwise highly-ranked and prestigious universities, is also later expanded.

Another, more relevant example of governance by capital on global level is presented by Gibbs in their analysis of the USA’s manufacture of the necessity of interventions during the Cold War, based on a “business conflict model.” (1991) Gibbs uses USA and Netherlands involvement in Congo c. 1950s-1960s as an exemplar of the USA using Latin America-style, CIA-driven interventions to depose a democratically elected anti-capitalist
prime minister, Patrice Lumumba. The USA, Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, and various extractive firms based in these states colluded together to use the CIA to supplant Lumumba with Mobutu, a pro-capitalist strong man in sub-Saharan Africa who would maintain extractive firms’ access to raw materials. Throughout the Congo Crisis, Gibbs argues, a “business conflict model” provides a more complex view than, say, a reductive Marxist structuralist model would, of how competing USA, Dutch, and UK business interests influenced the USA’s CIA and Department of Defense, as well as Dutch and Belgian Ministries of Defense. (Gibbs, 1991; Turner, 2007)

Using Gibbs’ business conflict model, competing interests, ranging from USA financial giant Rockefeller, to the Belgian extractive firm Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) and the holding company Société Générale de Belgique, to the ostensibly non-profit NGO American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters, all contributed to a complex situation of multi-national, intra-competitive capitalists attempting to influence their access to an exploitable, Cold War-era Congo. This lens allows for a “thick description” of more than simply “agents of capital,” that are overwhelmingly structural, but rather a consideration of how competition amongst pro-capitalist agents allows for further consideration of the influence nationalism and other identities play in such military-extractive-industrial complexes.

The Congo Crisis is just one example of governance by capital on a global level - whereby even those with access to electoral systems locally or nationally have their will violated. Of course, this example is from before the USA’s global hegemony, when the USSR and the UN both unsuccessfully attempted to help the Lumumba Regime and prevent the USA’s and Belgium’s ongoing control of the Congo. Today, in South(ern) Africa, there is
no support for the marginalized anti-capitalist, anti-USA factions. Under neoliberalism, not only does the USA possess global power, but its power is perceived as legitimate. This is due both to the now global common sense that there is no alternative to capitalism, and so, economically at least, the USA’s way is always the right way. The USA’s increased legitimacy is also due to the degraded ability of state institutions to challenge the USA’s state power. One example is the UNSC’s rejection of SCR-1441, which technically made illegal, but actually did not prevent the USA-led invasion of Iraq. After all, the world’s largest conventional and nuclear military power, the USA, is the power which legitimizes (or de-legitimizes) all other UN SC or General Assembly (GA) resolutions. Because of this, any alternatives to governance by capital proposed anywhere around the world have become transgressive, and labeled as radical, disrespectful, or not viable.

In conclusion, if the majority of citizens and academics had their preferences formalized into law by democratic nation-states and international systems, then neoliberal economic policies would have been voted down in most regions, even if other individualist poli-socio-economics overall weren’t. The Global Capital Crisis, and the multivarious, simultaneous, consequential conflicts of it reveal the total unsustainability of such absolutist poli-socio-economic models. However, neoliberalism itself is predicated on a necessary illusion that capitalism and electoral proceduralism is freedom, and, as demonstrated above, inherently silences and suppresses the less powerful. As such, the roll out of neoliberalism is always violent, in that it violates the consent and will of the majority of those who must survive under it, and it either replaces an already-violent system, or replaces a less violent system that local residents elected to have, but were denied.
Global Neoliberalism’s “Securitization,” Militarization, and Violence

Rolling out, or imposing, neoliberalism onto people outside the USA is almost identical to Osterhammel’s broadest definition of colonialism. “Domination of people from another culture,” certainly allows for interpreting as colonialism neoliberalism’s capitalist, non-state, or covert, domination of people. Even using Osterhammel’s more stringent guidelines for colonialism, neoliberalism’s global roll out meets all three of their criteria.

1. “One society,” in this case, means Huntington’s civilization of advanced capitalism in the Global North and West, which “completely deprives a second one,” in this case, anti-capitalist societies in the Global South, of “potential for autonomous development,” as global neoliberalism requires dependency upon the USA, IMF, WB, and powerful militaries to securitize capital; and as

2. “the ruling and the ruled are permanently divided” by unequal distribution of wealth and unequal access to public goods and services; and as

3. “The intellectual ‘yoke’ of an ideology;” here, neoliberalism as the only option, in turn delegitimizing public options, “legitimise[s] colonial expansion,” or in this case, further privatization and control of others’ territory by Global North and West firms.

The many impositions of neoliberalism under Contemporary Globalization sometimes required overt and widely-known, or covert and lesser-known violence against select populations. Depending on if each imposition was acceptable to what the media and populace of the imperial power, usually the USA, considered “common sense,” the violence could become more and more visible and acceptable. Neoliberalism’s roll out varies from Cold-War era military interventions to roll out capitalism in a number of ways. The advanced capitalism imposed now by the USA is in some ways more brutal than the advanced capitalism imposed during the 1950s-1970s. On the one hand, Development Theory’s racism was oppressive; on the other hand, they were not nearly as bad as structural adjustment, which remains covertly racist. However, I argue that the main difference is now there is less viable or visible opposition to neoliberalism than there was against capitalism during the
Cold War. This is true in terms of there being fewer visible alternative ideologies to neoliberalism that states and people perceive as legitimate, as well as there being less military capability for the colonized to resist the colonizers’, given almost all states’ dependency on the USA’s economy, as well as most states’ lack of robust, post-industrialized military technology able to challenge the USA’s overwhelming military power.

Having made these arguments and reviewed critical concepts of neoliberalism, I now detail some specifics of militarization and securitization, in theory and practice, as essential parts of the new, covert authoritarian imposition of hegemonic governance by capital.

“Securitization” is a process of a state maintaining the “free market” through deep state apparatuses’ selective application of violence, in order to maintain security; security, however, is a relative term, and in the case of neoliberalism, maintaining “security” means sustaining preferential capital flows and exchanges is a higher priority than ensuring bodily integrity. Much like neoliberalism is like capitalism, but different, so too is securitization and securitizing like securing, but different. The core of securitization as a process is composed of the answers to these main question of critical security theories:

● Who and what defines “security” as opposed to “insecurity”?
● How is the process of achieving “security,” or securitization, implementation?
● Who is made secure, included, and/or excluded through complex security apparatuses? (Gledhill, 2010)

In a simpler term, soldiers securing a site of significant national interest is an ostensibly straightforward concept. However critiquing the notion of security and its implementation, or focusing on the securitization of said site under neoliberalism, centers the narrative not on, say, the heroism of soldiers or the restoration of security, but on security and authority itself. Critiques not only include why that site was valuable enough to require
securing, but rather how that building, national values, and state violence complexly intersect with not only one another, but also histories of state violence and values.

Humans and institutions that cannot fully participate in private capitalist transactions tend to have already been historically colonized and marginalized. The historically colonized are, due to relatively less control of capital therefore less power, less able to participate in the transactions necessary to be relevant in a system that only values capital. As such, they are seen as increasingly expendable supernumeraries, and contributing to the insecurity of the system. Therefore, those populations are “secured” by the state, or non-state capitalists, through either being killed, ostracized, incarcerated, and/or enslaved if they refuse or are unable to assimilate into the neoliberal order.

*Increasingly Violent and Covertly Bigger Government*

As mentioned in the previous section, neoliberal securitization apparatuses generally include surveillance, incarceration, policing, the military, and monetary/fiscal/financial policies, executed by a deep state, without democratic oversight by elections, media, or human compassion. State enforcement keeps the poli-socio-economics of neoliberalism “secure” enough for private transactions to occur despite capitalist crises or threats to the security of that specific system. This state action, helped by media and academia collusion, also helps ensure enough humans in the system believe that it is “common sense” for this to be the only possible poli-socio-economic system. In the USA, this academic collusion manifests through formal education being either privatized and degraded, or neoconservative and nationalistic in teaching about Reagan’s triumph over the evil USSR.

In South Africa, it manifests in various ways, but especially through formal Economics programs internalizing neoliberal curricula, which encourage students to go into
profitable extractive industries to increase firms’ profitability, while also increasing their country’s GDP and other economic indicators. These state security bodies intersect with centers of knowledge production, such as media and intelligence bodies, or centers of knowledge legitimization, such as prestigious universities or influential NGOs. State apparatuses of securitization also include monetary and fiscal policy mechanisms, which in turn require powerful stock markets to maintain globally dominant exchange rates, which in turn require powerful corporations maintaining profitability - encouraging closer integration between corporations and the state.

This state action, though it often manifests through militarized, direct physical violence, also manifests as legal, financial, or environmental “slow violence.” (Nixon, 2011; Prashad, 2014) I argue that slow violence appropriately describes surveillance and long-term incarceration, racist court systems, gradual displacement, and environmental racism. As neoliberal society degrades the capacity to critically think about society beyond a discourse of individual freedom, so too does it degrade the ability to think critically about different forms of violence beyond direct physical violence. Even then, it is subject to narratives of personal responsibility. Nixon argues that “in an age when the media venerate the spectacular, when public policy is shaped primarily around perceived immediate need,” discourses of violence often invisibilize the mundane, banal, and temporally drawn-out violence that disproportionately impacts “the poor...those people lacking resources who are the principal casualties of slow violence.” (Dixon, 2010: 3, 4) As noted earlier, the covert growth of violence and bigger government requires that its application be as invisible as possible. As such, neoliberal society often suppresses drawn-out or complex narratives of violence, like the indigenously dispossessed or IDPs, who are less eye-catching, and possibly
empathy-arousing, but suffering extreme levels of psychological, emotional, and often physical pain.

The rise of debtors’ prisons and the incarceration of humans unable to afford bail, and who are often jailed due to inability to pay relatively low-cost fines, represents the carceral aspect of a poli-socio-economic system which does not tolerate humans too poor to participate in constant private transactions in a very specific way. (Giroux 2004, 2005; Alexander, 2012) The very high levels of restriction of movement through arrests, fines, indefinite detention, and simultaneously decreasing quality of prisoner treatment alongside increasing employment of prison guards, has also been termed a “carceral state.” (Zatz, 2014)

In all cases, the covert growth of the carceral state, military-industrial / security / surveillance complexes, and overt denials about bigger government requires deeper integration between agents of capital and educational institutions, governmental agencies, and mass media. Producing and legitimizing pro-capitalist discourses helps ensure people continue to consider it normal for their “smaller government” to increasingly spend more on the military, police, security, and surveillance, while simultaneously applying violence to many people, as covertly and invisibly as possible. This state action actually increases the size of significant state bodies, due to the high amount of state investment, and publicly-subsidized jobs, in militarized goods and services. Therefore, neoliberalism and securitization represents an increase in regulation of human behavior in many ways.

As such, state securitization of capital profitability enforces a rigid social order of humans that are ordered in way that encourages the largest possible amounts of the highest-possible profitable private transactions of capital, in order to indicate ever-increasing consumption and GDP growth, while degrading public spaces and service delivery. Surplus
labor in a variety of skills, such as both *de facto* enslaved assembly-line workers located at FoxConn plants in Shenzhen, China, as well as mineworkers in central and southern Africa, both exemplify the most violated victims of neoliberalism’s securitization processes.

Additionally, citizens of empire, such as residents of the USA and Europe, are also targets and victims of securitization. Under neoliberalism’s securitization, since the post-9/11 USA-driven rise of both an overt and covert surveillance-security state, the notion of security has constantly been used to refer to the predictability and stability of profitable flows of capital from exploitable sites, such as Chinese and African high-tech and low-tech sites, into USA-owned stock markets. Through a post-9/11 popular imaginary of constant fear of non-state terrorism, this notion of statist and capitalist security has been conflated with Eurocentric development and civilization, while coinciding with the emergence of information technology and computing as omnipresent and omniscient.

With post-industrialization, high-tech design or manufacture jobs remain a rare form of stable or profitable employment, while smartphones and computers have become omnipresent in the Global North and West. Simultaneously, these goods and services have become constantly fear-inducing due to the centrality they play in extra-judicial surveillance that supports an always-seeing, always-watching, always-listening, always-tracking security-surveillance state - what has been called a “digital dystopia.” (George, 2015) Simultaneously, and contradictorily, these goods and services empower those who use them to access information produced by mainstream, always-playing, -showing, -telling, and -selling mainstream media that uncritically discuss the exportability of jobs to other, more competitive nation-states due to “globalization.”
Of course, oil has historically exemplified complex and violent flows of capital. Of course, oil is still extracted in regions governed by USA-supported authoritarians, before it is shipped to core consuming countries’ for refinement, distribution, and subsidized sale to Global North and West consumers. Profitable hydrocarbon industries still influence states to continue to subsidize extractive companies and sustain profitable capital flows to their executives’ bank accounts, partly through sustaining *de facto* control of exploitable sites. As such, extractive industries retain significance under neoliberalism, and given impending global climate catastrophe, oil and the military-industrial complex may still prove more key to destroying the planet for the majority so that the minority can profit.

*Endless Securitization of Endlessly Precarious Populations*

Of course, securitization may be considered a marginalized piece of jargon, and only an updated iteration of past academic theories on military-industrial complex models that never became mainstream common sense. However, it is a useful update for theories of violence under neoliberalism and post-/de-industrialism. Another, final, fundamental part of neoliberalism, which may also be simply academically updated jargon to many, is the quality of “precariousness” and new working class of “the precariat”, which have been mentioned above. (Wacquant, 2009; 2010; Zatz, 2015) In simple terms, due to the decay of public institutions and provision of welfare services, as well as the decreasing stability of long-term employment, rather than industrialized workers known as the proletariat being a major part of the working class, under neoliberalism, precariously-employed, post-industrialized workers may be referred to as the *precariat*. (Wacquant, 2009; 2010)

This precariousness manifests in two ways. On the one hand, theoretically, precariousness denotes both ongoing uncertainty of employment, wages, and poverty, as well
as the general instability of neoliberalism, which requires violence to maintain its precarious position. On the other hand, actually, the *precariat* is manifested as contingent, at-will, sub-contracted service workers, or those employed on only limited appointments - a population which now represents the majority of laborers in the USA. In simple terms, not only are the working class impoverished, they are now also chronically at risk of unfair dismissal, with fewer union and state protections should that dismissal occur, following a regression of labor laws in line with de-/post-industrialization.

To summarize these theories of securitization, because capitalism is inherently precarious and prone to crises, a powerful state, acting on behalf of non-state, pro-capitalist agents, must exercise power to keep the system appearing stable, governable, and legitimate, thus hiding its precariousness, suppressing dissent, and securing reliably inexpensive labor for powerful firms. Furthermore, the state must exercise this power as invisibly as and covertly possible, maintaining the assumption that the market is “free” and there are fewer regulations governing human behavior than under, say, Keynesianism or Fordism.

Having outlined some conceptual and theoretical themes to neoliberal securitization, below are specific instances of the violence of neoliberal globalization, expanded to almost all parts of the globe under Contemporary Globalization. Once imposed, neoliberalism increases inequality (as the rich get richer and the poor get poorer), displaces indigenous populations (by allowing firms to drive them off of exploitable land), and ultimately creates contemporary indentured servitude (by forced migration of expendable laborers away from military conflict and/or economic catastrophe). Of course, in an ostensibly colorblind world where such racialized practices have become technically illegal according to state laws - but not social laws and capitalist logics - it has become common sense to assume that pro-slavery
logics are extinct. However, as noted with its historical origins in plantation economics and “Dixie capitalism” in The South of the USA, the logical end result of neoliberalism is \textit{de facto} and covert, if not \textit{de jure} and overt, slavery - the cheapest form of human labor.

The most useful academically-produced term I have found to describe this crisis is “precarity as capture.” (Barchiesi, 2012) Re-imagining neoliberalism’s precariousness and constant reduction of humans into increasingly expendable laborers with decreasing physical or financial security as \textit{de facto} slavery problematizes established boundaries of the worker-slave binary. Rather than using the less potent term “sweatshop,” I prefer the term “plantation,” due to its historical connection to plantations, and the rise of global plantation economics that necessitates new forms of slavery - not just “captive” or “highly exploited” labor. Below, I briefly survey some examples of \textit{de facto} slavery increasing around the globe under neoliberalism, ending with Marikana and extractive-industrial complexes in South Africa. This focus on neoliberalism’s neo-slavery concludes my thesis’s first critical premise.

\textit{Neoliberalism’s Precarity as Capture: The Global Rise of Neo-Slavery}

One of the most visible counter-hegemonic power dynamics during the Cold War, which continues to impact global poli-socio-economics under Contemporary Globalization, was the rise of regionally hegemonic powers that frustrated global hegemons. Arab states using OPEC and “petro dollars” c. 1970s capital financialization to resist both the USA and the USSR is a classic example. (Westad, 2007; Prashad, 2014) Post-Cold War, a great deal has been written about Dubai, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, focusing on the rapid accrual of financial, social, and political capital post-9/11. The opulence of “world class cities” or “worlding cities” assembled in amazingly short time periods has drawn significant criticism. (Roy and Ong, 2011) Much like other opulent assemblages under Contemporary
Globalization, amazing productivity and global images of power are made visible to extra-national viewers through opulent technological erections, such as Olympic stadiums and skyscrapers built alongside slums that exemplify absolute poverty. The visibilization of power is actually dependent upon the invisibilization of the slum-dwellers the and laborers who have no choice but to exist as indentured servants for an elite class. (Alegi, 2007; Davidson, 2008; Hari, 2009; Cooper, 2013) This has led to significant focus on Dubai as a simultaneous “city of gold” and “city of slaves,” with men and women, often darker-skinned migrants or refugees, existing in perpetual, wretched, indentured servitude as construction workers and prostitutes, respectively. (Cooper, 2013)

Under Contemporary Globalization and the post-9/11 globality, with its USA-driven xenophobia that manifests especially as Islamophobia and Sinophobia, it would be uncritical to limit critique to the Middle East or China without self-reflexive critical analysis of the USA’s complicity in increasing indentured servitude and de facto slavery around the world. USA consumer-driven high-tech plantations in China exemplify this. Spats of highly visible suicides at Apple’s sub-contracted high-tech plantations in China, especially the FoxConn plant, helped briefly visibilize the crisis of neoliberalism’s neo-slavery. Despite significant Sinophobia and mainstream media’s non-critical coverage of USA consumption financing high-tech plantations in China, the issue of indentured servants killing themselves to protest neo-slavery did temporarily disrupt the glossy imaginary of the USA’s, and California’s, high-tech idealism. (Chan and Ngai, 2010; 2012)

As the USA has increasingly married its (deep) state to the “free market,” the USA’s driving of all states to do the same has partly driven China to shift towards an overtly pro-“free market” (deep) state, away from its historical pro-command economy (deep) state.
As such, while the USA’s deep state has grown bigger while purporting to grow smaller, China, in contrast, overtly shifts towards a pro-“free market” model does not require assurances of smaller government. The result in China is a sort of extreme form of overt advanced capitalism and marriage of the state and market.

Useful terms relevant to not only China but to all global capital flows, and revisited in my case study, include the extraction of raw materials for high-tech commodities as “iSlavery” (George, 2015) and “informational capitalism.” (Fuchs, 2014) The rise of high-tech, post-industrialized consumerism in the information age, and the concomitant global rise of neo-slavery, both represent securitization’s global, multivarious impacts on producers and consumers. Those consumers higher up on the global value chain survive slower forms of violence than the more direct, more physical violence inflicted on the producers lower down.

In the ideas of iSlavery, digital dystopias, informational capitalism, and precarity as capture, we see that even USA consumers of high-tech commodities are subject to slow violence in the form of indebtedness and surveillance - as well as complicity in neo-slavery. (Barchiesi, 2012; George, 2015) USA consumers must face the moral violation of financing the violence of high-tech plantations and neo-slavery required to produce their high tech commodities, and which are ostensibly also necessary for a growing, globally competitive economy. In this way, both precariat and proletariat are captured by neoliberalism. A neoliberal subject is physically, financially, or otherwise unable to escape systemic violence, being doomed to participate in a global plantation economy as either a complicit consumer or as a de facto enslaved laborer.
I now focus on a region with relatively less critical or mainstream academic attention: Southern Africa under Contemporary Globalization. As noted earlier, Hochschild’s *King Leopold’s Ghost* (1998) is one of few influential texts on one of humanity’s most brutal colonial genocides in Central and Southern Africa. Their theory remains marginalized beyond small academic circles. With increases in critical security studies, more critical scholarship has emerged on extractive-industrial complexes that intersect with for-profit security-surveillance complexes specific to the African region. Much attention has understandably gone to Central Africa, Congo, “blood minerals,” and USA-supported interventions in a region often defined by genocide and civil wars. (Musah et. al. 2000; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002; Ferguson, 2006; Mullins and Rothe, 2008; Bachmann, 2010; 2014; Fuchs, 2014) Stanford University’s Professor and Chair of Anthropology Ferguson, who received their PhD from Harvard, has received extensive credit for critiquing Africa in the neoliberal world order, especially self-reflecting on anthropology’s complicity in colonialism. (Ferguson, 2002, 2006, 2013)

However, post-apartheid South Africa has received less critical security and anti-capital analysis that is not marginalized by mainstream Global North and West academics and policy-makers. As such, a great deal of academically-produced knowledge on South(ern) Africa post-apartheid reified capitalist-realist epistemologies, without significant post-/trans-national, or explicitly anti-colonial, critiques after 1994. Many Global North and West pieces within and beyond academia have focused specifically on intersections of public health and HIV/AIDS, poverty and inequality, and human rights violations and trafficking - but often without critiques about how neoliberalism drives these atrocities. (Carter and May, 1999; Sikkema, et al, 2010) In one forty page, USAID-supported report on South Africa’s post-
apartheid “one kind of freedom,” dynamics of poverty, Carter and May (1999) do not once mention any of the following terms: capitalism, neoliberalism, globalization, international financial institutions, the WTO, the IMF, indentured servitude, or human rights.

Alegi (2007) has focused on the political economy of “mega stadiums” and for-profit sport spectacles alongside “underdevelopment” in South Africa. They critique “South Africa's engagement with global capitalism” as “not mitigating apartheid's cruel legacies of racism, widespread material poverty, and extreme inequality,” and note global capitalism is increasing inequality under neoliberalism. (Alegi, 2007) A Guardian article covered the crisis of FIFA as analogous to global capitalist monopolies’ crises. (Mason, 2015) Mega stadiums do provide one highly visible exemplar of global neoliberalism, but my focus here, given South Africa’s student protesters’ focus on it, is Marikana, due to its invisibilization.

My argument, and the final, specific, actual example of neoliberalism in this first premise, is in line with the arguments of South Africa’s university students’ transgressive and radical protests of extractive-industrial complexes. That is, despite hundreds of years between Rhodes’s 1888 and 1889 founding of De Beers and the British South Africa Company (BSAC), respectively, today’s overwhelmingly Black South African miners still endure de facto slavery. As noted in depth in the following chapter, “South Africa in a Global Colonial History,” the 2011 Marikana Massacre was a watershed moment in post-apartheid, neoliberal South(ern) Africa, with its consequences still unfolding. (Chinguno, 2013a; 2013b; Alexander, 2014) Marikana exemplifies the extreme violence of global neoliberalism, including the perpetuation of de facto slavery as necessary for White-owned capital profitability. It also exemplifies both the potential of radicalizing resistance against such extreme violence, as well as how may visibilize violence.
Again, while the term “slavery” transgresses against common sense notions that this is a long-extinct practice, I intentionally invoke it to align myself with the transgressive narratives of South Africans, who in fact know better than the many Global North and West academics about the state of affairs in contemporary southern Africa. Again, in the current system which reduces humans and their qualitative experience into quantitative data and econometrics, it is actually preferential for state development indicators for firms to use indentured laborers, so long as on paper they are not listed as such.

Under neoliberalism, as long as a firm’s profitability or stock price increases due to a stable labor supply of always-available, always-secured, low- or no-wage laborers, so too does national GDP increase, while affording middle-class jobs in the deep-state to loyal capitalists, and/those or unable to be employed otherwise. Once officially employed and securitized, refugees lose status as “migrants” or “unemployed,” further benefitting the state, further incentivizing private firms to increase legalizing, without officially admitting, *de facto* slavery. Barring analysis of sub-state or non-market issues, like human rights and quality of life, on paper this system actually reads as economically sound. Under neoliberalism, if several thousand humans die or are maimed in the process of this economic development, the invisibility of their inhumanity, and the powerlessness of groups that both care and have authority, ultimately decreases the likelihood of the state or firm facing any repercussions for causing such violence. In fact, with enormous labor surpluses, state-subsidized labor control, and securitized automation and other technology, a firm may maintain future low- or no-cost labor expenses, due to an ever-decreasing need for many laborers, and ever-increasing level of contemporary peasantry needing employment, lest they be incarcerated. Under neoliberalism, given the overwhelming balance of power against
unarmed peasants, an armed uprising is unlikely to successfully occur. Such a severe imbalance of power means unarmed peasants stand little chance against an oppressive state armed with recently-purchased, high-tech, USA-manufactured weaponry.

**Summary and Clarifying Reiteration**

To clarify, here I provide a brief summary and clarifying reiteration of my above-detailed first critical premise: Contemporary Globalization, marked by the collapse of the USSR c. 1988-1992, and the consequent ascent of the USA to global hegemony, has yielded global neoliberalism. This is covert authoritarianism and de-democratization manifested through a totalizing ideology of political, social, cultural, and economic governance by capital.

My premise first outlined the analytical lens of hegemony, or state and non-state collusion to govern human behavior, which is a more useful lens to analyze complex, non-totalitarian power dynamics, such as global neoliberalism; conventional capitalist-realist IR focuses fail to imagine non-state oppression. I argued that hegemony may operate at different scales, with local or national agents overruled by the imposition of a regional hegemon, which may in turn be overruled by a global hegemon. This premise then defined neoliberal advanced capitalism, shortened to neoliberalism, and its inherent covert authoritarianism, as:

- Ostensibly an economic model overtly tied to Eurocentrism;
- Actually a poli-socio-economic logic with additional covert qualities;
- Hyper-individualistic;
- Founded on notions of the superiority and greater “efficiency” of “privatization”; 
- Ostensibly smaller-government overtly identified as de-regulation;
- Actually bigger-government that covertly re-regulates society through increased selective policing, militarism, and securitization

Therefore, neoliberalism is not what it purports to be: a purely economic logic. Instead, neoliberalism is a totalizing poli-socio-economic ideology that covertly re-regulates society and governs human behavior by imagining humans as only transactional consumers.
As such, it becomes common sense to assume that there is no alternative to capitalism, which represents the hegemony of capitalist-realist epistemologies. Therefore, under neoliberalism, those with more capital have more power, and their power is perceived as legitimate, making them an authority. Simultaneously, those with less capital have less power, and are perceived as illegitimate. Therefore, capital becomes the only source of legitimate authority, eroding the legitimacy of democratic processes, like elections or academically-produced knowledge.

If those processes transgress common sense and the laws of the (deep) state, which serve agents of capital, by promoting an alternative to capitalism, those processes therefore become illegitimate. This yields Brown’s and Giroux’s "de-democratization," “proto-fascism,” and "new authoritarianism," which I term "governance by capital," or “covert authoritarianism,” - similar to Robinson's "polyarchy" or Levitsky and Way's "competitive authoritarianism". Therefore, I argue that neoliberalism is effectively covert authoritarianism and de-democratization in favor of governance by capital - not governance by the will of the majority of voters, despite the presence of elections.

Under neoliberalism, the hegemony of agents of capital is perpetuated through a “revolving door” dialectic between agents of capital and policy-makers, who legalize and legitimize governance by capital in state law. Alternatives to governance by capital are considered transgressive, and in need of securing. "Securitization" describes neoliberalism’s process of re-regulating human behavior through increasing state violence against select populations. This state violence is invisibilized and legitimized by the common sense acceptance that profitable capital flows must remain secure by any means necessary. Neoliberalism’s multivarious processes of covert authoritarianism are all violent in varying degrees, as either direct, physical violence, or indirect, slow violence.
My second and third critical premises, and my South Africa case study, analyze how sites of democratization, such as universities, respond to such authoritarianism and de-democratization.

**Universities as Sites of Critical Democratization**

My thesis's second critical premise is that HEIs, and especially public universities, are idealized and sometimes actualized as sites of democratization. Universities that maintain public accessibility foster public participation through teaching democratic decision-making processes and critical thinking. If such democratizing processes are present in a university, then that university serves as a site of democratization, and this places a university in direct opposition to neoliberalism’s de-democratization and authoritarianism. This second critical premise in turn supports my thesis's third critical premise: that when sites of democratization, such as universities, encounter de-democratization and authoritarianism under neoliberalism, marginalized students may drive protests through radical and transgressive actions, which in turn may potentially drive social movements. Most of these critical concepts and theories of education fall under the lens of critical pedagogy, which I review below.

**Defining Tertiary Education Systems**

My thesis makes the following distinctions about educational systems, based on global trends and convergences in educational systems since the end of WWII, and continuing through the Cold War into Contemporary Globalization. My second critical premise’s terminology draws upon the following various perspectives on education and educational systems:
• Cold War-era critical pedagogy work (Freire, 1969; Hall, et al., 1978; Giroux, 1983; McNeil, 1986)
• GS and development theories addressing education (Gore, 2000; Kwick, 2000; Nederveen-Pieterse, 2012a; Escobar, 2015)
• critical pedagogy theories written c. Contemporary Globalization (hooks, 1994; Readings, 1997; Clark, 2000; Freire, 2000; Olssen and Peters, 2007; Crow and Dabars, 2015)
• UN, state government, and NGO policies and reports (UNESCO, 2006; 2011; 2012a; 2012b; 2014; 2016; CIGE and USAID 2012; Lohmar and Eckhardt, 2013; Goodchild et. al., 2014)

The intent here is to not reify a Global North and West perspective, but to recognize the wide disparity and variance in application of terms, and maintain consistent usage of terms throughout these sections. For that purpose, most, but not all, of these terms and how they are applied through my thesis do conform to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) categorizations and classifications (UNESCO, 2011: 6-15)

Defining Formal Education

The first is the term “education” versus “school.” “Education” is a term that denotes a general process or system of instruction, either formal and institutionalized or informal but not at random, and learning between an instructor and a student. “School” sometimes denotes “education,” or “primary education,” or “basic education,” but sometimes denotes a physical campus location. In some contexts “school” denotes a discipline or approach to education, such as a “school of thought,” or in a name such as the “Chicago School,” abbreviated from “University of Chicago School of Economics.”
It is generally accepted that primary education, often called “primary school,” occurs early in a child’s life and includes the fundamentals of literacy, numeracy, and, to a lesser degree, interpersonal behavior. In the USA, primary education is known colloquially as “elementary school,” where each successive stage of learning is called a “grade”; in other locales, it is often colloquialized as a “Form.” Students in the USA in “First Grade” would not be at an equivalent level to students in the UK or South Africa in “Form 1,” however. As of 2016, the aims of primary education around the globe have generally been agreed to be, per the International Standard Classification of Education (UNESCO 2011) “designed...to give pupils a sound basic education in reading, writing, and mathematics, along with an understanding of other subjects.” For the purposes of this thesis, the terms “numeracy” and “literacy” will be used in place of “mathematics” and “reading...writing,” respectively, in order to coincide with standard institutional indicators.

It is generally accepted that secondary education is that which: occurs after primary education; is targeted at young adults who may be instructed with slightly more focus studies than primary education instruction; is sometimes explicitly a preparation for tertiary education; and is founded on basic literacy and numeracy learned in primary education. Even at the secondary education phase, global uniformity in educational structure begins to fracture. Different nations have different year commitments and age requirements for secondary education, and different terminology for it. In the USA, “middle school” is a 2-year period between primary and secondary education, but not necessarily utilized evenly in every state, and the quality of secondary education varies wildly, with even different programs in the same school serving the same population sometimes having wild variation.
In Germany, at the mid-point of secondary education, tracking of students into either more
general, critical thinking education, or into more specific, vocational skills training.

In the USA, sub-national states like California administer their own state departments
of education with a high level of variability from one another, with students intended to, on
average, graduate from secondary educational systems around ages 17-19. In South Africa,
the Department of Basic Education (DBE) administers primary and secondary school, with
students graduating around age 17-18. Beyond secondary education, there is even more
divergence in pedagogy, terminology, and the bureaucracy of instructional systems. my
thesis insists on the general term of “tertiary education” to refer to post-secondary education.
“Higher education” is the colloquial alternative, but it reifies the notion of a hierarchy of
“higher” and “lower” educational castes. “Tertiary” denotes only a continuation after a
“secondary” and a “primary” schooling, and connotes slightly fewer moral and hierarchical
ideas. Despite this, and despite many policy and theory documents conflating the two,
“higher education” and “tertiary education” are often conflated, as are the specific
components of tertiary education: “college,” “university,” “Higher Education Institution,”
“academia,” “administration,” “instruction,” “training,” “department,” “discipline,” “skills,”
“training,” “learning,” “practical,” “critical,” “lecturer,” “professor,” “financial aid,” “loans,”
“private,” “public,” and so forth.

**Defining Higher Education Institutions (HEIs)**

For all intents and purposes, “tertiary education” refers to any education or formal
learning occurring after secondary education. Institutions or other actors that offer formal
tertiary education are herein referred to interchangeably as Higher Education Institutions
(HEIs) and tertiary education systems, in order to coincide with quoted sources, as well as to
acknowledge their place in the three-tier global educational hierarchy. HEI denotes both online and for-profit or private institutions, as well as physical university campuses and public institutions. “Academia” refers to both the concept of a system of tertiary education composed of exclusive universities, as well as to the actual inter-university networks and bureaucracies of different university populations, which are overwhelmingly situated in the Global North and West. The term “university” specifically denotes an HEI that possesses a physical, built environment in which university students can personally interact, and which is not a singularly-focused HEI, such as a conservatory or a skills-based vocational training program. My thesis will not use the USA colloquial term “college” unless it is part of a name of an HEI, and generally “College of Engineering” or similarly will be interchangeable with “department of engineering.” My thesis will note when a HEI that uses the term “university” in its name, but it is primarily a vocational training program, such as South Africa’s Cape Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT) which possesses a physical campus but has a limited vocational focus.

In South Africa, the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) is responsible for tertiary education, including both skills-based training and more classic liberal arts- and science-focused universities. In South Africa, the Department of Basic Education (DBE) is responsible for primary and secondary formal education. In the USA, the Department of Education provides federal guidance for public universities nationwide, and administers significant portions of loan and financial aid schemes, but does not exercise as much control over individual universities, or over USA state-based school boards and school districts. In Germany, individual states retain broad control over administration of their
policies, but the Federal Ministry of Education and Research provides federal guidelines and administers significant portions of financial aid schemes.

I conduct this review not merely to clarify my specific use of terminology. I do so also to highlight widespread disparities in what many assume to be accepted terminologies and processes, in a discourse rooted in Eurocentric histories and assumptions that the current 3-tier system is the teleologically ideal for governing human behavior in terms of learning and teaching. That this 3-tier educational model of is ideal for governing human education remains to be seen. Analyzing such educational models is part of critical pedagogy, human development, social psychology, and other academic disciplines.

**Critical/Radical Thinking, Pedagogies, and Democratization**

Analyzing the poli-socio-economics of educational systems in the larger society in which an educational institution is situated is also the realm of critical pedagogy. Critical pedagogy address the role of educational institutions, universities and physical sites of education, teaching students how to think critically, and training students for specific vocations with specific job skills. The roles of education, HEIs, and universities in society are debated as well by more quantitatively-inclined social scientists and economists. However, these sorts of debates tend to focus on top-down, capitalist-realist labor needs for skilled employees that support path dependent notions of development. (Mehta and Felipe, 2014) As such, critical analyses of the fundamental intents and outcomes of education tend to be less dependent upon existing econometrics, and more dependent upon qualitative narratives centered on the lived experiences of humans from a bottom-up, grassroots level. Critical pedagogy that interrogates the fundamentals of education, institutions, physical university campuses and built environments, and the difference between critical thinking
versus vocational skills training, are themselves transgressions against a neoliberalism that sees humans as only marketplace consumers in need of management, not engagement.

