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Religious Tension in Brazil:

The Rise of Militant Pentecostalism and Implications for Afro-Brazilian Religions

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ABSTRACT

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The size, power, and representation of the Pentecostal movement are rapidly increasing around the world, particularly in the Global South. This is especially the case in Brazil, where conversions from Catholicism and other religions to Pentecostalism have huge implications for religious tolerance and even race relations. Vulnerable minority Afro-Brazilian religions are increasingly targeted by evangelical Christians, particularly by Pentecostals and neo-Pentecostals, creating a tense situation between the two groups. Militant groups of Pentecostals have carried out violence against Afro-Brazilian temples and practitioners on the ground, as well as hate speech on the internet and other spaces in the public sphere. Brazilians and others commenting on the situation assert that Pentecostals target these religions for reasons of competition, and though I do not contest this, I expand on this discussion by examining moral disagreements between the two groups as well as the role of race and racism.

In order to investigate some Pentecostal methods for the spread of hate speech and violence, I traveled to Rio de Janeiro. I chose the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, a

huge and controversial neo-Pentecostal church network, as a case study. The UCKG is one of the biggest perpetrators of intolerance against the Afro-Brazilian minority religions. I attended numerous UCKG church services in various neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro as an observer and a participant. My findings were that the Church promotes a language of war and gives a moral justification for worshippers' battles with nonbelievers, and that it has elements of militancy in its proselytism. It also poses itself as the victim, asserting that it is discriminated against (for spreading hate) and demanding that its intolerance be tolerated.

In order to further investigate the motivations behind these behaviors and attitudes, I have utilized media coverage, social media, and academic sources. I have found that the UCKG is highly competitive for territory and that it additionally denounces Afro-Brazilian religions for moral reasons. But furthermore, even though Pentecostals and especially the UCKG are racially diverse, I assert that their attacks on Afro-Brazilian religions have racial undertones. Examples from Africa where the UCKG demonizes African traditions and employs racialized depictions of African peoples shed light on this conversation.

Overall, this thesis is a conversation about the increasing use of the public sphere on the part of evangelicals, and especially militant groups of Pentecostals and neo-Pentecostals, to spread hate against Afro-Brazilian minority religions. These behaviors reflect larger trends of increasing religious fervor in the public sphere around the globe, which undermines tolerance and secularity, and in this situation, even racial equality. The breadth and popularity of this movement in Brazil and globally necessarily makes an understanding of these issues crucial to efforts to promote religious and even racial tolerance and equality in Brazil and elsewhere.

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Introduction

On June 14th, 2015, Kailane Campos, an eleven-year-old girl, was attacked in northern Rio de Janeiro. Campos is a *candomblecista*, or a practitioner of an Afro-Brazilian religion called Candomblé. She and her grandmother were leaving a religious temple, dressed in the white robes of Candomblé, when two men started shouting at them. Campos' grandmother (a *mãe de santo*, or temple leader) has been quoted recalling that the men shouted out “*diablo*” meaning “devil,” “*vai para o inferno*” meaning “go to hell,” and “*Jesus está voltando*” or “Jesus is returning.” One of the men hit Campos over the head with a rock and then both men fled by bus. The police never identified them.¹ Three days later, at the doorway of a police building where Campos was going in for a forensic exam, she and her grandmother experienced a new instance of intolerance. A stranger approached them and identified himself as evangelical. He insulted them, told them to “burn in hell,” and criticized the validity of the investigation.² The series of events caught the attention of Marcelo Freixo, Rio’s elected State Deputy, who personally escorted Campos to find support from the NGO Liberdade Religiosa (or “Religious Liberty”), which works to defend religious liberty rights and provide counseling to victims of religious intolerance.³

The physical and verbal attacks against Campos are highly representative of the type of violence and intolerance that many practitioners of Afro-Brazilian faiths, including

¹ Bruce Douglas. "Attack on 11-year-old in Rio Highlights Fears of Rising Religious Intolerance." *The Guardian*. Guardian News and Media Limited, 19 June 2015. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.;

"Menina Vítima De Intolerância Religiosa Diz Que Vai Ser Difícil Esquecer Pedrada." *Rio De Janeiro*. Globo Comunicação E Participações S.A, 16 June 2015. Web. 14 Jan. 2016.

² Tiago Federico. "Menina Vítima De Intolerância Religiosa Diz Que Não Perdoa Agressores." *O Dia*. O Dia, 17 June 2015. Web. 15 Nov. 2015 ;
Leandro Resende. “Por que não me respeitam?’, indaga menina agredida por ser do Candomblé.” *O Dia*. O Dia, 18 June 2015. Web. 15 Jan. 2015

³ *Ibid.*

Candomblé, are currently experiencing all across Brazil and specifically in Rio de Janeiro. Regarding the physical attack, we cannot discern many details of the attacker's profile. It is surmisable, however, that he is an evangelical Christian, possibly a Pentecostal or neo-Pentecostal. There is little doubt that this attack was religiously motivated. Since the attacker was a stranger, it is likely that the mere symbol of Campos' white robes and/or her presence at a *terreiro*, or temple, were enough to invoke hatred and violence. The attacker probably associated the victim's faith with *feitiçaria*, or witchcraft, and possibly with devil-worship. None of these assumptions are currently verifiable. But these are not unreasonable assumptions, as I will demonstrate throughout this thesis. Namely, they are widely shared by many Brazilians, including government officials like Marcelo Freixo, who have consistently interpreted Campos' enigmatic event as an intolerant evangelical attack on Afro-Brazilian religions.⁴ Evangelicals, especially Pentecostals and neo-Pentecostals, are seen as waging a war on the Afro-Brazilian religious community.

Additionally, Brazilians, especially the victims of this violence, are increasingly speaking out that attacks against Afro-Brazilian religions are racially motivated. Available evidence suggests that the vast majority of victims in scenarios like Campos' are of African descent,⁵ despite the fact that Afro-Brazilian religions are practiced by peoples of widely diverse backgrounds and skin colors, including whites.⁶ The question then becomes whether attackers, especially evangelical or Pentecostal attackers, are motivated by religious

⁴ The four sources cited in footnotes 1 and 2 support this.

⁵ And based on photographs from news articles, which is admittedly a problematic form of identifying skin color and especially race, this includes Campos and her grandmother.

⁶ This needs more research. The media only discusses cases where the victims are of African descent, but a study is needed that looks at temples primarily housing 'black' worshippers and compares them with temples with many 'white' worshippers to see how much more frequently Afro-Brazilian groups are attacked.

intolerance and competition alone, or whether persecution of Afro-Brazilian religions is racist in nature.

This thesis will explore how rapidly growing support for Pentecostalism relates to the increasing violence and intolerance against Afro-Brazilian religious groups. I seek to examine how and why some groups of militant Pentecostals are promoting and enacting violence. I also aim explore how race is a factor in this violence. These questions are especially pertinent as Pentecostalism gains momentum in the Global South, and as religious fervor more widely thrives in most regions of the world.

The persistence of religion around the world surprises many scholars because it directly refutes the secularization thesis. As formulated by the founding “fathers” of sociology as well as anthropology (Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim; E.B. Tylor, James Frazer, Augustus Comte), secularization theory posited the decline of religion in modernity. Weber called this the disenchantment of the world. As industrialization accelerated, rationality and science would become seen as superior to faith. Religion, which Marx called “the opiate of the masses,” would lose force and currency. According to Giles Kepel, this theory has its origins in western Enlightenment thinking – reason, rationality, and science were considered ultimate embodiments of modernity and progress.⁷ With the tumult of the 1960s and the growth of individualized forms of spirituality, the decline of mainline religions, and the weakening of religious authority as a

⁷ Gilles Kepel. *The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in the Modern World*, Penn State Press, 1994.

cohesive power in social life, many western scholars adopted this line of thinking and applied it to the world.

In *Public Religions in the Modern World*, Jose Casanova explains that there are three prongs to modern secularization theory – differentiation (increased religious pluralism and reduced homogeneity), decline in belief (increasing numbers of non-religious or atheistic people), and privatization (religion operates in homes and religious institutions, not in the media or the government).⁸ Casanova does not refute that differentiation and even decline in belief are occurring world-wide and particularly in the West, and my case will not refute these either. However, his central thesis is that we are witnessing the “deprivatization” of religion in the modern world, meaning that there is a resurgence of religion in the public sphere:

Religious traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal and privatized role which theories of modernity as well as theories of secularization had reserved for them. Social movements have appeared which either are religious in nature or are challenging in the name of religion the legitimacy and autonomy of the primary secular spheres, the state and the market economy. Similarly, religious institutions and organizations refuse to restrict themselves to the pastoral care of individual souls and continue to raise questions about the interconnections of private and public morality.... One of the results of this ongoing contestation is a dual, interrelated process of repoliticization of the private religious and moral spheres and renormativization of the public economic and political spheres. This is what I call, for lack of a better term, the “deprivatization” of religion.⁹

In support of this line of thinking, Giles Gunn details the emergence of extreme forms of evangelical Christianity in the public sphere in the United States in his book, *Ideas to Die For*. His discussion of U.S. religious politics resonates rather strongly with the situation that I

⁸ José Casanova. *Public Religions in the Modern World*. University of Chicago Press, 2011.

⁹ *Ibid*, 5-6.

am analyzing in Brazil. He asserts that the realms of the public and the popular have been asked “not only to work for religion but to do much of the work of religion.”¹⁰ He argues, “We have been told that evangelical Protestants, like charismatic Catholics and orthodox Jews... are adamantly opposed to the invasion of the precincts of belief by popular culture, but to judge from the way they live their faith, this could not be further off the mark.”¹¹ Furthermore, he writes that these individualistic characteristics gave rise to the encouraging of Americans to take refuge in the “politics of sin,” which offered believers an opportunity to use their faith to change the public realm into something more congenial with their beliefs.¹² One consequence of all of this, in Gunn’s eyes, is the frequent drawing of boundaries between “us” and “them” (with threats like immigrants, slaves, women, etc. being lumped in the “them” category). He explains, “The upright and the reprobate, the saved and the fallen... have been ‘rewritten as the boundaries between good and evil.’”¹³ In this paper, I will demonstrate the ways in which Gunn’s descriptions extend far beyond the American religious sphere by showing how extreme groups of Pentecostals are relying on the public sphere to undermine secularity and to spread messages of hate and war in Brazil and globally. Namely, I will attempt to answer why Afro-Brazilians have been propped up as the “other,” falling into Gunn’s “them” category in a narrative about good versus evil.

This study will be much more exploratory than explanatory. Unfortunately, many of the attackers remain anonymous and we are left to guess at their motivations. While there is substantial anecdotal evidence of attacks on Afro-Brazilian communities, few official

¹⁰ Giles Gunn. *Ideas to Die for: The Cosmopolitan Challenge* (Routledge, 2013), 78.

¹¹ *Ibid*, 79.

¹² *Ibid*, 81.

¹³ *Ibid*, 82.

statistics exist on the subject. Afro-Brazilian religious communities are understudied and underrepresented, as not all victims are as vocal and proud as Campos and her grandmother.

However, the assumptions discussed around Kailane Campos' case are built upon a series of more knowable, intolerant and violent events orchestrated by small groups of militant evangelicals and often more specifically neo-Pentecostals. I will illuminate the Pentecostal role in this violence with a fuller description of fervent groups' presence in the Brazilian public sphere. By placing Campos' attack in a larger context of violence and looking at the different reactions and perceptions of the groups involved, I will demonstrate how Pentecostals are blamed for the violence. I will show that some groups of Pentecostals, especially the neo-Pentecostal church network called the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, are embracing a rhetoric of war that is likely contributing to rising violence. Furthermore, I will discuss an increasingly popular concept of "inside-out" tolerance, whereby some Pentecostal groups are speaking and acting out for the right to discriminate, to demonize, and to hate. Lastly, I will demonstrate that hate against Afro-Brazilian religions cannot be separated from hate against Africanness, implicating blackness to some degree.

With attention to the historical context and the present Brazilian religious landscape, this introduction seeks to give a general picture of the violence that the Afro-Brazilian religious community faces, emphasizing Rio de Janeiro as a site of study. I will begin by describing Brazil's changing religious landscape before defining the religious labels that will be used throughout this thesis. It is difficult to disentangle modern issues of persecution from the long, painful history of intolerance against Afro-Brazilian religions, which is further difficult to disentangle from a history of institutionalized and later privatized racism. So, after characterizing the religious groups in question, I will give a brief history of Afro-

Brazilian oppression. After, I will provide specific examples of the intolerance and violence perpetrated against Afro-Brazilian religions in Rio. Finally, I will end the introduction with a brief chapter outline and a description of my research methods.