The rise of post-modern, radical, transgressive, critical pedagogy is generally attributed to Freire, an educator who struggled alongside their deeply impoverished and colonized students in Brazil. (Freire, 1969) Freire’s work advocated for engagement with society similarly to Gramsci’s emphasis on movement and not management, on the covert subjectivity of overtly objective study, and on the ethical dimensions of the entire situation in which education occurs. (Gill, 1993) A great deal of consequent critical pedagogy became essentially a reiteration of Freire’s, and Gramsci’s, central call to action, summarized as:

- Because epistemology is subjective;
- because education is not excepted from poli-socio-economics; and,
- because of the inhumane suffering of most students; therefore,
- Education is a political act; and,
- educators must not remain complicit in oppression.

I expand here how the broad shift away from strictly objectivist, positivist, and Eurocentric pedagogies in the 1950s-1970s has been termed “the subjective turn” in academia. (Boghassian, 2006) This turn involved multivarious marginalized groups forcing their way into academia’s sites of knowledge production and legitimization by politically acting to affirm their epistemologies that had previously been disrespected and disregarded. Academia’s subjective turn witnessed the assimilation of marginalized epistemologies and methodologies, such as Black Studies, Queer Studies, Feminist Studies, and Chicanx and indigenous Studies. (Moraga, 1983; Anzaldua, 1986; Bernal, 1998; Armbruster-Sandoval, 2016) Central to this subjective turn were theories articulated by bell hooks, who embraced Freire’s notion of teaching as transgression, and highlighted how it was inherently transgressive for people of color and their epistemologies to exist within a historically White,

Harney and Moten’s radical text *The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study* (2013) carry on this tradition today by insisting that radical, transgressive, criminalized, and “fugitive,” Black studies have always driven change in the university, at great cost to “the subversive intellectual” - who is historically a colonized or marginalized student of color. Since the subjective turn, and increasing through Contemporary Globalization, there has been increasing convergence of anti-capitalist and counter-hegemonic social movement theories with critical pedagogy theories. One such example, revisited in my final critical premise, highlights exploited graduate researchers as today’s subversive intellectual, with the notion of sweatshops and the Ivory Tower. (Williams, 2003)

The subjective turn was also fundamentally a leftist turn, given its relative empowerment to silenced and invisibilized people. A recent book by retiring CSU Professor Lazer, *Why Higher Education Should Have a Leftist Bias* (2013) represents a logical conclusion to this notion. Lazere argues that because of the fundamentally right-wing nature of the USA, which significantly limits other sites of critical thinking beyond academia, HEIs offer students and society the rare opportunity to imagine alternatives to the current order. I return to this in my final, third premise, and conclusion.

Giroux theorizes that education, and particularly critical thinking at universities, should be founded upon the human capacity for change, especially changing society to
Giroux’s argument about tertiary education can be summarized in the following quote:

Education is not only about issues of work and economics, but also about questions of justice, social freedom, and the capacity for democratic agency, action, and change, as well as the related issues of power, exclusion, and citizenship. Education at its best is about enabling students to take seriously questions about how they ought to live their lives, uphold the ideals of a just society, and act upon the promises of a strong democracy. (Giroux, 2010: 195)

Giroux consistently argues this throughout their career, insisting that formal, institutionalized tertiary education, while often co-opted by the state, remains the single most important site for learning about and teaching social justice, which requires political action by educators and students. (2010) As early as the 1980s, witnessing the neoliberal/conservative backlash against radical anti-capitalist imaginaries in education, Giroux theorized about “a pedagogy for the opposition” that would empower marginalized people to coalesce and change society, using the university as a base. (Giroux, 1983) Before the Global Capital Crisis, and even before the USA-led invasion of Iraq, Giroux identified the damage of neoliberalism and “corporate culture” on higher education (2002) and its intersection with “proto-fascism,” or neoliberalism’s fundamental de-democratization processes. (2004a) Giroux was one of the first Global North theorists to identify “authoritarianism” as a fundamental part of neoliberalism (2004b); to identify the intersections of post-9/11 militarization and destruction of critical thinking, through the deliberate destruction of public HEIs (2004b; 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; 2011a); and to focus on the expansion of the military-industrial-academic complex, concomitant with the expansion of the post-9/11 surveillance-security state. (2007)³

³ This term “military-industrial-academic complex” existed, but in a pre-9/11, Cold War era context. See:
Giroux theorizes that the proliferation of an engaged, justice-oriented, critically thinking citizenry is a necessary component of democracy, and that universities are the best-equipped institution to maintain this fundamentally democratizing procedure. Giroux further argues that radical analysis necessarily exists alongside, and in a dialectic with, simultaneous processes of hegemonic normatization, colonization, and assimilation imposed upon universities, due to their non-exemption from poli-socio-economics beyond academia. In this way, Giroux optimistically sees universities as sites of transformation, where students empowered by critical thought and exposure to hegemony can better learn to resist it.

Theories of educational systems’ centrality to democracy are not unique to Giroux or radical pedagogists after the subjective turn. They have existed in some form since at least Dewey (1916) and modernization theorists like Lipset (1959), who explicitly state that education has a causal relationship to, at least, procedural democracy and participation. In the first decades of the USA, even Thomas Jefferson cited important correlations between education levels and national economic and democratic capacities as justification for public HEIs. As noted below in my outline of the history of the institutionalization of tertiary education, modern nation-states readily acknowledge a causal relationship between robust tertiary education systems and national power, if not also acknowledging increased levels of participation and, consequently, greater levels of democracy.

Universities are not exempt from the rest of society, though, and the subjective turn was a largely leftist movement against an overwhelmingly right-wing society. As such, the backlash against the leftist subjective turn was right-wing, and took the form of a neoliberal / conservative turn, epistemologically and pedagogically within academia, concurrent with a

neoliberal turn beyond academia across the USA. (Beverley, 2008) The Chicago School and 1973 Chile, mentioned above, and detailed just below this premise, best exemplifies the start of the convergence of neoliberal authoritarianism with tertiary education and public-serving HEIs. But, before my section “Neoliberalism’s De-Democratization and Ruination of Public Universities,” I survey the history of functional tertiary education systems, to contextualize my subsequent theories of counter-hegemonic social movements specifically at public universities being destroyed by neoliberalism.

The modern and contemporary concept of the university as we now know it derives from Europe’s imposition of their form of higher education on the rest of the world during colonialism. For this reason, Bologna, Venezia, Padua, Oxford, Cambridge, La Sorbonne, Frankfurt, and so forth are regarded as the oldest universities in the world (Kwiek, 2000) as opposed to the formal educational systems of the three mosques in Timbuktu; the Songyang academy in Dengfeng; Al-Azhar University in Cairo; or, the University of al-Qarawiyyin in Fes, which is the oldest known continuously-operating, degree-granting institution. (Verger, 2003) Germany, the UK, and other European states of have long histories of public education. Germany’s Humboldtian model and concept of public HEIs serving as critical sites of cultural, political, and technological knowledge production, as well as collegial “academic communities,” has long driven other states’ policies. (Kwiek, 2000; Harley, Muller-Camen, and Collin, 2004; Reihlen and Wenzlaff, 2013)

The university’s role in supporting at least national economic power, if not also political and cultural power, has been acknowledged by the USA and Europe since at least the 1800s. As noted above, founding father and slave owner Thomas Jefferson advocated for public primary and secondary education, as well as for tertiary education systems, citing their
次第に、ウィリアム・アンド・メアリー大学の母学（alma mater）をモチーフに、ウィリアム・ジェファーソンは大学を設立し、後にバージニア大学を設立。当然、欧州とアメリカの大学の初期は、アラブ、アフリカ、中央アジア、東アジアの各地域で、学びを制限し、適切な学生のみを含む。イーヴリー・リーグは、現代の高等教育に相当する状態として、望まれる、信頼できる、そして唯一の学生を含む。 アメリカのアイビーリーグは、現代の高等教育を維持するための、遺産と敬意に基づき、また唯一性、創設期に生まれた。 （ゴールドとカッツ, 1998; メトリター, 2011; ）この光景下、南方が米国における公立大学の創設を先導し、19世紀から20世紀に渡り、一般公開を可能にした。もちろん、当時は白人がしか出くわなかった、現代と歴史、の“一般”および“大学”の間の違いを示している。（ゴールドとカッツ, 1998; メトリター, 2011: 114-116）

現代性、19世紀と20世紀の間で、現代の西フェーライア国連邦が必要したのは、知識の生産のための合法的な中央の中心であった。 （キウック, 2000; メトリター, 2011; メンタとフェリペ, 2014）1840年ごろからは、米国は高等教育の高齢と高等教育の卒業率を維持し、年々のアクセスが一般公開を可能にした。 （ゴールドとカッツ, 1998; ニューフィールド, 2011; ）1802年と1862年の連邦立法によって、新たな州が公立高等教育機関を設立し、特に、工業化された上流社会を支援するものである。 （メトリター, 2011: 115）1868年、カリフォルニア大学が設立され、カリフォルニア大学システムおよび、米国州、特に、高等教育システムを構築した。
As the 1800s and industrialization advanced, enrollment in public and private HEIs grew in imperial cores as well as in colonial peripheries. Degrees granted and attendee demographics diversified gradually, with wide variability region to region, and the monastic and exclusive roots of most HEIs remained over the course of the long 19th century. The next most significant shifts in education policy would occur with the massive shifts in the global poli-socio-economic order, as a result of the collapse of de jure European colonialism and the end of the British Empire, largely caused by the ascendance of the USA and the USSR after WWII, during the short 20th century.

**Tertiary Education Globally: Post-WWII to Contemporary Globalization**

An economically thriving USA finalized its immediately post-WWII conventional and nuclear military dominance over former imperial powers through the destruction and occupation of Tokyo and Berlin, and the annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively. WWII into the the late 1900s was a time period of the USA’s pursuit of global hegemony, where the USA struggled to create an American-led world order and achieve simultaneous military, economic, and cultural power. Its principal opposition was the USSR, which tended to lack the economic and cultural power of the USA, but rivalled the USA in military strength. The USSR additionally, in multivarious contexts, rivalled the USA in terms of political and ideological power through support from anti-capitalist projects around the world. Both the Cold War’s ideological and technological contests necessitated significant production of knowledge that could claim to be, and could be perceived as legitimate, objective, unbiased, and therefore superior to the other ideologies’ knowledge.

A post-WWII global legal framework was created that emphasized the importance of education on the basis of both rights, representative democracy, culture, and economics. This
was driven in part by USA policies and institutions, as well as by sweeping international documents and constitutions. The 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1966 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 1966 UN International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESC) all gave education a significant place in development and human rights narratives. While specifically how much and to whom education should be given, and at what cost, was contested by anti-communist and anti-capitalist theorists, there arose general consensus in industrialized and industrializing states alike that education was a priority, generally.

During the early global Cold War, states prioritized massive expansion of research spending and construction of public universities. Within and beyond the USA, much of this was driven by military investments in social and physical national infrastructure, including education and universities. Just before the end of WWII, the USA had established the GI Bill in 1944, signalling the first major USA federal policy significantly appropriating funds to tertiary education since the 1800s. This period was unique in terms of the scale of the expansion of research spending and construction of public universities. This expansion was driven by USA state appropriations, specifically from the Department of Defense (DoD), which occupied ~80% of all USA governmental research appropriations up to the mid-1960s. (Leslie, 1993)

Between 1945 and 1980, enrollment in and graduation from institutions of tertiary education in the USA grew significantly, and participation in public tertiary education especially grew concurrently with construction of physical university campuses and increased funding. The GI Bill, post-WWII baby boom, initial Cold War dominance of the USA, the 1958 National Defense Education Act (NDEA), and the 1965 Higher Education
Act (HEA) coincided with massive expansion of public HEIs, especially in Western states, yielding a Fordist Golden Age of public universities. (Leslie, 1993; Evans, 1995; Jolly, 2009; Mettler, 2011)

This was wrapped up, however, in the military-industrial complex, which further necessitated large-scale, institutionalized education systems that would produce knowledge that served “the public,” meaning mostly pro-capitalist, anti-USSR nationalists. In addition to the pro-capitalist, pro-military culture of the USA within and beyond academia, so too did conservative rhetorics of talent, merit, nationalism, security, and competition exclude many poor or differently abled students from HEIs. (Urban, 2010) Funding schemes like the HEA somewhat resolved class exclusion, but notions of merit and competition still determined admissions to HEIs. In 1972, Title IX amended the 1964 Civil Rights Act, attempting to remedy gendered and racial exclusion, but decades later, this tools remains a blunt instrument at best. (Valentin, 1997) All in all, tertiary education remained a privilege to be earned, and not a right to which all humans were entitled, despite massive increases in state spending. Contrarily, in the USSR, major constraints remained in place for attaining education, and these constraints and systems were imposed on Soviet-aligned states. In some ways, though, once educated, Soviet citizens increased social mobility due to improved employment prospects (Novozhilov, 1991; Titma, Tuma, and Roosma, 2003) and, radical imaginations, albeit in some places where dissent would be even more violently suppressed than in the USA. (Zajda, 1980)

Ultimately, though, while not an intended outcome of a national government seeking to enrich itself in capitalist-realist terms, massive increases in tertiary public education in the USA, in addition to technological and social changes, resulted in an explosion of knowledge
production and consumption within and beyond academia. (Mettler, 2011; Newfield, 2008, 2011; Longanecker, 2014) The resulting military-industrial-academic complex generally increased all public accessibility to tertiary education as a side effect of its intent to increase national economic and military power. (Leslie, 1993; Longanecker, 2014) The development of medical and information technology was largely driven by research conducted through joint DoD-university schemes. The infamous Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) arose in 1958 after the USSR deployed Sputnik, but from DARPA interaction with universities, especially MIT, inventions ranging from the internet to Google Maps and GPS to graphical user interfaces (GUIs) were developed, complicating the militaristic histories of such programs. The impact of global, internationalized, institutionalized expanded access to tertiary education around the world is visible in the proliferation of military-industrial-academic complexes, and their concomitant general increase of access to tertiary education. The expanded medical, military, and financial capabilities of a robust tertiary education system based on public universities provided a model for other states around the world.

**Tertiary Education Regionally: North America and California**

Specifically in California, the 1955 establishment of the California Student Aid Commission, (CSAC) which oversees programs such as the Cal Grant, the CA equivalent to the USA Pell Grant, represents one component of increased public accessibility to tertiary education. The 1960 Donahoe Higher Education Act, also known as the California Master Plan for Higher Education, famously created a 3-tier tertiary public education system. (California Senate Bill No. 33, 1960; Graham, 1989) It was composed of a newer Community College (CC) and California State University (CSU) systems that would serve as the lower and middle tiers of the overall CA tertiary education system, respectively. The
upper tier of this system was the expanded University of California (UC) campuses that were able to accept, transfer, educate, and graduate all CA students meeting certain criteria. (Graham, 1989; Newfield, 2008)

Between 1868 and 1919, only 3 UC campuses were built: Berkeley in 1868, San Francisco in 1873, and Los Angeles in 1919. Between 1944 and 2005, an additional 7 campuses were built and/or officially expanded and incorporated into the UC system as full universities. For the CSU immediately post-WWII, 3 new campuses were established in two years: CSU Sacramento and Los Angeles in 1947, and Long Beach in 1949. At the UC alone, enrollment from 1940 to 2015 grew from approximately 23,000 Full-Time-Equivalent (FTE) students to approximately 238,000 FTES, an increase of over 1,000%. In 1940, using an approximate CA state population of 6.95 million, .331% of Californians were enrolled in the UC. By 2015, using an approximate CA state population of 39 million, .660% of Californians were enrolled in the UC. The establishment of CSAC, the Donahoe Higher Education Act, tripling of UC campus in 60 years, and the doubling of per-capita enrollment in the same time frame all represent a massive growth of public tertiary education in CA specifically.

California, and other sub-national western USA states, disproportionately expanded not only tertiary education access in the USA, but especially public universities and others HEIs (Goldin and Katz, 2008; Newfield, 2008; Ryu, 2011; Longanecker, 2014) By 2020, Western states will possess a significant minority, over 30%, of university-aged residents. (Ryu, 2011) Longanecker (2014) prefers to discuss the “federal/western research policy nexus” but I prefer Leslie’s (1993) and Giroux’s (2007) term the military- industrial-academic complex, as well as my own concept of California as a regional hegemon. These policies, contextualized by a long history of military and other technological development
being driven by federally-financed western HEIs, especially CA’s, made CA a regional and national driver of public education policy. For a brief period of time, which I expand on later, CA led the way in terms of diversifying curricula, students, instructors, and enrollment. Of course, California’s influence meant that whatever happened to its tertiary education systems would have ripple effects across the rest of the region, for better or for worse.

*Tertiary Education Regionally: South(ern) Africa*

In South(ern) Africa, education at all levels was overtly racist, Eurocentric, elitist, and exclusionary, from earliest colonialism through the post-WWII National Party apartheid regime that ruled South Africa from 1948 to 1994. Barring extraordinary exceptions, only the white elite of South Africa were allowed to achieve a formal tertiary education without undue individual or collective impediments. As examined in greater detail later, until the 1990s collapse of the apartheid regime, the vast majority of educational “development” in South Africa, which influenced the policies across Southern Africa, was aimed at reifying a racialized class system. Only in 1990 was there an actual increase of access to and education for non-Whites, and it was a largely symbolic gesture. (Badat, 1995; Jansen, 1997, 1999)

Despite this deep history of exclusionary education, South Africa as a modern nation-state, like in Europe, considered tertiary education an important component of the national economy. This is especially true in the role of educational institutions’ securing the profitability of the apartheid military-industrial complex. (Rogerson, 1990) Driven by the Cold War and the enforcement of apartheid within South Africa and across the southern African region, massive defense budgets and systems were similarly justified by the academic-military-industrial complex and supported through educated professionals. (Batchelor, Dunne, and Saal, 2000) Perhaps nowhere besides South Africa and the USA was
the military-industrial-academic complex so thoroughly established. White South Africans, despite comprising a small minority (around 10%) of the residents of the region, comprised the entirety of state military and police forces. All White South Africans faced compulsory conscription and military service. A great many also received formal tertiary education, in addition to their military vocational skills training. The overlap between Apartheid South Africa’s military and political elites with prestigious universities was significant.

Of course, the power shifts during the early phase of Contemporary Globalization included the collapse of the apartheid regime, which I detail later. Between 1989 and 1998 “South Africa’s defense budget declined by more than 50% in real terms” as the USSR, the Cold War, and conventional USA policies of supporting anti-communist regime’s military-industrial complexes also collapsed. (Batchelor, Dunne, and Lamb, 2002: 342) Between the late 1980s and late 1990s, concomitant with imminent collapse of apartheid and Contemporary Globalization, White-owned capital flight instigated a major recession and restructuring of the economy away from manufacturing towards a service economy - including education as a service, and a decrease on arms manufacturing. (Batchelor, Dunne, and Saal, 2000) The procurement budget alone, which in turn drove arms production in South Africa, as well as consumption Europe’s arms producers violating the UN-sanctioned arms embargo, “was cut by more than 80% in real terms.” (Batchelor, Dunne, and Saal, 2000: 554)

The 1994 abolition of de jure apartheid and political shift to a constitutional, procedural democracy included mass disarmament, restructuring, and even abolition of much of the South African Defense Force (SADF). By 1996, a new constitution had been ratified, and a new Ministry of Education created. The 1996 constitution explicated specific socio-
economic rights, especially education and educational equity. (Republic of South Africa, 1996; Berger, 2003) These entitlements, though commonplace in many post-WWII colonized states’ constitutions and the aforementioned UN resolutions, remain absent from the USA’s constitution. Such entitlements also remain absent from the USA’s contemporary neoliberal policies that de-fund education and consider it a privilege, not a right.

Un fortunately, in line with conflating “democracy” with “free market,” South Africa’s accessibility of education in policy was couched in a rhetoric of competitiveness, and situated in a globalizing economy driven by the global hegemony of the USA’s neoliberal capitalism. The new Ministry of Education privileged “outcome-based education” (OBE) models that required competitive testing to quantify students’ development - a decision heavily dependent upon USA educational theories. (Spady, 1994; Jansen, 1997) The importation of Spady’s theories is just one example of USA-driven, competition-based policies being privileged and incorporated into a developing set of national policies, despite significant academic evidence that OBE isn’t the correct model for post-apartheid South Africa (Jansen, 1997; 1999a; 1999b). In this way, while South Africa resisted the global hegemon, at least in its constitutional approach to rights, as it created foundational policy documents in the beginning of Contemporary Globalization, it neoliberalized many policies, including education.

**Tertiary Education Under Contemporary Globalization**

This section briefly reviews tertiary education systems under Contemporary Globalization, which I argue are being experienced around the world. Academia has been systematically coerced into colluding with agents of capital and the state, while neoliberalism’s destruction of education continues to stratify, ghettoize, and potentially
radicalize universities. These issues complement Giroux and help me focus on how social movements, the production of knowledge, and democratic participation are all becoming radically restructured by neoliberalism in critical sites of democratization: tertiary education and HEIs, especially formerly public universities. Under Contemporary Globalization, public universities have encountered, and continue to encounter, at least all of the following processes:

- reduced funding from the state, as measured by per-capita appropriations, relative shares of GDP and GNP, and in other proportional terms;
- increased tuition and other fees charged to individual students’ private households;
- a drive to conform to neoliberal capitalist priorities of privatization, prioritizing “free market” competition, entrepreneurialism, and profit-seeking; and,
- increasing precariousness and exploitation of university labor.

Because Contemporary Globalization has been defined as neoliberal globalization, which requires securitization, militarization, and violence, the collusion of once-liberal academia and neo-conservative thought must be reviewed. As mentioned, Chile in 1973 was a unique, watershed moment. The U of Chicago School of Economics’ collusion with state violence was when roll-back neoliberalism under the Cold War began to be refined into roll-out neoliberalism for the USA’s post-Cold War global export. 1973, Chile, and U of Chicago represent several simultaneous, new processes of collusion between academia, the state, and economic theories:

- increased visibility of the Pinochet Regime as an ideal manifestation of advanced, neoliberal capitalism, in a region historically colonized by the USA;
- the integration of the most extreme thinking of capitalist markets and profitability into mainstream economics, resulting in formal articulations of neoliberal capitalist rhetoric;
- the adoption of this neoliberal rhetoric by mainstream, right-wing politicians;
- the consequent adoption of this rhetoric for use as anti-left talking points by the USA’s conservative Silent and/or Moral and/or Christian Majorities and Coalitions; and,
- perhaps most importantly, the robust and highly-visible support of prestigious University of Chicago economists and other academics, who legitimized and popularized not only neoliberal economics rhetoric, but re-legitimized the necessity of intervention to establish “free markets,” conflated with “democracy,” in the post-Civil Rights era
Conservative USA academics’ highly visible and overt praise of the Pinochet Regime and its brutal form of advanced capitalism sharply diverged from the state’s covert tactics in executing yet another foreign intervention, as well as different from past academic denouncements of such militarism. Alongside corporatizing mass media, academia, led by the hegemonic U of Chicago, colluded with the state by legitimizing neoliberal poli-socio-economics, given universities’ status as epistemological authority figures. The U of Chicago School of Economics, and especially Milton Friedman, had widespread influence within and beyond academia, and were perceived as powerful, legitimate, and authoritative. Their ideas’ adoption by Ford-, Reagan-, and Thatcher-era conservative parties, and their support for the neoliberal Pinochet Regime, all legitimizated and mainstreamed neoliberalism.

Friedman’s and U of Chicago’s influence on Reaganism and neoliberalism is hard to overstate. Friedman had won the John Bates Clark Medal before the age of 40, in 1951. Friedman had extensive contact, and drew extensively on, the poli-socio-economic theories of Hayek, who was based in the UK’s London School of Economics (LSE), but also lectured at U of Chicago. Hayek’s theory of a *Road to Serfdom* (1944) and planned economies’ or “big government’s” logical end result of peasantry were central to Friedman’s and other conservatives’ “smaller government” arguments. It seems unsurprising that neither Hayek nor Friedman only shallowly engaged in race and slavery at all, and their theories’ ostensible opposition to bigger government directly contributed to today’s neo-slavery.

Hayek and Friedman both visited Chile during the Pinochet Regime in the 1970s and 1980s, as did Thatcher and multivarious USA-UK financial and intelligence elites. Both supported the NGO think tank, *Centro de Estudios Publicos* (Spanish; English: Center of Public Studies) that, ironically enough, was critical in Chile’s legitimization of militarized
In 1976, Friedman won the Nobel Prize. U of Chicago claims 12 Economics Nobel Laureates, which is double the runner-up: MIT. In 1973, Stanford’s prestigious Hoover Institute was founded, which Friedman ran from 1977 to the 2000s, while advising conservative elites. Throughout the 1980s, Friedman was a covert economic adviser for USA President Reagan, who awarded Friedman the National Medal of Science and the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1988. Friedman even created television series, *Free To Choose*, that popularize “free market” perspectives of capitalism and rational choice models beyond academia, from the 1980s to 1990s. According to the Economist, Friedman’s “smaller-government” neoliberalism was revolutionary.

These works revolutionised the conduct of central banks around the world…[his] great achievement is not his challenge to Keynesian demand management, but the popular writings that challenged a consensus favouring ever-greater state intervention in the economy….the 94-year-old economist was still working to spread his ideas about free markets...In developed countries politicians may talk like Keynesians, but they behave like monetarists.

(The Economist, 2006)

Such relationships between prestigious academics, politicians, policy-makers, the media, and influential institutions highlight right wing re-commitment to individualism and markets, with academia increasingly on board. After Chile in 1973, subsequent military escalation in order to impose increasingly neoliberal capitalist logics elsewhere became more and more simplistically tied to “spreading freedom” rather than “spreading capitalism,” and Keynesianism became replaced by neoliberal monetarism. All of this occurred alongside massive, and violently suppressed, civil disobedience during the Civil Rights, Feminist, and Chicancx movements, as well as the collapse in trust of government following Nixon and Vietnam, the stagnation of the Carter presidency, and Iranian and USSR-Afghan challenges to USA power. In this context, neoliberalism / conservatism and renewed nationalism
encouraged society to accept as common sense a simplistic notion that spreading capitalism was spreading freedom. Backlash against the subjective turn in academia coincided with this backlash against civil disobedience, which had been intimately connected to academia. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, while the subjective turn afforded some emergent fields marginal power, the social sciences disciplines of IR, political science, and economics retained legitimacy and power within and beyond academia, while they embraced U of Chicago neoliberalism, and became preferred by NGOs and the state needing to legitimize neoliberal policies. As mentioned, as the USSR collapsed, academia and emergent Mainstream GS largely abandoned and further marginalized Marxist / development / dependency theory, yielding unimaginative, path-dependent, capitalist-realism as the order of the day.

**Neoliberalism’s De-Democratization and Ruination of HEIs**

The above events locally situate the foundations of Contemporary Globalization and its global, covert authoritarianism within the USA’s academic communities. Here, de-democratization of societies visibly accelerated through the ruination of HEIs, especially formerly public universities that had been visible sites of left wing imagination. The democratic elements of formerly public universities were central to maintaining public tertiary educational systems that are humane, empathetic, public services. Now, they more closely resemble inhumane, unsympathetic, private marketplaces, after decades of internalization and uncritical reification of neoliberalism, treating students as consumers, and instructors as exploitable labor.

I agree with Giroux that, to date, HEIs, and especially public universities, were the most viable institutional site for democratization. Through allowing academic freedom,
exchange of ideas, rigorous peer review, and fostering critical thinking, universities may be
the only USA sites for alternative and radical imaginaries, including anti-capitalist, anti-
White, and pro-Black, -Queer, -Feminist, and/or -Chicanx challenges to authority. I also
argue that because universities may promote radical hope and democratization, they are
therefore targets of neoliberalism’s de-democratization and authoritarian destruction of
anything challenging the authority of capital. While this may sound bleak, and Dicken would
likely write off me, Newfield, Harney and Moten, et. al., below I briefly review how
Contemporary Globalization has put into chains the university in ruins.

In perhaps the least bleak, most optimistic terms, the issue of “university
transformation” towards a new “entrepreneurial university” model in the 1990s was
articulated 1990s by Clark.

[There is] a growing imbalance between demands made upon universities and their
capacity to respond if they remain in their traditional form...in societies around the
world, especially in public universities supported mainly by a national or regional
ministry...

The capacity is limited by underfunding and by rigidified internal structures that
were constructed in the simpler days of elite higher education.
(Clark, 2001: 10-11)

Clark does outline basic issues facing public universities around the world under
Contemporary Globalization. Globally, universities had historically been founded on notions
of some elite national HEIs, with colonial and/or Keynesian poli-socio-economics supporting
them, in order to strengthen national power, and perhaps foster critical thought. Neoliberal
globalization mandated change, though; as with global studies, just “change” is too vague an
assessment. What specific changes were happening to universities, which Clark argued
required them to be more entrepreneurial?
Universities, to continue being seen as worthy of state funding, had to increase and diversify both student enrollment and degrees offered - while simultaneously receiving fewer resources to do so. To remain competitive and forward-facing, universities had to become more internationalized, or globalized, and more inter-disciplinary - while simultaneously respecting the authority and autonomy of departments that refuse centralized control in order to maintain academic freedom. To continue serving the public, universities had to continue admitting certain numbers of certain categories of students - while primary and secondary education cuts degraded applicant quality, and students faced increasing barriers to entry.

Simultaneously, following the conservative backlash to the subjective turn within academia, and the neoliberal turn beyond academia, the legitimacy of knowledge produced by critical or anti-capital SS and HFA departments was questionable, and therefore less authoritative should universities invoke that knowledge to justify policy changes that went against capitalist-realist IR or economics recommendations. Universities’ quasi-medieval, historically monastic and colonial, and only somewhat public-serving bureaucratic, departmental, instructional and financial structures were all inadequate to meet those demands. According to Clark, if universities became “entrepreneurial” in their competition for institutional survival, that might mitigate the state providing providing inadequate resources.

I believe Clark’s highly influential theory, however, lacks significant critiques of existing poli-socio-economics, and so reifies the foundational components notions of neoliberalism. Readings’ *The University in Ruins* (1996) took a much more radical and critical approach, which I must assume Clark did not read.

The university is not just *like* a corporation; it *is* a corporation. Students in the University of Excellence are not *like* customers; they *are* customers…
Is it surprising that corporations resemble universities, health-care facilities, and international organizations, which all resemble corporations? Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish* explores the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century reorganization of the mechanisms of state power, especially the judicial system, around the surveillance and normalization of delinquents in place of their exemplary punishment by torture and execution. Criminals are treated rather than destroyed, but this apparent liberalization is also a mode of domination that is the more terrible in that it leaves no room whatsoever for transgression. Crime is no longer an act of freedom, a remainder that society cannot handle, but must expel. Rather, crime comes to be considered as a pathological deviation from social norms that must be cured….

The British turn to “performance indicators” should also be understood as a step on the road toward the discourse of excellence that is replacing the appeal to culture in the North American University. The performance indicator is, of course, a measure of excellence, an invented standard that claims to be capable of rating all departments in all...universities on a five-point scale. The rating can then be used to determine the size of the central government grant allocated to the department in question...[in order] to introduce a competitive market into the academic world...

...we must analyze the University as a bureaucratic system rather than as the ideological apparatus that the left has traditionally considered it...

The replacement of culture by the discourse of excellence is the University’s response to 1968...Forced to describe itself as either a bureaucratic-administrative or an idealist institution, it chose the former. And consequently there is no way back to 1968; a repetition of the radical postures of the late 1960s is not adequate to resist the discourse of excellence...

(Readings, 1996: 22, 24, 36, 150)

Giroux echoed and expanded upon these sentiments a decade later in *The University in Chains* (2007), asserting that not only had the notion of a culturally rich, idealized, critical university been destroyed by neoliberalism and transformed into a transnational corporation selling itself on quantifiable “excellence” - but that this transnational corporation was subservient to the post-9/11 military-industrial and security-surveillance complexes. It seems accurate to consider neoliberalism’s defunding of HEIs in early Contemporary Globalization as yielding contingent funding of the university in the post-9/11, Islamophobic, proto-fascist
USA. Multiple other theories about the destruction of HEIs under neoliberalism exist, reflecting what I earlier referred to as an effective consensus amongst academics that neoliberalism is inhumane and unsustainable. Haiven and Khasnabish’s assess struggles in neoliberal universities after 2007:

...the university has become a key site of struggle both in terms of what it could offer to capital (research and development, resources, expertise) and what it might do as a space - however imperfect - of critical and free inquiry. Within the university, the social engineering neoliberalism has sought to achieve more broadly has been replicated…

(Haiven and Khasnabish, 2014: 36)

Their text *The Radical Imagination: Social Movement Research in the Age of Austerity* outlines the omnipresent, slow, poli-socio-economic violence of neoliberalism across all of society, but especially in spaces and times where knowledge is legitimised, produced, and consumed - such as HEIs, and inside all humans’ imaginative minds. The authors outline how universities have become more socially stratified, ghettoised, and ultimately sites of precarious labor that tend towards contingent employment models. In these spaces, times, and movements, there is both a radical, hegemonic neoliberalisation under way, and a consequential and simultaneous (Foran, 2014) radical, counter-hegemonic “imagination” of “prefigurative” alternatives, that cannot be safely articulated by with such transgressive thoughts, or what Giroux terms “dangerous thinking.” (2015) Additionally, they argue, neoliberalism has promoted a lack of critical thinking all across society by forcing humans to replace creative, critical, or radical dreams with ideas of transactions and consumption.

Williams’ analogy of “the sweatshop and the Ivory Tower” (2003) exemplifies the notion of the corporatized, for-profit university highly exploiting formerly, relatively-privileged populations, such as graduate students, researchers, and lecturers. Pedagogists
from Finland have highlighted the new precariousness in the university amidst robust social democracies and formerly robust public educational systems, where such de-publicization had been unthinkable. (Procoli, 2004; Nikunen, 2012) Germany’s “academic communities” have transformed into bureaucratically managed corporations, too. (Reihlen and Wenzlaff, 2013) The UK’s shift to contingent instructors mass-producing articles for the profit of departments or institutions both reifies the USA’s model, and drives other similar changes within Europe. (Harley, Muller-Camen, and Collin, 2004) This privatization of public universities a la plantation economics, but for academic production, is none other a destruction of public educational systems, encouraged by neoliberal /conservative politicians.

Newfield argues that a right-wing political agenda, not any real economic imperative, drove the destruction of public HEIs from the 1980s onward, and drives the ongoing destruction of the formerly public UC. Newfield specifies how public universities’, and especially the UCs’, revenue shifts away from state budget appropriations to individual household tuition are the clearest econometric indicator of neoliberal practices of privatization and de-publicization. Newfield integrates an political-econometric analysis of state educational divestment with qualitative analyses of the university as a site of democracy and participation, which parallels Readings and Giroux. (Newfield, 2008) Newfield specifically focuses on the ideal of California’s public HEIs public service of creating a stable, educated, growing middle-class that is truly diverse and upwardly socially mobile. This was the ideal of the UC in the 1960s, which went a step beyond simple national economic assistance from an HEI.

This is only a slightly radical leftist notion of Fordism, Keynesianism, and the welfare state. Even though it is only slightly radical, it is and ideology that transgresses against
governance by capital, and so is incompatible with neoliberalism’s hyper-individualism, privatization, covert racism, and destruction of all public institutions that are not securing profitable capital flows for a select population. Newfield maintains that pre-existing systems and practices of higher education could be re-implemented as a relatively simple way to at least mitigate growing problems. Positing the university system as under attack by right-wing politics that have pre-existing left-wing solutions, which remain unimplemented due to a number of failures to create the political will, makes sense.

I agree with these assessments, and that the damage done to the university as a dialectic of an ideal leftist concept, alongside a practical political-economy driver, is effectively ruinous. In the 1980s-2000s, unprecedented state cuts to public HEIs just erected during the 1940s-1970s became essentially state educational divestment. Subsequently, universities massively increased the tuition to be paid for by students’ individual, private households, unless they luckily lived in a state that had robust financial aid schemes. Massive tuition increases ostensibly made up for universities’ lost revenue, while the salaries of high-ranking university administrators simultaneously, suspiciously inflated. In 1978, California’s Prop 13 infamously restructured educational and other public services finances by tying them to frozen property values, satisfying suburban homeowners with lower taxes, while gutting revenues for schools in poorer areas. The rest of the country took note, and this neoliberal policy in increasingly libertarian California drove similar policies elsewhere in the country.

Post-9/11, for-profit HEIs seized on the business opportunity offered by state educational divestment by becoming a multi-billion dollar industry that disproportionately profited off of military veterans’ GI Bill funding. Ultimately, for-profit HEIs, with Corinthian Colleges an exemplar, became one of the few moments of cooperation between
Republican and Democratic legislators during the Obama Regime, surprisingly enough through tapping the brakes on total privatization and for-profitization of tertiary education. (Mettler, 2011) By the Global Capital Crisis 2000s, conservative performance indicators across the Western USA showed that, correlative with state educational divestment, severely negative patterns were emerging. Test scores, literacy, numeracy, and graduation rates in primary education; delays and/or failures to graduate from secondary school; and increasing racial disparities and costs at all levels permeated public education. (Ryu, 2011) Of course, this increased conservatives’ calls for more privatization of education, to remedy the failures of public education - which they conveniently ignored they had defunded. (Newfield, 2008; 2011; Mettler, 2011)

Harney and Moten argue that, much like my concept of governance by capital, students, instructors, and institutions are now entirely subjected to “governance by debt.” (Harney and Moten, 2013) Giroux conceptualizes existence in the neoliberal university as surviving a new form of “bare pedagogy,” (2010) adapted from Agamben’s notion of “bare life” (1995) or minimal, dehumanizing existence, originally ascribed to colonized people surviving absolute poverty. Post-9/11 especially, Giroux argues, instruction at almost all levels of primary, secondary, and tertiary education, in almost every part of the Global North and West, is now managed by capitalist-realist normalization, driven by endlessly seeking profit, and facilitated by the USA’s perpetual warfare to securitize that profitability. (Giroux, 2010)

Due to the USA’s overwhelming global hegemony, instead of South Africa’s theories of decolonization and housing, employment, and education entitlements spreading from the Global South to the Global North, “full-blown neoliberal compradorism became the
dominant (if not universal) phenomenon within the ANC policy-making elite,” (Bond, 2014: 3) and the consequence of “permitting World Bank advisory teams to make a huge impact on social and economic policy, and in international trade relationships” meant “the combined logic of neoliberalism and uneven development had a devastating effect.” (Bond, 2014: 121-122) Not only did the USA’s OBE model become South Africa’s pedagogical model, in lieu of possibly better, indigenous models, but the implementation of OBE under extensive austerity measures was riddled with problems for instructors and students. (Jansen 1997; 1999; Jansen and Christie, 1999) Ongoing failures in education of all levels in South Africa represents just one form of how, when Apartheid and the USSR collapsed, hope for democracy was replaced by disillusionment with neoliberalism and its ghettoization of fundamental public services.

Instead of the ideas of Fanon or Biko or Freire or hooks being embraced by mainstream academics and policymakers, their ideas were further marginalized and only taught in underfunded critical SS-HFA departments, themselves situated within underfunded HEIs. As such, these ideas were forced into the margins of academia, already in the margins of society - the margins of the margins. Instead of the implementation of Freire’s and Gramsci’s radical notions of engaged instructors and students politically moving together, education has regressed to mere management of rote memorization of facts, critical thinking suppressed by exploitation and slow violence. Instead of the radical empowerment sought by critical pedagogy, and briefly glimpsed with the establishment of subjectivist Black, Queer, Feminist, and Chicanx Studies departments, we now have the neoliberal university, and institutionalized disempowerment.
I agree with the concept of a university in chains, shackled to a divested state married to the “free market,” which is in turn driven by military, security, surveillance, and extractive corporations, ultimately violating both students’ and instructors’ fundamental human right and desire to learn and to teach. (Giroux, 2005; 2007; 2010; 2011) Amongst faculty or departmental bodies, as well as student associations, all student and faculty power over university policies or state laws is erased. As such, academic freedom protected by reasonable tenure, rigorous peer review, shared governance, and other democratic promises made by universities remain unfulfilled. In today’s neoliberal university, almost all behavior, and thought, and imagination, must conform to capitalist-realist common sense, in turn degrading all university populations’ critical or radical capacities. Impossible workloads, disempowered students, bureaucratic catch-22’s, and the omnipresent debt and lack of financing all intersect to disable the practice of radical politics. To transgress against the logic of constantly working for profit, in terms of more grants, more degrees, more grades, or more published articles, is to become an expendable supernumerary within the academic-industrial complex, where union protections and academic collegiality are erased, and one exhausted academic laborer will soon be replaced by another desperately indebted competitor. The question then arises: how is it possible for academic laborers, students, and instructors to transgressively articulate radical alternatives, actualize radical democracy, and still survive within the university?

**Universities’ and Students’ Counter-Hegemonic, Radical, Transgressive Potential**

My thesis's third and final critical premise is a dialectic of my first two premises, and concludes the conceptual and theoretical reviews I feel are necessary to frame my South
Africa case study. My third critical premise is that, when sites of democratization, such as universities, encounter de-democratization and authoritarianism, such as neoliberalism and its destruction of public spaces, marginalized students drive protests through what are usually perceived as radical or transgressive tactics, and these in turn potentially drive social movements. I briefly review social movement theory generally, before specifically revisiting notions of radical and transgressive resistance, and how this may manifest within universities themselves.

Wallerstein summarizes global-scale systemic thinking as being comprised of “the systems of production, the knowledge systems, and the anti-systemic movements” that drive transition from existing systems. (Wallerstein and Martin, 2008: 1) Wallerstein et. al. formed an “Antisystemic Social Movements” to working group at Binghamton University to “collect and analyze movement activity over several centuries...’movements’ encompass broadly not just organized, normative, and institutionalized collective activity as commonly defined, but disruptive, momentary, and noninstitutionalized collective action.” (Wallerstein and Martin, 2008: 8) Having reviewed 250 years of revolution and antisystemic social movements, Martin highlights key challenges of counter-hegemonic social movements post-9/11:

If the 1968 conjuncture was a worldwide one, it was also a brief one: everywhere anticapitalist and antistatist movements were rolled back in a flurry of fierce repression...the first response. Yet...those who wielded power and wealth were forced to confront the shattered legitimacy of liberal developmentalism...

The first response toward these ends was the explicitly brutal, as the neoliberal counter revolution unleashed in the 1980s and 1990s reshaped the worldwide division of labor, disciplined unruly states and workers, and replaced liberalism with the harsh realities of the ‘free market’...
(Martin, 2008: 172-173)
I translate contemporary anti-systemic movements as counter-hegemonic social movements, given the USA-driven global system of poli-socio-economics. I have focused on poli-socio-economics, knowledge systems of production and legitimation through HEIs, universities as critical sites of democratization, neoliberalism as fundamentally de-democratization, and my local experience within the UC system. I now explore how, under global neoliberalism and Contemporary Globalization, can universities remain sites of potential radical and transgressive imagination?

**Radical Transgression, Counter-Hegemonic Social Movements, or “Revolution”**?

Recognizing the inherent antagonism between global, counter-hegemonic ideals, existing within the minds of disempowered peasantry, Scott’s “normal exploitation, normal resistance” (1987) seems a prescient complement to Nixon’s slow violence. Understanding that revolutions are complex, multi-faceted, slow, violent processes, and not the overnight and bloodless revolution that yields everybody's’ utopia, seems to support notions that slow resistance is better than no resistance. But, as I address in my case study and conclusion, what about when the slow violence is never-ending? What about when slow resistance is not an option, given the slow, but inexorable and invisibilized, advance of global climate catastrophe? What about when the prestigious collection of theories, predicated on slow, but rigorous and democratic, academic review, is proven insufficient to practically apply knowledge beyond academia? What about when the Ivory Tower has become a sweatshop?

We are taught about a world of this-or-that, mutually exclusive, binary, oppositional Cartesian dualism. Gunn would say that neoliberalism teaches us a Manichean good-or-evil, Islamophobic world order, with a gun held if not to our head, then to our neighbor’s. (Gunn, 2013; 2015) For the majority of the world population, simple existing while Black, or
Muslim, or Queer, or a Woman, or complex, or leftist, or anti-capital, is a transgression against the near-dystopian neoliberal order. For those within academia, acknowledging subjectivity transgresses against the hegemony of objectivity. Teaching emotionally or empathetically transgresses against the hegemony of rationality and logic. Expressing empathy or concern for fellow human beings transgresses against the hegemony of the neoliberal market, as humans supposedly have no purpose except for increasing profitable transactions.

As Harney and Moten have argued, to simply exist within the neoliberal university as a human being and not as a consumer is to be a subversive and a criminal, transgressing contradictory rules which demand academically free thought, on the one hand, and on the other hand, demand slavish devotion to the university’s labor exploitation. If universities are one of the only spaces and times in society where such a radical imagination has been allowed, if only marginally and temporarily, and because universities are visibly impacted by neoliberalism, and because universities maintain elitism and conservatism through various Eurocentric disciplines and practices, then I argue that universities may potentially continue to experience radical clashes in imaginaries, and therefore help drive counter-hegemonic theories and actions.

Perhaps universities will receive significantly increased funding, and their hemorrhaging will be staunched in the short term by maintaining public HEIs becoming common sense again. While I reduce Newfield’s argument somewhat here, they suggests this could work, at least short term. Right wing politics have left wing solutions; previous higher education policies could be restored to remedy growing problems. But, as Readings dismally notes, “there is no way to go back to 1968...Forced to describe itself as either a bureaucratic-
administrative or an idealist institution, it chose the former...a repetition of the radical postures of the late 1960s is not adequate to resist” neoliberalism on a global scale. (1996: 170-171) I agree; even if society were to shift back towards conventional leftism, the university has so globalized and corporatized itself that it cannot shake the spectre of neoliberalism, nor return to the hierarchical problematics of its colonial past. Harney and Moten argue for the need for “a criminal” relationship with a university no longer able to assist “the subversive intellectual,” in the act of teaching as resistance. (Harney and Moten, 2013) Asserting how meaningless teaching in the neoliberal university is, they insist “It is not teaching that holds this social capacity, but something that produces the not visible other side of teaching,” - an ethereal other side that the sold out university not only cannot help explore, but is indefinitely dedicated to suppressing. (2013: 27)

Even if universities and societies further neoliberalize, a history of a promise unfulfilled, of an ideal but not utopian place of creativity may maintain the spark of asking “What if?” This in and of itself transgresses neoliberal insistence on obedience to only the market. This appeal to a human nature that includes, not precludes, curiosity and imagination as part of education might preserve a fundamental collectivity that education fosters. This reminder of an alternative, even one previously crushed, or marginalized as myth rather than thoroughly and legitimately historicized, may maintain educational institutions as sites of future quiet resistance, where students live out a “widely felt culture of opposition” (Foran, 2014: 9) in an updated form of “everyday peasant resistance,” instead of trying to force neoliberal universities to re-emerge as sites of idealized rapid revolution.

This necessitates preserving and communicating that history and idea of possibility in order to support others’ radical imaginations. I at first would have argued that an accurate
description and comparison of neoliberal wretchedness, alongside a hopeful alternative is
necessary, to disrupt the false consciousness of today’s covert authoritarianism. As Foran
said, under the Global Capital Crisis, counter-hegemonic social movements large or small
“become even stronger when, to a widely felt culture of opposition and resistance, they add a
positive vision of a better world, an alternative to strive for to improve or replace what
exists.” (Foran, 2014: 9) Unfortunately, prefigurative politics and methodology is easier
theorized than actualized, especially under the conditions of austerity, and after my two years
of researching students and social movements under the terror of neoliberalism, I am no
longer certain about the capacity for students to articulate a better world when constantly
violated by the brutality of the neoliberal globality. I revisit this in my conclusion, after my
case study, alongside the other theories in this final critical premise.

The highly transgressive and radical nature of the protests in South Africa, especially
by the Rhodes Must Fall movement for decolonization, exemplifies the actualization of a
radical imaginary, at universities, under Contemporary Globalization. I believe that RMF,
OS, and similar student protests to date have achieved by making visible the invisibilized and
often slow violence of neoliberalism, as well as interrogating fundamental assumptions about
educational systems. Below is the not-so-subtle question that has haunted much of my
discourse, as well as the recent struggles for public higher education in CA and South Africa.

(How) Could Universities Drive Social Movements?

So, if universities may, and should, realize their potential as a critical space in which
imagination of resistance can occur - how does it happen? Neoliberalism violates universities
and students so visibly, whereas its constant violation of the historically colonized elsewhere
remains largely invisibilized, given its material near-indistinguishability from the previous
Cold War system. Claiming universities, which are historically colonial, exclusive institutions, are actually indispensable for radical and transgressive thinking and politics seems potentially Eurocentric and elitist. On the one hand, universities are historically colonial, exclusive institutions intended to produce knowledge that is legitimated by peer review and reliance on previously, similarly-produced knowledge. On the other hand, universities in the Global North and West, during the 1950s-1960s experienced a massive opening up to the general, actual public, with class, race, and gender barriers being reduced by both students and the state. Simultaneously, though constrained by the global Cold War, decolonization and anti-systemic movements significantly challenged the international Cold War world order from the 1940s-1960s, too.

Consequently, the suppression of these movements also expanded quickly, be it as the neoliberal / conservative backlashes, or as internal disputes and internalization of oppression, alongside state infiltration, broke movements beyond repair. Recognizing the shortcomings of the ideal of revolution, via Gramsci, Scott, and their contemporaries, necessitates recognizing the shortcomings of specific, and now variously mythologized or pathologized, historical specifics of actual failed social movements.

How do we reconcile the historical oppression and colonialism of universities with their potential democratization and emancipation? (How) Did universities drive this, though? (How) Did students support it? It is not difficult to find similarities between Malcolm X and Steve Biko or Franz Fanon; Fred Hampton and Thomas Sankara; Martin Luther King, Jr. and Desmond Tutu or Nelson Mandela; Assata Shakur with Albertina Sisulu; and other ostensibly dissimilar radicals geographically separated, but racially and ideologically similar.
Does arguing that these cases are more similar than dissimilar erase the important and unique qualities of each movement?

While HEIs, and particularly public universities, did promise to students and society to be sites of new discoveries, and even potentially radical new ideas, that time period was relatively short, and violently suppressed. (Altbach and Cohen; 1990; Broadhurst, 2014)

Here is a particularly graphic recollection of what the LAPD were capable of, in case mythologies of student activism have glossed over it:

Campbell Hall was sticky with the blood of students of color, who had been an earlier target of the day’s police assault.
I walked in a daze through the red-stained corridor of Campbell Hall into the springtime California sun, the blood-smeared soles of my feet sucking at the pavement.
Violent as it was, UCLA’s was one of the smaller [clashes] of that day’s...
(Connery, 2011: 2)

Over the course of the Cold War, the extreme violence of colonialism, the USA, and the USSR, both within states and beyond their borders, as well as within and beyond academia, radicalized students and non-university populations at the same time it applied radical violence to them. In this way, assimilation into the colonial power, or subordination to and collusion with the hegemonic force, also existed alongside, and prompted resistance to, the colonization, resulting in counter-hegemonic activity - which was often masculinist and driven by violent confrontation with a violent state. (Foran, 2014: 8)

I argue that previously, prior to Contemporary Globalization, neoliberal academia, neoliberal media, and neoliberal states around the globe, the concept of formal higher education had been less normalized and commoditized. As such, today’s university varies significantly from universities during the height of the 1960s social movements, beyond just de-funding and suppression of anti-capitalist or otherwise radical thought. Changes have
occurred in who goes to public universities, what behavior is expected to be conformed to there, as well as a general increased formalization of “college life” as an idealized, 4-year period distinct and disconnected from normal American life, including increased political divestment than before college.

I touch on Apartheid South Africa’s university students briefly in my next chapter, but the overwhelmingly White university students were much less influential in terms of direct political action than were overwhelmingly Black secondary school students, such as in Soweto, or the exceptional students, like Biko. Iran’s university students in the 1970s interestingly represent one of the exemplary cases of historical counter-hegemonic social movements being truly driven by diverse coalitions of university populations, including students, instructors, and recent graduates. (Abrihimian, 1982; Keddie and Richard, 2006)

Altbach and Cohen have long argued (1989, 1990,) that the USA’s Free Speech Movement (FSM) and its associated anti-war, pro-integration movements, especially at UC Berkeley, and in connection with the SCLC in the USA’s South, remain watershed moments for student power.

They still maintain this stance, insisting that as recently as the Ukraine, conflict, university “student were a key force in toppling Ukrainian autocrat Victor Yanukovych...on the Maidan battleground in Kiev from beginning to end.” (Altbach and Klemencic, 2014: 2)

They both reinforce my assertion that in the neoliberalized university, some factors such as “diverse student populations, part-time study...non-elite social backgrounds...increasingly high cost…” could increase political action. (Altbach and Klemencic, 2014: 3)

Simultaneously, they recognize that political action “depends on which part of the globe” students are in, and from, as “in Western societies where entire value systems have shifted to
postmodernism, students [are] becoming more individualistic and perhaps more interested in subjective well-being, self-expression, and quality of life" may work "against active political and social engagement." (Altbach and Klemencic, 2014: 3) Given this disparity between the power of Global North and West students, even those who survive neoliberalism’s slow violence, I am skeptical of Mainstream GS and academic articles that lack critiques on most social movements’ patriarchy, sexism, and racism, including USA universities’ pro-integration and FSM factions. I am especially skeptical of too much self-congratulations of CA and UC students regarding student campaigns c. the 1980s for student divestment from Apartheid South Africa.

I want to highlight the conservatism of the 1980s, combined with USA student movements’ constant domination by white men (McAdam, 1988; Loeb 1994; Soule, 1995, 1997; Barker, 2008), and the possibly exaggerated impact of student-initiated divestment from South Africa (Kaempfer, et al., 1987: 460) in facilitating the end of Apartheid. I argue that the 1980s USA student divestment campaigns better serve to teach lessons regarding intersectionality within movements, as well as the problematics of the privilege of Global North students’ focus on international, rather than local, racism. This is not to trivialize the achievement of USA student movements, which were considerable. The anti-Apartheid and anti-Reagan sentiments students vocalized in the 1980s transgressively challenged privatizing universities and militarization. I simple have to ensure that credit is given where credit is due, and for Apartheid South Africa, that means crediting the thousands of tortured and murdered Black Africans, and Cubans, who did far more to end apartheid than Global North and West students.
Keeping in mind the issue of accountability and who bears the brunt of the labor necessary for facilitating social movements, I conclude with the final critical concepts and questions that have informed my research and thesis thus far, before beginning my historical analysis of South(ern) Africa that precedes my case study of RMF.

**Can Universities Drive Social Movements Now?**

Given the above issues with the debatable impact and success of past university social movements, as well as the debatable “success” of non-university social movements that achieved only incremental reform in the face of neoliberal violence, the question remains just how much universities can, or do, drive social movements after the Global Capital Crisis. Are universities totally dispensable and unnecessary for social movements? Is academia? Given their history, I argue that while they are not dispensable, they are also not as important as some have made them out to be. I also predict that, pushed further and further to the breaking point, if universities in the USA drive a social movement, they may be radicalized far to one extreme or the other on an issue, given the extreme marginalization of the students likely to initiate it.

Academia certainly has, historically, incubated both critical theories about, and actual political acts of, counter-hegemony. Even under increasing neoliberalism, academic institutions have attempted to ask and answer critical questions of not only “why” and “what if,” but also “how,” regarding counter-hegemonic social movements, including in the formerly public UC, at Santa Barbara. Foran’s attempts to move beyond Marx to "multiple meanings of revolution today: not taking state power, as the Zapatistas and...others, are doing so well; taking state power through elections...chang[ing] the world by not taking power violently” appeals to me not only because it embraces anti-masculinist ideals that transgress
against conventional narratives of idealized violent revolution. Their notion of “political cultures of opposition and creation” is useful for seeing how from radical oppression inadvertently yields radically imaginative, or creative, resistance. Foran’s pitching this to other scholar-activists forces consideration by those academics less engaged than they are in the urgent necessity of radical change. (Foran, 2014: 10-11) But what if asking and answering critical questions isn’t enough to execute the “how”? What if the best theory, the best pitch, and the best connections are ultimately frustrated and undercut by the total delegitimization beyond academia of everything that the state and the markets collude against? What if the university has to be abandoned, and all its powers and privileges with it? What if the university is broken beyond repair?

If we consider the privilege that insulates academia and academics from practical political action as a positive, we could say academia serves as an incubator or fermenter of ideas, and (formerly) democratically produced knowledge, or new, marginalized, radical, alternative knowledge, may originate or be refined by academia for later used by social movements.

“Intersectionality” is my exemplar, both for my own experiences within the UC and social movements, as well as for RMF’s and OS’s deliberate invocation of it. The concept of intersectionality has been critical across multiple student movements of late, especially RMF and OS, as well as various campaigns in the UC. However, the failure of this term to transfer from academia, where it originated in the early 1990s, to mainstream usage, hints at the shortcomings of neoliberal academia. “Intersectionality” is concise, complex, nuanced, and flexible, as well as specific and practical; it took until 2014 and Black Lives Matter, which
arose distinctly separate from formal education systems, to make “intersectionality” close to a mainstream term.

#FundTheUC and #IGNITE (Invest in Graduation, Not Incarceration, Transform Education), Occupy, The Tea Party, Barack Obama, anti-Bush Democrats - none of these university or widely known movements before 2014 centered their narratives on intersectionality. Each movement failed to teach mainstream America something that a neoliberal education system, and corporate media, never would. Since Black Lives Matter has appeared, universities have followed suit and begun, once again, to center narratives around identity politics, especially emphasizing Black Feminism, anti-Blackness, and intersectionality. However, that just furthers what I hinted at with the above notes on anti-Apartheid protests in the 1980s: the unlikeliness of USA universities to be the first to put radical ideologies, like Black Feminism, at the center of their narratives, until marginalized people beyond academia have already done so.

I remain unconvinced that the university is not broken beyond repair, necessitating total deconstruction and/or abolition - an act of institutional destruction, or even structural violence in some way. I argue that only in certain situations, and when certain conditions are met, can universities truly drive social movements - especially given the new, covert authoritarianism in place. This may come in the face of seemingly optimistic assertions, including my own hope, about radical resistance growing alongside the spread of radical neoliberalism (Starr, 2005; Starr, Fernandez, and Scholl, 2011) and the apparent growth in participation of in-the-street protests. (Dodson, 2015) Unfortunately, my reading of Brown, Giroux, Robinson, and even Foran actually leads me to conclude that even with increasing protests and social movements, covert authoritarianism is increasingly making violence an
unavoidable and even necessary precondition for radical social change, which, if not repeating the past, is at least rhyming with it.

**Marginalized University Students’ Protests Actualize Prefigurative Politics**

As I proceed through my critical premises, global-colonial history of South Africa, and contemporary university students’ protests of South Africa, I hope to clarify how I believe UCT:RMF exemplifies one of the most likely possibilities for university-driven counterhegemonic resistance, which may in turn drive larger-scale, university-driven social movements. Lezra specifies how decolonizing epistemology and epistemography within the university is an uphill battle, as well as something that requires personal, interpersonal, departmental, and administrative structural investment in order to be effective. Lezra also specifies how tenuous and uncertain such a process is, given that decolonizing epistemology and epistemography within the university is institutionally resisted, as existing structures of educational systems are derived from colonial and industrial practices. Specifically looking at instruction and relations between authorities and students, Lezra’s position on social justice within the university is explicated as needing an intentional “process of de-colonization,” (2014a) which must occur especially in the teaching and analysis of violence and colonization to students. And yet, this theory, which originates in Global North and West academia, and which is rooted in theories of decolonization, post-coloniality, and critical pedagogy, is somewhat refuted within ongoing student protests and counter-hegemonic social movements. As I demonstrate by the end of my analyses, UCT:RMF deliberately centers their protests around “violence” in various forms, in order to evoke emotional responses from an apparently apathetic and/or unable and/or unwilling neoliberal society.
This notion of escalation in order to force a confrontation is a conventional, masculist approach to militant protests. As UCT:RMF demonstrates, their perceived necessity of violence in various forms, and the perceived transgression and illegitimacy of those claims, both highly problematize the accepted notions of violence as never acceptable. Foran has written extensively on how existing academic practices must radically transform and transgress further than they have thus far in order to address global crises. They have demanded academic transformations of studies into crisis- and justice-oriented “manifestos” and calls to action. What I investigate here is the possibility for radical protests, and especially radical protests constrained by neoliberalized academia, to move "beyond insurgency," as Foran (2014) suggests, to less violent, more sustainable, and, as UCT:RMF claims, "truly decolonial" and intersectional social change models.
Irvine, T. (2016) UCSB MA Thesis Chapter 03:

**South Africa’s Global, Colonial Context**

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South(ern) Africa and (De)Colonization

Today’s Westphalian-style nation-state unit known as the Republic of South Africa traces its origins to the Anglo, Dutch, German, and Portuguese colonization of Southern Africa c. the early 1500s, and accelerating as Europe imposed its world system was imposed upon the region and the globe. Colonization began with the naval conquests of Portuguese profiteers Bartolomeu Dias in 1486 and Vasco de Gama in 1497, in which saw Portugal’s autocracy claim territory at the southernmost point of the African continent. (Meredith, 2007; Giliomee, 2007) Despite Portuguese claims, in Southern Africa and what would eventually be known as today’s Republic of South Africa, there was minimal de facto European colonization beyond coastal raiding and trading excursions for materials, including slaves, until 1652. In 1652, the Dutch East India Company, representative of the ascendancy of the modern Dutch capitalist empire, created de Kaapkolonie (Dutch; English: Cape Colony) with the building of the de Fort de Goede Hoop (Dutch; English: Fort of Good Hope) which by 1674 was the Castle of Good Hope.

This Dutch colonization of land surrounding a military establishment, meant to secure trade and intimidate indigenous peoples, was the precursor to the settlements that would eventually evolve into the city of Cape Town, categorizing de Kaapkolonie as, initially, Osterhammel’s Type 1: Pure imperial colony. The geographical territory within the boundaries of this capitalist colony was de facto and de jure governed by the Dutch East India Company in an early form of governance by capital. This capitalist colony’s primary function was to resupply Dutch ships sailing along the profitable spice and slaves route between Europe and Asia. This function of re-supplying ships required agricultural
production in turn required appropriating resources from the indigenous peoples, primarily the pastoral Khoikhoi, and imposing capitalist privatization of the commons. This cycle of perpetual growth of the colony and colonization included, and I would say required, the mostly Dutch-speaking settlers violently displacing the indigenous people, mostly Khoikhoi, as they themselves were displaced from increasingly English-speaking settlers on the coastal urban centers. This mutual, reciprocal, perpetual displacement occurred with the backing of the government of the Dutch East India Company in order to establish farmsteads on newly private lots seized from KhoiKhoi, necessary for homesteaders to produce commodities. As the flow of capital continued to increase along naval trade routes, and became increasingly profitable for the firms with control of resources, more settlers and laborers were necessary to produce more resupply products demanded by the growing colonial-capitalist economy.

Consequently, the Cape Colony became a Type 2: Imperial settlement colony. This cycle of European settler colonialism, while perhaps not the overt desire of the Dutch East India Company, was an inevitable outcome of the actions taken by those in charge of this capitalist firm, and which ultimately profited that firm and its stockholders. Throughout the 1600s-1800s, as economic imperatives and religious violence globally drove various denominations of Christian Europeans West across the Atlantic to North America, so too did Dutch-, French-, German-, and English-speaking Christian Europeans flee South over the Atlantic to Southern Africa. Additionally, similarly to how violent and capitalist Christians colonized the indigenous peoples of North America in the British colonies, and later the Western region within the USA, so too did European settlers recreate their oppressive poli-socio-economics systems in Southern Africa. (Schumacher, 2002) This perpetual growth
saw influxes of entrepreneurial settlers seeking to serve Dutch, and increasingly British, colonial society, alongside settlers who wanted to flee such society.

Critical to understanding contemporary South Africa is the inland migration of the colonial Dutch population, derogatively known as boers (colonial Dutch/Afrikaans: English: farmers) that was both oppressed by the British, and who internalized and then perpetuated this oppression against indigenous peoples. This voertrek (colonial Dutch/Afrikaans; English: great trek, great departure) became the fundamental creation myth of the colonial Dutch, or “Afrikaans” race. (Roberge, 1993; Duffy, 2006; Thompson and Berat, 2014) This increasingly inland colonization during the 1800s displaced more indigenous peoples, and recreated oppressive systems in each new geographical space. This always included at least by oppressing indigenous Africans, and usually by stratifying White society, too. With this settler colonization and indigenous displacement came sexual intercourse between Europeans and Africans, sometimes through ostensibly consensual civil unions, and more often widespread sexual violence. The archaic term “inter-marrying” is intentionally not used here, as it masks the sexual violence and technicality of the very specific action of intercourse that resulted in “mixed race” or “coloured” peoples in this region. Through this colonization, along with the mixing of ostensibly distinct “races” and nationalities, came the mixing of languages.

The most relevant product of this mixing here is the concept of the language of “Afrikaans,” its derivative culture and ethnic identity of “Afrikanerdom,” and the people or demonym of “Afrikaners.” Afrikanerdom is a colonial Dutch identity and poli-socio-economic construct created in the 1800s to benefit select populations of Southern Africa’s White colonizers. (Duffy, 2006; Giliomee, 2010; Giliomee and Mbenga, 2010; Thompson
and Berat, 2014) Afrikanerdom is inherently, overtly, and covertly White Supremacist racism in its mythology, theory, terminology, epistemology, language, and practice. In its terminology, Afrikanerdom and its derivative terms, especially the demonym Afrikaner (Dutch; English: African) asserts that White Dutch colonizers are “African,” invisibilizing people indigenous to Southern Africa. In practice, Afrikanerdom and its derivative languages and identities of Afrikaans and Afrikaners, respectively, are largely claimed by whiteness and Eurocentrism. This is despite Afrikaans being a “Creole” language that largely resulted from Black Africans and people of color innovatively modifying the language of colonizers to survive in a colonized space. (Roberge, 1993, pp. 68-70; Giliomee, 2010; Valley, 2010; Open Stellenbosch, 2015a) From the 1800s, to Apartheid South Africa’s Afrikaner National Party government, to contemporary university student protests against the pervasiveness of Afrikaner White Supremacy, it seems clear that this fundamentally colonial, racist appropriation continues to problematize notions of a post-racial, decolonized South Africa.

By the 1700s, Dutch colonization and control of Southern Africa competed primarily with colonization by the British. Portuguese colonization occurred to a lesser extent on the eastern coast of Southern Africa, near present day Mozambique. German colonization occurred up the eastern coast in present day Namibia - though British influence was pervasive across the entire region, and continent. A series of bloody European wars for control of African land, labor, and other resources occurred in the late 1700s and early 1800s. That Europe’s power struggles consistently resulted in the mass murder, enslavement, and genocide of indigenous Africans sadly justifies ongoing use of Europe’s global eras to contextualize even critical histories of the continent and its regions.
South Africa in the Long 19th Century

This section summarizes the historical period of roughly the late 1700s through the early 1900s, or Hobsbawm’s “Long 19th Century.” and “ages” of “Revolution” for 1789-1848, “Capital” for 1848-1875, and “Empire” for 1875-1914. Hobsbawm is often critiqued for oversimplifying complex phenomena, especially underplaying the violence of c. 1900s socialist regimes in favor of critiquing capitalist regimes, alongside Eurocentric teleologies, methodologies, and epistemologies through their position as a Global North and West academic. Hobsbawm’s historical periods are problematic and do not perfectly fit Southern Africa. But, as noted above and in my GS Theory Review, global poli-socio-economic trends, and their local impacts, coincide with Hobsbawm’s historical delineations. This section consistently references Thompson and Berat’s widely-cited *A History of South Africa, Revised 4th Ed.* (2014) alongside Martin’s *Diamonds, Gold, and War: The British, the Boers, and Making of South Africa* (2007), Giliomee and Mbenga’s collaborative *New History of South Africa, 2nd Ed.* (2010) alongside Wallerstein, Osterhammel, and Stuchtey. I also draw upon Duffy’s *The Politics of Ethnic Nationalism* (2006) and W. Beinart and S. DuBow (Eds.) *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth-Century South Africa* (1995).

1795-1824: Imperial Britain Creates the British Cape Colony

Between 1795 and 1910, Southern Africa’s primary legal entity in control of territory in what would later be the Republic of South Africa was no longer the Dutch Cape Colony, but rather the British Cape Colony - colloquially known as the Cape of Good Hope. During 1795-1824, the creation of the British Cape Colony marked the rise of Anglo-British global hegemony’s local articulation in the Southern Africa, and consequent de facto loss of significant Portuguese, German, or Dutch state control of the Southern African territory. The
1795 Battle of Muizenberg, as a direct result of the French Revolution in Western Europe, the British invaded the Dutch-controlled Cape Colony. Through this violence, the British Empire became the primary agent in control of Southern Africa. The 1802 Treaty of Amiens, also a result of French Revolutionary Wars, saw the UK cede the Cape Colony back to the Dutch. The 1806 Battle of Blaauwberg, also due to the Napoleonic Wars, saw the UK re-invade the Cape Colony. The Anglo-Dutch Treaties of 1814 and 1824 legally and politically reaffirmed British, control of the Cape Colony.

As a direct result of France’s Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, Dutch power decreased, while British Imperial power and global hegemony became reinforced through its imperialism and colonial possessions. Additionally, Eurocentric concepts of nationalism, racism, and industrial capitalist modernity were reinforced within European colonies, as were liberal notions of constitutional republics and individualist legal systems. The initial influxes of Dutch settlers, followed by later influxes of British settlers and colonial administrators, accompanied by racial, ethnic, economic, and military tensions, all laid the foundation for persistent racial, ethnic, and poli-socio-economic violence between Anglo-British and Dutch-Afrikaner Whites.

**1795-1910: British Imperial Violence Encounters Violent Resistance**

Throughout this time period the region’s legal, linguistic, and poli-socio-economic systems maintained British Imperial state power. Anglo-British citizens sat atop a racialized class hierarchy that oppressed Dutch-Afrikaner peoples, who in turn oppressed indigenous Africans or mixed race people, racialized as “Blacks” or “Natives,” and “Coloreds,” or “Indians,” respectively. As colonization continued, the territory over which the British Empire claimed sovereignty was contested by indigenous peoples. Some of the most notable
were the surviving KhoiKhoi in the west; the Xhosa in the west and south; the Zulu in the east; and the Swazi, Tswana, and Sotho. British Imperial power was also resisted by inward-migrating Dutch-Afrikaner White people.