I. The Present Religious Landscape in Brazil

Since the Portuguese colonized Brazil in the 16th century, Catholicism has enjoyed cultural, political, and demographic predominance. Today, an estimated 123 million Roman Catholics reside in Brazil – more than any other country in the world.¹⁴ However, the share of Brazil’s overall population that identifies as Catholic has been dropping steadily in recent decades, while the percentage of Brazilians who belong to Protestant churches (and especially Pentecostal denominations) has been rising. Smaller but consistently increasing shares of Brazilians also identify with other religions (including the Afro-Brazilian religions) or with no religion at all.¹⁵

A Pew Research Center study shows that the number of Brazilian Protestants grew in the most recent decade from 15% of the population in 2000 to 22% in 2010.¹⁶ Based on the 2010 census, Pew states that 13% of all Brazilians, or 59% of the 42 million Brazilian

¹⁴ Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. “Brazil’s Changing Religious Landscape.” *Pew Research Centers Religion Public Life Project RSS*. Pew Research Center, 18 July 2013. Web. 12 Mar. 2015

¹⁵ “Religion in Latin America.” *Pew Research Centers Religion Public Life Project RSS*. Pew Research Center, 12 Nov. 2014. Web. 15 Mar. 2015.

¹⁶ “Protestant” is broadly defined here by the Pew Research Center to include Brazilians who identify with historically mainline and Evangelical Protestant denominations as well as those who belong to Pentecostal denominations, such as the Assemblies of God and the Foursquare Church. It also includes members of independent, neo-Pentecostal churches, such as the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God and the God is Love Pentecostal Church, both of which were founded in Brazil. But in keeping with categories in the Brazilian census, it does not include Mormons or Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Protestants, identified as Pentecostal.¹⁷ An additional 34% of the total Brazilian population are considered Charismatics, meaning that they belong to mainline Protestant or Catholic churches but self-identify as Pentecostal or hold beliefs in the gifts of the Holy Spirit. In my own direct analysis of the 2010 census, it appears that approximately 25 million Brazilians belong to “Evangelical churches of Pentecostal origin.”¹⁸ Pew explains that the growing numbers of Pentecostals and Protestants in general are largely due to religious switching, mostly due to Catholics converting.

In addition, the number of Brazilians belonging to other religions – including “Afro-Brazilian faiths” such as Candomblé and Umbanda, Spiritist movements, and global religions such as Buddhism and Islam – has been climbing. About 2 million Brazilians belonged to these other religions in 1970, and this number increased to about 6 million (4% of Brazil’s population) by 2000 and 10 million (5%) by 2010. The IBGE’s 2010 census lists nearly 3.9 million Spiritists, 407,500 Umbanda adherents, nearly 168,000 Candomblé adherents, 14,000 adherents to ‘other Afro-Brazilian religions,’ and 63,000 Brazilians who adhere to ‘Indigenous Traditions.’¹⁹ Finally, the number of Brazilians with no religious affiliation, including agnostics and atheists, grew from fewer than 1 million Brazilians in 1970 to 12 million (7%) in 2000, topping 15 million (8%) in Brazil’s 2010 census.²⁰ Pew provides the charts given in figures 1 and 2 to demonstrate these trends.

¹⁷ More recently, in July of 2013, the U.S. government estimated that 60% of Brazilian Protestants identify as Pentecostal: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. "International Religious Freedom Report for 2013." *U.S. Department of State*. U.S. Department of State, n.d. Web. 11 Mar. 2015.

¹⁸ See Appendix A.


¹⁹ See Appendix A.

²⁰ Religion in Latin America." Pew Research Centers Religion Public Life Project RSS. Pew Research Center, 12 Nov. 2014. Web. 15 Mar. 2015.

Figure 1.

Brazilian Population Trends, 1970-2010

Number of people in each religious group, in millions




Source: Brazil census
PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Figure 2.

Major Religious Groups in Brazil, 1970-2010

Percent of the population that identifies with each group



Source: Brazil census
PEW RESEARCH CENTER

These numbers are not infallible as Brazilian religious identity tends to be much more fluid than in the United States and reporting is unreliable. Brazilians may change religions relatively often or have multiple religious labels for themselves. They also may be dishonest when taking surveys if their religion is stigmatized (Afro-Brazilian religions are probably radically underrepresented). Regardless, a quantitative analysis of the religious landscape at least sheds light on general trends of changing religious demographics.

The decline in mainline religion and the increasing popularity of Pentecostalism as well as a smaller but still significant increasing popularity of Afro-Brazilian religions demonstrate that differentiation, or the first prong of the secularization thesis, is well-supported. Very small increases in atheism also demonstrate that the second prong, or decline in belief, is gradually occurring. However, the growing trend towards evangelicalism is significant as Pentecostals are increasingly active in the public sphere. As will be illustrated,

the third prong of the secularization thesis, or privatization, is not only currently unfounded but is radically opposite of Pentecostal behavior and success.

Lastly, to hone in on the site of Rio de Janeiro specifically, the city itself is more or less represented by the statistics above, and southeastern Brazil houses 18% of Brazil's evangelicals and is an important center of evangelical expansion.²¹ As a global city many minorities are present and Rio is one of a few urban centers that houses larger groups of Afro-Brazilian faiths than other parts of the country, making it an epicenter for the intolerance and violence explored in my project and therefore a good case-study site.

II Clarification of Terms

Characterizing Pentecostalism

Pentecostalism is arguably the fastest growing religious movement in the contemporary world. Globally, it has experienced exceptional growth from its modest beginnings with a handful of followers at the beginning of the twentieth century to some half billion adherents at the end of the century. In *To the Ends of the Earth: Pentecostalism and the Transformation of World Christianity*, Allan Anderson explains that perhaps the most important reason for this expansion is that Pentecostalism is fundamentally an ““ends of the earth,” missionary, polycentric, transnational religion.”²² Pentecostalism encompasses non-Catholic (Protestant) Christian churches and worshippers that emphasize the experience of the Spirit or Gifts of the Holy Spirit (such as divine healing, speaking in tongues, or direct revelations from God) as

²¹ Ricardo Mariano. "Expansão Pentecostal no Brasil: O Caso da Igreja Universal." *Estudos avançados* 18.52 (2004), 121-138.

²² Allan Anderson. *To the Ends of the Earth: Pentecostalism and the Transformation of World Christianity* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 1.

well as a belief in world evangelization. Pentecostal denominations value spreading the gospel and serving as witnesses for Jesus Christ in the farthest reaches of the globe, which is largely responsible for the success of Pentecostalism worldwide.

Because the terms Pentecostal and evangelical are often used interchangeably, a clarification of their distinctions is in order for this paper. The terms have overlapping definitions, but the former is more specific than the latter. Like some other Protestant denominations (including many evangelicals), Pentecostalism emphasizes conversion, moral rigor, and a literal interpretation of the bible, but what makes Pentecostalism unique is its belief that all Christians should seek a post-conversion religious experience called the baptism with the Holy Spirit. This second baptism (also called adult baptism) is characterized by glossalia, in which the newly baptized ‘speak in tongues.’ This practice refers to the biblical story of Pentecost (Acts 1:2), when “the apostles spoke to people from different parts of the ancient Middle East, to each in his own tongue, although the apostles had never learned those languages.”²³ Modern Pentecostals do not speak in a human language previously unknown to them, but they do emit a series of sounds claimed to be part of a ‘divine’ language only understood by God. Pentecostals believe that those baptized by the Holy Spirit may receive other supernatural gifts like the ability to prophesy, to heal, or to interpret speaking in tongues.²⁴

Relatedly, evangelical groups “stress the preaching of the gospel of Jesus Christ, conversion, Scripture as the sole basis for faith, and active evangelism (the winning of personal

²³ Kepel, *The Revenge of God*, 114.

²⁴ Allen Anderson, *To The Ends of the Earth* ;

John G. Melton. "Pentecostalism." *Encyclopedia Britannica Online*. Encyclopedia Britannica, 31 Aug. 2014. Web. 14 Mar. 2015.

commitments to Christ).”²⁵ However, evangelicals may or may not believe in the second baptism or practice glossalia and can belong to nearly any Christian denomination, as evangelism is emphasized in numerous sects of Christianity. Thus, while most Pentecostals are evangelicals, many evangelicals are not Pentecostals.²⁶

While this paper will attempt to focus specifically on Pentecostalism, it is important to note some variations in the way the label is used. For instance, in a 2006 report by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, Pentecostals have been separated from Charismatics (who also hold some Pentecostal beliefs or who self-identify as Pentecostal but do not belong to official denominations labeled as Pentecostal – for example, some Charismatics are mainline Protestants or Catholics), and then reclassified together to make up a group called “Renewalists.”²⁷ Members belonging to Pentecostal denominations make up substantial portions of the populations in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, but when the scope is widened to the larger category of Renewalists, we see demographic numbers double or triple (15% of Brazilians are considered Pentecostal, plus 34% Charismatics, totaling 49% of Brazil’s population for Renewalists). This demonstrates that how we define Pentecostalism has implications for how large the movement is.²⁸

²⁵ John G. Melton "Evangelical church - Protestantism." *Encyclopedia Britannica Online*. Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d. Web. 14 Mar. 2015.

²⁶ Also, because evangelical is somewhat of an umbrella term and does not refer to a specific denomination, I will not capitalize the term in this paper, though it I have found the term written both ways all across my research.

²⁷ Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. "Spirit and Power – A 10-Country Survey of Pentecostals." *Pew Research Centers Religion Public Life Project RSS*. Pew Research Center, 04 Oct. 2006. Web. 03 Mar. 2015.

²⁸ To contrast with Pew’s terminology, statistics regarding Renewalist churches in Brazil refer only to those historical protestant churches who either converted to Pentecostalism or became off-shoots of the historical church and added “Renewalist” to their official names as a way of indicating their beliefs in Pentecostalism. Additionally, when the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) records its census data on

Lastly, and crucially, most religious scholars make a distinction between Pentecostalism and neo-Pentecostalism. The former can be all-encompassing for summary purposes, but when used in contrast with neo-Pentecostalism it becomes more specific. It generally describes the movement up through the 1960s and also refers to a culture of small chapels that persists today. The latter refers to the newest wave of the religion, beginning in roughly the 1970s, that emphasizes “a much more centralized organization superficially comparable in its pyramidal structure to that of the Catholic Church.”²⁹ It is characterized by “monumental buildings in central locations [and] an ambition to become prominent social institutions.”³⁰ Neo-Pentecostalism is also characterized by the use of business management techniques in running churches, a greater emphasis on the theology of prosperity, and the use of the media for the work of mass proselytism and religious advertising (leading to the name ‘electronic churches’).³¹ In the Brazilian context, it has also been largely associated with having political influence and charismatic leaders, as well as appealing to less-educated Brazilian masses.³² Further regarding this movement in Brazil, Vagner Gonçalves da Silva of the University of São Paulo argues that “the centrality of the theology of the spiritual battle against other religious denominations, especially the Afro-Brazilian religions and Spiritism,” also characterizes neo-Pentecostalism.³³ My field research will support this description.

religion, it breaks evangelicals into subheadings of “missionary Evangelicals” (which I surmise to mean non-Pentecostal evangelicals) and “Evangelicals of Pentecostal origins” (see Appendix A).

²⁹ Patricia Birman and David Lehmann. "Religion and the Media in a Battle for Ideological Hegemony: the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God and TV Globo in Brazil." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 18.2, (1999, 145-164), 2.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Vagner Gonçalves da Silva. *Neo-Pentecostalism and Afro-Brazilian Religions: Explaining the Attacks on Symbols of the African Religious Heritage in Contemporary Brazil*. Mana, Rio de Janeiro, vol. 3, Selected Edition, 2007. Web.

³² Paul Freston. ““Neo-pentecostalism” in Brazil: Problems of Definition and the Struggle for Hegemony.” *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* 44.105 (1999), 145–162. Web.

³³ Gonçalves da Silva. *Neo-Pentecostalism and Afro-Brazilian Religions*.

For the purposes of this paper, I will sometimes use the more inclusive “Pentecostal” to refer to the religious groups in question when describing larger trends, but I will also often switch to discussing neo-Pentecostalism because of its stronger association with intolerance and because of my focus on the neo-Pentecostal church, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God.³⁴ I will also occasionally widen the scope to the broader category of evangelicals in order to reflect on global trends and behaviors, especially because evangelicals are more widely referred to in media articles about Brazilian religious events and trends.³⁵

Characterizing Afro-Brazilian Religions

Brazil has a few distinct but overlapping religions that were created or molded domestically but that have fascinating and diverse global origins: Candomblé, Spiritism/Kardecism, and Umbanda. Candomblé and Umbanda have roots in African traditions and a substantial amount of Afro-Brazilian followers, so they are often lumped together in literature and by government agencies like the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics or the U.S. State Department as “Afro-Brazilian religions” or “Afro-Brazilian cults.” Labeling the religions as “Afro-Brazilian” is a little misleading as both Candomblé and Umbanda also have numerous white followers and followers of mixed or other races (see

³⁴ That is not to say that traditional Pentecostalism has not been associated with intolerance against Afro-Brazilian religions. Here I am generalizing descriptions of religious labels to maintain some measure of brevity. The categories are not mutually exclusive, as many of the characteristics listed describe both groups in varying degrees. For a much more thorough discussion and critique on the varied and complex typologies of Pentecostalism and Protestantism more generally, see:

Paul Freston. ““Neo-pentecostalism” in Brazil: Problems of Definition and the Struggle for Hegemony.”

³⁵ There are also discrepancies when it comes to reporting on religious groups. For example, the Pew survey categories are based on survey responses of different Christians in multiple countries around the world, where surveyors labeled respondents at their discretion. Relatedly, Brazilians’ religious identities are fluid – Brazilians tend to switch religions or convert much more often than is standard in the United States, and they may have multiple religious labels for themselves. These complicated uses of labels beseech the issue that religious data is only as reliable as the self-identifications of worshippers, the categories and labels prescribed by researchers, and data provided by churches and religious organizations.

Chapter 2 & Appendix B for racial demographics). But, despite complex and changing racial demographics, the religions maintain a strong connection to black Brazilian identity. I will maintain this label as it is widely used in the academic community.³⁶

Candomblé is a syncretic religion composed of oral traditions with roots in the Yoruba, Fon, and Bantu animist religions that were brought to Brazil by African slaves in the 17th through the 19th centuries. The first official Candomblé temples of worship, which were dedicated to Yoruba gods and goddesses, were established in early nineteenth-century Bahia.³⁷ Slaves incorporated elements of Catholicism into their traditions, largely in order to feign conversion to Catholicism in front of Portuguese masters and observers, so there are many elements of Catholicism in modern Candomblé rituals. Candomblé has one supreme god called Olodumaré,³⁸ but it is also the religion of the *orixás* (“orishas” in English), or ancestral spirit deities. The *orixás* have secondary identities as Catholic saints (for many worshippers, the Catholic saint names are superficial, but for many others, the deities and the saints have conceptually merged into one being). Unlike Catholicism, however, Candomblé is more focused on a relationship with the environment, the community, and the *orixás* than with providing strict guidelines for living a moral life. So there are not rules dictating one’s marriage life or sexual orientation, for example. Perhaps the most controversial element of Candomblé is that many *terreiros*, or temples, still practice animal sacrifice using

³⁶ I am not, however, inclined to use term ‘cult’ because I suspect that it stems from a historic tendency to de-legitimize Afro-Brazilian religions by labeling them as something other than religion (‘superstition’ and ‘witchcraft’ also fall into this trap).

³⁷ Robert A Voeks. *Sacred Leaves of Candomblé: African Magic, Medicine, and Religion in Brazil* (University of Texas Press, 1997), 51.

³⁸ Here, ‘god’ is not capitalized because Brazilians call Olodumaré an *orixá* (a word meaning a god or deity that is not usually capitalized) or they call him by his name. He is not called ‘Deus’ (meaning ‘God’) in the same way that the monotheistic God of Christianity is called ‘Deus.’

domesticated animals like chickens, where the blood and entrails are offered to the gods and the rest of the animal can be cooked to eat. It should be noted that Candomblé is also referred to pejoratively as Macumba, which does not have an English translation but has an association with devil-worship. Strangely, while this term has largely been used to demonize Candomblecistas, it has also been embraced or accepted by some Brazilian anthropologists as synonymous with Candomblé, so the term often comes up in research on the subject.³⁹

Spiritism (*espiritismo*), was not created in Brazil in the same way as Candomblé, but it has certainly been molded there. Also called Kardecism (*Kardecismo*) because it was developed by a French man who adopted the last name Kardec, Spiritism draws on reincarnation but also on Christianity. Spiritists emphasize God as the principle of everything and believe that God presides over a material world and a spirit world. Spirits can come and go as they please through these worlds, and humans can communicate with them through a medium. Spiritism is still largely practiced in Brazil, but additionally, much of its modern realization is through its influences on Umbanda, as Brazilian Spiritists founded Umbanda. Spiritism is also a bit less “Afro-Brazilian” than Candomblé and Umbanda, as its European origins made it more popular with whites upon its introduction to Brazil in the 19th century.⁴⁰

³⁹ In this section I give a generalized description of Candomblé (and also later of Umbanda). For more on the rich history of its origins, creation and spread throughout Brazil, as well as modern variants (the term Candomblé refers to the mainstream version of the religion which derives most of its influence from Yoruba traditions, but there are still branches that take on different names and maintain traditions from different regions in Africa), see:

Nei Lopez. “African Religions in Brazil, Negotiation, and Resistance: A Look from Within.” *Journal of Black Studies* 34.6 (2004). Sage Publications, Inc.: 838–60.

⁴⁰ It is interesting to note that we hear little or nothing about Spiritism or Kardecism, which originated in Europe, in the United States. Based on my knowledge of Brazilian and American culture and history, I wonder if this might be correlated with the fact that Brazilian culture has a legacy of embracing magic and mysticism much more than American culture.

Nonetheless, modern variants of Spiritism are encompassed by the “Afro-Brazilian religions” label when used by Brazilian media and academic sources.

Umbanda shares many similarities with Candomblé and it is often considered Candomblé’s indigenous counterpart. It was founded in the early 1920’s and 30’s and is basically a mixture of Candomblé, Spiritism/Kardecism, and indigenous Brazilian beliefs and practices, including emphasis on worshipping and communicating with animal spirits.⁴¹ Umbanda was founded by Spiritists who sought out Afro-Brazilian rituals in order to add excitement and emotion to their practices, so they drew on elements of Candomblé. This is sometimes referred to as the ‘blackening’ of Kardecism.⁴² Later, indigenous spirits called *Caboclos*⁴³ were incorporated into ceremonies. Thus, Umbanda became a religion of all three of Brazil’s dominant or largest races – whites, blacks, and indigenous peoples. Like Candomblé and Spiritism, Umbanda rituals include conversing with the dead, although the religion does not emphasize spirit possession in the same way that Candomblé does. Umbanda also places a greater emphasis on medicine and healing. Modernly, there are sects of Umbanda that tend to minimize African traditions and are mostly adhered to by white practitioners, and there are sects that embrace African traditions and tend to have more black practitioners.

III. A Historical Legacy of Persecution

⁴¹ Steven Engler. "Umbanda and Hybridity." *Numen* 56.5 (2009), 555.

⁴² *Ibid*, 557.

⁴³ Unlike ‘orixá,’ ‘Caboclo’ is usually capitalized in Brazilian literature, perhaps because it is a name for a specific group of spirits – the spirits of indigenous peoples.

The history of the Afro-Brazilian religions, particularly of Candomblé, cannot be untangled from the history of race relations in Brazil. Traditionally, persecution against Afro-Brazilian religions has been tantamount to racism. African traditions have been mistreated since the first African slaves arrived in Brazil and were forced to convert to Catholicism, the official religion of the Brazilian colony under the Portuguese. This persecution led to the creation of syncretic religions like Candomblé (African slaves masked their traditions under Catholic ones to remain undetected). Many scholars of Afro-Brazilian history attribute the historical oppression of black roots to the slave masters' fear of slave rebellions and insurrections, and later to fear of the diminution of the slave masters' status and privilege.⁴⁴

The Portuguese monarchy in Brazil abolished the slave trade in 1850, although the legality of owning slaves was maintained into the 1870s and 1880s. As more and more Africans and Afro-Brazilians were 'freed,' no allowance was made for projects to absorb this labor force or compensate them. Many died outside the properties of their former masters, as there was no shelter for them in the cities. The result of the "cautious and unsympathetic liberation" was that uneducated ex-slaves were thrown into competition with immigrant labor flowing into Brazil from the 1970's onward.⁴⁵ When Princess Isabel finally abolished slavery in 1888 (note how late this date is in comparison with the rest of the New World), abolition was not the culmination of a struggle for liberty but rather a slow and procedural process

⁴⁴ The oppression of black roots and related creation of syncretic religions in Brazil parallels the creation of voodoo in the Caribbean and the United States and related African syncretic religions throughout the New World.

⁴⁵ Lilia Moritz Schwarcz. "Not Black, Not White: Just the Opposite. Culture, Race and National Identity in Brazil." *Center for Brazilian Studies* (2003): 7. University of Oxford. Web. 14 Jan. 2016.

enacted by the government, resulting in a sort of “passivity and resignation” regarding black disadvantage.⁴⁶

Throughout this time period and particularly toward the end of the nineteenth century, white Brazilian intellectuals increasingly found inspiration in the prejudicial ideas of naturalists like French novelist Joseph Arthur, Comte de Gobineau. Gobineau’s book, *An Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races* (1853), is often considered the first example of scientific racism, and it convinced many whites that their race was inherently biologically superior to blacks. Gobineau reprovved of biological and cultural crossbreeding, mixed customs, and adulterated religions. In his legacy, Brazilian scientists began supporting phrenology, physicians proposed eugenics and condemned mixed marriages, and lawyers pushed to restrict Africans from migrating into the country and even suggested a separate penal code for blacks.⁴⁷ Blacks were seen as subhuman second-class citizens by many. Relatedly, any religious beliefs associated with slaves, and thus with African roots and blackness, were persecuted socially and legally.

Afro-Brazilian studies scholar Nei Lopes outlines how this persecution played out against Candomblé in the former federal capital of Rio de Janeiro. Lopes explains that as the twentieth century dawned, a series of "civilizing" campaigns were unleashed in the former capital to address the urgent imperative of hygiene:

Religious practices of African origin were considered pollutant and antihygienic and were harshly repressed, repeating what had happened in 1829, when the Accu Candomble [a terreiro] was violently overrun by police repression. There was invasion and confiscation of liturgical objects and other property. The population rejected this incident legally by making representation to the provincial government. In 1927, a police commission was created in Rio

⁴⁶ Ibid, 9.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 10.

de Janeiro to repress what was called "low spiritism." In 1934, repression was intensified with a special police precinct for that issue. And in 1937, within this precinct, a Department of Drugs and Mystifications was created specifically to combat religious practices considered criminal. It was in response to these actions that, in 1934 and 1937, Afro-Brazilian Congresses were held in Recife and Salvador.⁴⁸

During this time, the inauguration of Brazilian President/dictator Getulio Vargas sparked a long-overdue reduction in the legal persecution of Afro-Brazilian religions. With encouragement from outspoken Candomblé leaders and the Afro-Brazilian Congresses, Vargas decriminalized African religions with Presidential Decree No. 1202 in 1938.⁴⁹ However, he also re-imposed Catholicism as the official religion of the country.

In this same era came a change in the way that Brazilians conceptualized miscegenation. Brazilian Anthropology Professor Lilia Schwarcz explains, "Only in the 1930s does miscegenation transform itself from being Brazil's supreme disgrace into being its sublime defining characteristic."⁵⁰ Schwarcz refers primarily to a classic book written by Brazilian author Gilberto Freyre as a key catalyst for this change. Freyre's famous piece *Casa-Grande e Senzala* (or *Slave Masters and Slaves*) painted an idealized portrait of Brazilian slavery, one of paternalistic masters and faithful slaves. For Freyre, the Portuguese were tolerant and capable of syncretizing cultures, and cross-breeding was an acceptable model of civilization. Brazilian history was a history of sexual intercourse of the three formative cultures that produced cultural enrichment and racial harmony.

This rhetoric slowly worked its way into mainstream culture and politics. The national identity of Brazilians became tied to mixed-race, Samba, Capoeira, and other

⁴⁸ Lopez. "African Religions in Brazil."

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Schwarcz, "Not Black, Not White," 12.

symbols of Africanness and miscegenation. The creation and spread of Umbanda in the 1920s and 1930s marked another symbolic mixing of Brazil's three seminal cultures, as European Spiritism mixed with Candomblé and indigenous traditions. Afro-Brazilian religions were adopted by small but significant groups of whites, and religious demographics became increasingly diverse.