In 1797, the first “pass laws” were implemented, so the state could better regulate “natives” on the basis of a *de jure* racial category. (Union of South Africa, 1920) The British Empire’s 1795-1910 control over the Cape of Good Hope, and later British Cape Colony, routinely experienced sub-state conflict between Anglo-British and Dutch-Afrikaner Whites, or between Whites and indigenous Africans. After their *voertrek*, inland Dutch-Afrikaners claimed territorial sovereignty by establishing small constitutional “republics,” in a practice remarkably similar to USA settler colonialism’s “filibusters” (Nevins, 2002; Gonzalez, 2011) in present-day Texas. Afrikaners’ employed mass displacement, rape, and murder to establish the ironically-named “Republic of the Free State.” Through this and several similar territorial claims, Afrikaners asserted their superior “Afrikaner” identity and right to indigenous land that the British also sought to colonize, due to its resources and exploitability. Under the direction of profiteers like Rhodes, Anglo-British land claims to areas rich in diamonds, gold, and other resources drew the attention of the British, leading to attempts to displace White Afrikaners and indigenous Africans.

The First and Second Boer Wars of 1880-1881 and 1899-1901, respectively, exemplify how Europe’s warfare became a definitive part of today’s Republic of South Africa. British Imperial forces waged brutal, industrialized war against the guerilla forces of the poor, often illiterate and innumerate, and rural, Afrikaners. Imperial Britain in the Boer Wars is the first known intentional use of modern concentration camps to commit mass slaughter, as well as biological warfare, resulting in the mass slaughter of thousands of both
Afrikaner and indigenous African civilians. The brutality of these conflicts established seemingly insurmountable mutual animosity between Whites in South Africa of different ancestry, that was only later overcome by mutual racism against Black South Africans - a dynamic that overdetermined poli-socio-economic identities up through Contemporary Globalization. (Legassick, 1995)

In 1910, as a direct consequence of the Boer Wars and British Imperial power consolidation, the nation-state legal entity of the Union of South Africa, a “self governing British Dominion,” was created by combining the territories of the British Cape Colony, Natal Colony, Transvaal Colony, and Orange River Colony. Again, it must be reiterated that throughout the 1800s and throughout the extraordinarily violent inter-European White South African wars, indigenous Black Africans were routinely murdered, raped, enslaved and exploited for the most brutal and dehumanizing forms of labor. Indigenous people were oppressed in almost every way imaginable under both Anglo-British and Dutch-Afrikaner systems, either in the British Cape Colony or the Dutch-Afrikaner “Republics” - all of which regulated electoral access by race. Despite this, the focus of the majority of Afrikaners remained their oppression by Anglo-British forces, rather than recognizing their oppression of indigenous Africans.

**1829 and 1866: The Creation of University of Cape Town and Stellenbosch University**

UCT’s and Stellenbosch University’s (SU) creation in 1829 and in 1866, respectively, were representative of institutions largely created and operated under ideologies of racist and colonial capitalist-realism, justified through the legal systems created by legislators entirely comprised of White men. In 1829, under British administration, UCT’s all-age predecessor school of the South African College was established. In 1874, the South African College was
split into a younger-age school for what would now be considered a primary and secondary school, and the older-age school for further education was named the University of Cape Town. In 1866, Stellenbosch Gymnasium matriculated its first students and began teaching with professors at the Master’s level, before it was renamed Stellenbosch College in 1881, and then renamed again to Victoria College in 1887. (Smuts, 1979) After receiving funds in 1915 from a wealthy colonial winemaker, Marais, who mandated that at least half of all classes be taught in Afrikaans, the institution received full university standing in 1918, and was renamed SU. (Duffy, 2006; Pretorius, 2014)

Through all of the colonial eras, maintaining *de jure* racism required the production of knowledge that explicitly reinforced racist state policies and legal systems, or knowledge that the state could easily co-opt and adapt to maintain a colonial status quo. Most social institutions, and especially universities as sites of knowledge production and legitimization, reinforced White Supremacy under South Africa’s dominant paradigms of Anglo-British colonialism c. 1790s-1940s, and then Dutch-Afrikaner colonialism c. 1940s-1990s. This thesis summarizes the military-industrial-academic complex in colonial Southern Africa as follows:

1. "Black" and "Colored" laws created by non-representative state legislatures, and upheld through state courts; in a dialectic with
2. Medical, social, and pseudoscientific theories produced and legitimized through academia and civil society; in a dialectic with
3. Intersecting notions of the rationality, objectivity, and consequent superiority of European methodologies and epistemologies; therefore resulted in:
4. **A mutually-reinforcing elite discourse between the state, society, and academia that legitimized *de jure* and *de facto* White Supremacy.**

Stellenbosch University served as a site of legitimizing Afrikaner White Supremacy, evidenced by its politics and departments, especially its explicitly pro-colonial, -Dutch, and -Afrikaans anthropology department, the first epistemology embraced by the university
(Duffy, 2016: 73-80; 200-205) and an epistemology with deep histories of helping colonial powers maintain notions of ethnic superiority. (Smith, 2012: 11, 66, 83) Even when not overtly producing and legitimizing racist theories, colonial HEIs like UCT and SU covertly maintained Eurocentrism through individualistic, masculist, capitalist-realist pedagogies, which imported European structures for instructors, administrators, students, laborers, and physical space of the university campus.

**South Africa in the Short 20th Century**


**1910s-1940s: from Anglo-British to Dutch-Afrikaner Hegemony**

As Europe’s wars of the 1700s and 1800s impacted European colonies in Southern Africa by shifting the global balance of power towards the British Empire, so too did the Europe-driven World Wars I and II shift the balance of power away from the British Empire. As noted in the GS theory review and my first critical premise, in the short 20th century the British Empire recalibrated and suffered through the early 1900s global economic depression, flu epidemic, and other conflicts of global hegemonic succession during and after World War I. This was locally articulated in Southern Africa as Afrikaner nationalism resurged in the Union of South Africa, generally exemplified by the founding and expansion of South Africa’s Afrikaner-driven National Party in 1915. (Legassick, 1995; Duffy, 2006) During this time period, up through the 1990s, South Africa’s colonization could be additionally considered a Type 3: Pure settlement colony, where massive land displacement, accompanied
by violence necessary for the sake of seizing territorial control, defined the processes of colonization.

While Anglo-British and Dutch-Afrikaner tension persisted, Whites in Southern Africa mutually supported overall White Supremacist laws. In 1913, the Union of South Africa created the “Natives Land Act,” also known as the “Bantu/Black Lands Act.” It is generally agreed to be one of the first sweeping land-based segregation laws in the region, and it specified that only approximately 10% of all land in the region could be legally owned by indigenous people. In 1915, during WWII, the Union of South Africa’s military, which was aligned with and an agent of British Imperial forces, invaded and conquered Germany’s South West Africa colony. This began a military occupation and struggle between colonial-German, British Imperial, and indigenous African forces in South West Africa that continued for the next 60 years, through the 1980s decolonization into present-day Namibia. The 1923 “Natives (Urban Areas) Act” laid the legal foundation for the coming decades’ explicit geographical segregation that made urban locations Whites-only, unless Black visitors or laborers held a special pass. The 1927 Immorality Act explicitly criminalized all sexual activity between White people, or “Europeans,” and Black people, or “Natives.”

In the 1940s, the British Empire’s global hegemony and regional hegemony further collapsed during and after World War II, yielding to the USA’s and USSR’s bipolar global hegemonic contest of the Cold War. Throughout the post-WWII period and the Cold War, South(ern) Africa was a key site of conflict between poli-socio-economic systems, especially varieties of capitalism and its necessary cheap labor and constant growth. In South(ern) Africa, the Dutch-Afrikaner National Party espoused apartheid (Afrikaans; English: apart- hood, or a state of being apart) to order society by the ideals of White Supremacy, and to
maintain poli-socio-economic and racial supremacy for a single social category within the
social order.

1940s-1990s: Apartheid South Africa

In 1948, ascending to power in Whites-only elections, the Afrikaner White
Supremacy National Party imposed apartheid across South(ern) Africa, until the regime
collapsed in the early 1990s after over 40 years of indigenous anti-colonial resistance. The
seemingly endless atrocities of apartheid won’t be examined in detail in this thesis. However,
the main critical, historical, legal, and social events are reviewed, with a focus on student
actions, given their centrality to even a concise history of South Africa, and their necessity
for any analysis that considers contemporary resistance to ongoing colonization and state
violence.

Legalizing Political, Social, Cultural, and Economic Segregation

The 1950 Population Registration Act created what would become the foundation for
apartheid: the dividing up of humans into racial categories, with the primary four categories
of “White,” “Colored,” “Indian, and “Black” or “Bantu” or “African.” While some
categories, primarily “Colored,” eventually received slightly more sub-categorizations, the
primary hierarchy of the Union of South Africa’s racialized society shifted in the late 1940s
and early 1950s under the National Party’s apartheid regime. The 1950 Population
Registration Act combined and amended previous legislation, notably the Prohibition of
Mixed Marriages Act (1949) that criminalized marriage between different races, and the
Immorality Act Amendment (1950) which criminalized all romantic activity between White
and “any non-White” peoples. It had previously only prohibited sex between “Whites” and
“Blacks.” This slew of racist legislation immediately after the 1948 rise to power of the
Dutch-Afrikaner National Party is generally accepted as representing \textit{de jure} post-WWII Apartheid South Africa, which explicitly formalized, legalized, and extended many \textit{de facto} racist practices that had existed prior to 1948. The result of these laws, which required close interaction between the state and universities, was the creation of a racialized caste system under which all humans within Southern Africa, because of South Africa’s regional hegemony, became categorized and regulated by the authority of a powerful, industrialized, advanced capitalist state that formalized the ideology of White Supremacy into legal and cultural norms.

The shift was from the above-described hierarchy of Anglo-British Whites over Dutch-Afrikaner Whites over all non-Whites. The shift was to European Whites, with a slight edge for Dutch-Afrikaner over Anglo-British Whites, over “Colored” and “Indian,” all of whom were situated over “Black.” In this way, the foundation for the racialized caste/class system of apartheid was explicitly anti-Black White Supremacy, with added privileges for those considered closer to Dutch-Afrikanerdom.

\textbf{TABLE 3.1:} Racialized Class Hierarchy in Southern Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Apartheid to WWII, 1795-1945</th>
<th>Apartheid, Post-WWII, Cold War, 1948-1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Natives”</td>
<td>“Colored” and “Indian”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Black” or “Bantu” or “Native”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the 1950s, largely as a consequence of such overt Dutch-Afrikaner White Supremacy, resistance to this authoritarianism massively increased. This is evidenced primarily through the growth of the existing African National Congress (ANC), as well as increased collaborations between civil society agents of “procedural democracy,” or
constitutional, electoral, liberal governments. Pro-procedural democracy agents included, but were not limited to: the ANC, the South Africa’s Indian Congress, and post-WWII groups such as the SAAC, PAC, ANC-YL, and SASO. I argue that South Africa post-WWII has much in common with other industrialized, racialized, and advanced capitalist societies. I argue that apartheid South Africa has much in common especially with the USA post-WWII, when multivarious counter-hegemonic social movements flourished. I argue there is significant overlap in terms of the USA’s and South Africa’s racialized state violence, racialized class systems, promotion of procedural democracy, and marginalization within social movements.

*Violent Oppression Yields Violent Resistance*

A global, colonial history contextualizes ostensibly disparate local resistances in southern and South Africa by noting that the post-WWII period saw the beginning of the collapse of the remaining British and French empires through colony states fighting for *de jure* decolonization and the rise of visible resistance around the globe in many different locations. Some of the most visible examples of this international contest is the Third World Project spearheaded by the likes of Nehru and Nkrumah and Sukarno in India and Ghana and Indonesia, respectively. In these cases, all of which were British or Dutch colonies, the decolonization transition saw colonial states and their legal figureheads attain some measure of nation-state agency and international legitimacy, under the leadership of a respected statesmen. Unlike India, Ghana, and Indonesia, which by no means were non-violent, but were arguably less violent, South Africa under Afrikaner apartheid was one of, if not the, most brutal sites of colonial violence. This contrast helps in understanding that under apartheid, White South African authorities’ brutal repression forced the likes of Mandela,
Mmbeki, Tambo, Sobukwe, and other resistance groups into the political margins of transgressive non-state action, denounced as treasonous or terrorist. These decolonization leaders had to exist in these margins far beyond the time of what the above-mentioned *de jure* decolonized states had to endure.

In other colonial states, like those above, it is true that non-state action by civil society and/or militant groups, which could fit most definitions of terrorism, preceded decolonization powers that became accepted by the West and Global North as legitimate states, such as those in Ghana, India, and Indonesia. Despite overlap, however, significant differences are evident in the extent of White European populations and infrastructure, both physical and social, in former British Imperial colonies, compared to former French, Portuguese, or Dutch Imperial colonies. In the more industrialized, significantly White-settled, and advanced capitalist South Africa, which exercised regional hegemony over the less industrialized, less settled, and cruder colonial capitalist societies bordering South Africa, the White Supremacy authority and power of the state and civil society barred a figurehead. The established state apparatus of control of goods and services, as well as military-industrial complexes and security-surveillance complexes, ensured Afrikaner power was an almost totalizing, systematically legitimized, well-resourced authority.

Ultimately, the strong authority of the state of the Union of South Africa decreased the likelihood of the eruption of an Algeria- or Vietnam-like war for independence, while maintaining a regime as or more brutal than French colonial regimes. Because of these factors, among others, in the 1950s non-violent, procedurally democratic movements emerged for South(ern) Africa’s decolonization, in the form of congresses, statesmen, petitions, and other forms of democratic proceduralism and civil society agency. However,
these broadly non-violent liberal agents, best exemplified by the ANC, were denounced as terrorist and delegitimized by the colonizer to a greater extent and for longer than similar movements in the above-mentioned colonial states, where Nkrumah’s and Sukarno’s movements eventually gained local, global, and international support.

In 1955, the South African Congress Alliance, driven by the ANC, but including the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), South African Communist Party (SACP), and other representative, liberal, multiracial, procedurally democratic, and generally anti-capitalist groups, convened in the history “Congress of the People.” This convention in the slum of Soweto was a watershed moment that included the famous Freedom Charter drafting, outlining basic demands for a liberal, multiracial, procedural democracy in South Africa, and prefaced by the primary demand: “The People Shall Govern!” Unfortunately, Union of South Africa state police broke up the convention on its second day, outlawed the ANC, and arrested many representatives, including figureheads such as Mandela, who were tried the following year in the 1956 Treason Trial. From 1955-1956, though many figureheads, including Mandela, were cleared of charges, the ANC and the SACP were outlawed, O.R. Tambo was exiled, and the Freedom Charter was criminalized on grounds of treason and violating multivarious apartheid laws.

In 1959, Robert Sobukwe subsequently founded the PAC, fracturing away from the ANC’s liberal, multiracial, inclusive, procedurally democratic approach for a more militant, exclusively Black-led approach. This insistence on (a) more radical militancy and (b) exclusively Black leadership would later be replicated by Steve Biko with SASO in 1969, which broke away from the liberal, multiracial NUSAS, and by Rhodes Must Fall in 2015, which broke away from the liberal, multiracial SRC at UCT. Additionally the 1959
Promotion of Bantu Self-government Act began a process of internally displacing Black South Africans onto the infamous, small, resource-scarce territories termed “bantustans,” where they held primary “citizenship” for “self-determination,” while simultaneously losing South African citizenship. See Figure 3.1.

**FIGURE 3.1:** Map of Apartheid South(ern) Africa, with “Bantustans” Detailed


In 1960, the Sharpeville Massacre, commonly identified as one of, if not the, most visible atrocities of apartheid, marked another watershed moment in the anti-apartheid struggle. On March 21, 1960, 69 peaceful protesters were killed by state forces at a protest
against pass laws. Much like the 2012 Marikana Massacre over 50 years later, the Sharpeville Massacre locally, regionally, globally, and internationally highlighted the brutal violence of White Supremacy in South Africa, and the state’s authority over black and brown bodies struggling against overwhelmingly violent authoritarianism in order to achieve some form of democracy.

After Sharpeville, the ANC created its armed military wing, Umkhonto-we-Sizwe (MK), with Nelson Mandela as its co-founder, and Chris Hani as its Chief of Staff. The PAC expanded its armed military wing Poqo (Xhosa; English: “pure” or “alone”) and renamed it to the Azania People’s Liberation Army (APLA). The term Azania refers to ancient Greek and Roman references for Southern Africa, and marks an attempt to subvert White European labelling and categorizations. This tactic is especially echoed by Rhodes Must Fall.

MK and APLA differed in that MK attempted to minimize civilian casualties, whereas APLA explicitly stated they would harm civilian White South Africans. Both marked a major escalation in the use of violence by the anti-apartheid struggle after Sharpeville, which Mandela later described as “inevitable” in his closing arguments at 1963 the Rivonia Trial. After Sharpeville, MK and APLA executed dozens of violent acts of sabotage and terrorism that often killed unarmed civilians in addition to South African military and police personnel, while the ANC and other civil society organizations executed peaceful, non-violent protests.

Additionally, widespread, coordinated, militant, violent decolonization resistance swept across Southern Africa in the 1960s. In 1960 in Namibia, the Southwest African People’s Organization (SWAPO) formed out of a coalescence of previous civil society groups. The primary group was OvamboLand People’s Organization (OPO), which was
exiled after police murdered 11 leaders in one day. SWAPO led a coalition resistance against the Union of South Africa’s regional hegemony. SWAPO’s armed wing, also active beginning in the 1960s, was the People’s Liberation Army for Namibia (PLAN).

Additionally, beginning in 1961, until 1974, Angola’s War of Independence began, which later became a site of South Africa exercising regional hegemony. See Table 3.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory, Politics</th>
<th>Acronym and Name</th>
<th>Figureheads, most visible, in chronological order</th>
<th>Tactics</th>
<th>Main Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **South Africa, center-left** | - ANC: African National Congress | - Albert Lutuli  
- OR Tambo  
- Walter Sisulu  
- Nelson Mandela  
- Thabo Mbeki  
- Jacob Zuma | - Protest and Performance  
- Coordinated Civil Disobedience  
- Elections  
- Court Cases | - Apartheid Republic of South Africa  
- South African Police (SAP)  
- South African Defense Force (SADF)  
- South African Police Special Task Force (SAPS, STF)  
- Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB)  
- South Africa Bureau of State Security (BOSS)  
- National Intelligence Service (NIS) |
| **South Africa, radical-left** | - PAC: Pan Africanist Congress | - Robert Sobukwe  
- Clarence Makwetu | - Protest and Performance  
- Coordinated Civil Disobedience  
- Coordinated Violence Against Military and Government Targets  
- Coordinated Violence Against Civilian Targets  
- Regional Support for Anti-Apartheid Resistance | - Apartheid Republic of South Africa  
- South African Police (SAP)  
- South African Defense Force (SADF)  
- South African Police Special Task Force (SAPS, STF)  
- Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB)  
- South Africa Bureau of State Security (BOSS)  
- National Intelligence Service (NIS) |
| **Namibia** | - SWAPO: South West Africa People’s Organization  
- OPO: OvamboLand People’s Organization | - Sam Nujoma  
- Andimba Toivo ya Toivo  
- Lucas Haleinge Nepela  
- Andimba Toivo ya Toivo | - Protest and Performance  
- Coordinated Civil Disobedience  
- Elections  
- Court Cases | - South-West Africa  
- South-West African Police (SWAPOL)  
- Apartheid Republic of South Africa  
- South African Defense Force (SADF)  
- South African Police Special Task Force (SAPS, STF)  
- Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB)  
- South Africa Bureau of State Security (BOSS)  
- National Intelligence Service (NIS) |

In 1961, the Union of South Africa technically achieved “independence,” was renamed the Republic of South Africa, and ended use of the British monarch as head of state. However, much like Rhodesia, one White Supremacist regime achieving independence from another did not actually self-determination for the majority of residents in that territory. In 1963, Mandela and other figureheads were arrested and tried in Rivonia, where Mandela infamously outlined the inevitability of violent resistance to apartheid, before life imprisonment on Robben Island. In 1966, after SWAPO’s consistent petitioning of the UNGA and International Court of Justice, the UNGA adopted Resolution 2145, which declared as illegal South Africa’s occupation of South West Africa / Namibia. This laid the legal foundation for eventual elections in Namibia, with the UN an impartial observer. However, Apartheid South Africa’s covert USA backing and occupation of South West Africa / Namibia precluded democratic procedures.

In the late 1960s, Apartheid South Africa passed increasingly authoritarian racialized laws, simultaneously further suppressing and radicalizing anti-apartheid movements. The 1966 Group Areas Act, 1967 Terrorism Act, and 1968 Separate Representation Act all further stripped non-Whites, but especially Blacks, of rights, representation, labor protections, mobility, and property. The 1970 Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act even stripped Black South Africans’ citizenship, claiming they were only citizens of arbitrarily assigned, impoverished, and powerless Bantustans. Throughout this time, the “deep state” of South Africa, what has been called its “third force” (Ellis, 2007) developed with extensive, covert paramilitary, intelligence, and secret police units, like the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB), which executed the widespread torture that was critical to controlling the population.
1968-1970s: Steve Biko Writes, Students Radicalize, Biko Dies

In 1968, a radical student from the University of Natal named Steve Biko founded the South African Students Organization (SASO), which was to be exclusively for and by Black South African students, and entirely led by Black South Africans - something that Rhodes Must Fall emulated in 2015. In 1971, SASO adopted a “Declaration of Student Rights” that resisted the conformist and White Supremacy racism of the existing pro-Dutch-Afrikaans legislation, and the group continued for the next years to politicize schools and townships around the country. (Badat, 1999) SASO marked a break from the multiracial and inclusive approach of liberal NUSAS, which to date had not been radical, or effective, enough. Biko alleged these groups served White culture through incremental reform more than they served Black culture through radical restructuring and thinking beyond Whiteness. Biko’s theories and political organizing with SASO massively expanded Black Consciousness across South(ern) Africa by demanding and creating space for Black students to transgressively actualize their radical, and criminalized, politics of Black leadership without White oversight.

The 1974 Afrikaans Medium Decree required that Afrikaans be the medium of instruction in all schools, including Blacks-only schools. In 1976, the Soweto Student Uprisings, led largely by secondary school students, marked the biggest and most visible counter-hegemonic social movement since the start of apartheid. Estimates range from 10,000 to 20,000 protesters in Soweto alone, with sporadic violence and rioting sweeping across South Africa after the initial protests began by secondary school students in Soweto. (Ndlovu, 2004) Over 500 people died during the Soweto Student Uprisings, over 100 of whom were under 18. Widespread protests and violence increased significantly after this
watershed moment, as did state suppression. By 1977, Biko was legally indefinitely detained under the 1967 Terrorism Act. Within months, he was tortured to death by the state and SASO was banned. In 1979, various students created first the Azanian Students Organization (AZASO) to succeed SASO; they later renamed it the South African National Students Congress (SANSCO). In 1979, yet another anti-apartheid student organization, the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), formed, but it primarily focused on supporting ANC priorities and strategies by supporting their boycotts, strikes, and rallies.

1970s-1980s: Things Fall Apart, Violently

From the 1970s onward, MK and APLA attacks increased in severity and frequency. After the 1975 Alvor Agreement, driven by the 1974 anti-colonial Carnation Revolution in Portugal, Portuguese de jure and de facto power in Angola and Mozambique yielded to multivarious armed decolonization movements, and the Angolan Civil War and the Mozambican Civil War began. In both Angola and Mozambique, proxy and paramilitary powers from the USSR, Cuba, USA, and South Africa waged covert battles for de facto control over the now de jure decolonized states. Mozambique’s civil war lasted until the mid 1990s; Angola’s lasted until the early 2000s.

In Namibia, between 1975 and 1989, SADF overtly fought proxy wars against SWAPO’s PLAN, and covertly used paramilitary forces against Angola’s leftist, Cuba- and USSR-backed Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA). During this time, the USA and South Africa both provided material support to pro-capitalist Angola militants. The most notable was Jonas Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Cuba’s covert anti-capitalist war in Angola, via the MPLA, fought UNITA; over 90,000 Cuban personnel were present at its peak, with estimates of up to 5,000 Cuban
soldiers dead due to combat alone. (Gliejeses, 2012) Additionally in the 1980s, in consultation with the USA, National Party leaders proposed a pro-capitalist multinational trade bloc: the Constellation of Southern African States (CSAS). CSAS represented a future, pro-Apartheid, pro-capitalist international system in Southern Africa. (Makgetlaneng; 2013) Should the various anti-apartheid conflicts failed, it is possible that the CSAS, and not SADC, would be the regional bloc driving Southern Africa’s policies today. See Table 3.3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Acronym and Name</th>
<th>Figureheads</th>
<th>Main Allies</th>
<th>Main Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>- MK: uMkhonto we Sizwe</td>
<td>- Nelson Mandela</td>
<td>- ANC</td>
<td>- Apartheid Republic of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- APLA: Azanian People's Liberation</td>
<td>- Cris Hani</td>
<td>- PAC</td>
<td>- South African Police (SAP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army (Previously, Poqo)</td>
<td>- Jacob Zuma</td>
<td>- SACP</td>
<td>- South African Defense Force (SADF)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Kgalema Motlanthe</td>
<td>- USSR</td>
<td>- South African Police Special Task Force (SAPS, STF)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Robert Sobukwe</td>
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<td>- South Africa Bureau of State Security (BOSS)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- Matooaane Mapefane</td>
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<td>- South Africa National Intelligence Service (NIS)</td>
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<td>- Potlako Leballo</td>
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<td>- South Africa Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- USA Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- US Agency for International Aid (USAID)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>- PLAN: People's Liberation Army of</td>
<td>- Sam Nujoma</td>
<td>- ANC</td>
<td>- South-West Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>- Herman Andimba Toivo ya Toivo</td>
<td>- USSR</td>
<td>- South-West African Police (SWAPOL)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Dimo Hamaambo</td>
<td>- CUBA</td>
<td>- Apartheid Republic of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>- MPLA: Movimento Popular de</td>
<td>- Agostinho Neto</td>
<td>- ANC</td>
<td>- South African Police Special Task Force (SAPS, STF)</td>
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<td>Libertação de Angola</td>
<td>- Viriato da Cruz</td>
<td>- PAC</td>
<td>- South Africa Bureau of State Security (BOSS)</td>
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<td>- José Eduardo dos Santos</td>
<td>- SACP</td>
<td>- South Africa National Intelligence Service (NIS)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- USSR</td>
<td>- USA Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)</td>
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<td>- CUBA</td>
<td>- US Agency for International Aid (USAID)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>- FRELIMO: Frente de Libertação de</td>
<td>- Eduardo Mondlane</td>
<td>- ANC</td>
<td>- National Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Moçambique</td>
<td>- Samora Machel</td>
<td>- SACP</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Joaquim Chissano</td>
<td>- USSR</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rhodesia (Zimbabwe,</td>
<td>- ZANU: Zimbabwe Africa National</td>
<td>- Enos Nkala</td>
<td>- ANC</td>
<td>- Rhodesian Army, Air Force, Guard Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia)</td>
<td>Union</td>
<td>- Robert Mugabe</td>
<td>- SACP</td>
<td>- Rhodesia Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Ndabaningi Sithole</td>
<td>- USSR</td>
<td>- British South Africa Police (BSAP)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Union</td>
<td>- Alfred Nikita Mangena</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- ZANLA: Zimbabwe African National</td>
<td>- Lookout Masuku</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Liberation Army</td>
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<td>- ZAPLA: Zimbabwe People's Revolution</td>
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<td>ary Army</td>
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At the same time that structural adjustments were implemented worldwide by the USA- and Europe-driven WB and IMF, HIV/AIDS began to sweep across Southern Africa, particularly devastating the absolutely impoverished, largely illiterate and innumerate, non-White communities that had been denied healthcare, as well as education, housing, and other common social services. Throughout the 1980s, public service delivery further degraded, and impoverishment, malnourishment, and state violence further suppressed and radicalized South Africans. The precariousness further increased as increasingly coordinated militant anti-apartheid violence, and sporadic violence by common criminals, spread further and further into urban centers. Many pundits speculated that civil war would devastate South Africa, much as it had in Angola and Namibia. Throughout all of this, armed resistance throughout South(ern) Africa was generally articulated as USA- or South Africa-backed right-wing militias fighting Cuba- or USSR-backed left-wing militias.

In 1984, the National Party unveiled constitutional reforms that offered some form of representation for “Coloureds” and “Indians” in a tricameral legislature and multiracial executive cabinet, with “Whites” retaining majorities both the legislature and executive. No “Blacks” were represented anywhere in this legislature. In fact, the 1984 reforms actually consolidated and therefore increased the authority of the state by combining the head of government (formerly, the president) and the head of state (formerly, the prime minister) into a single office of “die Staatspresident” (Afrikaans; English: State President). The State President had sweeping foreign and domestic powers, was highly partisan, and was therefore controlled by the National Party.

In 1985, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was formed out of 21 different trade unions joining together during a convention at the University of Natal. In
1982, Cyril Ramaphosa founded the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), one of the most important unions at this time, which would later be critical during the Marikana Massacre. This marked a significant increase in the power of low-paid service laborers and labor unions even under apartheid, and it added another dimension to the party-, militant-, and student-driven anti-apartheid actions thus far. In 1986, comprehensive divestment and sanction measures finally passed in the USA, despite the opposition of the Reagan regime and the USA President’s vetoing of such legislation. In 1987 during the national general election, over 250,000 mostly Black and Colored South African laborers went on strike, severely disrupting the routine White South African life and flow of capital, making many townships, suburbs, and even urban areas truly ungovernable. In 1988, with Mandela leading from prison, the ANC began covert talks with the National Party and FW de Klerk regarding possible negotiations.

**Universities’ Legitimization of Apartheid, Despite Protest**

While SU and UCT both remain bastions of Eurocentrism and capitalist-realism at the expense of truly African pedagogies, methodologies, epistemologies, SU stands out as the exemplar of military-industrial-academic complexes and collusion. Before and during apartheid, Stellenbosch University (SU) functioned as an intellectual and poli-socio-economic stronghold of White Supremacy by providing intellectual legitimization of racist state policies, by justifying existing practices for integration into Apartheid South Africa’s *de jure* legal system.

It is true that there were somewhat visible protests by university students against Apartheid between the 1940s and 1990s. (Badat, 1995) However, the overwhelming drivers of social change and protests under Apartheid South Africa were not the overwhelmingly
White university students at overwhelmingly White universities that were heavily invested in maintaining White Supremacy. (Luescher and du Toit, 2008) Instead, the social justice narrative at universities in Apartheid South Africa was, at best, “diversity” and “cosmopolitanism” that nonetheless resulted in “social segregation and exclusion,” if not narratives of “development” and “democracy” (Luescher and du Toit, 2008: 79, 80, 96-97)

One of the simplest ways to evidence SU’s Afrikaner nationalism, racism, and involvement in upholding apartheid is the amount of powerful and influential pro-apartheid academics and politicians educated at SU. The list of such academics and politicians includes, but is not limited to, the following extremely influential White South Africans:

- James Barry Munnik “JBM” Hertzog, a Boer general in the Second Boer War, and Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, 1924-1939
- Johannes Frederik Janse van Rensburg, lawyer and leader of Ossewabrandwag (Afrikaans; English: Ox wagon sentinel) a WWII, covert, far-right, pro-Afrikaner, pro-Nazi, anti-British organization
- Daniel Francois “DF” Malan, first apartheid-era National Party Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, 1948-1954
- Hendrik Frensch “HF” Verwoerd, second apartheid-era National Party Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, 1954-1966, whose government ruled during the 1961 Sharpeville Massacre, and independence from the collapsing British Empire
  ○ Vorster was also Minister of Justice during the 1963 Rivonia Trial of Mandela
- Magnus Malan, apartheid-era Minister of Defense of the Union of South Africa from 1980-1991 during the bloodiest period of Southern African decolonization conflicts

Another example of SU’s ongoing collusion with the state to maintain Dutch-Afrikaner White Supremacy is its historical and contemporary connection with prestigious, militaristic think tanks, such as the Council for Scientific and Industrial Relations (CSIR).

Established in 1945 by the White Supremacy government, this para-statal body / public-
private partnership facilitated and legitimized academic research on state violence and social control throughout Apartheid. Much like the USA’s Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), or the DARPA-MIT nexus, the research conducted through the SU-CSIR nexus in the name of “peace” and “security” lacks a critical frame, reifying violent state practices by making them policies.

SU has remained an excellent real-world manifestation of Giroux’s military-industrial-academic complex. To this day, CSIR conducts research that reinforces capitalist-realist policies of surveillance and control, as indicated by their connection to drone warfare, or “unmanned aerial vehicles,” and is “a prime R&D agency and operates as [Republic of South Africa’s] strategic ‘in-house’ science and technology defence,” under their “Defense, peace, safety and security” program. (CSIR, 2014a) To this day, CSIR maintains a mutually profitable, and legitimized, relationship with SU, which includes high tech security-surveillance research and drone development. (CSIR, 2014b) Two members of RMF and OS both informed me that prior to their joining the protests, they had been recruited by CSIR. After they learned the extent of its ties to the military, police, and other state security forces, they could no longer continue, even if it meant incurring unmanageable levels of student loan debt.

Furthermore, the military-industrial-academic complex in contemporary South Africa exemplifies neoliberal securitization of “insecure” black and brown bodies. Groups like CSIR coerce students, including lower-income and/or students of color, into employment with racist and violent, but profitable, military-industrial and security-surveillance inclined research. These research “opportunities” are offered in exchange for the firms’ financing tertiary education, often through loans or bursaries. In this way, not only does violence
against black and brown bodies continue to be both legitimate and a source of profit for some agents, but people of color are systematically coerced into collusion with this legitimization of racialized violence, through financial violence and precarity.

Finally, to this day, while some of the chief architects of apartheid, such as SU alumni noted above, have died, been disgraced, imprisoned or otherwise held accountable for their crimes, this is not the case. The cardiologist Wouter Basson, who was acquitted in 2002 due to jurisdictional technicalities regarding prosecuting crimes committed in Namibia, openly admitted to directing Apartheid South Africa’s chemical and biological weapons program Project Coast during the 1980s, which had extensive involvement with CSIR. (UNIDIR and CCR, 2002: 31,169) One of Basson’s/Project Coast’s most infamous acts of mass murder was 1982’s Operation Duel, where over 200 SWAPO/PLAN members were poisoned and then had their bodies subsequently dumped from an airplane into the Atlantic Ocean. (Burgess and Purkitt, 2001: 22) Basson also enabled the CCB to contaminate the Namibian Dobra refugee camp with cholera and yellow fever. (Burgess and Purkitt, 2001: 44)

Like this entire chapter, what I have provided here is a fraction of what occurred, often due to the design of people with close ties to prestigious knowledge production and legitimization sites, like SU and CSIR. Despite this, these people still freely live a relatively luxurious life in South Africa. In the case of Basson, they have reinvented themselves as “a fashionable cardiologist in the upmarket suburb of Durbanville in Cape Town” (Underhill and Child, 2011) who gives motivational talks to exclusive, Whites-only private gatherings, like at Cape Town’s Kelvin Grove Club. (Davies, 2013) While not a formal lecturer at SU, Basson maintained ongoing contact and access to SU students until at least 2014 as a cardiological “tutor” (Stellenbosch University, 2015) as well as ran a private practice in
Durban. As of 2016, Basson is in the process of fighting to retain their Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) credentialing, which was not revoked until 2013. Through these above examples, it is clear that the legitimization of state violence within advanced capitalist societies, if not always requires, still usually utilizes integration with academia.

**South(ern) Africa and Contemporary Globalization**

As analyzed in depth in my Introduction and GS Theory Review and three critical premises, the collapse of the USSR and consequent decrease in support for anti-capitalist movements, including Cuba, directly intersects with neoliberalism’s USA-driven ascent to global hegemony. It also intersects with and influences South Africa during its most significant power transitions since the rise of Apartheid immediately post-WWII.

Contemporary Globalization also birthed a new regional Southern African order, subordinated to the USA’s global order.