Freyre laid the groundwork for what would later come to be known as Brazil's "myth of racial democracy," a myth that is still maintained today. This was cemented in the 1950s, when, based on the fact that Brazil had no open racial conflicts, a couple of UNESCO-sponsored studies painted Brazil as a racially-harmonious model for other societies to follow.⁵¹ Brazilians began to see racism as a thing of the past, if it had every truly existed at all. For followers of Freyre, racial discrimination was mild and largely irrelevant, and discrimination within the Brazilian social hierarchy was targeted at class, rather than race.⁵² Many citizens began to argue that racial distinctions had faded because national identity was tied to mixed-race. Supposedly everyone could be harmoniously encompassed under the mixed-race category.

But while the official depiction of race relations and national identity had changed drastically from the nineteenth century, inequality and prejudice prevailed on the ground. Schwarcz writes:

The Brazilian tendency would be to continue to discriminate, despite considering such an attitude outrageous for the sufferer and degrading for the practitioner... It is as if the Brazilians repeated the past in the present, but

⁵¹ While at present many Brazilians still feel that a lack of open conflicts or segregation laws means that Brazil has always had less racism than the United States, many scholars alternatively argue that precisely because there were no open racial conflicts, Brazilian society never really dealt with its racism (supposedly in contrast with the Jim Crow era in the U.S. and the subsequent Civil Rights Movement).

⁵² Edward E Telles. *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil* (Princeton University Press, 2014), 7.

translated it into the private sphere. The abolition of slavery, with rights under law and the right to work becoming universal, was not to affect the traditional pattern of racial accommodation; on the contrary, it would serve only to camouflage it.⁵³

Substantial work has been done on modern race relations in Brazil, and the general position in the academic community is that the myth of racial democracy is still a myth. Sociologist Edward Telles dispels the myth in his work *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil*, in which he examines modern racial miscegenation and inequality. He shows that high rates of racial intermarriage and residential proximity do not actually translate into the full inclusion of blacks into Brazilian economic and political life.⁵⁴ In fact, Afro-Brazilians are disproportionately poorer and face “a discriminatory glass ceiling,” where upward mobility is concerned.⁵⁵ And, Telles explains, social development, including education and quality of healthcare, coincides with racial composition, where the racially darker Northeast has poorer development than the predominantly white Southeast.⁵⁶ Citing Telles’ and other influential works, John Burdick states, “In Brazil, in general, the lighter one’s skin and the straighter one’s hair, the higher one’s status ; the darker one’s skin and the more tightly curled one’s hair, the lower one’s status.”⁵⁷ Despite these issues affecting everyday realities on the ground, Brazilian culture still embraces the sentiment of equality. The mulatto remains a quintessential symbol of national identity, and miscegenation remains a popular ideology.

⁵³ Ibid, 18.

⁵⁴ Melissa Nobles. Review of *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil*. American Journal of Sociology 110 (6). University of Chicago Press (2005), 1805–7. doi:10.1086/432381.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 1806.

⁵⁶ Telles, *Race in Another America*, 20.

⁵⁷ John Burdick. "Why is the Black Evangelical Movement Growing in Brazil?." Journal of Latin American Studies 37, no. 02 (2005), 311.

Currently, many of the Afro-Brazilian activist groups engaging problems of racial inequalities and practices are religious. Relatedly, the black consciousness movement affirms ethnic and racial identity based on African-derived religions such as Candomblé.⁵⁸ This will be described further in Chapter 2 when I explore the role of race in modern violence against Afro-Brazilian religions.

IV. Afro-Brazilians Under Attack in Rio

Centuries of violence and intolerance against African-derived religions transitioned into a few decades of relative tolerance beginning in the late-twentieth-century. Apart from modern issues surrounding neo-Pentecostalism, Patricia Birman and David Lehmann describe Brazil as “a country noted for religious tolerance, for a history of multiple and multi-levelled symbolic and political exchanges between different religious traditions, Catholic, ‘African’ and indigenous.”⁵⁹ This description glosses over the violence and institutionalized intolerance that were directed toward Afro-Brazilian practices in the past, but it more or less describes Brazil at the end of the 20th century. And as the Catholic Church in Brazil grows increasingly progressive, many see it as relatively harmless to Afro-Brazilian religions. The 1988 Brazilian Constitution guarantees religious freedom to all religious groups and the Brazilian government has continued promoting tolerance since then.⁶⁰ In July of 2015, the Racial Equality Act was signed into law and for the first time explicitly provides

⁵⁸ Stephen L. Selka. “Ethnoreligious Identity Politics in Bahia, Brazil”. *Latin American Perspectives* 32 (1). Sage Publications, Inc. (2005): 72.

⁵⁹ Birman and Lehmann. “Religion and the Media in a Battle,” 1.

⁶⁰ An annotated English translation of the Brazilian Constitution can be found at: Comparative Constitutions Project. *Brazil's Constitution of 1988 with Amendments through 2014*. *Constitute*. University of Texas, Austin, 28 Sept. 2015. Web. 16 Feb. 2016.

for the right to practice religions of African origin.⁶¹ Additionally, members of religions of African origin are granted access to religious professionals in hospitals, prisons, and other institutions.⁶²

That violence and intolerance have increased again, along with a decline in Catholicism and a steep rise in the popularity of Pentecostalism, threatens to undo the commendable progress that has been made in the realm of religious tolerance. Hundreds of attacks on the Afro-Brazilian religious community have occurred in Brazil in recent years, sometimes anonymous, but often directly linked to evangelicals. This specifically connects to neo-Pentecostals; Vagner Gonçalves da Silva cites examples of neo-Pentecostal “armies of Christ” being urged to take to the streets and disrupt Afro-Brazilian rituals or to try to close down terreiros.⁶³ Other tactics range from propaganda blitzkriegs launched on blogs and YouTube videos to threats, violence and expulsions from drug gangs. Rio de Janeiro seems to be one of a few epicenters of this violence.

For example, a Candomblé center north of Rio de Janeiro run by priestess Maria de Conceição, 53, has been attacked eight times in recent years. In June of 2014, the center’s upper floor was set on fire and destroyed. Previously, attackers fired shots at her terreiro and her nearby house, and set fire to her car.⁶⁴ Similar to Kailane Campos’s situation, no one has been arrested for de Conceição’s attacks, but de Conceição, Brazilian and American media

⁶¹ This is law # 12.228. Note the safeguarding of Afro-Brazilian religion under an act explicitly concerned with racial equality. The government sees the association between African traditions and modern race relations. This is one of many examples to come that portrays the strong ties between race and the Afro-Brazilian religions.

⁶² Michael Anthony. "Brazil." (n.d.): n. pag. *State.gov*. U.S. Department of State. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.

⁶³ Gonçalves da Silva, Neo-Pentecostalism and Afro-Brazilian Religions.

⁶⁴ Phillips, "Afro-Brazilian Religions Struggle."

reporting on the issue, and Rio's Commission to Combat Religious Intolerance (CCIR) all believe that these attacks are committed by evangelicals.

While much of the violence is committed anonymously, extremist evangelical leaders have publically verbalized their passionate disdain for Afro-Brazilian religious traditions, and in some cases this coincides or even leads to worshippers committing violence. "We can't fully explain why religious intolerance is increasing, but one indicator is that some neo-Pentecostal churches have been preaching hatred in the pews and on the Web," said Carlos Alberto de Souza, watchdog for the Department for Policies to Promote Racial Equality.⁶⁵

Evangelical Pastor Tupirani Lores, 48, grew up in central Rio in a family that participated in Afro-Brazilian religions, but he converted to evangelical Christianity in his early 20's. Lores opened his own Generation Jesus Christ church, and he has reportedly said that Afro-religions in Brazil are satanic.⁶⁶ In 2008, four members of his congregation, likely motivated by Lores, entered an Umbanda center in central Rio and smashed statues and idols. In 2009, Lores and Afonso Lobato, one of those involved in the incident, were jailed for 18 days for religious discrimination after attacking Afro-Brazilian and other religions on blogs and videos posted to YouTube. In one video, Lobato said Afro-Brazilian religions were the devil's work and that their leaders were homosexuals (pointing out sexual orientation as another target for evangelical intolerance).⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Lears De Veneta. "Brazil Tries to Combat Religious Intolerance of Minority Faiths - OnFaith." *OnFaith*. N.p., 10 Oct. 2013. Web. 02 Dec. 2015.

⁶⁶ Phillips, "Afro-Brazilian Religions Struggle."

⁶⁷ Ibid.

Last year, Rio prosecutors launched a civil action to require Google to remove seventeen specific videos attacking Afro-Brazilian religions from YouTube. A federal judge ruled against them, writing that Afro-Brazilian religions could not be considered true religions because they lack a written text, a hierarchical structure and a God, basically limiting the definition of religion to monotheistic religion. Unfortunately, intolerance is not limited to the religious or private sphere, but it is also expounded in the public sphere by elected members of the Brazilian government. Ivanir dos Santos, president of Rio's Commission to Combat Religious Intolerance has reportedly stated, "If you turn to the courts, which can be the arbiter of such situations, it can keep this from happening, in order to safeguard the constitution, and that the magistrate ends up expressing an opinion similar to those who preach hatred is unacceptable."⁶⁸ Fortunately, a higher court reversed this ruling, pointedly referring to "religions from the African matrix" and ordering the videos removed. Google is reportedly appealing the ruling in support of free speech.⁶⁹ While this issue is certainly complicated, as freedom of speech laws are invaluable and should not be undermined, Brazil already has laws in place that make public displays of racism and anti-Semitism illegal (including publishing books and videos exhibiting hate speech), so it is inconsistent to struggle with whether or not to ban videos preaching hatred towards Afro-Brazilian religions.⁷⁰

In addition to physical attacks on Afro-Brazilian religions' congregations and property, as well as hate speech spread by religious leaders on the internet, there is also the issue of intimidation and religious intolerance as a means of monitoring populations in poor

⁶⁸ My translation from Portuguese. Quoted from: De Veneta, "Brazil Tries to Combat Religious Intolerance."

⁶⁹ Phillips, "Afro-Brazilian Religions Struggle."

⁷⁰ Anthony, "Brazil." U.S. Department of State.

areas. Evangelical Christianity is becoming increasingly popular in *favelas*, or Brazilian slums, and evangelical churches have even spread faster in favelas than in other areas. This is often viewed positively, as the evangelical churches provide moral guidelines for favela-dwellers, discouraging drug use and violence, and offering community resources. However, these churches tend to look negatively upon Afro-Brazilian religions. At times, the church leaders themselves speak out against Candomblé and Umbanda, but it is more often the overlords of the favelas (drug traffickers) that forbid the practice of Afro-Brazilian religions with the threat of violence against those who disobey. It is necessary to point out that Brazilian slums are disproportionately inhabited by black and mixed-race Brazilians, and Afro-Brazilian religions have traditionally found favelas to be safe havens at times when the rest of society was much less accepting. Adailton Moreira, a *pai do santo* (father of saint, or priest) and a member of Rio's Commission to Combat Religious Intolerance, said Candomblé priests and centers have been expelled from many Rio favelas by drug gangs influenced by radical evangelical Christians, whose churches have proliferated in these areas. Moreira commented, "Racism is intrinsically holding hands with religious intolerance."⁷¹

Moreira's comment brings us back to the question of race. What actually explains the increasing persecution of Afro-Brazilian religions? What role does race play in this tension? As I will argue in Chapter 2, race is an important factor in these conflicts, and unfortunately, it is often overlooked or dismissed.

V. Organization of Chapters

⁷¹ Ibid.

Chapter 1 of this thesis will set up the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God as a case study for Pentecostal extremism and intolerance. I will discuss the ways in which Pentecostals are being accused of attacking Afro-Brazilian religions before introducing the Universal Church as a prime example of the accused. I will demonstrate the way that church leadership has used the public sphere to demonize Afro-Brazilian religions. I will detail my research in Rio de Janeiro with specific attention to my observations and participation in Universal Church sermons and rituals, and I will demonstrate how the Universal Church promotes narratives of war and battle, posing this as a key factor correlated with intolerance. Crucially, I will argue that the Universal Church is one of many groups that has begun to fight for the right to discriminate, positioning itself as the true victim when it is restricted from promoting hate or criticized for doing so. This relatively new dialogue about tolerance turned inside-out poses the attackers as the victims, drawing attention away from those who are truly being persecuted.

The second chapter of this thesis will attempt to explain the motivations behind evangelical and specifically neo-Pentecostal attacks on Afro-Brazilians. Religious competition as well as genuine morality clashes are at play, but racial elements must also be taken into account. The role of race is difficult to pinpoint, as racial demographic statistics are unreliable and the religious groups in question are racially mixed. However, the physical and discursive violence aimed at African traditions and practitioners of these traditions very much resemble the historical racism that Afro-Brazilians have experienced since their forced immigration to Brazil. I argue that the interpretations that the attacks are racist are not unreasonable and cannot be dismissed. Finally, I will briefly examine some parallel issues of

tension and violence in Africa to show the ways in which Pentecostals have provoked legitimate accusations of racism there as well.

VI. Research Methods

In this project I ask open-ended questions and employ mostly qualitative research methods. All of my data is taken from public events, figures, publications, videos, and statements made on social media. To embark on gathering primary source material, I visited Rio de Janeiro for five weeks in July of 2015. I visited a couple of small, traditional Pentecostal churches in Rio, and I also attended two-hour sermons as an observer and a participant at Universal Church of the Kingdom of God locations in Rio. I visited a three separate UCKG churches in two different neighborhoods – Copacabana and Botafogo – on ten occasions. This is certainly a limited sample, but my descriptions of my experiences in Chapter 1 resonate strongly with outside source descriptions and online videos of UCKG sermons. During my stay in Rio, I also collected local newspapers and attended a public forum for religious freedom, and I use media coverage of the public forum to supplement my description of it in Chapter 1.

Apart from analyzing the events and sources gathered during my research trip, I employ a large amount of media analysis and event description. I also analyze publications from the Brazilian and U.S. governments (including census statistics), and I look at Instagram, Youtube, and Facebook pictures, videos, and comments surrounding Pentecostal attacks on Afro-Brazilian religions and perceptions of the groups involved.

Chapter 1

The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God: A Case Study

The debates around Kailane Campos' and similar attacks, and subsequent marches and rallies speaking out for religious tolerance set the stage for the religious scene in Rio de Janeiro when I arrived in July of 2015. My observations during my five-week-long research trip will inform this chapter, which seeks to describe reactions to violence against Afro-Brazilian traditions in Rio De Janeiro before delving into a detailed discussion on the church most accused of intolerance: the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God.

The UCKG is the center of attention in conversations about evangelical intolerance. It is perhaps guiltier than any other large-scale Pentecostal church of promoting hate, as I will illustrate. It has been militarizing in some ways, and it disguises its intolerance in an enemy/war discourse, with African traditions (along with many other groups) as its target. It is also leading a conversation about what I call "inside-out" tolerance, where Pentecostal groups are argued to be discriminated against for their discrimination. Each of these behaviors contributes to a climate of war and hate directed at African traditions.

1.1 Pentecostalism Accused

Rio de Janeiro's Commission to Combat Religious Intolerance (CCIR) is urging people to take legal action against perpetrators who commit crimes of intolerance. The CCIR has campaigned for religious tolerance (in relation to Afro-Brazilian faiths, but also to other minority groups like Muslims and members of the Bah'ai community) all around the city, leading marches and protests as well as public forums.

One particularly active promoter of public forums is the previously mentioned Marcelo Freixo, who is a Rio state deputy from the Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (Socialism and Liberty Party, or PSOL). In addition to his role as deputy, Freixo is the current president of the Commission for the Defense of Human Rights and Citizenship, housed under the State of Rio's Legislative Assembly. In August of 2015, during my stay in Rio, Freixo's Commission held a public audience for a discussion on religious intolerance and the ways in which it undermines democracy, and approximately 600-700 people attended.¹ During the public audience, politicians, a police chief, religious leaders, and victims like Kailane Campos and her grandmother spoke about the 532 cases of religious intolerance that occurred in the past year, 70% of which involved Afro-Brazilian religions. In response to the climbing cases of religious intolerance, Freixo declared that he would ask the president of the Legislative Assembly to enact a new law to create a delegation to combat racial and intolerance crimes.² Throughout the event there was an overwhelming outcry of support for Afro-Brazilian religions, and some of the leading supporters were devout Christians.

For example, Reverend Lusmarina Campos Garcia, of the Lutheran Church and director of the Christian Church Council of Rio de Janeiro, argued that those who attack victims in the name of Jesus did not understand the true message of the gospels, had not actually studied theology, or had studied a theology based "exclusively on Western values, of

¹ I was able to attend the public audience, but due to the challenges of understanding speakers' Portuguese as a non-native speaker and a member of an audience in a large auditorium-style setting, I am also using internet coverage of the event and the Commission's meeting held immediately afterwards, to support my description. See the following article on Marcelo Freixo's website:

"Comissão De Direitos Humanos Debate Intolerância Religiosa." *Marcelo Freixo Deputado Estadual*. Assembleia Legislativa Do Estado Do Rio De Janeiro, 18 Aug. 2015. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.

² Again, the Brazilian government associates attacks on Afro-Brazilian religions with a need for better racial equality measures.

the proprietary white man, which excluded indigenous peoples, blacks, women, and people of different sexual orientations.”³ In the past, Campos Garcia’s Council of Christian Churches of the State of Rio de Janeiro (CONIC-Rio) has made public its intention to take part in the rebuilding of religious temples that have suffered damage. “We need to have a counter testimony in response to an action as powerful as that destruction. We want to show that those attitudes that are presented as being Christian behavior, do not represent us,” declared Campos.⁴ The Council has become respected as an advocate for racial equality and religious tolerance.

Relatedly, returning to Freixo’s public audience, Pastor Marcos Amaral of the Presbyterian Church argued that it was important to identify the aggressors in part to show society which evangelical factions were responsible for the violence. He explained that the majority of evangelicals did not condone the discrimination, but that the crimes are committed by followers of Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal churches; “televised groups that have power projects, and political and economic interests.”⁵ There has been a large consensus that evangelicals are responsible for increasing religious and other intolerance across Brazil (intolerance towards homosexuals, for example, is a topic for a different research project), but as supported by Amaral’s statement, Brazilians often have Pentecostals in mind more specifically when they place blame on evangelical groups.

³ See f.n. 1.

⁴ Geoffrey Reeson. "Thousands Call for an End to Religious Intolerance in Brazil." *ALC News*. Latin American Caribbean and Communication Agency, 02 Oct. 2014. Web. 03 Dec. 2015.

⁵ *Ibid.*

A prime group that is blamed for promoting intolerance and violence is the hugely controversial Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, which embodies Pastor Amaral's description of a televised church with power projects and political and economic interests.

1.2 The Universal Church: An Overview

The Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus, or the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, is a neo-Pentecostal church network that houses Brazil's third largest Pentecostal congregation.⁶ The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (henceforth UCKG or the Universal Church) has about 8 million Brazilian worshippers, placing world membership totals above 12 million and growing. To demonstrate how saturated Brazilian cities are with UCKG churches, a search for churches in Rio de Janeiro alone yields 760 location results.⁷ Furthermore, the UCKG is in many ways Brazil's most vocal (and controversial) Pentecostal church, which is why it serves as a powerful object of study.

Bishop Edir Macedo, the leader and founder of the UCKG, has built a media empire. In 1990, he purchased Rede Record, a Brazilian television network.⁸ The network is Brazil's second-largest broadcaster, and it remains unclear how Macedo got the money to purchase it, but it is used as a media investment as well as a proselytizing platform. In Brazil alone, the UCKG owns about 23 other TV stations, 71 radio stations, and Brazil's leading gospel record label.⁹ The Church also has a newspaper called *Folha Universal* with a weekly circulation of

⁶ The UCKG is third largest Pentecostal church in Brazil, after the Assemblies of God church and the Christian Congregation of Brazil, respectively.

⁷ See the Church website's location search feature: <http://www.universal.org/locations/busca/rio-de-janeiro,-rio-de-janeiro,-brazil/>

⁸ "#1638, Edir Macedo and Family." *Forbes*. *Forbes Magazine*, n.d. Web. 15 Mar. 2015

⁹ Rowan M Gerety. "Miracles on Demand." *The Revealer*. *The Revealer / NYU*, 22 Mar. 2013. Web. 17 Mar. 2015;

about 2.5 million.¹⁰ The newspaper is free, and church volunteers pass out copies in front of church locations as well as on street corners, so that when I was in Rio de Janeiro for research, I was bombarded by church employees and offered newspaper copies countless times.

In addition to this huge presence in Brazil, the Universal Church has gained considerable influence globally. It has a huge presence in southern Africa, namely Mozambique and Angola (ex-Portuguese colonies like Brazil) as well as South Africa. Religious sociologist and UCKG expert Paul Freston argues:

Although other churches of Asian or Latin American origin have arrived in southern Africa (above all, Brazilian groups in the Lusophone countries), none can rival the UCKG in its numerical growth and impact on public awareness. Indeed, it is possible that no Christian denomination founded in the Third World has ever been exported so successfully and rapidly; only 27 years after its establishment in 1977, it has over a thousand churches in some 80 countries around the world, outside its native Brazil.¹¹

To further illustrate this geographical success, it is remarkable to note that the Universal Church has several media holdings in Africa. In Mozambique alone, it owns Record TV (also known as Miramar TV), which is Mozambique's most popular television station, a newsletter with circulation rivaling the country's leading weeklies, and a network of radio stations. Through all of these platforms it communicates about faith-cures for societal ills, including AIDS, and it advertises government-sponsored large-scale miraculous faith-healing gatherings.¹² While this geographical spread and media presence is representative of many evangelical, Pentecostal, and more specifically neo-Pentecostal

Jeevan Vasagar. "The Exorcists." *The Guardian, World*. The Guardian, 14 Jan. 2001. Web. 18 Mar. 2015.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Paul Freston. "The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God: A Brazilian Church Finds Success in Southern Africa". *Journal of Religion in Africa* 35.1 (2005): 34.

¹² Gerety, "Miracles on Demand."

churches (Pentecostals tend to be huge proselytizers and neo-Pentecostals are often televangelists, which is largely responsible for rapidly growing support and conversions around the world), Edir Macedo and his UCKG bishops have arguably gone above and beyond. Freston explains that the Universal Church sees itself as having a ‘universal’ vocation, “in the 'horizontal' sense of geographical spread as well as in the 'vertical' sense of the penetration of social institutions such as politics and the media.”¹³

Therefore, the actions of the Universal Church directly refute the secularization thesis, or at least the prong of the thesis that predicted the privatization of religion. The UCKG is a prime example of the way that religion is increasingly entering the realm of the public sphere in extreme ways with extreme success.

1.3 Bishop Macedo Spreads Hate-Speech

The significance of Edir Macedo’s extensive media holdings is that they have the potential to shape public opinion, promote political ideologies, and foster great intolerance. Macedo not only uses the public sphere to ask for donations, entertain loyal fans, speak the gospel, and televise himself speaking in tongues, but he also promotes Pentecostal morality to an extreme degree, demonizing groups that he sees as sinful. He has made a rather loud fuss about condemning Afro-Brazilian religions in televised sermons and in writing.

Vagner Gonçalves da Silva, of the University of São Paulo, classifies neo-Pentecostal attacks on Afro-Brazilian religions into six categories, and the first category is “attacks made within the space of neo-Pentecostal church services and through their channels of divulgation

¹³ Freston, “The Universal Church...Finds Success,” 37.

and proselytism.”¹⁴ This behavior, which I have already begun to discuss in the introduction, is particularly connected to the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God. Gonçalves da Silva explains that inside neo-Pentecostal churches, sessions are frequently held to exorcise demonic entities associated with Afro-Brazilian religions. The UCKG, which emphasizes exorcism to an uncharacteristic degree, calls these spirit extractions ‘unloading’ demonic entities. The exorcism process is blatantly offensive in that it takes Afro-Brazilian deities, sometimes specific deities held in high regard by the Afro-Brazilian religious community, and turns them into demons. But beneath the surface there are further and even more meaningful issues of disrespect. Candomblecistas and Umbandanistas view spirits as both possessing and being possessed by a person, being incorporated (almost literally) into that person. The Universal Church characterizes these entities as independently mobile spirits untied to any specific people, capable of targeting anyone they wish.¹⁵ From the point of view of Afro-Brazilian religious practitioners, the Church has stolen or appropriated their system, and perhaps more importantly, it has distorted their sacred beliefs.¹⁶

From the pulpits, this intolerance and notions of exorcism are extended to the media. Exorcism is recorded and televised, as-is in some cases, and it is dramatized for T.V. series in others. Gonçalves da Silva describes such demonizing *telenovelas* (soap operas) and other

¹⁴ Vagner Gonçalves da Silva. Neo-Pentecostalism and Afro-Brazilian Religions: Explaining the Attacks on Symbols of the African Religious Heritage in Contemporary Brazil. *Mana*, Rio de Janeiro, vol. 3, Selected Edition, 2007. Web, March 05, 2016.