The long decade of the 1990s contained many transitions within Africa: state breakups; policy shifts; expansions of pro-capitalist poli-socio-economics; South Africa’s dismantling of *de jure* apartheid; and the collapse of anti-capitalist movements. As mentioned in my Introduction and Theory Review, the USA significantly changed its policies of covert support in order to maintain its legitimacy as an ostensibly “smaller government” and “democratic” authority, although its policies often applied mass state and non-state violence to humans in weaker or peripheral regions. Especially in Africa, (post)colonial nation-states continued to face intra- and inter-state conflict and breakup as weak and/or violent state governments, often influenced through covert foreign intervention that profited select populations.
Global Neoliberalism’s Violence Plagues Africa

As a direct result of Europe’s colonialism limited political, social, economic, cultural, and physical infrastructures meant global neoliberalism’s structural adjustments compounded pre-existing wretchedness. This period of extensive state conflict throughout the 1980s and 1990s has largely been termed “Africa’s Lost Decade” by conventional, capitalist-realist IR and economics theorists that seem to conveniently ignore colonialism and decolonization.

Professor Kaldor, writing from the prestigious London School of Economics (LSE), theorized a highly-influential concept of “new” versus “old wars” in a global capitalist-realist frame. (Kaldor, 1999, 2007) Largely disregarding the intersections and histories of race, gender, class, and colonialism, Kaldor instead focused on “tribalism” of “underdeveloped” states, a la Huntington’s Islamophobic notions of civilizations basically doomed to conflict, lest they internalize neoliberalism. I prefer perceiving Africa’s ongoing conflict under Contemporary Globalization as a continuation of colonialism. After this final national and regional review of post-Apartheid South Africa, I continue to that which is still influenced by the transition era: student protests, like Rhodes Must Fall.

Despite various aforementioned forms of de jure state independence, North Africa experienced extensive conflict during Contemporary Globalization. In the late 1980s into the 1990s in Somalia, long-fermenting civil war resulted in a “failed state,” the emergence of an autonomous but unrecognized Somaliland, and the collapse of the Cold War USA-backed Barre Regime. Beginning in the 1980s and continuing until 2005, the Second Sudanese Civil War unfolded, becoming one of the longest civil wars recorded, and only ending with the 2011 partition of the state into Sudan and South Sudan. In 1990 in Chad, civil conflict ended a Global North and West-backed regime with a coup that brought Idriss Deby, who still rules
Chad as of 2016, to power. In 1991 in Western Sahara, a ceasefire between Spain and Morocco introduced a UN peacekeeping force to facilitate self-determination of that territory, instead of governance by Morocco - an issue unresolved as of 2016. In 1992 in Algeria, a state of emergency was declared for the ruling party to maintain power over religious military insurgency; this state of emergency would continued until 2001. In 1993, Eritrea achieved full independence from Ethiopia after a decades-long war of independence against the formerly USSR-backed Ethiopian state.

Central and Western Africa also experienced massive armed conflict as “the end of history” yielded “freedom” and “democracy” as the new world order. From the late 1980s into the early 2000s in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire, brutal civil wars unfolded. They were noteworthy for extensive, profitable security and extractive firms’ interventions, as well as for Nigeria’s regional hegemonic influence via the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its military monitoring group (ECOMOG). In 1994 in Rwanda, the infamous Hutu-Tutsi genocide unfolded without Global North and West intervention, other than profitable French and Dutch arms sales. Rwanda’s, Burundi’s, and Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) racialized class tensions still exacerbate regional conflict in Central Africa. In 1992-93 and 1997-99 in the Republic of Congo, two civil wars ravaged the country. From 1996 to at least 2003 in DRC, the deadliest war on earth since World War II unfolded in DRC. (Mullins and Rothe, 2008; Stearns, 2012) Offshoots of it still continue, and South Africa maintains extensive economic and military involvement. (ISS 2012, 2013a, 2013b; Nibishaka, 2011)

In Southern Africa, Apartheid South Africa’s violence peaked in the late 1980s, with the militant violence waged by MK, APLA, PLAN, and the MPLA against the apartheid
regime, combined with sanctions by global powers including the USA, combined with widespread crime and ungovernability as a result of massive poverty and state-sanctioned violence. The 1988 Tripartite Agreement, formally signed in New York and so termed the “New York Accords,” officially ended South Africa’s and the USA’s, as well as Cuba’s and the USSR’s, covert intervention in both Angola and Namibia. This cleared the way for Namibia’s independence from overt Apartheid South African control. I agree with Gliejeses and Westad that these treaties occurred not because of USA-led diplomacy, but because of anti-capitalist violence waged Angolan, South African, Namibian, and Cuban soldiers - which I later discuss as problematizing notions of non-violence movements’ impact on abolishing de jure Apartheid.

I argue that the USA and South signed treaties primarily because Cuban- and USSR-backed anti-capitalist fighters effectively won a covert war of attrition against South Africa- and USA-supported pro-apartheid and pro-capitalist UNITA Angolan fighters. (Gleijeses, 2012) The Angolan conflict was a long and expensive proxy war that the USA supported only as long as it profited the USA in its anti-USSR, anti-Cuba Cold War contests. (Gleijeses, 2003; 2012; Westad, 2007) MK and APLA in South Africa, SWAPO in Namibia, and MPLA in Angola all attrited Apartheid South Africa’s power, with material and human resources supplied to them by the USSR and Cuba. Additionally, FRELIMO in Mozambique, and ZANU / ZANLA in Zimbabwe, all further drained South Africa’s military and economic resources. As South Africa’s and global regime changes appeared inevitable, the USA no longer profited from helping Apartheid South Africa pursue its pro-capitalist, pro-apartheid border wars. The USA, through structural and adjustment and covert authoritarianism, could
still wield global hegemony without Apartheid South Africa as necessary for maintaining profitable capital flows.

As such, South Africa was forced to the negotiating table primarily by being worn down economically and militarily by MK, APLA, and MPLA; secondarily by losing the support of the post-Cold War USA; and additionally by growing international pressure. The defeat of Apartheid South Africa defeat in Namibia and Angola symbolically and politically weakened the hardline White Supremacy apartheid government of PW Botha, and contributed to his eventual resignation and succession by FW de Klerk in 1988. By 1990, South West Africa became Namibia and achieved *de jure* independence as Apartheid South Africa’s military withdrew from both Angola and Namibia. Conflict continued within Mozambique and Angola for several years, but the role of the USA, USSR, Cuba, and Apartheid South Africa decreased significantly, at least in terms of covert military involvement. Within a decade of major combat ending, Mozambique’s, Angola’s, Zambia’s, and Tanzania’s formerly African-socialist regimes had became local pro-capitalist forces who followed the lead of the USA and South Africa.

**South Africa in the Long Decade of the 1990s**

Between 1989 and 1990, Apartheid South Africa’s State President Botha suffered political and personal health setbacks, leading to their resignation and de Klerk’s succession. Similar to Gorbachev in the USSR in the late 1980s, de Klerk undertook tentative reforms that became a landslide of poli-socio-economic change as a result of the state’s precarious authority. Driven by the ANC and Mandela et. al., and faced with likely civil war, de Klerk capitulated.
De-Criminalizing Anti-Apartheid Politics and Civil Society

In 1990, de Klerk announced in his inaugural address that the government would end its criminalization of Mandela, the ANC, PAC, SACP, and other anti-apartheid, socialist, and/or political parties, such as the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). In 1990 May, ANC and Apartheid South Africa negotiated at the presidential palace, *Groote Schuur* (Afrikaans; English: Big Barn), yielding the Groote Schuur Minute. This agreement laid the foundation for negotiations. It guaranteed immunity for exiles, release of political prisoners, and reductions of violence by both the Apartheid South African state, as well as non-state, anti-apartheid groups’ violence. In August, negotiations were held in Pretoria, producing the Pretoria Minute, which led to the suspension of MK’s violence and the end of the long-running formal state of emergency by the government. Additionally, in 1989, de Klerk overtly recognized Apartheid South Africa’s covert nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons by ordering their disarmament.

In 1991, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was formalized, and included the vast majority of political actors at the time, although the far-right, White Supremacy, pro-Apartheid Conservative Party, and the far-left PAC, both boycotted and denounced the group and its actions. South African Students Congress (SASCO) was formed by merging the liberal, multiracial NUSAS with the South African National Student Congress (SANSCO), formerly the Azanian Students Organization (AZASO) that succeeded Biko’s SASO. Driven by the ANC, CODESA compelled de Klerk to enact the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act, which repealed many restrictions on Coloured, Indian, and especially Black South Africans’ rights to mobility, property, labor protections, legal representation, and citizenship. The major educational program to finance tertiary education
at HEIs was restructured into the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) which especially focused on Black South Africans. What would later become the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) were also devised by Mandela et. al. at this time. They could not be implemented, though, until elections officially removed de Klerk and other pro-Apartheid authorities. Additionally in 1991 the newly-created UNESCO Félix Houphouët-Boigny Peace Prize was first awarded jointly to de Klerk and Mandela for their collaboration.

Throughout 1992-1994, various actions destabilized negotiations between the ANC and the state, threatening mass violence. In March, a referendum limited to White South Africans yielded 68% in favor of negotiating an end to apartheid, with the far-right Conservative Party the most vocal opponent of the now center-right National Party’s reforms. At a CODESA convention in Boipatong, Gauteng Province, the Boipatong Massacre began with a fight between the ANC, state police, and the IFP, resulting in over 40 deaths. After more violence seemed inevitable, de Klerk ultimately dismissed several high-ranking SADF officials to purge hard-line right-wing individuals who might use military force to prevent imminent changes. As CODESA negotiations faltered, a new approach to incorporate more groups and create an interim constitution, called the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MPNF), helped include significantly disparate parties such as the NP, PAC, and the IFP into negotiations. It also included British and USA officials as mediators and advisors - an initial compromise that later neoliberalized the transition, but legitimized it in the eyes of hard-line pro-capitalist powers

In 1993 April, MK Chief of Staff and SACP leader Chris Hani was murdered on the orders of former Shadow Finance Minister, and founder and head of the Conservative Party
Clive Derby-Lewis, potentially destabilizing the entire transition. However, Mandela and the ANC pacified near-rebellious factions, and ultimately accelerated negotiations for a less violent transition, allowing the MPNF to implement an interim constitution by November. In December, Mandela and de Klerk jointly received the Nobel Peace Prize.

In 1994 April, the interim governing body, the Transitional Executive Council, oversaw the first ever multiracial elections. Mandela’s ANC won in a landslide, near super-majority, with 63% of all votes; followed by de Klerk’s NP with 20%; and Buthelezi’s IFP with 11%. International observers declared the elections relatively fair and free of violence. Mandela appointed de Klerk, still head of a reduced National Party, as one Deputy President for the duration of the 1994-1996 transitional government, alongside Thabo Mmbeki as another Deputy President, who remained once de Klerk resigned in 1997.

Post-1994: From Apartheid to What?

Throughout the 1990s, ANC-NP cooperation established the Republic of South Africa as an internationally-legitimized, liberal, multiracial, procedural, Presidential democratic system of governance. Between 1994 and 1996, the Republic of South Africa continued to transition from de jure Apartheid with minimal coordinated, but much widespread, non-state violence. The racist SADF was abolished completely, and instead the military, no longer based on mandatory, Whites-only, male conscription, became a volunteer force renamed the South African National Defense Force (SANDF). Similarly, the brutal South African Police (SAP) were restructured and renamed the South African Police Services (SAPS). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), partly structured upon Chile’s post-Pinochet Rettig Report, (Wilson, 2001: 52) was established in 1995 by the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act. This attempt at restorative justice and national
reconciliation provided amnesty to those who confessed to human rights violations under Apartheid. TRC began public trials in Cape Town in 1996 and largely concluded by 2000. At that point, the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), and NGO headed by Tutu, *de facto* executed analysis of reconciliation practices and policies for South Africa’s Department of Justice.

Dominant narratives, academic theories, and common sense all identify 1994’s multiracial elections, the 1996 implementation of the new Constitution, and the TRC as proof of a transition “from apartheid to democracy.” After waging arguably the longest-running battle with overt colonialism within a decade the ANC had gone from a banned terrorist group, most of whose leaders were either exiled or incarcerated, to the elected majority party governing the nation-state with the largest economy in Africa. The ANC and Mandela et. al. had apparently triumphed an overtly White Supremacist, White minority-ruled, authoritarian, nuclear-armed regime that spread its violence across most of Southern Africa.

However, how much South Africa actually diverged from its colonial apartheid past remains hotly debated, and this controversy is the centerpiece of the ongoing university student social movements presented in the next chapter. While I agree that the ascent of the ANC and collapse of *de jure* apartheid was a triumph, the post-1994 transition occurred under global neoliberalism, and amidst the wreckage and wretchedness of hundreds of years of colonialism. As such, it yielded little more than procedural democracy at best, and neoliberalism / covert authoritarianism at worst.

My arguments are largely in line with Professor Bond’s sweeping analysis of the conditions birthing post-apartheid South Africa: *Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism*. Bond focuses on the political and economic compromises Mandela et. al.
made with agents of White-owned, global capital. I agree that the ANC prioritized preventing civil war and earning international legitimacy of Black majority rule, given the constraints of global neoliberalism. I also agree, however, that select political elites became a *comprador bourgeoisie* class within the new South Africa. In line with Bond’s theories and South Africa’s ongoing protests, I argue that:

1. Global neoliberalism’s pressure to abandon socialist / communist / anti-capitalist ideals in favor of capitalist-realist social structures; and,
2. A complex combination of inadequate economic power, greed, and exhaustion from years of struggle drove ANC party elites to enrich and insulate themselves with relative wealth;
3. Therefore, most ambitious, socialist, redistribution programs were abandoned by the end of the Mandela Regime, with neoliberalism fully imposed by the Mmbeki Regime.

*Talking Left while Walking Right*

Post-1994, the Republic of South Africa ostensibly attempted to implement social welfare programs that redressed colonialism’s massive inequality and structural violence. Initial plans for widespread socialist redistribution were the goal of multiple groups in CODESA and MPNF - but the ANC ultimately led most of these negotiations. The two most visible and ambitious programs, RDP and BEE, were poorly implemented and designed as the ANC began governing in 1994. (Nattrass, 1994; Ponte, Roberts, and van Stittert, 2007; Bond, 2006, 2014) Even under the tragic poli-socio-economics the ANC inherited in 1994, Bond argues that “the RDP was not unrealistic or unfeasible” given enough national coordination. (Bond, 2014: 3) The ANC’s stated goals were to meet the basic needs of the vast majority of the population, which colonialism had deprived of modern housing, sanitation, electricity, or education access for hundreds of years. The ANC’s party platform, combined with the ideas of RDP, BEE, NSFAS, and TRC, and combined with one of the most pro-socio-economic rights constitutions in human history, put South Africa among the most progressive, tolerant, and capitalistically-redistributive social democracies - on paper.
Because of the constraints of global neoliberalism, during the 1990s transition era, a great many structural adjustments were made to South Africa’s economy in the interest of profitability and privatization. This was largely articulated through ANC-negotiated acceptance of strings-attached IMF loans, beginning as early as the 1980s, that precluded any truly radical restructuring of society away from free market logics. In this way, what was originally an ANC and SACP platform of industry nationalization, capital redistribution, and otherwise socialist programs became instead processes of privatization that appeased the IMF, WB, and WTO, while profiting both global agents of capital, and an emergent, local *comprador bourgeoisie*, comprised of ANC elites profiting from new local authority, regional power, and global legitimacy.

By 1996 March, the core principles of RDP were abandoned. The former ambitions were secretly mocked as “Rumours, Dreams, and Promises,” as ANC elites and finance executives highlights their newfound aversion to nationalization or redistribution as a way to market South Africa to global financiers. (Bond, 2014: 70) World Bank staff “claimed successful penetration” into the TEC and RDP planning, as well as other transition offices “responsible for most of the [development] policies,” where ultimately “three of the four authors of the urban and rural [development] strategies were from neoliberal institutions.” (Bond, 2014: 82) In addition to this external infiltration, there was also good old fashioned corruption and selling out. This occurred at a time when South Africa’s economy was, quite simply, broken beyond repair by any but the most competent teams with the best resources. Decades of arms and luxury goods manufacturing, facilitated by reliance on *de facto* slave labor for services affordable only by White South Africans, yielded a totally unequal and unsustainable balance of capital. While it had been relatively advanced in terms of
industrialization during the Cold War, under Contemporary Globalization, and after years of violence bordering on civil war, the skewed demographics and high costs made it a near worst-case scenario for producers and consumers, in addition to the majority Black population. Here is a brief list of South Africa’s economic damage c. 1994, before neoliberalism:

- Insufficient consumer buying power
- Inadequate global competitiveness
- Debilitating lack of international *savoir faire* (French; English: sophistication)
- Structural bias of production towards luxury...goods and away from capital goods
- Inefficiencies caused by enduring racial and gender imbalances
- Drain of capital abroad or into speculative investment pools controlled by a small crew of unpatriotic [globalized] finances
  
*(Bond, 2014: 76)*

Some estimates place the value of the capital flight out of South Africa at around 6% of GDP per year from 1980 to 2000. (Mohamed and Finnoff, 2005: 93) As the rand repeatedly crashed, the economy recessed, political upheaval still threatened, and the state hemorrhaged resources of all types, some financiers saw an entrepreneurial opportunity. Bond asserts:

Big capital had shown the capacity to cajole, threaten, and simply go on ‘investment strike’...even with the lifting of further exchange controls in mid-1996 - meant to soothe foreign and local investors - capital flight intensified and the rand kept crashing, leading business leaders to call for still further, faster liberalisation. The Finance Ministry could pursue what were widely recognised by orthodox commentators as ‘sound economic policies’, yet it was mainly hot money that erratically flooded in and out...

*(Bond, 2014: 63-64)*

Ultimately, at the time of transition, global neoliberalism demanded local obedience to governance by capital. Agents of capital, many of whom were embedded within the state and even in the transitional policy makers’ circles, convinced Mandela and Mbeki to “talk left” overtly, but covertly “walk right.” While select parts of the ANC profited from liberalization of the economy, and the many departing White economists and financial
executives were replaced by Black employees who became well-paid pro-capitalists, the vast majority of the population simply stayed almost as wretched as they had been before. Elite White South African capitalists retained significant power, and the many Black South Africans and politicians who ascended to power became a new form of elite. In a global lens, South Africa’s “democratization” under Contemporary Globalization shares much in common with Chile post-Allende in the 1970s under Pinochet, or Russia and eastern European states post-USSR in the 1990s.

...selling out the poor and working classes on behalf of international finance was also the general fate of so many labour and social democratic parties… Even where once-revolutionary parties remained in control of the nation-state - China, Vietnam, Angola, and Mozambique, for instance - ideologies wandered over to hard, raw capitalism.
(Bond, 2014: 161)

In all of these cases, an influx of “hot capital” with re-regulation in favor of maximizing only a select number of industries’, institutions’, and individuals’ profitability led to massive privatization, erratic FDI, and occasionally good GDP growth. It also yielded the curses of neoliberalism: market instability, persistent inequality, the defunding of public services, such as education and healthcare, and the excessive influence of profitable firms and their agents on the state and policymakers. 20 years after "democratization" supposedly ended minority rule, but it would seem that governance by capital has yielded negligible changes to material quality of life. See Tables 3.4-3.5 for textual data sets, and Graphs 3.1-3.2 for visual data sets.
### TABLE 3.4: South Africa Nation State Critical Economic Indicators, 1990-2014

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-HDI Value</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.733</td>
<td>0.696</td>
<td>0.604</td>
<td>0.621</td>
<td>0.666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP, Total, $Billion</td>
<td>349.7</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>418.8</td>
<td>505.5</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>641.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP, Annual % Change</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>0.895</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>0.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP, Per Capita</td>
<td>9934.8</td>
<td>9331.4</td>
<td>9519.1</td>
<td>10610.7</td>
<td>11650.8</td>
<td>12105.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI, Per Capita</td>
<td>9987</td>
<td>9566</td>
<td>9719</td>
<td>10935</td>
<td>11833</td>
<td>12122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI, Net Inflows, % of GDP</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation, GDP Deflator, Annual % Change</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment, % of Total Labor Force</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Unemployment, % of Labor Force Ages 15-24, Male-Female Combined Average</td>
<td>48.65</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>45.55</td>
<td>48.95</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>52.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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All values are in terms of 2011 PPP$, unless otherwise noted.

**Source(s):**
World Bank; Statistics South Africa; United Nations Development Programme; UNDP Human Development Report 2015

### TABLE 3.5: South Africa Nation-State Critical Inequality and Poverty Indicators, 1993-2011

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GINI Index</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Poverty, $1.90 per Day, % of Population</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Poverty, $3.10 per Day, % of Population</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All values are in terms of 2011 PPP$, unless otherwise noted.

**Source(s):**
World Bank; Statistics South Africa; United Nations Development Programme; UNDP Human Development Report 2015
GRAPH 3.1A: 1990-2014 South Africa Nation-State Inequality, I-HDI Value

GRAPH 3.1B: 1993-2014 South Africa Nation-State Inequality, GINI Index
GRAPH 3.2: 1990-2014 South Africa Nation-State Unemployment

GRAPH 3.3: 1993-2011 South Africa Nation-State Absolute Poverty
As indicated by Tables 3.5 and 3.6, alongside Graphs 3.1A-B and Graphs 3.2A-B, the economic stagnation of South Africa post-1994 has resulted in very real, quantifiable, and qualifiable suffering that remains comparable to that of Apartheid. Even disregarding less widely-accepted indicators such as Youth Unemployment and the “around x$ a day” poverty line, in terms of every major, conservative economic indicator, the material quality of life in South Africa has remained almost the same as it was in the early 1990s.

Almost every indicator above has flatlined; the Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) indicator has barely changed, nor has its GINI Index (inequality) value. While Absolute Poverty, both in terms of surviving on “less than $2 a day” or on “around $3 a day” has relatively decreased, it remains staggeringly high at around 15% and 35%, respectively. Modest decreases in Absolute Poverty are offset by relatively increased unemployment. Adult and Youth Unemployment have remained at crisis levels for at least 20 years, with over half of young people unemployed, exacerbating the risk of crime and long-term depressed income.

For the majority of South Africa’s population surviving in bare life, impoverished, unemployed, illiterate, uneducated, and unable to access healthcare, there has been little material change post-1994. In this way, despite all of the noteworthy praise for the overthrow of de jure Apartheid, disarmament of White Supremacy, and claims to democratization, there has sadly been only continued existence of wretchedness. For most, there was no actual transition from minority rule - except upon the shift from elite rule on the basis of race to elite rule on the basis of capital. Because of neoliberalism, South Africa has simply shifted to ruled by an elected, wealthy, multiracial elite, as opposed to its historical rule by an unelected, wealthy, uni-racial White elite. This elite transition, from racial to class apartheid,
from *de jure* and *de facto* Apartheid to covert, *de facto* apartheid of a different sort, to covert authoritarianism, occurred because of Contemporary Globalization’s multivarious processes of global neoliberalization. Rather than “freedom” or “democracy” spreading worldwide and leveling the playing field, there has been reinforcement of global apartheid between the Global North and West and the Global South. Now, state and non-state forces, agents of capital, academics, and perhaps worst of all, common sense, all assert that there is no alternative to capitalist-realist, neoliberalized, procedural democracy.

**South Africa: Thabo Mbeki and the Post-9/11 Global War on Terror**

The USA exploited its global hegemony in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, by coercing many states to adopt, if not the USA’s policies, at least the USA’s discourse around state violence, terrorism, and security. The USA-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, as part of the Bush Regime’s GWOT, ostensibly legitimized massive state military and surveillance action around the world, under the auspices of securing “democracy” in the form of a capitalist-realist nation-state with stable economic growth.

As noted before, the UNSCR vote against Iraq did not stop Iraq from being invaded. The USA, the UK, Poland, and Australia committed overt invasion and occupation that technically violated international law and the UN. While only those 4 states contributed military personnel, the USA coerced at least 45 others into publicly signing onto the idea of its invasion to legitimize it. While this may have been more of a “coalition of the billing,” (McClure, 2003) the “shilling,” (Ali, 2004) and/or the “bribed and bullied,” (Newnham, 2008), these states subscribed to the rhetoric of being “willing” to overtly invade, occupy, and restructure a state for the purpose of establishing a capitalist-realist regime, and they profited from this process while “helping to vindicate the American military action.”
(Althaus and Leetaru, 2012) While torture, as opposed to military force, is not detailed here, the USA’s widespread legalization and application of what most of the world overtly denounces additionally exemplifies the *de facto* rules of the international community: the USA does what it wants, because might makes right.

While I’ve addressed USA-driven global militarization generally, in terms of Africa specifically, the establishment of USA’s Africa Command (AFRICOM) is an important development directly related to the GWOT, which this thesis considers a major component of the contemporary global order. South Africa was a vocal opponent of AFRICOM being established at all, and especially against it being established in an African locale. Because of South Africa’s influence in the AU, and Gaddafi’s then influence in it, the AU strongly opposed AFRICOM. As such, AFRICOM was established in Germany, not anywhere on the actual continent of Africa.

On the one hand, this could be seen as an effective use of complex interdependence mitigating militarization and the USA’s global hegemony. On the other hand, despite this, the post-9/11 USA military action across Africa has gradually increased as ostensibly religious, “tribalist,” extremist, non-state terrorist threats have increased during the GWOT. In fact, what the USA has done with AFRICOM under the GWOT is little more than an overt and now fully-legitimized re-iteration for Contemporary Globalization of the USA’s support of strongmen such as Pinochet or Mobutu during the Cold War. The difference now is that most of the influential forces on the planet agree that there is no alternative to capitalism. Now, the USA holds greater political and cultural power, in addition to a discourse in their favor about how applying military and economic violence to secure profitability is legitimate.
 FIGURE 3.2: 2014 Map of Overt USA Military Operations in Africa

Source(s):
FIGURE 3.3: 2014 Map of Alleged Covert Military Operations in Africa

Source(s):


These sub-state threats classified as “terrorism” and mandating now-legitimate USA or South Africa intervention largely expanded and diversified after the invasions and destabilizations of Iraq and Afghanistan. Interventions by the USA have occurred almost everywhere on the continent with great frequency, except Southern Africa. In northern Africa, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has expanded in Algeria and Mali, and the USA’s policies of intervention have resulted in a failed state, civil war, and widespread terrorism in Libya - along with the de facto toppling of long-time anti-capitalist Gaddafi. In eastern Africa, Al Shabab has expanded in Somalia and Kenya. In central Africa, Seleka and Anti-Balaka militias and terrorist groups have expanded in Central African Republic (CAR). In each of these instances, the USA has had an opportunity to deploy more military forces in Africa, either directly or through peacekeepers, allied nation-states’ militaries, or private security initiatives. With each deployment, profitable capital flows have been maintained, not the least of which are those connected to USA arms manufacturers and other agents of military-industrial complexes.

**SADC: Regional Integration, Complex Interdependence, and Capitalist-Realism**

Sweeping discourses centered on the state’s legitimate use of violence in the form of surveillance, the police, and the military to stop alleged terrorists extended to Southern Africa. Post-1994, South Africa joined the international community, was affirmed as a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, and had significant political, social, and cultural clout due to the figureheads of Mandela, the ANC, and others’ long fight against apartheid and colonialism. South Africa, colloquialized as “The Rainbow Nation,” and legitimized locally and globally, was dubbed a democratic authority and representative of Africa’s potential development. In 1994, South Africa possessed the largest economy on the continent.
of Africa and the region of Southern Africa. Its military remained formidable. Its population boasted a large, liberated, pro-African culture - and media exports. As such, South Africa possessed simultaneous military, economic, and cultural dominance - the three qualifiers for being hegemonic.

Similar to Apartheid South Africa, the Rainbow Nation became a regional proponent of capitalist-realism. Largely through its integration into, and dominance of, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), South Africa began reinforcing the authority of states, rule of law, as well as pro-capital regional integration, replacing its former Pan-African socialism with belief in complex interdependence. While not promoting all of the same ideologies as apartheid-era designs for CSAS, South Africa’s domination of SADC, and expansion of the Southern African Customs Union, (SACU) reflected its increasingly neoliberalized, though not overtly racist, economic restructuring of the region and enrichment of its own state power at the expenses of other African states and peoples in the region. See Figures 3.4.A-3.4.B, Graphs 3.4.A-3.7.D, and Table 3.6.
FIGURE 3.4.A: Map of SADC, SACU, Southern Africa, Overlay

Source(s):
SADC History http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/
WTO SACU Secretariat Report https://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp213_e.htm
FIGURE 3.4.B: Map of SADC, Political Detail

MEMBER STATES OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)

SADC Member States: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

SADC Headquarters: SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, Botswana

Source(s):

South Africa 48.69%
Angola 21.44%
Tanzania 6.33%
Zimbabwe 11.9%
Botswana 1.49%
Mozambique 2.11%
Malawi 1.67%
Lesotho 0.35%
Namibia 1.42%
Zambia 4.04%
Swaziland 0.53%

- South Africa: 29.05%
- Angola: 9.66%
- Tanzania: 22.21%
- Zimbabwe: 8.69%
- Botswana: 1.17%
- Malawi: 7.29%
- Mozambique: 11.81%
- Namibia: 1.23%
- Swaziland: 0.72%
- Zambia: 6.87%
- Lesotho: 1.30%
**GRAPH 3.4.C**: 1995 SADC Power Disparities, Strongest Member States, Armed Forces Personnel, Aggregate Percentages

**GRAPH 3.4.D**: 1995 SADC Power Disparities, Strongest Member States, Armed Forces Personnel, Disaggregated Absolutes

GRAPH 3.5.B: 2014 SADC Power Disparities, Strongest Member States, Armed Forces Personnel, Disaggregated Absolutes
GRAPH 3.6.A: 1995 SADC Power Disparities, GDP, Disaggregated Absolutes, $B

**GRAPH 3.6.C**: 1995 SADC Power Disparities, Strongest Member States, GDP, Aggregate Percentages

- **81.1%** South Africa
- **90.1%** 4 Most Powerful SADC Member States
- **100%** All 11 SADC Member States

**GRAPH 3.6.D**: 1995 SADC Power Disparities, Strongest Member States, FDI, Aggregate Percentages

- **47%** South Africa
- **73.7%** 4 Most Powerful SADC Member States
- **100%** All 11 SADC Member States

South Africa: 349.873
Angola: 126.775
DRC: 32.782
Tanzania: 48.03
Zimbabwe: 14.197

GRAPH 3.7.B: 2014 SADC Power Disparities, Strongest Member States, FDI, Disaggregated Absolutes, $B

South Africa: 5.792
Angola: 1.922
DRC: -0.344
Tanzania: 2.045
Zimbabwe: 0.545
GRAPH 3.7.C: 2014 SADC Power Disparities, Strongest Member States, GDP, Aggregated Percentages

- South Africa: 51.4%
- 5 Most Powerful SADC Member States: 84.0%
- All 15 SADC Member States: 100.0%

GRAPH 3.7.D: 2014 SADC Power Disparities, Strongest Member States, FDI, Aggregated Percentages

- South Africa: 31.3%
- 5 Most Powerful SADC Member States: 53.8%
- All 15 SADC Member States: 100.0%
<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SADC, All 11 Member States, 1995</strong></td>
<td>122,913,000</td>
<td>568,900</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>191,751</td>
<td>2.65584</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
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<td><strong>SADC, 4 Most Powerful Member States, 1995</strong></td>
<td>82,000,000</td>
<td>502,800</td>
<td>88.4%</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
<td>39,100,000</td>
<td>277,000</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>155.46</td>
<td>1.248</td>
<td>47%</td>
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<td>Angola</td>
<td>13,000,000</td>
<td>122,000</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>4.968</td>
<td>0.472</td>
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<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1,580,000</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>4.731</td>
<td>0.0704</td>
<td>3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1,750,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.859</td>
<td>0.275</td>
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<td>Malawi</td>
<td>9,820,000</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>1.397</td>
<td>0.00564</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>15,900,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>2.522</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1,650,000</td>
<td>8,100</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>3.942</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>963,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>1.699</td>
<td>0.0518</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>29,900,000</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>5.255</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>9,250,000</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>3.807</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>11,700,000</td>
<td>67,800</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>7.111</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>42,200,000</td>
<td>65,100</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>5.841</td>
<td>-0.0224</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SADC, All 15 Member States, 2014</strong></td>
<td>312,560,000</td>
<td>507,440</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>680,722</td>
<td>18.5129</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SADC, 5 Most Powerful Member States, 2014</strong></td>
<td>220,200,000</td>
<td>412,500</td>
<td>81.3%</td>
<td>571.66</td>
<td>9.96</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>54,100,000</td>
<td>82,300</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>349.873</td>
<td>5.792</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>24,200,000</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>126.775</td>
<td>1.922</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>74,900,000</td>
<td>134,000</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>32.782</td>
<td>-0.344</td>
<td>-1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>51,800,000</td>
<td>28,400</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>48.03</td>
<td>2.045</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>15,200,000</td>
<td>50,800</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>14.197</td>
<td>0.545</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

South Africa, Angola, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and DRC are bolded and highlighted to emphasize regional power. SADC total values do not double-add; 1995 numbers do not add DRC to SADC totals. All values are in terms of 2011 PPP$, unless otherwise noted.

Source(s):
World Bank; OECD; SIPRI; International Institute for Strategic Studies; CCR;
As the above Figures, Graphs, and Tables detail: South Africa remains the overwhelming regional power within Southern Africa and SADC, through persistent, significant economic and military power advantages relative to other member states. While there has been a significant decrease in the number of armed forces personnel within South Africa, relative to each other individual state, South Africa remains evenly balanced. When factoring in the history of the professional military in South Africa, alongside its economic resources, there reduced military personnel still rival that of the other most powerful SADC member states. Even with the relatively greater population and armed forces personnel of the DRC, the persistent economic dominance of South Africa’s economy in terms of relative and absolute FDI and GDP mitigate the DRC’s potential influence within SADC.

Recognizing that under governance by capital and the new, covert authoritarianism in which South(ern) Africa is situated, South Africa’s might would appear to make it right, too. With newfound authority and clear regional hegemony, South Africa could legitimately use violence against terrorists or other sub-state combatants in order to secure state power, the rule of law, and profitable capital flows. Since 1994, SANDF has been involved in at least a half a dozen inter-state conflicts under the auspices of peacekeeping. Most notable are the direct SANDF unilateral interventions in the name of state stability in Lesotho in 1996, (de Coning, 2000) and multilateral intervention in the DRC in 1999 with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which continues as of 2016, under the auspices of UN peacekeeping.

From 1999 to 2008, the Mbeki Regime and ANC governed South Africa during a period of further stagnation of South Africa’s material quality of life, concomitant with accelerating global, regional, and local neoliberalization. The Mbeki Regime marks a clear bridge between the initial, hopeful, post-1994 Mandela-era of the Rainbow Nation, and
today’s increasingly unequal and violent South Africa. Mbeki exemplified Bond’s theory of “Talk Left, Walk Right” by being one of the most visible figureheads of supporting an “African Renaissance,” or moving beyond Africa’s Lost Decade and ostensibly tribalist violence. Mbeki’s demeanor and British education simultaneously represented African respectability, as well as assimilation into Eurocentric, capitalist-realist concepts of education and success.

The Mbeki regime, while publicly denouncing “global apartheid” and disparities between the Global South and Global North and West, ultimately furthered neoliberalism in South Africa by reducing state spending, increasing “de-regulation,” and fully shifting South Africa away from social democracy, towards market fundamentalism - despite rhetoric to the alternative. If Mandela et. al., in capitulation to agents of global capital, laid a pro-capitalist foundation of post-1994 South Africa with a compromised RDP and development plans, then Mbeki, and later Zuma, built up the neoliberal house. Mbeki was instrumental in talking up the potential of South Africa despite neoliberal globalization, and ensuring a high regional visibility through SADC and the AU. Mbeki’s flagship diplomacy in their regional hegemony was known as “soft diplomacy” with Zimbabwe, where Mbeki supported state authority at the expense of suppression of both anti-capital and pro-capital sub-state dissidents. This ultimately perpetuated widespread perception of the Mbeki and Mugabe Regimes as corrupt, undemocratic, and unable to govern a capitalist-realist state, notwithstanding the long exploitation of Zimbabwe, Zambia, and South Africa by colonial and neocolonial forces.

Possibly the worst moments for the Mbeki regime came with the peak of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Mmbeki’s speculation that HIV/AIDS was not a viral infection
tarnished his reputation, although he emphasize the connection between poverty and poor healthcare and overall quality of life. A major win for fighting HIV/AIDS came about through public pressure led by non-state forces, such as the NGO *Medicins Sans Frontieres* (MSF) (French; English: Doctors Without Borders) to circumvent international capitalist copyright laws, empowering South Africa and other hard-hit states to important Brazil-produced generic anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs). (Babovic and Wasan, 2010) One of the most significant interactions between South Africa and the USA in this time period was the 2003 creation by the USA of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).

PEPFAR was both a public relations project to humanize the Bush regime through promoting the image of “compassionate conservatism,” especially after the drawn-out fights over access to generic ARVs, opposed by profit-seeking pharmaceutical corporations. Additionally, PEPFAR was an attempt to alleviate the impact of HIV/AIDS on emerging economies and workforces to aid capitalist-realist development.

As the 2000s rolled onward, Mbeki accelerated South Africa’s privatization, market liberalization, poor growth, delays or failures in land reform and basic needs projects, poor education, and healthcare failures. The majority of the population remained trapped in poverty through low-paying service jobs, while a minority, especially those in government or finance, maintained high-paying jobs. Additionally, South Africa’s economic dependence on extractivism for a major part of its economy expanded, rather than decreased (Bond, 2014b) while South Africa greenwashed its behavior through rhetoric about the importance of addressing global climate change.

However, the USA’s, the EU’s, and China’s economies especially thrived, and global capital around the world accrued and increased due to financialization and the ever-profitable
military-industrial(-academic) complex of the USA. This prosperity erratically extended somewhat to Southern Africa, now playing by the rules of capitalism. 1995 and 2005 especially saw relatively high year-to-year GDP growth and decreasing unemployment. Unfortunately, while the profits of neoliberalism were erratic, its violence appeared ready to stay indefinitely.

**South Africa: Jacob Zuma and the Global Capital Crisis**

As the Global Capital Crisis began with the 2007 bubble’s burst, Southern and South Africa experienced democratic and economic stagnation, alongside ideological fractures. The 2008 Mbeki to Zuma Regime change in 2008 represented this fracture, and further neoliberalization, as Mbeki’s neoliberal house was not quite as luxurious as Zuma’s mansion.

After a 2007-2008 probe into Zuma as possibly corrupt, which Mbeki allegedly mishandled, the ANC began to impeach Mbeki, who capitulated to prevent a drawn out crisis in South Africa. Then-Secretary General of the ANC, and former MK member, Kgalema Motlanthe, a Zuma loyalist, succeeded Mbeki and effectively served as acting President until the following election. In 2008, the ANC again won reelection by a large margin. Zuma became President and appointed Motlanthe as Deputy President. Ramaphosa became an ANC party executive, until their 2014 appointment to Deputy President, replacing Motlanthe, who failed in a 2012 challenge to replace Zuma as president.

Zuma’s past included entrance into the ANC via the SACP, and then MK, which yielded 10 years imprisonment on Robben Island alongside Mandela. Zuma’s post-incarceration time was dedicated to strengthening the ANC and anti-apartheid resistance, mostly in Mozambique. He had no formal education, but extensive informal education in KwaZulu-Natal, as well as military training with MK. Zuma’s post-1994 political career
could almost be defined by scandal and controversial allegations of corruption. Zuma, always a high-level ANC party loyalist, faced a 2005 rape trial resulting in acquittal, as well as the above-mentioned corruption probe, resulting in acquittal, related to governmental arms deals and fraud. Zuma’s questionable challenge to, and replacement of, Mbeki was a self-serving act that mirrored most of their political career: technically legal, and highly profitable.

Allegations of corruption and mismanagement continued to circulate amongst the party under Zuma’s leadership, and the ANC’s influence began to see some potential threats in other parties. In 2008, the Congress of the People (COPE) split from the ANC, and in the 2009 general elections the main post-1994 opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), a combination of various opposition groups, including remnants of the old NP, won over 20% of the general vote. Another significant internal power struggle in the ANC arose out of the ANC Youth League (ANC-YL) that was historically a strong source of new recruits and politicians for the ANC. The ANC-YL was led from 2008 to 2012 by Julius Malema, whose intense anti-capitalist comments on land redistribution were often characterized as too radical. Malema’s ardent anti-Whiteness and anti-White Supremacy was often qualified as hate speech and inciting violence. In 2013, after being censured repeatedly, Malema left the ANC-YL to found the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and focus on a platform of aggressive socialist resource redistribution, marking the EFF as more radical and farther to the left of the ANC.

Elections in 2014 and 2016 elections were significant because they represented a true post-Mandela South Africa, not only since they were the first since Mandela’s death. Instead, the optimism and pride in an “African Renaissance” had, like the economy, stagnated. Scandals, corruption, unemployment, and inequality dampened hope. The Tripartite Alliance
between the ANC, COSATU, and SACP became more and more strained. In the 2014 national elections, the EFF captured over 6% of the vote, winning recognition and seats in the national legislature, and the DA captured 16%. The ANC retained a majority and landslide victory with 62% of the votes. In the 2016 sub-national (district, metropolitan, and provincial elections) elections, for the first time in history, the ANC overall received under 60% of votes at all levels. Only four district councils did the ANC win 61% of all votes. Across all of the Western Cape, the DA won a majority or plurality control of municipalities.

**FIGURE 3.5:** South Africa’s National Assembly Composition, by Party

Graphic visualizing change over time in the composition of South Africa's National Assembly. Solid vertical lines denote elections. Dashed vertical lines denote "floor-crossing" periods. Furthest-right solid vertical line indicates constitutionally-mandated election in April–July 2019.  

**ANC:** African National Congress;  
**(N)NP:** (New) National Party;  
**DP/DA:** Democratic Party or Democratic Alliance;  
**COPE:** Congress of the People;  
**IFP:** Inkatha Freedom Party;  
**UDM:** United Democratic Movement;  
**EFF:** Economic Freedom Fighters  

**Source(s):**  
Wikimedia User "Htonl," a DA Employee ;  
[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:National_Assembly_(South_Africa)_party_composition_history.svg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:National_Assembly_(South_Africa)_party_composition_history.svg)
Everywhere except the Western Cape, the ANC remained in power, though by slimmer margins, and with more visible and more viable challengers, than ever before. Protests and scrutiny increased on Zuma and the ANC, with two severe recent scandals. One, “Guptagate,” included revelations of ongoing, mutually-profitable, but technically legal exchanges between Zuma and a wealthy Indian family with ties to high-tech IT, media, and extractive firms. Another, “Nkandlagate,” included revelations that Zuma’s private mansion had been upgraded with military-grade security systems, a helipad, and medical facility, at the cost of over 200m ZAR (over 15m USD, using 2011$PPP) paid for by various government bodies. Simultaneously, and contradictorily, Malema’s own publicly-funded private mansion prompted a scandal, but was considered resolved when it was auctioned and purchased by a wealthy ANC party member. Not only had Mandela died, in a way abandoning the ANC and South Africa to survive neoliberalism without his political power, but so had Desmond Tutu publicly denounced the ANC after a lifetime of support.

**2011: Marikana Massacre, Turning Point(?)**

It is true that South Africa has not visibly adopted all of the USA-driven rhetoric on terrorism, terrorists, and the disavowal of all wrongdoing by a presumably democratic state. In the DRC, Zimbabwe, and with its own extractive-industrial complexes, however, South Africa has very visibly applied military force, through militarized domestic police and internationally through SADC- or AU-legitimized interventions, to secure state stability, and simultaneous profitability. Recent rhetoric and behavior of the state, especially in the case of the Marikana Massacre, perilously mirrors the repressive discourse of Apartheid South Africa, only now situated within the USA’s neoliberal logics of securing profits at all cost.
One of, if not the, most visible and important events of contemporary, post-1994, post-9/11, South Africa under the Global Capital Crisis was the 2012 Marikana Massacre. Drawing upon “abyssal thinking,” “coloniality,” and “non-being,” Ndlovu (2011) offers my preferred description of the context of the platinum miners who went on strike to demand safer conditions, better pay, and an end to their “hell.”

What can be understood about the black population in South Africa is that the large majority belong to the zone of non-being that is generally characterised by hellish living conditions, such as low wages, hard labour, squalid accommodation and premature death….in almost all private sectors of the economy, whites constitute management/ownership, while blacks are the source of cheap labour...according to the mineworker, the command to shoot the protestors [sick] came from a white man… instead of regretting the death of human beings, the state/capital became concerned about how ‘investor confidence’ would be affected, this means that the identity of a ‘black body’ lacks the required ‘ontological density’ to warrant regret, even after being violated. Thus, after the Marikana massacre the state (together with capital) sought to exonerate itself…

Coloniality as a murderous structure has survived by hiding, which means there is a need to reveal its location and presence by employing a decolonial approach.

While there is no disputing that the persons who committed the Marikana massacre and the Sharpeville massacre (in 1960) were South African police officers acting on behalf of the state, the target has always remained the black population. Thus, although the composition of the police force which committed the Sharpeville massacre was predominantly white, while those who presided over the Marikana massacre were predominantly black, the target of the massacre has remained the same.

What this shows is that the structure of coloniality is a racist one. (Ndlovu, 2011: 55-56, 53, 54)

Alexander (2014) can supplement this with the following specifics about the LonMin platinum miners specifically in 2010 and 2011.

...risks intensified by pressure to work in hazardous locations; the arduous character of work, which often, because of production targets, included shifts lasting 12 hours or more; doubled-up bodies endlessly shaken by heavy drills; artificial air full of dust and chemicals; high levels of sickness, including TB; and managers (often white) who were disrespectful and adversarial.
In many cases workers were caught in a debt trap, leading to forced deductions from wages and payments to micro-lenders and lawyers that left some workers paying 15 times the value of their original loan (Bond 2012). Income was further stretched by the need to support old and unemployed dependants, and, since most workers were oscillating migrants with two families, costs were often doubled. Housing conditions were generally abysmal. In 2010 Lonmin admitted that half the people living within 15 km of its mines lived in informal housing, and a high proportion of these were miners and their families.

Workers also complained about the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), to which most workers belonged before the strike. They mentioned its corruption and its collaboration with management...

On 13 August, Frans Beleni, NUM’s general secretary, called for ‘the deployment of the Special Task Force or the South African Defence Force’ (Alexander et al. 2012, 178). Three days later it was the task force that carried out the massacre. (Alexander, 2014: 3)

LonMin miners began striking with demands for roughly $1,200 per month, or double to triple their current salaries of $450 to $650 per month, respectively. On the basis of this salary as their main income, they are not within the Absolute Poverty zone of surviving on $3 per day or less. However, considering the miners’ support of unemployed family members, lack of reasonable union protection or representation, and incredibly high-risk occupations, they maintained an overall wretched quality of life despite a relatively lower-middle class income, with few to no opportunities to be employed in any other capacity.

It should be reiterated that Cyril Ramaphosa, who founded NUM in 1982, sat on the board of LonMin during 2011, while also serving as the second highest party official in the ANC. It should also be noted that on August 15, Ramaphosa sent emails to the board asking for actions against the miners, whose strike he labeled as “dastardly criminal” behavior. (Smith, 2012) LonMin’s 2014 reported net revenue was $965m, with net income of $204m and operating income of $52m. LonMin is a combination of “London” and “Rhodesian Mining and Land Company,” which was incorporated in the UK in 1909.
On August 16, 2011, 34 miners were shot to death by Black, mixed race, and White South African Police; 78 others were wounded, and 2 other strike protesters had been killed in the week leading up to the Marikana Massacre. According to Rhodes Must Fall’s memorial to the murdered, a leader of the strike, MgCineni “Mambush” Noki was “shot 14 times by the police, including in his head, neck, legs, button, elbow, calf, and thighs.” The details of the massacre are as follows:

There is no doubt that police gunfire was the immediate cause of the massacre. The police killed all 34 men (and no police were injured)....The strikers had been sitting peacefully on and around the mountain when the police reeled out razor wire in front of them.

Fearful of being penned in, they began to leave the area, most walking northwards in the direction of Nkaneng, the nearby informal settlement where many of them lived. Video footage shows that the workers were not running and not a threat to the police. It was at this point that the police started shooting. Only then did the men begin to run, but they were scattering, not charging at the police. At some point, a middle-ranking officer tells his men to shoot if they feel threatened, which, in the context, can be interpreted as permission to kill.

Within a few seconds, 20 strikers were shot dead by task team gunfire...

Many workers then retreated towards a low koppie about 300 metres west of the mountain. Here they were surrounded, and a further 14 were slaughtered.... 14 of the 34 dead men were shot in the back or the back of their head...

These task teams were armed only with automatic weapons loaded with sharp ammunition, making it almost inevitable that workers would be killed.

Indeed, the police ordered four mortuary vehicles early on the morning of the killings, so they were expecting deaths to occur...

(Alexander, 2014: 2, 3)

In mid-June 2015, the South Africa national government publicly released and summarized the 600-page report by the judicial commission on the Marikana Massacre. This commission was created by South Africa President Jacob Zuma in August 2012, who appointed as chair Retired Supreme Court of Appeals Judge Ian Gordon Farlam. (South Africa Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, 2015) Farlam is on the UCT
Governing Council, and UCT has strategic investments in LonMin, as well as other extractive industries. The Marikana Massacre Report absolved ANC party elites, including then-South Africa Minister of Police Nathi Mthethwa, and 2014-2016 South Africa Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa. (Smith, 2012) The report’s strongest indictment of a politician was a recommendation of an inquiry into South Africa National Police Commissioner Riah Phiyega, and pointing out that the tactics selected by the South African Police Service (SAPS) were likely to result in bloodshed, if not better executed next time. On the one hand, the Marikana Commission Report yielded “a mood of profound disappointment in Marikana itself over what they saw as the commission’s failure to hold senior politicians to account.”

Through a questionable, but technically legal, adjudication process, the state’s absolution of any wrongdoing or responsibility for massacring civilians furthered its official, legal use of deadly force. If the ANC government can keep the violence of Marikana invisible through official rhetoric of police simply dealing with terrorists or criminals, and only a few inquiries or reforms here or there, then the neoliberal system may continue undisturbed by the worst massacre since apartheid. On the other hand, the attempt to invisibilize the Marikana Massacre poured fuel onto the hot rage at universities and around the country that Rhodes Must Fall and Open Stellenbosch had begun kindling in early 2015. This unprecedentedly tense and precarious situation, of awakening students, of disillusioned dreams, and of widespread wretchedness and perpetual slow violence is the context for 2015’s eruption of the most significant, widespread, impactful, radical student protests in South Africa since the 1976 Soweto Student Uprisings.
FIGURE 4.0: Photograph of discarded protest sign; Profile Picture of UCT: Rhodes Must Fall

Text Description(s): Dear history / this revolution / has women, gays, / queers & trans / remember that / #RhodesMustFall

South Africa’s Contemporary Protests and Social Movements

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Renewing the visibility of identity politics

Marginalized university students’ “leading” discourses and protests

Ostensibly radical demands, strategies, and tactics, transgressing common sense

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Communicating counter-hegemony with both social and conventional media
Introduction and Emergent Critical Themes

Thus far, my thesis has presented a summary of South(ern) Africa’s global, colonial histories of (de)colonization, from modernity up through Contemporary Globalization. I have emphasized the ideas of violence and the issues of local and regional powers struggling against, and been both co-opted by, and in collusion with, global hegemons. I have hopefully clarified how these contests for power, legitimization, and ultimately authority have impacted the region of Southern Africa specifically, post-Cold War, through the post-9/11 Global War on Terror, and during the Global Capital Crisis. In this chapter, I bring these issues together with my brief history and analysis of contemporary protests and social movements in South Africa. Focusing on UCT’s Rhodes Must Fall (UCT:RMF) and SU’s Open Stellenbosch (OS) in late 2015 to early 2016, I argue that South Africa’s contemporary protests and social movements may be thematically understood as:

1. **Renewing the visibility of identity politics** in terms of intersectionality, race, sex, gender, and class, in opposition to, and in conversation with, respectability politics
2. **Marginalized university students’ “leading”** discourses and protests, and subsequently driving social movements with local, regional, and global impacts
3. **Ostensibly radical demands, strategies, and tactics, transgressing** against common sense narratives of The New South Africa, The Rainbow Nation, and so forth
4. **Performative and artistic protests re-centering narratives** on violence and pain of Black and Brown bodies
5. **Communicating counter-hegemony with both social and conventional media**

The structure of this chapter consists of this brief introduction to this case study specifically, which includes the above above general reiteration of my critical premises and global, colonial histories. I then present a summary of critical events and images of the protests to date. As this history is for the completion of a Master’s-level thesis, it is an
inadequate and all-too-brief summary of RMF and OS. I have selected as many critical images as possible, that I argue are representative of the above themes I have identified. Following this visual and textual history, I conclude with by lead-in to final chapter: qualitative analyses and comparisons.

**Critical Events and Images from South Africa**

**Pre-2015: High Tensions and Dissatisfaction**

2014 began amidst calls for protests, most visibly by Student Representative Councils (SRCs) on various campuses. Throughout the year, protests increase in number and intensity, but were not driven or led by university students or their demands/rhetoric. As early as 2014 May, ""Remember Marikana” Stenciling/Graffiti appears, credited to a “collective of anonymous graffiti artists” called Tokolos Stencils who claim responsibility for stencilling/graffiting the UCT Rhodes Statue. See Figures 4.1.A-4.1.B.

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5 Appendix B of this thesis provides hyperlinks to an ongoing project to historicize the movement, which has yielded hundreds of pages of footnoted, month-by-month documentation of events, beginning in late 2014. Due to its length and dynamic nature
FIGURE 4.1.A: “Remember Marikana” by Tokolos Stencils Art Collective

Source(s):
The 2015 academic year began in January with high tensions high, after 2014’s recognition as the most turbulent year of violent protests since 1994. (Chigwata, T.C., O'Donovan, M., and Powell, D.M., 2016) NSFAS and higher education was already a visible, publicly-recognized, critical issue. Protests increase in intensity, originating at CPUT in the Western Cape, with SASCO and SRCs complementing some students staging sleep-in occupations of administration buildings. In early 2015 April, Rhodes Must Fall emerged.

2015 March-April: “Rhodes Must Fall” at UCT; “Open Stellenbosch” at SU

The initial event was a small protest of a few people, centered on Chumani Maxwele, with Wandile Kasibe serving as a documentarian who produced artistic and high resolution photographs of the protest. On March 9th, 2015, Maxwele, with signs reading "Exhibit: White Arrogance," perpetrated a highly visible, transgressive, and illegal act of heaving buckets of human excrement onto the Cecil Rhodes statue at UCT.

Source(s):

FIGURE 4.1.B: “Remember Marikana” Stenciling Upon the UCT Rhodes Statue
The statue occupied a highly visible location at the center of UCT, amidst the main staircase up the hill on which UCT is located, between the rugby field and a primary on-campus student activities building, Jameson Hall. #RhodesMustFall emerged on social media. It rapidly spread throughout the UCT campus and became a massively popular in the streets uprising against "White Supremacy and privilege," driven by "the justified rage of
black students." The UCT:RMF collective asserted "the removal of the statue will not be the end of this movement, but rather the beginning of the decolonisation of the university....We want to state that we adopt an unequivocally intersectional approach to our struggle against racism..." Pressured by increasing student-driven protests and sharp critiques of the universities’ lack of post-1994 transformation, the UCT Council began deliberations on the future of the statue.

**FIGURE 4.2.B:** “Rhodes Must Fall” crowd holding a banner and defacing UCT Rhodes Statue

In 2015 April, Rhodes’s statue fell, and Open Stellenbosch at emerged at SU. On April 9th, 2015, the Rhodes statue was removed while throngs of students watched, cheered, and documented the event. On April 10th, 2015, “approximately 50-70” students, led by Mbali Matandela, a Black South African woman and a UCT student, continued occupying the Bremner administration building. The students renamed it "Azania House," referring to
only by that name moving forward, and placing signs all over the building. The occupying UCT:RMF protesters declared they “want to encourage the university to engage with their mandate of transformation...the protests were always about addressing transformation at the university.”

On April 16th, under 100 UCT students, largely comprised of members of the UCT:RMF collective, marched to and held a demonstration in front of a parliamentary building in Cape Town, in a protest that referenced Biko and Fanon to challenge “a Black government and White Supremacy.” The group demanded that “Afrophobia Must Fall” as they marched. Upon arrival at the government facilities, the small group is attacked and dispersed by security personnel using stun grenades. UCT Sociology Professor Xolela Mangcu said in an interview with The Times that "the university has made inroads with curriculum reform in faculties," especially focusing on creating “decolonized” Black Studies curricula, with the support of “Tom Moultrie, president of the UCT academics’ union.”

Despite this, as of 2015 April, there was only one Black woman Professor at UCT. The explicitly youth-focused, alternative news site The Daily Vox ran an extensive piece by a UCT student, identifying “The movement after the statue” as including 5 key parts of UCT:RMF:

- Decolonising the University
- Moving Beyond UCT, to Other Campuses
- Staying Student-Centric and Apolitical
- Confronting Management
- Being Transgressive
On April 15th, a student demonstration called “Who Belongs Here?” initiated what soon became Open Stellenbosch (OS). The collective soon identified itself through social media as:

a group of students, staff and faculty working together to bring about change…[an] anti-racist, anti-sexist, non-partisan movement working in a space of deeply entrenched structural and institutional racism and patriarchy…the university management has consistently conceived of transformation in unproductive terms…

**FIGURE 4.2.C:** “Open Stellenbosch” protesters, all in black, holding “I Can’t Breathe” signs in front of SU

Source(s):

The name itself was the core demand of this university student social movement and protest. “Open Stellenbosch,” demanded reforming an existing institution so that it is “open” and not “closed,” “inclusive” and not “exclusive,” and achieving this primarily by focusing on a language policy that shifts away from Afrikaans, towards English for all classes. This idea of the inclusivity of multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-partisan social movements, as well as an end goal of English language instruction, is the first ideological distinction between OS and UCT:RMF. UCT:RMF explicitly excluded non-whites in leadership circles, and always
asserted "decolonization" of society as the end goal - not "transformation" of the existing university or other institutions founded on British Imperial, colonial, or otherwise Eurocentric ideas.

Additionally, OS immediately adopted USA-based protest demands such as “I can’t breathe,” the last words of Eric Garner before he was choked to death, on camera, by New York City police. UCT:RMF was wary of being too USA-centric, and skeptical of the growing Black Lives Matter movement as seeking integration into, rather than abolition of, the USA capitalist-realist system. Despite this, later April OS demonstrations were attended by UCT:RMF protesters, who declared solidarity with OS’s short-term goals, while noting divergent strategies and tactics. OS, like RMF, also created a robust online presence through social media accounts. These social media accounts maintained member anonymity, eased facilitating rapid local organizing, generated significant national online support in a short amount of time, and established the movement in the collective consciousness of university students in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, and elsewhere.

In 2015 May, despite threats, both movements grew. UCT:RMF focused less on protests and instead on facilitating "plenaries," or teach-ins, that focused on intersectional, Pan-African, Black Feminism. Having been forced out of Azania House, UCT:RMF continued to occupy another building, consequently renamed "New Azania House," throughout the end of the month. OS meanwhile increased its activity through a series of demonstrations, and circulated images through social media and the physical SU campus to clearly explicate the demands outlined in their initial statements and interviews. In early May, highly visible OS spokesperson Sikhulekile Duma received a threatening and profane SMS. After searching social media for the sender’s phone number, they identified the sender
as SU Nuclear Physics Lecturer Anton Stander. Stellenbosch University immediately suspended the lecturer, temporarily. A May 10th statement from SU denounced protests thus far, by invoking student procedures and respectability politics, saying they were possibly unconstitutional and an act of intimidation.

Like UCT:RMF, OS proceeded to facilitate a “lecture and workshop” on “The Decolonization of the University,” as well as other on-campus seminars and discussions regarding social movements and White Supremacy. OS very visibly demanded apologies for university suppression of dissent; they also focused public attention on an imminent removal of a significant on-campus plaque commemorating HF Verwoerd. On May 15th, SU fired Anton Stander, who admitted to threatening the student with racial slurs. Despite this, many other OS members beyond just Duma maintained they also received threats for their involvement, from other SU employees, and Stander’s “was [only] the first one which members were able to trace to a possible source.” On May 28th, the large and prominently displayed “H.F.” Verwoerd plaque was removed, 15 years after the 2000 renaming of a major university administration building that formerly was named after Verwoerd.

In June, OS hosted an “Open Stellenbosch Student Congress” on South Africa’s national Youth Day, aiming to bring together students focused on institutionalizing social movements trying to transform universities and education. During this time, which was South Afria’s winter break, UCT:RMF visibly decreased its activity and went through internal re-organization, and changed their profile pictures on social media to an image of a discarded protest sign that read: “Dear history, this revolution has women, gays, queers, & trans / remember that / #RhodesMustFall,” with the caption “Lest we ever forget.” See Figure 4.0 above.
In late June, UCT administration attempted to take punitive action against over 200 supporters or the UCT:RMF protests, centering around their occupation and obstruction of administrative offices. Additionally, in mid June, Rhodes Must Fall In Oxford (RMFO) begins its first protests at meetings against monuments still standing around Oxford University’s Oriel College. As noted earlier, the Marikana Commission Report absolved ANC party elites of the Marikana Massacre. Driven by UCT:RMF students, visible critiques emerge across South Africa regarding the the military-industrial-academic complexes, and the interconnections between extractive industries’ dominance of the economy, political parties that benefit from profitable extractivism, and universities who are governed in part by elite individuals involved with such mutually-profitable relationships. UCT:RMF updated its social media at the end of June with the Telekos Stencils “Remember Marikana” and Mambush graffiti. See FIGURE 4.1B for details. On June 28th, OS also updated its social media to reflect solidarity with Marikana.

On July 22nd, 2015, the newly-created Decolonise UCT Law group announced a victory of sweeping law curricula reform. New curricula would include Mamdani, Mbembe, and African American critical race theorists - as previously, the curricula had not required this. On July 29th, OS staged a highly visible disruption of an SU career fair. This yielded significant administration and community backlash and threats against the collective, which usually manifested as racial slurs and notions of student being "disrespectful" or "unappreciative" of their "privilege" of living in Stellenbosch or attending SU.

2015 August: “Remember Marikana” and “Max Price for Black Lives?”

August 2015 marked a turning point and significant escalation by university students, especially UCT:RMF. August 16 marked the 3 year anniversary of the Marikana Massacre,
and UCT:RMF focused their protests against dehumanization of Black Africans by highlighting universities’, and specifically UCT’s, investments in White-, or USA- and/or UK-controlled, firms that exploit labor. On August 18th, UCT:RMF described the interconnections between universities, banks, extractive firms, and political parties as “the thinly veiled web of wealth, domination and violence that UCT has continuously benefited from since its establishment,” highlighting UCT’s retirement investments in LonMin mine, which operates in Marikana as of 2016.

On August 16th, UCT:RMF publicly released a video detailing their allegations against UCT in relation to Marikana, LonMin, and (neo-)colonial extractive industries more generally, while calling students to action on an August 20th mass demonstration. From August 16th to the 17th, UCT:RMF undertook a massive stencilling/graffitiing campaign across the campus, followed by a press conference attended by over a hundred students in Jameson Hall. The phrases “Remember Marikana”; “Max Price for Black Lives?”; “UCT is Anti-Black”; and “UCT Has LonMin Shares!” were graffitied on all of the most visible parts of campus. Tokolos Stencils’ artistic rendering of a photograph of the strike created one of the most iconic symbols of both UCT:RMF and post-Marikana protests: Mambush, raising his fist, clutching a spear, wearing a simple green blanket as a cloak, and opening his mouth in a scream. See Figure 4.1A.
FIGURE 4.1.A: “Remember Marikana” by Tokolos Stencils Art Collective

Source(s):
Tokolos Stencils Art Collective, Remember Marikana, (August 16, 2015)
The UCT students’ use of Tokolos Stencils’ previously marginalized (and illegal, graffiti-based) image, in time with growing discontent beyond universities regarding the Marikana Report, drove an increasing, online, social media, and in-the-streets discussion. The demand was clear: “remember Marikana.” Recognize the worst massacre since 1994. Remember the ongoing exploitation of Black South Africans. And, driven by UCT:RMF, they insisted on connecting this ongoing exploitation to the overwhelming White-owned firms affiliated with extractivism.

**FIGURE 4.3.A:** “Remember Marikana” and “Max Price for Black Lives” Stencils and Graffiti at UCT

Source(s):
Text description(s):

‘Mambush’ The Man in the Green Blanket; Mambush was from Twalikhulu in the Eastern Cape. He began working for Lonmin in 2009 and was a leader of the strike. On 16 August 2012 Mambush was killed at scene 1 after being shot 14 times by the police, including in his head, neck, legs, buttock, elbow, calf, and thighs. He left behind his wife and five young children, as well as his sister and niece who also depended on him for financial support. According to his sister, Nolufefe Noki, ‘It was really painful to hear about my brother’s death. I have seen a doctor at the very least three times since his death. I was in a state of shock and was stressed. There is no one to look after us now that my brother is dead. My two sisters are married and live in their homes. I live here with my orphaned niece. We both depended on Mgcineni.’”

Source(s):

On August 15th-16th, UCT:RMF facilitated another student occupation of New Azania House. On August 17th, in solidarity with the survivors and victims of the Marikana Massacre, Open Stellenbosch facilitated simultaneous protests with UCT:RMF at Stellenbosch University and UCT, respectively. They planted, in highly visible locations, 34 white crosses for the 34 victims, alongside descriptions of the victims' families and deaths. On August 19th, Open Stellenbosch facilitated a screening of a recently-released documentary on the Marikana Massacre, *Miners Shot Down* (Desai, 2014).

In addition to insisting that South Africa remember Marikana, they further demanded remembrance of the humanity of the miners murdered by police, as well as the shocking inhumanity of what could not be reasonably interpreted as justifiable force against the miners. On August 20th, UCT:RMF facilitated a visible and disruptive mass demonstration of up to five hundred students in the center of the campus next to Jameson Hall, near where the Rhodes Statue had formerly stood. During this August 20th action, a UCT:RMF member scaled the university main building and replaces the UCT and South Africa flags with the green blanket worn by Mambush, the Marikana Strike leader. See Figures 4.3C-4.3.D.
FIGURE 4.3.C: Screenshot of social media; close-up: Mambush’s green blanket on UCT flagpole

Source(s):
Additionally on August 20th, Cape Town Contraband media group released #Luister, a 34 minute documentary featuring interviews with SU students of color regarding harassment and exclusion. #Luister spread the demands and issues of OS much farther than had previously been done, prompting significant community support - as well as retaliation and requests to stop their protests. By the end of September 2015, #Luister had over 300,000 views.
In early August, a rape at SU had been highly visible in the media. OS only released a statement trusting that SU administration would act in a timely manner to investigate it. Little progress had been made, and tensions with the masculinism of both UCT:RMF and OS led to a desire to focus explicitly on how women were excluded both in society and in social movements. On August 26th, Open Stellenbosch held a mass march specifically against sexual violence, and the policies of administration that exclude and dehumanize survivors of sexual violence, especially women of color. Many White university student bystanders taunted demonstrators during the march, which was almost entirely comprised of women of color and queer people of color, who chanted variations on “Rape Culture Must Fall!” and “Sexism Must Fall!” UCT:RMF attended this protest, but comments from one of the male members criticizing the tactics of the sexual violence protest highlighted a rift between the masculine radical militancy of some members of UCT:RMF, and the more inclusive, more respectable tactics of Open Stellenbosch.

However, throughout the end of 2015 August, OS coordinated with UCT:RMF to bus in masses of students from other universities, especially UCT, to different universities with their own growing protests. On August 30th, UCT:RMF threw its now considerable weight behind OS’s #Luister documentary, and OS’s upcoming early September OS March Against Apartheid Culture. Additionally, at the end of August, ANC elite and Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) Minister Blade Nzimande reviewed #Luister, then publicly called for investigations into SU. Yvonne Phosa, the Chair of a parliamentary portfolio committee on higher education and training, specifically addressed troubling reports of violence against SU students, and highlighted Stellenbosch’s inadequate rate of transformation post-apartheid. SU Rector and Vice Chancellor Wim de Villiers, and other
university administrators, were questioned before the parliamentary committee, where Villiers insists that the university is listening to students, but that students were failing to respect existing procedures.

In September, ongoing OS- and UCT:RMF-driven protests escalated confrontations, growing students’ support, and simultaneously growing anti-protest backlash. On September 1st, 2015, the OS "Mass March Against Apartheid Culture" drew thousands of predominantly non-white students from around Western Cape, including thousands from UCT, Cape Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT), University of Western Cape (UWC), and RMF members now starting groups across these different institutions. UCT:RMF attended with banners, busses, and other material and human resources in support of the action, despite above-mentioned ideological differences. ANC-YL, SANSCO, EFF, and DA political parties all had supporters, if not representatives, in attendance, wearing party colors and regalia. Amongst other supportive social media coverage by UCT:RMF, they published on Twitter a photo of a person of color, wearing the EFF red beret and a Pride t-shirt, standing alongside the entirely black and colored cadre of armed private security guards protecting the SU administration building. The caption read “Gatekeepers of White Supremacy,” and this concept became a focal point of media, supporters’, and detractors’ analysis of the protests.

On September 2nd, immediately after the Open Stellenbosch Mass March Against Apartheid Culture, several white South African students create an event titled “#WhereIsTheLove?” that explicitly sought to create “lekker” (Afrikaans; English: “good” or “fun”) “vibes” and silence those creating “not lekke vibes around Stellenbosch University” by “put[ting] an end to this destruction and negativity.” There is no other way to describe #WhereIsTheLove, which changed its description after massive online backlash, besides as
an event that identified the overwhelmingly Black and Colored students protesting as destructive, negative, and ultimately not adding value to the campus.

In mid September, from September 15th-17th, violent protests with property damage at UKZN and VUT were triggered by two off-campus international students being murdered and sexually assaulted, as well as changes in university financial aid “funding requirements from a 50% pass rate to 70% [pass rate].” As a result of this, UKZN significantly increased its security presence with “140 guards….drafted to keep the calm at the campus.” By the end of 2015 September, the SU Council took action, after sustained and increasing public scrutiny and pressure from OS. Namely, the SU Council announced they would be:

- appointing a committee to investigate employees for anti-transformation comments;
- removing the word “safeguard” from their academic policy in regards to Afrikaans;
- increasing the speed of development of isiXhosa as an academic language.

OS fired back that this was not enough, and demonstrated again for greater transformation, including dissolution of the SU Council, at a protest outside of the Council’s next meeting. Lastly in September 2015, on the 30th at UCT, a planned speech on wealth and income inequality by Thomas Piketty was disrupted by UCT:RMF. They took over the stage when logistical failures prevented Piketty from arriving and speaking. Besides highlighting the inequality present in UCT, and through ongoing exploitation of Black Africans for cheap service labor, UCT:RMF reiterated the taunting phrase “Max Price for Black Lives?” to the entire audience, until security forced them to leave.

2015 October: “End Outsourcing,” “Fees Must Fall,” and a “National Shutdown”

In 2015 October, tuition increases sparked the #FeesMustFall movement, which was driven by the fertility of the RMF and OS movements. This was a watershed moment for the year, arguably a turning point for all protests and social movements in South(ern) Africa, as well as for student protests around the world. Students allied with outsourced laborers to
focus on demands for living wages, fair labor practices, insourcing of outsourced / subcontracted service laborers, and to end outsourcing entirely. Alliances between students, laborers, and both students’ and laborers’ families yielded record numbers of stakeholders becoming protesters who shut down streets - largely facilitated by student groups coordinating activity via social media.