¹⁵ Patricia Birman and David Lehmann. "Religion and the Media in a Battle for Ideological Hegemony: the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God and TV Globo in Brazil." (*Bulletin of Latin American Research* 18.2, 1999, 145-164), 9.

¹⁶ This description demonstrates some of the ways in which the Universal Church incorporates magic into its services. It employs some of the very elements of African-derived religions that it hates in order to express hate against them. Neo-Pentecostal churches have been described as embracing and reappropriating Africanness by numerous authors. Gonçalves da Silva discusses this in: Neo-Pentecostalism and Afro-Brazilian Religions.

religious television programs (e.g. *Fala que eu te escuto*, *Ponto de luz*, *Pare de sofrer*, *Show da fé* etc.) transmitted by Edir Macedo's Rede Record network and by other TV networks with time slots bought by neo-Pentecostal churches. He characterizes these programs as follows:

Many of these programs show reconstructions of "real cases" or dramatizations in which symbols and elements from Afro-Brazilian religions are depicted as spiritual means for obtaining malefic results only: the death of enemies, the spread of disease, the separation of couples or love tangles, family disagreements, etc. Such programs also commonly include testimonies of conversion from people claiming to be past frequenters of terreiros, who are interviewed by the pastor and 'confess' the harm they inflicted with the help of Afro-Brazilian entities (referred to as encostos, 'props,' 'supports'). The most heavily exploited testimonies are from those claiming to be former priests of Afro-Brazilian religions, called ex-pais-de-encosto, 'ex-prop-fathers,' who explain in detail how they made despachos [ritual offerings] and the malevolent intentions behind them.¹⁷

This religious use of television networks and telenovelas in particular have concerned the intellectual left, who have denounced telenovelas in general for their "narcotic effect on the political consciousness of the Brazilian masses."¹⁸ The portrayal of hate against African traditions conveyed through dramatic, extravagant soap operas has the potential to contribute to rising violence or at least intolerance against these groups on the ground.

In addition to the prejudicial broadcasts on his television network, Macedo also uses written work to demonize Afro-Brazilian religions. He published a book called *Orixás, Caboclos e Guias, Deuses ou Demônios?* whose title asks whether Afro-Brazilian deities (gods and goddesses and spirit guides of Afro-Brazilian religions) are actually gods or are demons instead. The book, which sold more than three million copies from 1997 to 2005,

¹⁷ Gonçalves da Silva, "Neo-Pentecostalism and Afro-Brazilian Religions."

¹⁸ Birman and Lehmann, "Religion and the Media in a Battle,"6.

says that religious syncretism is “a curious and diabolical mix of African and Brazilian indigenous mythology, spiritism and Christianity, which created or favored the development of fetishistic cults like Umbanda, Quimbanda, and Candomblé.”¹⁹ In 2005, two plaintiffs launched a civil case against Macedo in Salvador da Bahia, calling the book “degrading, vituperative, prejudiced, and discriminatory” in relation to Afro-Brazilian religions.²⁰ The judge, Nair Cristina de Castro, suspended sales of the book based on the notion that it was, in essence, hate speech. Cristina de Castro stated that the ideas put forth in the book were abusive to the fundamental rights of adherents to Afro-Brazilian religions but also to society in general who has the right to live peacefully in the face of diversity.²¹ Despite the initial ban, the book was later liberated due to freedom of speech laws. It is still sold on the church’s website blog, where the following sales pitch written by Macedo can be found:

I believe it to be impossible for a practitioner of Spiritism to read this book and continue in his practice. I believe it also to be difficult for a Christian to read this book and continue to profess careless and stagnant faith. All of the areas of demonism are exposed and discovered in this book: all of the tricks and deceit used by the devil and his angels to elude humanity are revealed. The reader will be enlightened about the origin of illness, disputes, addictions and all of the ills that plague society.²²

The descriptions of intolerance and hate speech above set Afro-Brazilian religious deities and practices up as responsible for the ills in society. Those who support Afro-Brazilian religions are painted as “them” in an us-versus-them and good-versus-evil scenario.

¹⁹ Agência Folha, comp. "Juíza Suspende Venda De Livro Do Bispo Edir Macedo." *Folha Online*. Folha De S.Paulo, 10 Nov. 2005. Web. 26 Nov. 2015

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² My own translation from Portuguese to English. Taken from: Bishop Edir Macedo. "Re: Orixás, Caboclos E Guias, Deuses Ou Demônios?" Web log comment. 18 May 2012. Web. 29 Nov. 2015

Notwithstanding the colossal intolerance promoted by Macedo, he is an immensely popular public figure. His autobiography *Nada a Perder (Nothing to Lose)*, which is a trilogy, can be found in just about any bookstore in Rio (in fact, every one of the dozen or so bookstores I visited in Copacabana, Botofogo, Flamengo, and downtown Rio had it on display in the window or near the ‘religion’ section). On the Church website it is stated that Macedo has sold more than 10 million books, divided into more than 30 titles.²³ This combined with the inconceivably extensive media presence described previously demonstrates that Macedo’s ideas reach millions and millions worldwide, so it is rather frightening to ponder how many have been swayed by his condemnations of African traditions and Afro-Brazilian religions (and other vulnerable minorities).

1.4 An Outsider’s Experience with the Fervent

Even with all of my prior research on the Universal Church and my understanding of the blind faith that characterizes many Pentecostal congregations, attending UCKG sermons in person was an astonishing experience.²⁴ The churches I visited house about three hundred people at a time and offer services three or four times a day, every single day (though larger Universal Church sites house thousands of people, and the Temple of Solomon megachurch headquarters in São Paulo has a seating capacity of over 10,000). True to Pentecostal character, especially regarding neo-Pentecostalism, UCKG services are extremely lively with constant music, singing, dancing, and shouting. In these relatively smaller churches that I

²³ "Who Is Bishop Macedo." *Universal*. The Universal Church, n.d. Web. 26 Nov. 2015.

²⁴ The descriptions of Universal Church services that are to follow are based on my own observations during my five-week stay in Rio de Janeiro. My church and sermon samples are certainly limited, but my descriptions seem to be representative of average UCKG services as there are countless descriptions of similar services held by the Universal Church all around the world with the same features. See the work of Paul Freston for corroboration on the description of UCKG sermons.

visited, the pastors sing on a microphone for about two thirds of the two-hour services. They talk loudly over organ and CD music for the other third of the time. Adherents are encouraged to stand, sway, and wave their hands the entire time, and they are also occasionally asked to join hands with those around them. I felt completely out of place sitting down for more than a couple of minutes, so I took on the role of a faithful worshipper and stood with my hands in the air or nervously clasped in my neighbors' throughout most of my visits.

Much of the pastor's sermon discusses bible verses touching on morality, family values, and faith healing. After every couple of sentences uttered by the pastor, someone from the audience shouts "*meu deus!*" meaning "my god!" (an equivalent of amen). There is an almost tangible element of devotion and complete submission in the air throughout the service, which is augmented by the low lighting, the loud volume of the microphone, the constant background music, and the singing and shouting. This air of devotion is particularly perceptible during communion, when the worshippers line up on both sides of the church to receive a small cup of grape juice and a wafer, and also during faith-healing rituals. There are two methods of faith-healing: church employees heal individual worshippers who walk in two single-file lines up to the stage and receive a blessing and holy oils on their foreheads, or the pastor mass faith-heals the entire congregation by having everyone drink from water bottles (that they themselves have brought from home) that he has collectively blessed, from the stage, all in one fell-swoop.²⁵ As an outsider, the rituals felt shockingly economical. By

²⁵ I had a moral dilemma when deciding whether to participate in faith-healing. Was I to be the only one of hundreds to sit out while worshippers rushed to the front of the church to receive the blessings of the pastor, or was I to be an imposter in line, taking part in an important ritual in which I did not believe? I decided to err on the side of blending in, and mimicked those around me even when it came to 'be healed.'

the end of the service, when it is time to kneel on the ground with one's head on her chair, the majority of adherents are crying and mumbling their prayers to God, often almost in a trance-like state. Many of the mumbles are unintelligible, although I did not personally witness any organized glossalia, or speaking in tongues. All the while, collection envelopes circulate around the room and church volunteers nudge worshippers to donate. The pastor ends the service with several minutes' shouting about a need for the congregation to donate as much as they can. As a visitor uninterested in donating, the most discomfort I experienced was at the end of each service when I tried to avoid the collection envelopes and the volunteers' stares.²⁶

One of the many important observations to take away from this depiction above is the adoration the worshippers hold for their pastor. As someone unfamiliar with such religiosity, the unfettered devotion of the congregation was a bit disconcerting to me.²⁷ Somewhat to my surprise, I did not hear any condemnations of different faiths when I attended Universal Church services. However, during every single service I attended (hearing four different pastors' sermons on a couple different occasions each), I observed a powerful rhetoric discussing a sort of cosmic war. The words '*guerra*,' '*batalha*,' and '*luta*' (meaning war, battle, and fight respectively) were uttered countless times, always in the context that Pentecostal worshippers need to fight outside forces (those opposed to Pentecostalism, and

²⁶ The UCKG is more effective than most churches in collecting tithes. In addition to the aggressive sales pitches from the pulpit that I witnessed, it also tries to commit members to regular weekly donation amounts or salary percentage commitments. For more on these tactics and their effectiveness, see: Birman and Lehmann, "Religion and the Media in a Battle."

²⁷ It is also crucial to recognize that the Universal Church, like countless other Pentecostal churches and churches of different denominations and religions, has done immeasurable good for countless communities. For example, the Church has raised food and money for the poor on a large scale and set up numerous rehabilitation centers for drug addicts in Brazil where there is little to no public funding in this sector. It is not my intent to ignore such positive behaviors, but for the sake of staying on topic, I will mostly concern myself with behaviors relevant to the research questions outlined in the introduction.

evil in general).²⁸ One pastor warned that the devil was going to visit each of the worshippers in the body of someone trying to question their faith, and it was the worshippers' duty to remain faithful. On a couple of occasions, adherents were likened to *soldados*, or soldiers, fighting for the greater good in the face of evil. This rhetoric received several cries of support from the audience, and most of the descriptions were extremely vague, so that the audience was not explicitly told who the enemy was or what actions were justified in fighting against it. Universal Church followers are being taught by the leaders they adore to engage in ambiguous wars with unspecified enemies.

To describe this language, I borrow the term 'cosmic war' from Professor Mark Juergensmeyer of University of California, Santa Barbara. Juergensmeyer writes in numerous works and lectures regularly about the great battle between good and evil, right and wrong, and religion and irreligion that is going on in the minds of the world's most fervent worshippers. He explains that the authority of religion gives worshippers the "moral standing to employ violence," making religious terrorism (and for my purposes violence more generally) difficult to combat because "its enemies have become satanized: one cannot negotiate with them or easily compromise."²⁹

I am not the first to recognize a rhetoric about war used by Pentecostals or specifically the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, as ideas about cosmic wars or holy wars can be found in a variety of official church publications from numerous Pentecostal groups. For example, in his preface to Edir Macedo's *Orixás, Caboclos e Guias, Deuses ou*

²⁹ Mark Juergensmeyer. "Terror in the Name of God," in *Thinking Globally: A Global Studies Reader* (Univ of California Press, 2013), 298.

As the research of Professor Juergensmeyer shows, this rhetoric can be found in many other religions outside of Pentecostalism, including other sects of Christianity, messianic Judaism, and extremist Islam to name a few.

Demônios? Pastor J Cabral writes, “Pastor Macedo has embarked on a true holy war against all of the work of the devil.”³⁰ Using this rhetoric allows the protagonist to use a God-given moral authority to position his opposition as the enemy in a kill-or-be-killed scenario. In the case of the sermons I attended, the enemy was anyone challenging the true faith. In Pastor Cabral’s description in the preface to Macedo’s inflammatory book, the enemy, or the work of the devil, is synonymous with African spirits and traditions. It is not a leap, then, to fear that congregation members are interpreting their enemies to be Afro-Brazilian religious followers.

1.5 The UCKG Builds an Army for God


In support of the rhetoric of the cosmic war, the UCKG has recently formed a group for faithful young men called the Gladiadores do Altar, or Gladiators of the Altar. The Church reportedly formed the group with the declared intention of attracting new pastors, but a video clip of the Gladiators that has been circulating through Brazilian news channels and internet sites has



³⁰ Quoted from Júlio César Tavares Dias. "Religiões Afro-brasileiras No Discurso Da Igreja Universal Do Reino De Deus: A Reinvenção Do Demônio." *Unicap*. (Universidade Católica De Pernambuco, 2012), 68. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.

caused many to question the real motivations behind its formation.³¹ In the clip, hundreds of young men with buzz-cuts and matching uniforms march and chant in unison and shout that they are “ready for battle.”³² Some scholars see this as a marketing campaign to attract young boys from the periphery into the Church, but adherents to Afro-Brazilian faiths are worried enough that they actually sent representatives to the Federal Public Ministry on March 23, 2015 to demand an investigation into possible cases of religious intolerance.³³

Figure 3



Like me, they have noticed that the UCKG condemns Afro-Brazilian religions and that it promotes a language of war, and some are starting to worry that “if the language is of war, then their practice might be as well.”³⁴ Figure 3 is an image of protest that has been circulating around Instagram. On the right side of the picture is a Gladiador do Altar (with the Universal Church symbol on his shirt), and he is stabbing the female Candomblecista on the left. The woman is dressed in typical Candomblé attire and appears to be Afro-Brazilian.

As we see all of these behaviors of the Church start to unfold, it becomes rather clear that the combination of Macedo’s hate speech, his wide and well-receiving audience, the

³¹ A quick youtube search of ‘gladiadores do altar’ provides a couple dozen results linking to the video of the boys marching. For a Brazilian journalist’s description of the event, see: Deutche Welle. ““Exército” Da Universal Preocupa Religiões Afro-brasileiras.” (The article title translates out to “Universal Church’s “army” worries Afro-Brazilian religions.”)

³² The picture of the Gladiadores do Altar on the right was posted on Instagram by Jean Wyllys, a progressive politician from the PSOL party.

³³ Deutche Welle. ““Exército” Da Universal Preocupa Religiões Afro-brasileiras.”

³⁴ Ibid.

Church's rhetoric on war, and the encouragement of young devotees to form a militarized group that is "ready for battle," has the potential to incite intolerance and violence. The UCKG is not entirely or even largely representative of all Pentecostals of course,³⁵ but it is representative of the most fervent and extremist kinds of Pentecostals, which are the ones I am concerned with in this project. With the behaviors discussed above progressing alongside an increase in physical attacks on Candomblecistas and Umbandanistas, it is unsurprising that the historically-marginalized Afro-Brazilian religious community feels persecuted and fearful of the future. This fear has caused many members of the Afro-Brazilian religious community to speak out against evangelicals, Pentecostals, and specifically the Universal Church using images like the one above but also making statements in the media and in courts.

1.6 Intolerance Must Be Tolerated

The UCKG's official position is that the Church itself is the true target of religious intolerance, which has been declared in a handful of publications. In an opinion column in the Brazilian newspaper, *Folha de S. Paulo*, public relations manager and Bishop in the Universal Church Carlos Oliveira argued that the UCKG experiences prejudice from outsiders as a result of demonizing propaganda spread on the internet. He writes, "The absence of a frank and clear discussion pushes the Universal Church, the evangelical denominations, and other minority religions to a circus armed by opportunists that sow prejudice and ignorance against us."³⁶ In Oliveira's eyes, non-Pentecostals are threatened by

³⁵ And in fact on my visits to very small, local congregations of independent churches in Rio I witnessed much less discussion of holy war, for example.

³⁶ Leiliane Lopes. "A Igreja Universal é Vítima De Preconceito, Escreve Bispo." *Gospel Prime RSS*. Gospel Prime, 27 May 2013. Web. 02 Dec. 2015.

the Church because of its rapid expansion and success, putting the Church at the forefront as a victim of intolerance. He does not mention the Universal Church's position on Afro-Brazilian religions or directly refute common accusations made against the Church. I have seen a couple of articles printed in the *Folha Universal* collaborating this sentiment – the UCKG is promoting a narrative that places itself as the victim, where accusing them of intolerance and hate speech is in itself intolerant.

To be fair, there are websites and Facebook pages dedicated to exposing the Church's every misstep and calling for its dissolution, and cartoons like the one above depicting the Gladiador as a murderer are prejudicial. It is also logical that indeed there are many who are threatened by the Church's rapid expansion, particularly where its media empire, political influence, and physical construction of church sites are concerned. Other religions and even other Christian denominations are losing members through conversion to the UCKG.

The rest of the narrative placing the Church as the victim, however, holds little weight. Contrary to what it would have the world believe, the Universal Church is not exorcising spirits and condemning African traditions (and homosexual and other groups) defensively. It uses the public sphere to shape public opinion. It is on the offensive in a campaign to spread hate.

Chapter 2

Motivations for the Intolerance

As demonstrated in previous chapters, intolerance, hate, and violence are on the rise against Afro-Brazilian religions this is correlated to the rise of Pentecostalism. I have established that a Pentecostal rhetoric of war supports or even promotes this hate. A common justification for intolerant behaviors is that it is the religious freedom of Pentecostals to promote intolerance, and that their intolerance must be tolerated. What remains less clear, however, are the motivations behind the spread of hate and violence. Why are leaders of Pentecostal churches (for example, the UCKG's Edir Macedo) spreading hate speech? Why are congregations heavily persuaded by this? What makes Afro-Brazilian religions in particular one of the biggest victims? What role, if any, does race play?

In this chapter, I will examine some of the motivations behind Pentecostals' targeting of Candomblé and Umbanda. Supporting common perceptions of the Brazilian media, I first assert that issues of competition and moral disagreement are at play in these conflicts. Second, I will look at the role of race. While Brazilian race and skin color as well as racial demographics within these religious groups are enormously complex, the use of Candomblé as a symbol of black identity in Brazil necessarily links the religion to blackness. Thus, I argue that attacks on Afro-Brazilian religions cannot be separated out from attacks on Afro-Brazilians. Whether it is a conscious motivator or not, race is one factor in the victimization of Candomblé and Umbanda. Examining instances where Pentecostals in Africa have spread hate against African traditions and ultimately been accused of racism can begin to illuminate

this question. I will describe how the ethnocentrism of the Universal Church in particular, in Africa, links attacks on African religious and other traditions to racial prejudice.

Defining motivations is especially difficult because of a doubt as to whether the groups in question are communicating honestly about their motives and intentions, or whether there are hidden motives. Motives are often expressed in disguised form. It is also difficult to know whether there are motivations the groups themselves are not even conscious of. This is not to mention that the labels of evangelicalism, Pentecostalism, and neo-Pentecostalism are umbrella labels encompassing diverse groups with diverse attitudes towards African traditions and diverse motivations behind their actions. Tracing lines of causation in such matters is notoriously challenging, and I do not claim to do this fully.

2.1 Competition and Moral Condemnation

A general consensus in politics and the media is that a “low-intensity war” is being fought for Brazilian souls.¹ Thus, the interpretation is that the conflicts between Afro-Brazilian religions and evangelicals in general are simply conflicts of competition. Paul Freston, an academic expert on the UCKG, explains that numerical success is highly valued in Brazilian evangelical churches, which is “a plausible motivation for a church that enjoys organizing huge events and whose newspapers are full of photographs showing packed auditoria.”² Regarding the UCKG’s expansion around the globe and especially in Africa, Freston argues that “in the case of a highly proselytistic church, [UCKG] global expansion must have some connection with the romance of fulfilling the classic Christian missionary

¹ Dom Phillips. "Afro-Brazilian Religions Struggle against Evangelical Hostility." *Washington Post*. The Washington Post, 6 Feb. 2015. Web. 02 Dec. 2015.

² Paul Freston. “The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God: A Brazilian Church Finds Success in Southern Africa.” *Journal of Religion in Africa* 35.1 (BRILL, 2005), 33–65.

mandate.”³ Evangelical and specifically Pentecostal churches are actively expanding and recruiting throughout Brazil and globally, and this necessarily means encroaching on territory held by other religions.

Returning to the local level, Pentecostalism advertises to demographics that are traditionally linked to Afro-Brazilian religions. Both groups appeal to uneducated urban and rural poor populations, and this is true for the Universal Church above and beyond other Pentecostal churches. It is reasonable to assert that the religious groups in question see each other as threatening because of their attempts to maintain strong support bases in overlapping demographic groups. Furthermore, Pentecostal groups are invading Afro-Brazilian religions’ territories, as demonstrated in the introduction in the discussion on the evangelical presence in favelas. Rio’s Committee to Combat Religious Intolerance argues that Pentecostal groups demonize Candomblé and Umbanda in order to bolster their own numbers. This all relates back to the value of numerical success, which is also undoubtedly connected to power and money. In addition to providing boasting rights, larger Pentecostal congregations donate larger amounts of Brazilian *reais* through tithing and other means. In the case of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, this means more support for national and global media empires.

There is also an issue of moral disagreement. Author Jeffrey Haynes describes Candomblé as a religion of the body, undertaken with trance, music, and dance, differentiating it from Pentecostalism.⁴ “Candomblé is a festive religion, where notions

³ Ibid.

⁴ Note, though, that Haynes does not address the fact that Pentecostalism is also undertaken through trance, music, and dance, in different ways. Embracing bodily elements, like dance (and especially exorcism) is most

central to Western theology – including, sin, guilt, and expiation – play little or no role.”⁵

Relatedly, many Pentecostals see Afro-Brazilian religions as immoral and link them with homosexuality and overindulgence, depicting these behaviors as satanic. It is reasonable to assert that Pentecostalism probably does not denounce homosexuality for reasons of competition, but instead because it considers homosexuality a sin, and it is possible that a similar thing can be said about Afro-Brazilian traditions more generally.

Another example of an ‘immoral’ practice in the eyes of Pentecostals is the common Candomblé practice of animal sacrifice. Some Candomblecistas still kill chickens by chopping their heads off, after which they offer the blood and guts to the orixás and eat the rest of the meat. While this kind of butchery (sacrificial or not) is a standard practice in many non-Western places throughout the world, it has received much criticism and its legality has been questioned in Brazil (and other places such as the U.S.), especially by Pentecostals. Perhaps part of competing with Afro-Brazilian groups is to genuinely save as many souls as possible and denounce as much ‘evil’ and immorality as possible. So, it may be the case that Afro-Brazilians get condemned for exactly the reasons that Pentecostals give – many Pentecostals may genuinely see them as demonic and sinful, and they are attempting to save people from these influences.

Both hypotheses above are easily supported. Afro-Brazilian religions’ lack of ascetic conduct and their controversial practices are likely enough to provoke denunciation from Pentecostals. It is also important to recognize that most Pentecostal churches accept anyone

characteristic of the UCKG out of any Brazilian Pentecostal church. However, the UCKG characterizes its use of the body as good and Afro-Brazilian religions’ use of the body as evil in a dualistic system.

⁵ Jeffrey Haynes. “African Diaspora Religions.” In Juergensmeyer, Mark, ed. *Thinking Globally: A Global Studies Reader*, 63-68 (Univ of California Press, 2014), 65.

who wishes to join, in a sort of condemn-the-sin-not-the-sinner mindset, helping to support a notion of competition through growing congregations. As evangelicals, Pentecostals take up a responsibility to preach the word of God to the unconverted, whoever the unconverted may be. The following excerpt from *Orixás, Caboclos e Guias, Deuses ou Demônios?* written by Edir Macedo supports both the competition and morality arguments from above:

In our church, we have hundreds of *ex-pais-de-santo* and *ex-mães-de-santo* [priests and priestesses respectively], who were deceived by malignant spirits for years. After attending one of our meetings motivated by radio or television programs, or brought by another person that already frequented our services, they were transformed into new creatures.⁶

Macedo encourages conversion (which bolsters numbers and happens to increase revenues for the Church, helping to maintain Macedo's position on Forbes' list of billionaires) and also promotes the saving of persons who have been deceived by demons, elevating Pentecostalism to a morally superior status.

It is undoubtedly the case that competition and morality are both at play in Pentecostal denunciation of minority religions, most likely in different ratios for different persons. Macedo is more likely to be motivated by competition and money than the average worshipper or the anonymous Brazilian who physically attacks someone like Kailane Campos. So, competition is probably more likely to be a factor in the behavior of religious leadership than in the congregation. On the other hand, worshippers at lower levels may more often feel that they are "saving souls" and weeding out sin.