By the end of 2015 October, South Africa had been stunned by nearly 2 weeks of protests on a scale unseen since the 1976 Soweto Student uprising and the collapse of apartheid. While I argue that the protests and social movements were driven by university students, they needed support from laborers, and not necessarily labor unions, as well as sympathetic community members, especially family members. The outcomes of the Fees Must Fall movements were at least a short-term goal of tuition fee freezes, as well a long-term shift in discourse towards “fallism,” or abolition, or that “X must fall.”

By early October 2015, months of university student protests have forced a national discussion in the media, amongst politicians, and across nearly every university about violence, exploitation, and colonization, rather than security, development, or ANC-DA-EFF political platforms. On October 3rd, UCT:RMF broadcast across their social media platforms a new campaign, building on the momentum of their Marikana focus: “Workers and Students Unite Against Oppression.” The earlier October protests emphasized the fact that the most exploited of outsourced workers remain overwhelmingly Black and overwhelmingly women, who still lived in and commuted long hours from townships on the periphery of metropolises in to largely White or upper class areas. A massive banner in the streets comparing Sharpeville with Marikana, the 34 white crosses from the Marikana protests in August, and robust online and social media messaging maintained visibility through UCT:RMF
throughout the protests. The most visible labor union in support of UCT:RMF attending these early protests were members of the National Education, Health, and Allied Workers’ Union (NEHAWU).

**FIGURE 4.4.A: #EndOutsourcing Protesters, with sign reading “Outsourcing is neo-liberal exploitation”**

Source(s):
On October 6th, UCT:RMF once again led student occupations, this time of multiple buildings, which included teach-ins and inclusion of community members. This time students explicitly expanded appeals to laborers and unions at the university, and held small community screenings of their new documentary, “#Outsourced.” Once again, UCT:RMF tore down the UCT and South Africa flags from the main university administration building and raised the green blanket of Mambush, while simultaneous demonstrations disrupted activities in the center of the campus. On October 6th, in Johannesburg, over 2,000 Wits students turned out in solidarity with many outsourced workers to protest. While there were many protests of varying sizes, and especially police-on-student violence and property damage near Johannesburg and in KwaZulu-Natal, the most visible and focused of all remained the articulate and well-mediated campaigns in Western Cape, led by UCT:RMF at
UCT, and OS at SU. On October 7th, UCT:RMF publicly released their documentary, 
#Outsourced, publicizing interviews with exploited and impoverished university employees of sub-contractors. Many of those testifying noted that, though unionized, they remain highly exploited and maintain a precarious existence of wage slavery and perpetual indebtedness.

On October 13th, University of Witwatersrand (Wits) announced a much higher-than-expected tuition fee increase: 10.5%. This prompted massive student demonstrations across the campus that generated national coverage, and called attention to other planned tuition/fee increases of between 9% and 12%, also made public by various universities just a few days before. Within 24 hours, UCT:RMF and OS facilitated protests that shut down both universities and nearby communities, and coordinated mass civil disobedience in other universities and communities across the Western Cape, including UWC and CPUT. Protests almost simultaneously exploded at Rhodes University in south-eastern South Africa and at UKZN in campuses Durban and Pietermaritzburg. Rhodes University and Wits suspended all lectures and implemented emergency curfews.

A common theme of the protest was the fact that education, particularly free and accessible education to Black South Africans, had been a key ANC promise for post-apartheid, as well as a central part of the Soweto Student Uprisings in 1976. Again, it is clear that the contemporary demands of university students and student-driven protests are reiterations of previous demands under anti-apartheid struggles for decolonization. See Figure 4.4.C. These various protests all coalesced under the social media hashtag #FeesMustFall, which conventional media circulated and began referring to. UCT protests very visibly and significantly continued for days to shut down entire neighborhoods further and further away from UCT. Streets were blocked as thousands-strong marches converged on
critical governmental and parliamentary buildings and police stations. By October 18th, SU students controlled the primary SU administrative building "Admin B," which they renamed "Winnie Mandela House." On October 19th, OS announced that management had gone to court and received a high court interdict to authorize police use of force, pleading on social media for support. Additionally on October 19th, a UCT-requested high court interdict authorized police to use force against any protesters “interfering with university operations." UCT targeted not only key individuals of the protest groups, but almost comically targeted the hashtags used by the groups themselves. See figure 4.4.D.

FIGURE 4.4.C: Crowd of Fees Must Fall protesters; standout: Black woman holding sign reading “1976?”

Source(s):
In the matter between University of Cape Town
Rhodes Must Fall, First Respondent; #Fees Must Fall, Second Respondent; Left Students Movement, Third Respondent; UCT Trans Collective, Fourth Respondent; SASCO UCT, Fifth Respondent; PASMA UCT, Sixth Respondent; Patriarchy Must Fall, Seventh Respondent; UCT Left Students Movement, Eighth Respondent; Thato Phule, Ninth Respondent; Brian Kamanze [sic], Tenth Respondent; Ru Slayen, Eleventh Respondent; Mzomhle Bixa, Twelfth Respondent;

Source(s):
Less comical, however, was the increasing use of riot police deploying flashbangs, stun grenades, rubber bullets, tear gas, water cannons, and armored personnel carriers to violently disperse crowds of students and other protesters. There were instances of property destruction, and one instance of protesters overturning a vehicle and injuring the driver after an attempted to move through crowds onto the Wits campus. However, the overwhelming majority of protesters had peacefully occupied and disrupted university activities. Despite this, at least 23 UCT students were arrested, detained, and charged. Some of those arrested were charged with trespassing and illegal gathering. Some, however, including Chumani Maxwele, were initially charged with high treason. Legal and public pressure later saw the most severe charges dropped due to lack of evidence.

By October 20th, DHET Minister Nzimande resolved to cap tuition/fee increases at 6% nationwide. Students continued to protest, now in the tens of thousands in almost every city with a major university. By this point, for almost an entire week, student-driven protests had now severely disrupted many cities, and at the least shut down almost every university campus. Hereafter, protests only increase in size, as police increasingly tried, and failed, to disperse students with increasingly violent tactics. Mass arrests prompted students to shift protests to police stations, and focus on circulating images and videos of police brutality. On October 22nd, UCT students continued to occupy and control the UCT physical campus. At one point, students forced vans of police to flee the campus, followed by a triumphant post from UCT:RMF declaring “The students have driven off the police. Viva students!” UCT students then graffitied/stenciled signs renaming Jameson Hall "Marikana Memorial Hall." They additionally placed photographs of miners murdered in the Marikana Massacre over “the faces of the white male Vice Chancellors” whose portraits adorn that building.
By October 23rd, protests were at their climax. Largely due to (UCT:)RMF pushing for a #NationalShutdown, coordinated through both social media and in-the-streets organizing, South Africa universities, media, and politics was totally occupied by the Fees Must Fall protests. Tens of thousands of students, laborers, community members, and even sympathetic and/or opportunistic politicians were occupying universities and marching on local government/parliamentary buildings nationwide. As the 10th consecutive day of massive and increasingly disruptive protests began, massive crowds of at least 10,000 converged on the national capitol in Pretoria. Largely using social media and SMS, UCT:RMF led the coordination of UCT, UWC, SU, and CPUT students’ and laborers’ movement of resources around Cape Town and Western Cape, shutting down different campuses and police stations, and bringing aid.

In the morning of October 23rd, many protesters, especially those from CPUT and UWC, with UCT:RMF in support, attempted to shut down the Cape Town International Airport. A thousands-strong crowd marched for over an hour, heading for the air traffic control terminal and runways, blockading roads en route. They were ultimately blocked by riot police who issued ultimatums and fired non-lethal ammunition from armored personnel carriers and fire hydrant trucks. Fear of the use of lethal ammunition also deterred protesters from continuing. On October 23rd, within the protection of a board room in the Pretoria Capitol building, Zuma, announced a 0% tuition / fee increase for the coming year. The triumphant spread of “#FeesHaveFallen” swept social media; this was immediately countered by UCT:RMF as untrue, arguing that a 0% increase is not the same as the intended goal of fee abolition. UCT:RMF continue to drive discussion that #EndOutsourcing must be achieved through an ongoing #NationalShutdown and more protests. UCT:RMF, now
comprised of as many laborers as students, continued to protest highly visibly in Cape Town, while protests elsewhere subsided after news of the 0% increase.

On October 28th, 2015, after 2 weeks of non-stop protests of thousands of students and laborers often clashing with police, UCT management finally promised to end outsourcing, and to begin to insource all workers per the demands of UCT:RMF under the auspices of the #EndOutsourcing campaign. After the October 28th announcement, UCT:RMF held an evening plenary and sent out calls out to “Comrades at CPUT, UWC, Stellenbosch and other higher edu [sic] institutions. Mobilise your constituencies for parliament.” On October 29th, thousands of students and laborers descended on the parliamentary government buildings in Cape Town, delivering a list of demands to Ramaphosa for national university reforms to end outsourcing, and to instead insource labor. Additionally, On October 31st, OS released a statement reframing their protests now on “corruption” of the university, as “the question naturally arises of what areas of the budget will be affected in making the books balance.”

Post-“Fees Must Fall”

The Fees Must Fall movement, established after the weeks-long national shutdown in October, represented a shift away from, and yet driven by, UCT:RMF. Ultimately, the short-term victories of the Fees Must Fall protests and the longer-term, more incremental reform-oriented strategies of Fees Must Fall diverged from Rhodes Must Fall’s initial, more radical demands for decolonization. Within a few months student protests had largely lost momentum and begun to fracture, largely due to fissures within the Fees Must Fall movement and idea, which continued to consist of extremely diverse populations, as well as due to the fissures regarding gender and sexuality within the (UCT:)RMF movement(s).
2015 November: “A Luta Continua” and “Izwe Lethu”

In early 2015 November, protests continued across the country in varying but generally decreasing levels of intensity and violence. UCT and Stellenbosch held mass demonstrations that received less police attention than the higher-black population student bodies at UWC and CPUT, where police act more aggressively and violently towards protesters. UCT:RMF focused on shaming both Price and the UCT SRC for negotiating specifics of insourcing agreements without consulting protesters, arguing that their social movements were less corrupt than SRCs and university administration. From November 7th to the 9th, UCT:RMF disrupted a series of attempted meetings between Price, the SRC, and labor unions. UCT:RMF insisted on mass attendance at these negotiations, and deliberately defied expected codes of conduct and established procedures for collective bargaining. UCT:RMF protesters occupied closed spaces, challenged union representatives and university administrators, sang and chanted when negotiations were attempted, and broadcast it all on social media, increasing online and on-the-ground attention.

On November 7th, OS released a statement outlining the problems of outsourcing and the role universities play in exploitation via outsourcing, as well as support for protesting laborers. OS advertised and promoted more upcoming #EndOutsourcing mass demonstrations on SU’s rooiplein, bringing the labor exploitation focus from Cape Town into Stellenbosch. SU mass demonstrations against outsourcing occur without incident, until a small fire is lit at a statue to Afrikaner nationalist Jannie Marais. From November 10th to the 11th, after protests with significant police violence at UWC and CPUT, UCT:RMF put out social media calls asking for “airtime, medical and food supplies,” as well as bail money for the “targeted #FMF [#FeesMustFall] leadership team.” Images posted by various protesting
groups showed a grim scene at UWC: squads of heavily armed and armored riot police, security buildings on fire, and students demonstrating wounds from rubber bullets, stun grenades, batons, and other crowd control weapons.

On November 18th, OS declared support for laborers, asserting that “whatever ‘destruction’ or ‘violence’ occurred yesterday was a direct result and reaction to years of continual onslaught on workers’ rights and their dignity.” Additionally, within a day of the Marais statue-burning protest, nearly 100 professors, PhD candidates, and administrators signed a letter supporting SU’s new English language policy. On November 23rd, OS condemned another round of fire-based property destruction as the actions of “opportunists” now expelled from laborer and student protests, but OS also re-affirmed solidarity with laborers. Despite property destruction and pressures to either escalate or disperse, by the end of the month, over 200 instructional and administrative employees of SU had signed on to endorse OS’s demand for English instruction.

Throughout this time, UCT:RMF and OS, through support from and to laborers, kept protests in the Western Cape visible at a national level. Increasingly, Pan-Africanist and nationalist claims dominated the demands of students. At this time, Izwe Lethu (Xhosa, Zulu; English: our land) and A Luta Continua (Portuguese; English: the struggle continues) became highly visible as UCT:RMF adopted these slogans in order to connect their contemporary social movements with earlier anti-apartheid struggles of Southern Africa. Increasingly, UCT:RMF pushed the discourse towards land reform, reparations, and the persistence of White and upper-class minority control and ownership of most urban spaces in South Africa, as well as of most of the means of production and economic power in the region.
Throughout early December, OS focused public scrutiny on the SU Council, which, as of 2016, remains entirely comprised of older White men, most of whom are Afrikaners. OS argued that the SU “Council, yet again, has shown that its interest rests primarily with the preservation of not a language but an oppressive cultural system which allows a white minority group to flourish...” UCT:RMF continued to drive a narrative of celebrating the
power of students and laborers protesting together, including a horn recital at a formal concert hall in commemoration of students. CounterPunch and other Global North and West anti-capitalist media sources continued to increase the visibility of RMF and decolonization in discussions over education, HEIs, public universities, institutional racism, and social movements.

Meanwhile in the USA, in October, the movement “Harvard: Royall Must Fall” emerged. Students protested their institution’s symbol, a shield reading “Veritas” above three sheaves of wheat, which referenced its major financial founder, and former slaveowner, Isaac Royall, Jr. The original symbol conspicuously lacked references to the production of said wheat, which Royall Must Fall altered to be carried upon the backs of Black slaves. See Figures 4.4E-F. In the UK, Rhodes Must Fall in Oxford increased in power while Fees Must Fall led to South Africa’s national shutdown. Several hundred Oxford students had presented a petition to the executives of Oriel College, demanding removal of its Rhodes statues and plaques. Rallies of hundreds of students in Oxford complemented these petitions, and Oriel College stated that it would remove at least a plaque commemorating Rhodes, with consideration of future removal of a statue. An Al Jazeera interview with a RMFO member, Sizwe Mpofu-Walsh, increased visibility of the movement and different RMf and Fallist collectives around the globe.
In 2016 January, negotiations and protests both variously continued and broke down.

In the UK, backlash against RMFO grew significantly, following attacks on student by visible politician, such as South Africa's de Klerk, Australia's Abbott, and the UK's Phillips.

On January 20th, the student government at Oxford voted 245-212 in favor of supporting removal of the Rhodes statue, in addition to the plaque. Within only a few days, however, following revelations that at least 1.5 million pounds of donor funding had already been pulled due to RMFO, Oriel College is "panicked into cancelling the proposed six-month
[statue] consultation, and the plaque...will also stay, but both will have an accompanying sign providing historical 'context'."

UCT:RMF began the year with several protests with banners reading “#FeesMustFall 2016” and noting “in the wee hours of 1st January 2016 in Longstreet, we sent a friendly reminder of the continuation of the previous year’s struggle,” attempting to maintain visibility after the temporary tuition freeze. Various student protest spokespeople, identified as Simone Cupido for OS, Chumani Maxwele for RMF, and former wits SRC President Shaeera Kalla for #WitsFeesMustFall, were cited in an article predicting expanded protests related to extant fees. A DHET preliminary report, based on Nzimande’s meeting with representatives of HEIs estimated at least 150 million ZAR in damages from protests in 2015, with HEI executives saying increased security will be necessary. Alex Hotz, from RMF, and Simone Cupido alleged that “men in black,” or private security contractors used by universities and deployed by UWC against overwhelmingly majority Black students, included Vetus Schola. This for-profit security firm is allegedly mostly comprised of Apartheid-era SADF veterans, according to OS and UCT:RMF protesters.

For UCT:RMF, mid-January signalled a shift towards "Black cis and trans women and non-binary people" who "reclaimed the space after the patriarchy by cis het men again perpetuated oppression at a meeting at Azania House," marking growing divisions between highly masculine and more intersectional/feminist factions within UCT:RMF. Though public support and attention shifted after the tuition freeze, OS continued to highlight language and corruption issues at SU; UCT:RMF continued to highlight student and labor exploitation through increasingly evocative performance art installations that served a dual role as protest sites and as histories of the larger social movements.
2016 February-March: “Echoing Voices from Within,” “Shackville,” and “I am the Last Respondent”

In 2016 February, a student art piece, Shackville, was demolished by the university, and at UFS, overwhelmingly White rugby fans beat Black protesters who disturbed their match by occupying the field, chanting, and singing. The destruction of colonial art, a part of the Shackville protest, alongside students resisting the police and private security forces, led to UCT suspending students through a court interdict. In 2016 March, an art exhibition of RMF, “Echoing Voices from Within,” was facilitated by the UCT's Center for African Studies (CAS) and a male member of UCT:RMF, the documentarian Wandile Kasibe.

However, the exhibition was shut down by a protest from the UCT: Trans Collective, some of whose members stripped naked and blocked access to the building, and smeared red paint across photographs. One went so far as to write in red paint the word "rapist" across the iconic image of Maxwele throwing feces onto the UCT Rhodes Statue. The protest was led by Hejin Kim, a previously outspoken supporter of (UCT:)RMF. The destruction of the student artwork by both students and university authorities marked increasing divisions between different factions within UCT:RMF, each of which alleged the other was erasing or prohibiting their own struggles for decolonization - and each of which were marginalized by the university.
Figures 4.5.A and 4.5.B below represent how evocative artwork has played a significant role in both promoting and generating support for these protests, as well as how it has been a central site of contesting the violence of various agents involved in social movements. Figure 4.5A, “Chapungu” (Shona; English: Bateleur Eagle) is an iconic photo of a Black woman, adorned with wings and in a black leotard, with arms outstretched in front of the UCT Rhodes Statue as it was removed in front of throngs of students. The image has been interpreted as representing the rise, power, and resilience of colonized peoples, and their triumph after struggle against colonial violence. However, its questionable use as an advertisement, and perhaps a cover for the violence of misogynistic actions within (UCT:)RMF, also highlights how claims to legitimacy by protesters have been highly critical and centered on performative visualizations and artwork.
FIGURE 4.5.A: “Chapungu,” photo, advertising UCT CAS “Echoing Voices from Within” Exhibit.

Source(s):

Figure 4.5B, almost perfectly captures the internal antagonism of different factions of (UCT:RMF). The perplexed expression of a White employee of UCT pleads with a trans activist painting the word “rapist” across Maxwele’s iconic image. This is a photograph of a radical activist protesting violence, by disrupting an art exhibit about radical activists protesting violence. This is both affirmation and condemnation of the pervasiveness of this type of disruption within UCT at this time. It is a disruption of a disruption, a re-appropriation of a re-appropriation, and a challenge to the university’s institutional decisions about who deserves exhibition. The human body takes center stage in both cases; Maxwele heaves human fecal matter onto a colonial monument, and Hejin Kim paints blood-red words
of condemnation across the university’s exhibition of Maxwele. These antagonisms represent the inherent discord and self-reflexive critiques of UCT:RMF, as well as how the institution, typically represented by a perplexed White man, pleads for it to stop.

In Figure 4.5.C, the Shackville protest is captured in images. In front of Marikana Memorial Hall, near where the UCT Rhodes Statue previously stood, UCT students installed one of South Africa’s common shanty-town dwellings: a shack made of corrugated tin, no more than ten by fifteen by eight feet. These structures are transportable by a group of dedicated laborers, and are one of the most common household structures across the region, and this represented how most of Cape Towns’s township residents still live - but injected into the upper-class site of UCT. Students painted on the shack the words: “Shackville”; “UCT Housing Crisis”; and :UCT is Anti Black”. After the shack stood for a day, during which time activists and homeless students would gather around it to discuss politics with passers-by, UCT students escalated the protest. They collected colonial artwork from around the campus and nearby neighborhoods and created a large bonfire adjacent to the shack, around which students danced and chanted, while being encouraged to add to the bonfire.
FIGURE 4.5.C: Collage of “Shackville” and Colonial Art Demolition Protests

Source(s):
South Africa: Independent Media Group.
FIGURE 4.5.D: UCT security forces demolish Shackville

Source(s):
FIGURE 4.5.E: Protesters and security forces near burning truck following demolition of Shackville

Source(s):
**FIGURE 4.5.F:** A blanketed UCT:RMF leader sits in front of the charred wreckage of Shackville

Source(s):

UCT:RMF’s Shackville, the climax of which is portrayed in the above Figures 4.5C-E. represents the peak of UCT:RMF protests after Fees Must Fall, which explicitly violated the Eurocentric sanctity of artwork, especially colonial artwork. This protest was based on public, simultaneous art performances and political interventions, and intended to escalate confrontations and encourage students’ emotional response to the idea of decolonization as an active demolition of colonialism. Unfortunately, Shackville occurred at a time of increasing internal antagonism within these counter-hegemonic social movement. Laborers’ insourcing negotiations had dragged on for weeks, and most other universities had either suppressed protests or accepted a 0% fee increase for the time being. Public attention and support had shifted to the elected SRCs and negotiations to mitigate education costs, and against the ostensibly radical, transgressive, and increasingly criminalized UCT:RMF agents.
The result was indeed a confrontation and escalation - but one in which it appeared security forces and the university decisively won.

As UCT’s suppression of protests became increasingly effective, student demands shifted to “Bring back our cadres,” referred to the widespread intimidation of protesters by security and administrators, in addition to the several de facto expelled students listed on the interdict. Students continued to shame UCT for failures to address housing, in addition to previous failures to adequately “transform” post-apartheid, compounded by the slow and usually hostile responses to student protesters - but all of this increasingly occurred with eroding public and student support. Not only was the art installation destroyed, but there were fewer supporters than usual in attendance at both the students’ daytime demolition of colonial art and the university’s nighttime demolition of the art installation.

Finally, the university successfully secured a high court interdict against specific UCT:RMF leaders after Shackville, banning them from campus and classes until trials would be held. The high court interdict, which included sixteen respondents, along with the 17th respondent described as “any persons associating themselves with unlawful conduct on campus and/or protest action at any of the applicant’s [UCT’s] premises.” The phrase “I am the last respondent” became another rallying cry by UCT:RMF and OS, emphasizing how all students were, sooner or later, going to end up as respondents on legal documents should dissent continue to be criminalized.

UCT:RMF also created a petition demanding a “Shackville TRC,” whereby university and security personnel could be held responsible for using force against students, in exchange for student forgiveness, and reparations to the students affected by the police violence. UCT:RMF, had long critiqued the transition from apartheid to neoliberalism,
arguing that there was ongoing punishment against Black and Brown bodies, while White South Africans received amnesty and forgiveness. UCT:RMF sought to expose the hypocrisy of a university that held students accountable to a higher standard than it held itself, and which unevenly enforced “political violence” (Concerned South Africans, 2016).

Their petition and critique of selective enforcement of public reconciliation processes may be summarized through this excerpt:

It is either that restorative justice is desirable and a Shackville TRC is established or that the University of Cape Town must admit and reject publicly the legitimacy of post-1994 TRC as a process that, among many things, was tasked with addressing the legacy of political violence (and facilitating constructive reconciliation of communities in conflict).

Is restorative justice reserved for powerful whites or when they are involved in political violence? Or can it also be used to provide different forms of engagement for the disenfranchised and dispossessed? Is restorative justice a luxury or an option?

While many student collectives, persons and organisations involved have taken particularly harsh positions on the South African TRC and its failings we must call upon those proponents, the University of Cape Town being of them, to step forward and demonstrate the capacity and potential for restorative justice in post-conflict societies and communities.

The liberal institutions who laud these TRC processes must be put to the test, let us as a community see whether they are capable of living up to the rhetoric they readily prescribe for conflicts and political violence that exist beyond the comfort of the ivory tower.

(Concerned South Africans, 2016)
2016 March-June: “End Rape Culture” and “Death of a Dream”

In 2016 April, video and photos emerged of Maxwele and other high-visibility male RMF members physically fighting with a Queer woman at a demonstration. At the same time, highly visible rapes at SU reminded the social movements of the persistently high levels of violence against women of color. OS tried to both address sexual violence, as well as keep pressure on SU to reform its language policies, increasingly focusing on the disproportionate exclusion of women students at SU, and gender inequality.

#EndRapeCulture and Take Back the Night became visible demands and groups that OS made and allied with, respectively - all while losing public and student support.

At UCT, similar increases in attention to the gendered power imbalances within society, within HEIs, and within social movements increasingly pitted more masculist factions against more intersectional feminist factions. This is exemplified by a march through UCT to a police station, and then back up to Marikana Memorial Hall, titled “Patriarchy Must Fall,” and which prominently displayed a Rhodes Must Fall banner throughout - but which had only around a hundred marchers at its peak. See Figure 4.6.
FIGURE 4.6: A UCT student supported of UCT:RMF’s #IamTheLastRespondent Campaign, 2016 March

Source(s):
Kasibe, W. and UCT: Rhodes Must Fall (2016) I AM THE LAST RESPONDENT “and when we speak we are afraid / our voices will not be heard / nor welcomed / but when we are silent / we are still afraid / So it is better to speak / remembering / we were never meant to survive” - Audre Lorde. Facebook.com (February 29, 2016) pp. 1-7.
In 2016 May, the Cape Town high court ruled that five of the highest-visibility students who were the critical drivers of UCT:RMF were guilty of criminal behavior. They had to pay many of the legal costs of UCT’s prosecution and management of protests and were indefinitely suspended, and effectively expelled. The desperation of students was exemplified through the artistic interventions and performances of "The Death of a Dream," which alleged UCT was where Black students' dreams went to die. Students dressed themselves entirely in black robes, with Wanelisa Xaba posing from high resolution photographs, acting out being shot in the head. Her makeup consisted of bullet wounds to the neck and forehead - many photographs suggested a shooter firing at her from behind. Additionally, full-sized body bags were deployed around Marikana Memorial Hall for the entire day, with tags describing students and miners placed alongside them, as well as references to Shackville. See Figures 4.7.A – 4.8.B.
FIGURE 4.7: “Patriarchy Must Fall” marches in Cape Town, 2016 February.

Source(s):
FIGURE 4.8A: Wanelisa Xaba’s Death of a Dream, 2016 May.


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Amidst setback after setback, public opinion shifted to understanding that “UCT is winning.” (Teagle and Ngongoma, 2016) As the Winter break approached, multiple setbacks, student expulsions, upcoming elections, and the exhaustion of a year of traumatic and violent struggle against seemingly insurmountable odds, combined with increasing internal divisions within student protest groups, significantly slowed down social movements previously driven by universities, and now witnessing the collapse of those bearing the brunt of the backlash from the powers that be. What had been accomplished within roughly a year? How does it
fit into a global context? Throughout the 16 months that I tracked the movement, UCT:RMF consistently and unapologetically asserted that South Africa’s students and citizens were colonial subjects, and that a process of necessarily violent - at least structurally - decolonization, a la Fanon, was the only solution to end ongoing colonialism. (UCT:)RMF significantly shifted the local, regional, and even national discourses of student movements towards demands for radical change, founded upon the radical suffering experienced by most students.

I expand on my five identified themes below, before moving on to my concluding chapter of contextualizing these themes and this case study amongst potentially comparable social movements elsewhere post-2007. To reiterate, I interpret South Africa’s contemporary protests and social movements as consistently manifesting the following themes:

1. **Renewing the visibility of identity politics** in terms of intersectionality, race, sex, gender, and class, in opposition to, and in conversation with, respectability politics
2. **Marginalized university students’ “leading”** discourses and protests, and subsequently driving social movements with local, regional, and global impacts
3. **Ostensibly radical demands, strategies, and tactics, transgressing** against common sense narratives of The New South Africa, The Rainbow Nation, and so forth
4. **Performative and artistic protests re-centering narratives** on violence and pain of Black and Brown bodies
5. **Communicating counter-hegemony with both social and conventional media**

**Renewing the visibility of identity politics**

The first and perhaps most obvious theme of UCT:RMF, OS, and other related movements in South Africa has been their renewing of the visibility of identity politics. Prior to UCT:RMF, the polite discourse of progress, development, The Rainbow Nation, and change via elections dominated most household discussions, even post-Mandela. UCT:RMF changed that by forcing people to confront the way that violence remains overwhelmingly determined along lines of identity established hundreds of years ago under European
colonialism, and which were primary methods of identification and political action during anti-apartheid struggles.

This renewal has been deliberate, and UCT:RMF and OS both explicitly focused on intersectional identities. Race, sex, gender, ethnicity, language, national origin, education level, family background, political affiliation, physical and mental ability, socio-economic status, and class more generally have all been critical to the intellectual and political actions of UCT:RMF. Despite tensions between various factions and different times, UCT:RMF consistently tried to prioritize women, queer folk, and especially queer women of color as leaders within the movement. They also deliberately excluded students from leadership positions on the basis of race, in direct violation of liberal, institutional protocol.

Additionally, their divergent but complex approach to leadership access placed them in direct opposition to, and in conversation with, respectability politics both in terms of what universities expected, as well as what social movements expected. Notions of consensus decision-making or shallowly democratic hierarchies were both discarded in favor of demanding that students follow the leadership of those suffering the greatest, directly drawing upon Fanon’s “the first shall be made last,” and “the last shall be made first.”

Placing Fanon, and not Mbembe or Mamdani or Ghandi, at the center of their narrative and intellectual critiques, marked the group as problematically approaching theories of violence and social change, in the eyes of White, liberal, capitalist-realist institutions. Unapologetically doing so, while at the same time recognizing issues of violence within social movements and the importance of Black Feminism and intersectionality, marked the group as transgressive both to highly masculist reliance on violence and traditionally feminist non-violent discourses. While there was extensive use of Audre Lorde and Assata Shakur,
even the women of color leading UCT:RMF tended towards Biko, if not Fanon, in terms of insisting on immediate, rapid social restructuring, even if it meant institutional violence, property damage, or confrontations and clashes between dissidents and the state.

**Marginalized university students’ “leading” discourses and protests**

UCT:RMF differed from OS in that, while OS had elected positions, spokespeople, and a clear, if mostly horizontal, hierarchy, UCT:RMF tried to reject hierarchies completely, while still subscribing to historical Pan-African socialism and not subscribing to Western, industrialized anarchist ideologies. In this way, UCT:RMF leaders described to me their organization as spontaneous collective that strived to be structureless and leaderless. The closest analogy they provided to me was that of Occupy. And, as I expand in my final chapter, like Occupy, the vague structure in some ways benefitted the legitimacy of the group as a social movement truly representing grassroots demands, while also undermining the ability to overcome internal antagonisms.

Despite this, as evidenced by the specific respondents on the high court interdicts, a group of under a hundred UCT students did serve as the intellectual and tactical core of UCT:RMF. Their expulsions and the subsequent loss of momentum of the collective evidences this, if nothing else did. However, consistently throughout 2015, a group of around one dozen students, all Black or mixed race, were the most visible “leaders” or “facilitators” of the group, for lack of a better word, despite no formal elections or hierarchical governance structures. In that way, critical feedback, new leaders, fresh perspectives, and power shifts kept the group accountable as students joined, and as problems with the organization were pointed out. Additionally, UCT:RMF inspired similar RMF and “must fall” movements
around the world and South Africa - making UCT:RMF as a group itself a leader of sorts, especially in terms of other groups’ adopting their discourse of decolonization. UCT:RMF also maintained intense self-reflexive critiques regarding intersectionality and not perpetuating oppression within their own movement - which occurred despite their best efforts to the contrary - and in so doing set a standard for other groups to emulate. Without UCT:RMF as an example, there may never have been Fees Must Fall - or it likely would not have had the abolitionist “must fall” demand at its center. Furthermore, the return to Fanon and insistence upon their inclusion, as well as the correction of the shocking exclusion of many Black Consciousness theorists in curricula nationwide, may not have happened without UCT:RMF insisting on a decolonized curricula, both within social movements and within educational institutions.

Because of the exclusivity of UCT:RMF’s leadership by non-White students, the vast majority of whom were either conscious of oppression or survivors of it, the discourse of UCT:RMF was not constrained by any form of conventional liberal respectability politics. In other words, the raw, unapologetically Black, unapologetically decolonization-focused work was achievable because it was led by marginalized students who lacked the privilege to follow the respectable and slow processes of the institutions they sought to ultimately abolish. SRCs that were largely comprised of politically-inclined or-affiliated students, usually who were either loyal to the ANC or the SACP, but were always loyal to the liberal electoral system that had elected them to a position of relative power in the first place.
Ostensibly radical demands, strategies, and tactics, transgressing common sense

The demands of UCT:RMF and, to a lesser extent, OS were both perceived as ostensibly radical. As noted above, the failure of both groups to be acceptably “respectable” in the eyes of their educational institutions and cities made them stand out as leaders and drivers of social movements. However, this standing out was inherently a transgression against what was acceptable - belief in The Rainbow Nation and capitalist-realistic, electoral, procedural democracy inevitably solving all problems without violence. OS, even though initially seeking only to change the university, was immediately criminalized and denounced as disrespectful misbehavior of ill-informed children. Simply existing as non-Afrikaner people in Stellenbosch was an act of transgression against the entire history of Stellenbosch, both city and university, as a bastion of White Supremacy. To attempt to reform the institution as students and not as professors, and to do so by peacefully disrupting university events, was perceived as highly transgressive and out of line with what was expected and normal behavior of non-White SU students.

UCT:RMF explicitly noted that they intended to be transgressive, beginning with Maxwele’s feces-centered protest, and all the way through the continual struggle for increased visibility of Black and trans women within the movement, despite decades of patriarchal social movement theory seeking to render their contributions invisible. From the explicit comparisons of Marikana to Sharpeville, to the allegations that UCT’s retirement investments in extractive firms bloodied the hands of individual UCT administrators, to the constant return to destroying colonial artwork, UCT:RMF escalated and confronted colonialism almost entirely through transgression. The act of attempting to block an international airport, even at the height of the Fees Must Fall protests, was a truly radical
break from peaceful protests that obeyed the law and did not interfere with the global flow of capital.

**Performative and artistic protests re-centering narratives**

The above issues of identity politics, marginalized students’ leadership, and transgression all may be seen as what UCT:RMF and OS did; these two themes focus on how they did it. On the one hand, UCT:RMF and OS wrote expansive, well-cited, articulate pieces in English, as well as pieces in Zulu, Xhosa, and Afrikaans, outlining their stances, goals, and next steps. However, these lengthy pieces remain inaccessible to vast swaths of the population, many of whom are illiterate and innumerate, or deeply constrained by technological and intellectual disparities. This is not to say that the millions of South African township residents lack the intellectual capacity to understand (UCT:)RMF’s lengthy descriptions of why Mbembe’s post-coloniality is a watered-down and White-friendly version of Fanon’s decolonization.

Instead, it is to recognize, as UCT:RMF themselves acknowledged, that most South Africans’ brutal poverty and bare life survival render them incapable of having the time, energy, or even internet access to participate in online-only political discourses full of academic jargon. In this way, much like how there may never have been Fees Must Fall without Rhodes Must Fall, there may never have been attention paid to these movements had they remained strictly intellectual activities that adhered to the respectability of the Ivory Tower and its exclusive educations. The Piketty lecture that UCT:RMF exemplifies this notion, where a European economist was to fly to UCT to lecture elite professors and
administrators on inequality, without any township or labor representatives present to participate, let alone listen and learn.

The content of their messages coincided with their format: violence and violation of Black and Brown bodies was communicated through performative and artist protests. The pain and anguish of surviving colonial, direct, physical, indirect, slow, and financial violence took center stage. As I note in my next and final chapter, South African students prioritized the following issues of violence with their performative and artistic interventions:

- **Racial violence**, especially historical exclusion from decision-making, microaggressions, and psychic anguish of being surrounded by Whiteness and White Supremacy
- **Sexual violence**, especially the persistence of disproportionately high levels of rape, sexual assault, sexual harassment, and silencing of women, queer, and trans students and social movement activists - despite attempts to address patriarchal power structures
- **Financial violence**, especially the burdening of students with fees and tuition, student loans, or bursaries and *de facto* indentured servitude to for-profit firms that range from complicit to active in their exploitation of overwhelmingly Black laborers and subjects
- **Institutional discrimination** and exclusion, effected by means of the above intersecting violations of students, and which manifested as perpetual loss of power and access even once Black and non-White students or citizens achieved initial entry into White spaces

Performative and artistic protests were the key to translating the message of decolonization from critical, rational theory to actual, visual, emotional understanding. Through jarring, provocative, transgressive, and Black-centric performance artwork, UCT:RMF made it clear that they experienced violence as colonial subjects. By re-centering narratives on the violence, pain, resilience, and beauty of Blackness and resistance, they connected in a visceral way that Zuma and the ANC, and even Malema and the EFF, remain unable to do. Much like their independence from the SRC, their independence from political parties and the associated constraints of speechmaking, campaigning, and organizational hierarchies allowed many different performances regarding Blackness being subjected to White Supremacy to flourish in a rapid amount of time and in highly accessible media. The proliferation of high-resolution photography and new media reporting on these protests and
events, as well as videos like the OS documentary #Luister and UCT:RMF documentary #Outsourced, meant that contemporary decolonization discussions were more accessible that they had ever been before.

**Communicating counter-hegemony with both social and conventional media**

As touched on above, (UCT:)RMF did not rely exclusively on social media or on conventional media. They instead used both, in conjunction with, and in order to facilitate, in-the-streets activities. The vast majority of the online presence of these social movements ironically remains with American-own corporations Twitter and Facebook - an irony acknowledged by UCT:RMF. However, these platforms allowed for rapid, decentralized coordination of protests, in conjunction with cheap SMS-capable cell phones. Combined with the anonymity of multiple users logging into the accounts, large groups of students could collaboratively send out requests for aid, or for more protesters to arrive at different locations - without the oversight of respectability politics constraining these militant calls to action. Furthermore, these calls to action were not, except in a few cases, more online than in-person. While at times the robust social media presentation masked lower numbers in the streets, for the most part massive demonstrations were able to be organized, legitimizing the robust online assertions and demands as truly supported by larges parts of the population.

Conventional media played a large role, as well as social media. Print newspapers in South Africa tend to be regarded as lower-quality and closer to tabloids, with large, flashy headlines. Many papers are stapled daily to telephone poles and taxi ranks, with especially eye-catching headlines drawing greater attention. While they may be derided as tabloids, they also serve as free advertisements. Allegations of apartheid-era racism, failed political parties,
and students rising up against authorities circulated in extremely simple terms by conventional media throughout working-class neighborhoods and Cape Town townships made it easier for UCT:RMF to approach laborers living there for collaboration and assistance.

Finally, UCT:RMF and OS members extensively wrote opinions/editorials for online and print media sources, going head-to-head with professors and politicians who selectively castigated and praised different students or goals of student protests. Brian Kamanzi and Wanelisa Xaba especially wrote scathing and widely-read pieces that denounced the authoritarian tactics of universities and police, while further intellectually and socially legitimizing the cause of UCT:RMF’s stated goal of decolonization. All of these issues - the identity politics, the transgression, the performance art - came together through robust use of multiple media that transcended what had been previously done by students post-apartheid, and transformed the perceived power of students in South Africa - and beyond.
Radical Oppression Necessitates Radical Resistance

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South Africa’s Neoliberal Global Context, Universities, and Students

I have presented critical theories and specific examples of deep, colonial histories of South Africa, the Southern African region, and the world, especially focusing on the intersections of violence, education, and the covert authoritarianism of neoliberalism. I have further broken this down into spectacular, physical direct violence, as well as "slow violence," or environmental, financial, or otherwise systemic racism, sexism, and classism. I have recapped Southern Africa's definitive struggles to date: decolonization from Europe, including from the global hegemon of Imperial Britain, regional hegemon of Apartheid South Africa, and contemporary power imbalances at the sub-state level of South Africa.

I have also hopefully clarified how, despite mainstream academia's and common sense's insistence to the alternative, there have been negligible de facto improvements to the quality of life for the majority of South Africans.

Understanding the critical concepts of global neoliberalism and covert authoritarianism, combined with the historical context of contemporary South Africa’s university students, their demands for “decolonization” may appear transgressive, but they have, in fact, entirely legitimate claims that, although radical, make perfect sense in terms of ongoing colonialism. When comparing the demands and issues faced by other university student protests and social movements under similar circumstances, the themes of South Africa’s protests are visible.

Because of my social positionality, prescribing solutions or jumping to conclusions about South Africa would risk my perpetuation of a colonial research methodology. For that reason, I have thus far taken extreme care to provide not only qualitative or only quantitative
analyses of immediate issues in South Africa, or to otherwise conform to mainstream, capitalist-realist academic methodologies. In keeping with this thesis as a critical GS project, I have incorporated multiple and various disciplines and perspectives on the issue, allowing for both a zoomed in “thick description” of events in the present, as well as a zoomed out, global-scale, “long duree” contextualization of those events. I provided detailed, critical-theoretical, and global-colonial-historical contexts of South Africa in order to justify my historiography, interpretations, and analyses. As such, this Master’s level thesis is an almost unmanageable size, though it is hopefully a testament to the inability to simply summarize South Africa today in such misused terms as “globalization” or “democracy” or “corruption.”

South Africa and its contemporary university students, their protests, and the counter-hegemonic social movements driven by them are clearly situated within the political, social-cultural, and economic systems of post-Cold War Contemporary Globalization, which is defined by global neoliberalism. This de-democratization and covert authoritarianism on a global level has, on the one hand, sparked more and more radical forms of covert state violence, through securitization, in collusion with informal, common sense assumptions, alongside formal, post-apartheid instruction about how The Rainbow Nation is a country of progress and development under the tenure of the ANC. These neoliberal claims to legitimacy and power, or authority, render invisible their co-optation by agents of global capital. On the other hand, increasingly radical forms of neoliberalism have radicalized local resistance - which UCT:RMF students exploded into the local, national, regional, and global consciousness as “decolonization.”

After decades of austerity, privatization, and abandonment of Pan-Africanist socialism, the neoliberal university in South Africa - like elsewhere - is in ruins. The intersections of
securitization and privatization have led to increasingly desperate and exploited students unable to be served by the degrading NSFAS and the detached, unresponsive, and entrenched political elites of the state. These decades of governance by capital exacerbated the structural imbalances that centuries of colonialism imposed upon the region and its indigenous people. Once forced to teach themselves as criminals without access to decent facilities, South Africans now are taught by underpaid and underqualified teachers in a public school system that still lacks facilities, and still fails to go beyond basic numeracy, literacy, and simplistic capitalist-realist ideas of poli-socio-economics - almost all of which are imported from the Global North and West.

So many students are criminalized, impoverished, denied access to quality resources, indebted, indefinitely unemployed, or otherwise marginalized by a system that talks about how it is meant to empower them. Much like how the 2011 Marikana Massacre marked a turning point for how labor exploitation and de facto enslavement to extractive firms under the ANC and neoliberalism, so too did 2014-2016 mark a turning point for how university students may take their protests beyond the walls of academia and drive social movements. So how, then, can these social movements be considered to move beyond national borders and become a global phenomena?

**Making Global Comparisons**

It is easy to start with conventional notions that disregard the similarities between apparently separate case studies. It is also difficult to avoid a totalizing, purely structural, top-down imposition of how everything is the same if everything is subject to global neoliberalism. As I recognized in my introduction, GS theory review, and critical premises,
there are varieties of neoliberalism and capitalism, and there are varieties of local resistances to global authorities. However, the shift towards conservative, post-structuralist, hyper-individualist epistemologies in academia and beyond under Contemporary Globalization has overwhelmed and marginalized the vast majority of anti-capitalist thinking. Furthermore, the power imbalance of global neoliberal agents against local anti-capital agents is also overwhelming. It is, on the one hand, inaccurate to theoretically erase individual and local agency by acknowledging the relative helplessness of anti-authoritarian protesters. It is another act of erasure, however, one which neoliberalism itself perpetrates through its invisibilization of its violence, to refuse to recognize the overwhelming totality of these power imbalances.

For example, a typical case of a South African student attending a South African university may consist of their likely childhood in a township, where they were told they live in a democracy, were indoctrinated through near-mythical stories of the ANC, and studied hard to meet certain testing criteria in an under-equipped school. Following admission to a university that overwhelmingly employees White, male, English- or Afrikaans-speaking academics, and which uses overwhelmingly USA and UK varieties of capitalist-realism for their curricula, this student is given insufficient state funding and housing, and must take out incredible amounts of student loans, and/or become employed by a profitable USA- or UK-based firm in order to mitigate their student loan debt. Upon graduation, they face likely long-term un-, under-, or mal-employment, and a relatively wretched quality of life.

For another example, a typical case of a South African laborer working in a mine may consist of a similar childhood in a township, where they could not achieve the test scores required for university admission, and who were also indoctrinated into a certain political
party affiliation. They go on to years of unemployment, illness exacerbated by inadequate healthcare, housing, food, and general poverty, and finally find a job that pays better than others in the mines. In the case of Marikana and LonMin, this consists of literally bone-breaking labor, reduced life expectancy, and inadequate political representation by a corrupt labor union. When it came time to strike, the dozens of miners held traditional spears as a symbol of resistance, but posed no actual threat to the dozens of riot police equipped with live ammunition.

Most importantly, like formal HEIs, the police and the for-profit extractive firms possessed something that no anti-authority or anti-capitalist agent can under neoliberalism: legitimacy. Even in the few circumstances where students and laborers held the upper hand in terms of power, such as the October 23rd march on Pretoria’s capitol buildings, or when UCT students drove police off of the campus, they were never considered legitimate. Therefore, these anti-capitalists were never authorities, but rather marginalized, criminalized, insecure bodies in need of securitization as soon as possible - which has happened through arrests, trials, expulsions, and delegitimization of the original demands for decolonization. It would be an act of erasure to ignore this overwhelming intellectual and conceptual, as well as very physical and material, power asymmetry. This is not to say that there is no hope of successful resistance, but rather to say that given the realities of global neoliberalism, there are very few possible ways for local agents to successfully resist the entrenched, legitimate power of pro-capitalist state and non-state authorities, which are supported by the USA’s global, neoliberal hegemony.
Common Issues and Motivations

Across South Africa, and across the world - including in my two proposed most viable alternative case studies of California and Germany - similar processes that are not qualitatively different are underway. Again, to re-iterate and clarify, I summarize neoliberalism as:

- Ostensibly an economic model overtly tied to Eurocentrism;
- Actually a poli-socio-economic logic with additional covert qualities;
- Hyper-individualistic;
- Founded on notions of the superiority and greater “efficiency” of “privatization”;
- Ostensibly smaller-government overtly identified as de-regulation;
- Actually bigger-government that covertly re-regulates society through increased selective policing, militarism, and securitization

Under Contemporary Globalization, and especially since the Global Capital Crisis, these fundamental components of neoliberalism threaten humans in almost every part of planet earth, with varieties of slow and indirect, or physical and direct, violence. Crises of imagination and critical thought, alongside increasing consolidation of authority by the agents of global capital, have all accelerated the destruction of public education. These issues remain especially visible in former and potential sites of democratization, such as public universities and HEIs. Such sites of democratization, ruined and privatized though they may be, have offered one of the best examples of counter-hegemonic resistance to the totalitarian theories of neoliberalism. This is true even only in terms of how visible the radical restructuring and violence of neoliberalism appears when considering pre-neoliberal success of public universities. Because both California and Germany have previously represented some of the most robust, high quality, accessible, and affordable public HEIs and universities, they represent excellent case studies for the radical violence of neoliberalism in terms of education. Additionally, both California and Germany represent comparable histories, contemporary poli-socio-economics, and regional hegemony.
While somewhat dissimilar from South Africa, I argue they are dissimilar by a matter of degree and not by a matter of quality. I want to first acknowledge my own privilege and the general privilege distinctions between a student in academia’s Global North and West versus the Global South. Taking the analogies of the South African student and laborer above, I recognize that there are severe differences between the lived experiences of South African, Californian, and German students and laborers. A Californian student, even a student of color, deeply indebted, and perpetually un-/under-/mal-employed, has a significantly different material quality of life than their counterpart in South Africa. The same holds true for Germany and South Africa.

However, comparing these three cases is not a comparison between apples and oranges. The local differences of quality of life, especially for historically colonized and marginalized populations, such as women, LGBTQ-identified individuals, and people of color, are differences of degree, and not quality. A Turkish or Syrian immigrant, educated in Germany, but barred from citizenship or facing constant microaggressions and lifetime earnings losses due to their race, ethnicity, and/or national origin, may not have an identical experience to a South African facing such exclusion, but this experience is more similar than dissimilar under global neoliberalism. The same applies to, for example, a Black Californian student who, despite achieving higher education, and perhaps even securing a living wage, stable career, family, and property, may at any point be killed by police or a White American with little to no justice ever being served by a broken court system.

The most obvious similarities between these three apparently dissimilar cases, and which I do not spend much time on here, are their neoliberalized laborers. In every locale, including California and Germany, constant outsourcing and exploitation of labor is
increasing, leading to increasing securitization. Germany, with the remnants of its social democracy, perhaps experiences this the least within its own borders, although their capitalist-realistic society still depends upon consumer-driven, constant growth, which necessitates securitized access to fossil fuels located in the Middle East, eastern Europe, and Russia, where similarly slavish and wretched work conditions make possible Germans’ affordable quality of life. In California, despite the best attempts to erase its histories of *de facto* slavery necessary for its agricultural economies, marginalized subjective studies have slowly accrued ample evidence for how Latin American migrant laborers have perpetually served as California’s, and the USA’s, necessarily low-to-no cost laborers.

Chicano Studies especially has revised the White Liberal histories of California by documenting the deportation-industrial complexes institutionalized by the state, from the Bracero Program and “Operation Wetback” from the 1940s to the 1960s, to the H2A visa programs in the 1980s, to NAFTA and “Operation Gatekeeper” from the 1990s to the present. The notion that Germans, Californians, and South Africans all are coerced into relying upon some form of *de facto* slave labor for their energy, food, and/or general economic growth is neither a popular nor legitimate narrative. The vast majority of today’s capitalist-realistic society, or even academia, would dismiss this as hyperbole. Despite that, this thesis maintains that this underlying structure of advanced capitalist exploitation, which actually prefers and encourages firms to adopt *de facto* slave labor, is in fact the foundation of each of these societies under Contemporary Globalization. This predisposition towards radical exploitation, violence, and oppression informs how all public services, including formal education, have also been coerced into adopting increasingly exploitative labor practices and institutionalizing discrimination.
Commonalities Across Dissimilar Cases

I have identified the following as critical themes within South Africa’s contemporary university student protests:

- Renewed visibility of identity politics, respectability politics
- Marginalized university students’ “leadership”
- Ostensibly radical demands, strategies, and tactics
- Performative and artistic protest re-centering narratives
- Use of both social and conventional media

I argue that across South Africa, Germany, and California, university students’ protests specifically have all seen these following themes emerge:

1. Visibilization of, through the prioritization of, issues of racial, sexual, and financial violence and exclusion of students
2. Prioritization of access to education as something to which humans are fundamentally entitled;
3. Communication of demands in ways described as radical, transgressive, and criminal;
4. Contestations of their legitimacy by right-wing students and civil society agents.

It should be noted that while there is much overlap between these two sets of themes, and all three cases overlap in terms of their fundamental neoliberalism, the most significant divergences are outlined below.

In Germany, a fundamentally less exclusive electoral system, combined with a culture and history of supporting formal education, and compounded by greater material resources due to European privilege, all resulted in fairly rapid governmental responses to demands for free higher education. In the simplest terms possible, Germany remains, in gross over-simplified terms, fundamentally more democratic than either California in the USA, or South Africa in Southern Africa. Germany’s material power and higher quality of life encourages this. While neoliberalism continues in Germany through increasing outsourcing and management of HEI instruction, the outcomes of student protests in Germany were largely successful, and occurred within a relatively short amount of time. Furthermore, the
discourses in Germany were not dominated by calls for revolution or radical social restructuring, except for in some parts of social movements that explicitly discussed USA imperialism and neoliberalism. Instead, appeals to parties, electoral processes, and in-the-streets protests ultimately led to parties being either voted out of office, or adopting policies conducive to free, public, tertiary education.

Perhaps the most obvious connections between Germany and South Africa are, on the one hand, their deep histories of colonialism, as well as their 1990s major social restructuring and implementation of capitalist-realist procedural democracies. Germany, despite its relatively late formalization as a consolidated, territorially-bound, Westphalian style nation-state in 1871, was a clear colonial and imperial power both in South-West Africa, as well as during the Nazi Regime. South Africa, as examined in detail in my third chapter, was extensively colonized by Anglo-British and Dutch-Afrikaner powers. In another sense, however, both states underwent massive changes, both during WWII immediately before the Cold War, and in the 1990s immediately after the Cold War. The re-unification of Germany saw capitalist-realist West Germany, with the support of the USA and the emergent EU, absorb and impose advanced capitalism onto East Germany, not unlike how the ANC Regimes in South Africa behaved post-1994.

California is something of a middle ground between Germany and South Africa. On the one hand, it too shares a significant history of accessible public tertiary education, but this is mostly derived from post-WWII, Cold War era expansion. It too has represented, on a global scale, an American model of robust public HEIs, albeit of a variety different from Germany’s academic communities. California, too, has seen education become a pivotal electoral issue, with the institutional and taxation mechanisms required to maintain
affordable education being a highly visible part of many campaigns. Both California and Germany, as well as South Africa, made the affordability, cost, and class-based exclusion of students a central part of their protests. Alternately framed as “exclusion” and “privatization,” as well as, to a lesser extent, “financial violence,” the issue of increasing private household fees and decreasing state investment have been central parts of California and Germany.

Perhaps the most important similarities between California and Germany, and where South Africa diverges, is their loyalty to notions of incremental reform achieved through electoral and legislative processes. Unless considering California’s contemporary university student protests as part of the 1960s Free Speech Movement(s) (FSM), then California’s consistent, contiguous protests of 2016 are temporally bounded by the Global Capital Crisis, as were Germany’s and South Africa’s. In this sense, the timing of each of these protests is strikingly similar: California’s ongoing protests for eight years, from 2008 to 2016; Germany’s concluded protests for six years from 2006 to 2012; and South Africa’s ongoing protests for at least two years from 2014 to 2016.

While Germany lacked widespread visibility of protests targeting specific ideologies, except for neoliberalism, California and South Africa have both focused on various ideologies. Targets of protests in California and South Africa furthermore embraced identity politics, where this was less often the case in Germany. As such, Californian and South African university students extensively protested patriarchy, sexism, and racism, and made sexual violence critical parts both of their demands on universities, as well as a focus of their social movements’ organization. For this reason, although Germany indirectly addressed who can access universities, I interpret their lens as dependent more upon “class” rather than an
intersectional approach of race- and gender- and otherwise-determined class, such as that which has been present in California, and remains central to South Africa. Finally, in the simplest terms possible, the notions of massive social restructuring up to a revolution have been clearly and consistently visible from the start in South Africa. Demands for revolution, for abolition of existing systems, and even in some cases for abolishing a three-phase, primary-secondary-tertiary education system and HEIs entirely, has not been visible in California and Germany. Except for Harvard: Royall Must Fall, and the recent 2016 #DecolonizeLACityHall protests, the most radical demand of “decolonization” has been limited to South Africa, relative to these three cases. See Table 5.1.

| TABLE 5.1: Student Protesters’ Rhetoric in South Africa, California, and Germany, post-2007 |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Revolution | Intersectionality | Racial Violence | Sexual Violence | Financial Violence |
| South Africa | x | x | x | x | x |
| California | | x | x | x | x |
| Germany | | | | | x |

Having summarized the similarities and dissimilarities between South Africa and two other anti-privatization protests driven by university students on two different continents, especially in terms of rhetoric and protesters’ demands, I want to briefly consider the larger context of how these social movements have played out. In Germany, as noted, protests and elections combined led to significant education policy changes, though not abolition of neoliberalism. In California and South Africa, however, the outcomes are depressingly similar.

In both cases, students have faced severe police violence, been incarcerated, and the most ostensibly radical students have been expelled. In both cases, temporary tuition freezes were won after demanding abolition or reduction of tuition fees. In both cases, the viability and representation of elected student groups to effect any actual policy change has been
called into question, and yet these student groups remain perceived as the most legitimate voices of students. In both cases, outsourcing of workers has been highlighted, with little or delayed responses by universities, complemented by insistence that balancing the budget due to insourcing labor necessitates further cuts or fee increases. In both cases, state divestment from education continues, unless any sustainable, radical changes are implemented, and not rolled back when public attention shifts. Finally, in both cases, the financial, sexual, and racial violence against students continues, despite its increasing visibility.

See Tables 5.2.A-5.2.C.

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<tr>
<th>Desired Outcomes</th>
<th>Achieved Outcomes</th>
<th>Rhetoric</th>
<th>Critical Terms</th>
<th>Visible Demands</th>
<th>Visible Targets</th>
<th>Tactics</th>
<th>Time Frame</th>
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<td>Sexual Violence</td>
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### TABLE 5.2B: Overview of California’s Contemporary University Students’ Protests, post-2007

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<th>Critical Terms</th>
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<th>Visible Targets</th>
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<th>Time Frame</th>
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<td>University Mgmt.</td>
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### TABLE 5.2C: Overview of Germany’s Contemporary University Students’ Protests, post-2007

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### Common Conclusions: Radical Oppression Necessitates Radical Resistance

My conclusions after roughly 18 months focusing on Southern Africa, and roughly 12 months studying its social movements and deep histories, are problematic and transgressive. I label them as such in order to note how they problematize contemporary thought regarding social movement change, especially violence, as well as the fact that I am analyzing these issues of global violence from a position of relative global privilege, and simultaneous relatively academic marginalization. I would fail in my aim to be critical and self-reflexive if I did not once again recognize the problematics of my own knowledge production. I seek to label these conclusions as transgressive because of my argument that critical GS needs to
transgress against existing political-realist epistemologies, but especially because my research has led me to conclude that without transgressing the accepted common sense and respectable notions that neoliberalism imposes, little change will occur. As I stated in my first chapter’s introductory iteration of my thesis, generally speaking, the more transgressive and radical protests were, the more they influenced policy and other protests and social movements.

In Germany, gradual privatization and increase of tuition fees were at first met with scattered protests and appeals to politicians, with little response. Only once students took to the streets, occupied universities, and large populations began voting against pro-privatization politicians, did tuition become free once again. In California, nearly a decade of protests that have focused on institutional reform have yielded only minimal, incremental reforms, and ongoing marginalization. The most transgressive acts of university student protests in California, such as militant occupations of buildings and highways, have been both (a) brutally suppressed and (b) relatively poorly attended compared to more respectable events, such as planned marches, petitioning, and electoral campaigning. In South Africa, while suppression has grown increasingly radical, the highly transgressive demands for decolonization by UCT students ultimately set the stage for protesters to ask for much greater change; therefore, when they were forced to accept less than their ideal, it was still a more significant relative change than that which California and Germany were forced to accept.

Within two years, South African university students facilitated a national shutdown, froze tuition, and dramatically shifted the discourse around tertiary education and social problems in general. There is no comparable outcome, especially not within such a short time period, in California or Germany. Only after 8 years of incremental reforms, during which
time tuition and fees have steadily climbed and unsustainable rates, and coinciding with non-
university social movements such as Black Lives Matter and presidential elections. In
California, relatively less radical and transgressive student protests have been at least equally
led by non-university protests. In South Africa, university protests after 2014 have led almost
all other significant social movements.

I argue that this is because South African university students have been more radical,
transgressed against a greater number of accepted norms, and self-reflexively critiqued their
movements, all while employing historically successful tactics. Their success and radical
transgression is also dependent upon their explicit engagement with concepts of violence,
both in terms of its efficacy, the experience of violence by colonial subjects, and the
inevitability of radical and/or violence resistance to a radically violent system.

Complexly Confronting Violence

Understanding anti-apartheid movements in South(ern) Africa through a lens of the
efficacy of violent resistance in Angola, Namibia, and elsewhere problematizes common
sense assumptions about the necessity of non-violence. As UCT:RMF has transgressively
argued for over a year, dominant narratives of non-violence conveniently protect legitimized
state authorities, while erasing the trauma and pain of anti-apartheid movements that resulted
in tens of thousands of murdered and tortured indigenous South(ern) Africans. The
legitimacy of the state’s monopoly on violence, increasingly used only to secure profitable
flows of capital, has been forced to the center of the narrative by UCT:RMF’s focus on
Marikana. Their post-Shackville demand for a TRC, or a student-on-university justice
mechanism that is not dependent upon a corrupt court system, has forced debate about the
state’s selective application of restorative justice, which serves only select populations.
Germany’s and California’s university students have not consistently embraced such radical or revolution-focused demands. When they do, they are often contingent upon non-violence, as is understandable given their focus, in line with UCT:RMF’s, on no longer perpetuating oppression. However, these discussions often neglect the context of all students’ property damage being considered a type of “violence” that is punished more heavily than any universities’ or police forces’ direct physical violence against students’ bodies. Furthermore, these discussions of non-violence may be well-intentioned in their attempts to refine social movement strategies so that future oppressions are prevented. However, I fear they significantly delay transporting critical knowledge about social movements beyond relatively small academic circles into the streets, where the majority of the world lives and dies without the privilege of philosophizing about violence. Indeed, as universities have neoliberalized and encouraged mass overproduction of academic products, that increasingly saturate a marketplace of idea where only the most prestigious institutions’ and individuals’ products are consumed, it seems increasingly pointless to rely on academically-produced knowledge to ever have a tangible or timely impact on social movements.

I believe that UCT:RMF in fact represents a model for other universities and students seeking radical change should adopt - a deliberate and direct engagement with complex ideas of violence, and not reductive assertions of “violence is bad” which is how mainstream discourse dilutes complex and nuanced discussions of violence, such as those offered by Foran, Lezra, and others. An honest and complex confrontation of violence, in some form, seems to have become necessary for counter-hegemonic social movements. intending to confront overwhelmingly violent systems of oppression, which remain equipped with all manner of weapons, from thermonuclear warheads, to always-surveilling smartphones, to a
monopolies on common sense assumptions that there is no alternative to capitalism. Both Lezra and Foran have done this, extensively. Foran’s driving question, to me, seems to be “is it possible to move beyond [directly violent] insurgency” like past social movements? I increasingly feel that the answer is that, while directly violent insurgency continues to be problematic, and there is hope for a sort of emotional insurgency, even direct, physical violence is increasingly becoming one of the few visible options of counter-hegemonic resistance. This is not to suggest that it is the ideal or least problematic option, but that it is increasingly appearing to be the only possibility to increasingly violated and oppressed peoples.

On the one hand, in terms of confronting violence and creating empathy, Lezra understandably has prioritized how to not cause harm to students while teaching about inhumanity, atrocity, and violence. Their focus on empathy and emotion as central to this process is, I believe, correct, and exemplified through UCT:RMF. But what has been articulated within academia, and constrained by its institutional discrimination, UCT:RMF has rapidly actualized both within and beyond academia - but by doing so, in some senses, violently. Reparations are a form of justice that are at least structurally and financially violent, insofar as they are predicated on violating and damaging existing systems. Abolition of any system requires the violation of policies and procedures and employment of those involved in that system. UCT:RMF has advocated for both of these through advocating everything from abolishing universities in their current forms, to land expropriation and forced displacement and repatriation of White South Africans. Both of these revolutionary acts necessitate some form of violence, either as a clash between those with a vested interest in maintaining their own capital profitability, or through dismantling and violating existing
systematic norms. It is not a coincidence that these same conversations about land and other material possessions were held before 1994.

UCT:RMF has consistently made the same appeals as militant anti-apartheid movements from the 1960s-1980s. UCT:RMF has intentionally forced emotional, often violent and unwanted, responses amongst bystanders, in order to force a social conscientization towards colonial subjects predicated on feeling terrible and being moved to action - without the promises of non-violence and happiness that some “joyful militancy” (Achmat, 1993; Esteva, 2014) theories rely upon. While positive alternatives are necessary for breaking the cycle of oppression, again, today’s context is the aforementioned hegemonic capitalist-realist media. This media dilutes nuanced ideas into ineffective platitudes that ensure the state retains a monopoly on violence, and uses it effectively in the suppression of non-violent, unarmed protesters, even when their demands are not radical.

In simpler terms, joyful militancy appears to be a wonderful, non-problematic theory from the privilege of Global North and West academic circles. However, the likelihood of enslaved miners being able to prioritize joy and positive emotions while they are gunned downed, beaten, impoverished, assaulted, and detained seems implausible and useless - at least in the immediate term. The centrality of singing, chanting, and the toyi-toyi in South African protests may be one form of “joyful militancy,” but it is certainly one that prioritizes resistance and struggle against oppression and violence above happiness or joy. While I agree that "the ends of justice are no longer held to justify the means of violence," most of South Africa's history, and the contemporary cases of Marikana, OS, and (UCT:)RMF all provide evidence that invalidate the idea that "the means of non-violent resistance reflect and guarantee the ends that they seek." (Foran, 2014: 9) This is because non-violence has never
before, despite centuries of struggle, “guarantee[d] the ends” sought in South(ern) Africa. I am not arguing that non-violence never will work, but I am arguing that an honest assessment of centuries of counter-hegemonic resistance in South(ern) Africa substantiates UCT:RMF’s radical and transgressive claims that, without an accompanying violence or threat thereof, non-violence has never worked. I argue this to discourage unrealistic optimism in the face of pessimism-inducing amounts of evidence to the contrary; I argue against this optimism because of the way that existing media-, military-, and academic-industrial complexes dilute and co-opt such optimistic rhetoric to the benefit of entrenched authorities.

Is Comparably “Violent”, Transgressive Protest Possible or Effective Elsewhere?

On a local level, as noted above, when California students do embrace revolution-focused demands, they are not always contingent on respectful, non-violent approaches - using my above complex notion of violence. The recent cases of the Afrika Black Coalition (ABC) and Black Student Unions (BSUs) forcing the UC to divest from private prisons, as well as growing pro-Palestinian Boycott, Divestment, and Sanction (BDS) movement against Israel, have both violated existing norms. These groups have unapologetically put the survival of the oppressed above a commitment to the status quo, and in doing so have been labelled as violent and criminal. While BDS is explicitly described as a non-violent movement, it is in fact violating the financial business of Israeli, UK, and USA firms, and violating the unspoken rules of Global North and West academics ignoring Israeli human rights abuses due to a presumption that Israel is a liberal democracy. ABC and BSUs have variously embraced Pan-Africanism and some forms of socialism, or otherwise anti-capitalist ideologies, which inherently support the abolition, and violation of, capitalist systems. At the very least, all of these anti-authoritarian movements are prone to violating established
notions of respectability politics, and are consequently labelled as violent for doing so. Again, if such is the case, it seems that some similar embrace, not outright rejection, of necessary “violence” must prefigure actualization of movements seeking to address neoliberalism’s violence. This embrace must occur in a way that transgresses established capitalist-realist ideas of only direct physical violence that is only legitimate when it is applied by the state.

As noted above, I perceive UCT:RMF as something of a model for other movements, given the increasingly similar qualities of societies and educational systems around the world, and UCT:RMF’s relative success compared to other cases. However, the internal antagonisms of UCT:RMF, as well as constant suppression by UCT and police, has led to its near collapse. The ostensibly legitimate SRCs in South Africa suffer from significant infighting and internalization of petty politics, too. Locally, elected student groups in California struggle with the same internalization of detrimental political practices, but are able to exert even less influence on university policies or official political parties than are SRCs in South Africa. The above-mentioned “radical” and potentially “violent” groups such as ABC, BSU, and pro-Palestinian groups are overwhelmingly marginalized within California politics, and are overwhelmingly comprised of marginalized students. Arab, progressive Israeli, and Black students within California’s HEIs constitute only a fraction of the overwhelmingly White and/or middle-class and/or respectability politics student body.

How, then could the radical, transgressive, and potentially “violent” student protests’ strategies of UCT:RMF be effectively adopted within CA? I believe that, as this concluding chapter is titled, that radical oppression increasingly necessitates radical resistance. And, as Haiven and Khasnabish theorize, and as UCT:RMF have actualized, something truly radical
has to be imagined, enacted, and then effectively communicated. Without all three of these processes - imagination, action, effective communication - the radical resistance is likely to fail. I believe that both endless, critical, abstract, academic analysis, which perpetuates purely intellectually satisfying academic activity, as well as physical, misogynistic, patriarchal, sexist violence, have both contributed to UCT:RMF significantly losing momentum and increasing its internal antagonisms. These same obstacles degrade university students and protests in Germany and California, and must be addressed if the successful components of UCT:RMF’s radicalism are to be utilized by other, currently less-radical protesters.

That said, what UCT:RMF accomplished in such a short amount of time is remarkable. Even if the group collapses, they have laid the discursive and social foundation for a radical anti-capitalist movement that has re-centered the narrative of violence, colonialism, and decolonization. As such, their five key themes could be adopted even by relatively small groups of students elsewhere, in order to make visible violence and pain suffered in highly advanced capitalist sites, such as California, the USA, Germany, or Europe. On the one hand, it is implausible and likely ineffective to return to the same radicalism of the 1960s FSM and anti-Vietnam protests. Additionally, it seems impossible to imagine protests of the scale seen in South Africa ever occurring in the respectable and orderly suburbs of California, or in the upper-class urban sites where most UCs are located. However, the entire point of UCT:RMF and the theory of the radical imagination, and the idea of resistance growing increasingly radical as oppression radically increases, is this: what common sense asserts is impossible, at some point, is forced to occur. The interregnum
between the dying old and the as-yet unbirthed new demands some sort of emergency operation.

In the past two years in the USA, except for the sole instance of UC Santa Cruz students blocking Highway 17 (and subsequently being arrested, tried, and effectively expelled) the only visible shutdowns of profitable infrastructure in the USA has been executed by indigenous Americans leading the obstruction of extractive industries’ pipelines, or by Black Lives Matter, or by related racial justice groups operating outside of university students. It may seem impossible to imagine waves of students conducting hunger strikes, or occupying strategic buildings alongside laborers and family members, or taking the more radical initial steps of emotional and artistic interventions to conscientize Californians before these conventionally militant actions are possible. It seems impossible for the small, university-approved art exhibition at UCSB on solitary confinement to have an impact. It seems impossible for some truly radical, militant anti-incarceration, anti-police, or otherwise anti-authority performances to galvanize UC students into action on the basis of its violent emotionality alone. However, in the 1980s it was impossible for most in the Global North and West to imagine that the Berlin Wall and USSR, or apartheid, would collapse. In the 1970s, it seemed impossible to imagine that the national guard would murder unarmed students at Kent State and Jackson State. In the 1960s it seemed impossible that dozens of Buddhist monks would self-immolate themselves to protest the brutality of Vietnam. It previously seemed impossible that slavery is thriving and even increasing in 2016, and yet neoliberalism has indeed perpetuated this practice.
And yet, much of what “was” impossible now simply “is,” and my research indicates it “is” because radical and transgressive acts, both violent and non-violent, actualized ideas that were formerly marginalized as purely intellectual, constrained within academia or otherwise made invisible and inaccessible. I believe that, with each escalation of neoliberalism’s violence, state divestment from education, and the ongoing violation of Black and Brown bodies, so too is it increasingly necessary for protesters seeking radical change to take actions seen as impossible, transgressive, and even “violent”.

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