⁶ My translation of an excerpt cited in: Tavares Dias, Júlio César. "Religiões Afro-brasileiras No Discurso Da Igreja Universal Do Reino De Deus: A Reinvenção Do Demônio." *Unicap*. (Universidade Católica De Pernambuco, 2012), 68. Web. 1 Dec. 2015. Excerpt taken from Macedo's *Orixás, Caboclos e Guias, Deuses ou Demônios*, p 17.

2.2 The Race Factor

However, there is the other common interpretation that intolerance against Afro-Brazilian religious groups is motivated by racism as much or more than competition or moral prejudice. The question of race cannot be overlooked, especially if many from the Afro-Brazilian religious community hold the perception that they are victims of a legacy of historical racism that continues today. Furthermore, as Pentecostal numbers grow rapidly (specifically through neo-Pentecostal global networks), it is crucial to investigate whether there is something about the religious sect itself that fosters racial disharmony.

It is quite difficult, though, to pinpoint the role of race and racism in the violence committed by Pentecostals against Afro-Brazilian religions in part because, unlike in past centuries, the attackers do not expound racial motivations. Furthermore, the histories, demographic traits, and the relationship between race and religious identity for the groups involved are enormously complex. The situation is, quite literally, not black and white.

Religio-Racial Demographics

Based on the 2010 Brazilian census, I constructed a table to demonstrate racial demographics within religious categories, which can be found in Appendix B. My findings were that out of over 25 million Brazilians listed under “Evangelicals of Pentecostal Origin,” about 41% of them consider themselves “white,” 49% are “brown,” and less than 9% are “black.” Out of over 407k Umbandanistas in the census, about 54% are white, 27% are brown, and 17% are black, and out of over 167k Candomblecistas, about 30% are white, nearly 40% are brown, and nearly 30% are black. While Pentecostalism has a much larger

proportion of whites than Candomblé and also holds the smallest proportion of blacks, the numbers demonstrate that none of these groups is racially uniform.

To further complicate the picture, it is important to note that these racial categorizations are self-reported – the Brazilian census office asks people “What is your race or color?” and offers respondents a choice between *branco* (white), *pardo* (brown), *preto* (black), *amarelo* (yellow), and *indigena* (indigenous).⁷ Respondents subjectively label themselves, and the labels offered are a bit of an oversimplification when compared to the way that Brazilians usually conceptualize race or color. When the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) took a similar national census in 1976, the question asking Brazilians to describe their own skin color was open-ended, and it famously yielded 136 results.⁸ The results included colors like *alvinha* (snowy white), *azul* (blue), *acastanhada* (somewhat chestnut-colored) *café com leite* (café au lait, or coffee with milk), *pouco-clara* (not very light), *pretinha* (black, with a diminutive meaning young or small), etc.⁹ None of the respondents listed *preto* (without the diminutive) as their skin color, although one of the categories was *negra* (also meaning black). The government most likely continued offering the five color options in their later surveys as a response to this multifarious mess of results, but their five options are not quite in line with popular discourse.

Admittedly, Edward Telles explains that roughly 95% of the respondents in the 1976 survey stuck to 6 relatively basic colors generally overlapping with the ones given in today’s

⁷ Luisa Farah Schwartzman. “Does Money Whiten? Intergenerational Changes in Racial Classification in Brazil”. *American Sociological Review* 72.6 (2007): 941. Web.

⁸ Associated Press. "136 Variations of Brazilian Skin Colors." *USA Today*. Gannett, 08 July 2014. Web. 01 Feb. 2016.

⁹ Ibid. Translations of the skin colors originally published on the website “Africa is a Country” by Lilia Moritz Schwarcz of the University of Sao Paulo.

census, along with *moreno*, which I will return to below.¹⁰ Despite this clustering around 6 terms for the official survey, though, few scholars would describe the list of color labels in the Brazilian imaginary as numerically limited. Race in popular Brazilian discourse, at the grass-roots level, is indeed conceptualized using dozens of personalized skin color labels, most often referring to some shade of brown or another. Professor Henry Louis Gates Jr., of PBS, argues that “racial categories are on steroids” and explains that “color [in Brazil] is in the eye of the beholder.”¹¹ When Gates, who is an African-American, asks four Brazilians off the street to describe his skin color, they each give a different label for the same color: *moreno* (brown), *caboclo* (indigenous), *mulatto* (mixed), *cafuzo* (a mixture of African and Amerindian ancestry), and *negro*.¹² He also asks a group of men with varying dark skin color shades how they identify themselves, and they all initially self-identify as *negro*. But when Gates points out that their tones differ quite a bit, they each list unique secondary labels distinguishing themselves from each other (e.g. *moreno-oscuro* or dark brown, versus *moreno-claro*, or light brown).¹³ Sometimes Brazilians may stick to general categories, similar to the ones used on the census, and other times they may branch off into specific color labels. This use of diverse labels (Gates insists that there are over 100 of them, and that they are indeed used in everyday exchanges) has become known as Brazil’s color continuum. This continuum allows Brazilians to measure themselves as lighter or darker relative to each other.

¹⁰ Edward E Telles. *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil* (Princeton University Press, 2014), 95.

¹¹ Henry Louis Gates, Jr. “Black in Latin America E02, Brazil: A Racial Paradise,” YouTube video, 3:43, from a PBS series called Black in Latin America, 2011, posted by Bladeboy05, April 15th, 2016.

¹² Ibid, 3:49 : 4:13.

¹³ Ibid, 4:15 : 4:45.

As introduced above, in the open-ended 1976 census and other national surveys, *moreno* has consistently held as one of the most popular labels, even in popular discourse. *Moreno* has never been offered as an option on the census despite being much more popular than its census counterpart, *pardo*. It generally means brown, but ethnographers have found it ambiguous enough to substitute for almost any other color category. It is seen as tied to the racial-democracy ideology by emphasizing a common Brazilianness. Some ethnographers have found that if the census used *moreno* instead of *pardo*, the results would show a smaller white population and a larger non-white population.¹⁴ So, the term for brown offered on the Brazilian census has important implications for the white to non-white ratio in the racial demographic landscape.

But while *moreno* appeals to a universal Brazilian identity, it is criticized for ignoring or diminishing blackness by many black activists. Activists reject *moreno* and seek to diminish ambiguity and destigmatize blackness by embracing the term *negro*. *Negro* was once considered highly offensive and has never been offered as an option by the Brazilian census (despite being listed by respondents on the open-ended survey), but black activists have turned it into a political category asserting ethnic pride.¹⁵ The woman that describes Professor Gates as *negro* proudly declares “I am not a racist” after labeling him.¹⁶ The exchange connotes an element of black solidarity, and it also suggests that perhaps it is acceptable for her to use a term that was tied to racism in the past was specifically because she is not racist. In offering the more politically correct term *preto* and not offering *negro*, the

¹⁴ Telles, *Race in Another America*, 95.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ See f.n. 12.

Brazilian census overlooks or ignores an option that is important to a segment of the black community.

In addition to oversimplifying the ways in which Brazilians conceptualize color, the census also points to the ways in which Brazilians tend to conflate racial origins with color appearance. Even the census survey question “What is your race or color?” poses race and color as one-in-the-same. Unlike in the United States, race in Brazil refers much more to skin color or physical appearance than to ancestry.¹⁷ So observable color functions in Brazil similar to the way that racial heritage functions in the United States. Telles notes one exception to this: even more than preferring the term negro, some black movement leaders prefer “*afrodescendente* [(African-descendent)] because it clearly identifies the descendants of enslaved Africans, which is critical in the reparations (for slavery) movement.”¹⁸ In this unique case there is an emphasis on racial heritage over color. However, this is ignored by most of Brazilian society and by censuses and other surveys, which use colors as racial categories.

With color classification as basically synonymous with racial classification comes a subjective tendency to “whiten.” In the United States, a person with any African ancestry is legally defined as black, but Brazil has no such laws. Brazilians tend to be inclined to label themselves and others as something other than black, regardless of ancestry. The 136 colors listed on the 1976 survey that now make up the color continuum are seen as whitening tools – they are ways to avoid racial classification as black. Telles explains how a large number of Brazilians who label themselves as white have African ancestors, along with countless

¹⁷ Telles, *Race in Another America*, 1.

¹⁸ Telles, *Race in Another America*, 23.

members of the brown and *mestiço* (mixed-race) populations.¹⁹ This conflation of race with color along with the subjective self-reporting of respondents produces biologically inaccurate but sociologically important demographic data favoring whiteness.

In relation to whitening, survey-based research has demonstrated instances of color reclassification. Sociologists have found that “black” or “mulatto” Brazilian families become “whiter” as they move socially upward.²⁰ Researcher Louisa Farah Schwartzman finds that “more-educated nonwhite parents are more likely to marry whites and less likely to marry nonwhites, and more-educated interracial couples label their children white more often than do less-educated interracial couples.”²¹

If socioeconomic status and education levels affect the self-identification and reporting of race, then it is certainly possible that religion does this as well. This begs the question, are Candomblecistas, Umbandanistas, and evangelicals or Pentecostals more likely to identify as one color than another? When a religious person fills out survey questions on race, is there a correlation between his or her religion and the racial color category (s)he selects apart from observable skin color? I wonder if practitioners of Afro-Brazilian religions with dark skin are more likely to identify as preto or negro than Brazilians with comparable skin tones but with negative views of Afro-Brazilian religions? I would not be surprised if the black population of Pentecostals (9%, according the survey) were hugely underrepresented, more so than the Afro-Brazilian religions. This needs further research.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Schwartzman, “Does Money Whiten?” 941.

²¹ Ibid.

Religio-Racial Identity Constructions & Black Activism

Despite the colossal complexity of the sociology behind the racial demographic reporting in Brazil, it is reasonable to describe each of the religious groups in question as racially diverse and encompassing of members from all colors along the continuum. Furthermore, switching the angle to look at how race (or rather color) categories are divided up into religious groups, most Afro-Brazilians are actually Christian (the Afro-Brazilian religions, again, are significant but small minorities). In his article, “What is the Color of the Holy Spirit? Pentecostalism and Black Identity in Brazil,” John Burdick describes how a series of surveys taken in the late 1990s demonstrated that “Brazilians who identify themselves at the dark end of the color continuum are converting to Pentecostal churches over historical Protestant churches at a rate of about three to one.”²² So, Pentecostalism has become the most popular Christian sect for black Brazilians. This reinforces the idea that Pentecostalism and Afro-Brazilian religions appeal to and compete for adherents from overlapping demographics. If Pentecostalism recruits and accepts black Brazilians so zealously, and Brazilians with African heritage support Pentecostal organizations and leaders that provoke violence against Afro-Brazilian religions, racism becomes much too easy to dismiss.

This holds especially true when I recount my experience with the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God. The Universal Church has been accused more than any other of intolerance against Afro-Brazilian religions, and yet the pews at the sermons that I attended were filled with people that fall all along the color continuum (based on my own observation,

²² John Burdick. “What Is the Color of the Holy Spirit? Pentecostalism and Black Identity in Brazil”. *Latin American Research Review* 34.2 (1999). Latin American Studies Association: 109–31.

and again, I wonder how they might label their own skin colors). In fact, in Copacabana in particular, there were very few observably “white” or European-looking followers in the pews – most everyone appeared, at least to my unskilled eye, to have African or other non-white ancestry. The Universal Church has been described by researchers as housing larger percentages of Brazilians with dark skin tones than other Pentecostal churches. Why would blacks support a church that attacks African traditions if not because they genuinely believe the traditions are sinful, regardless and not because of racial identity connections? It seems counter-intuitive to assert that racism is supported by black Pentecostals.

Nonetheless, the surface picture that racism is not involved is much too simplistic. The complex racial demographics of the religious groups in question do not rule out racism, as black racism against other blacks is not unheard of. We know that Afro-Brazilian religions remain strongly associated with blackness and African identity to this day (hence the label as Afro-Brazilian). Despite racial mixing within the religious categories, blacks are more likely than whites and browns to practice Afro-Brazilian religions. Using a table built on census data, from a 1995 publication authored by Reginaldo Prandi, of the University of São Paulo, Telles describes the following trends:

Nationally, white and brown participation in umbanda and candomblé is similar. The primary cleavage is between blacks and non-blacks. Blacks are twice as likely as non-blacks to participate in umbanda and three to four times as likely to participate in candomblé... Brown and white participation rates are also similar across metropolitan areas except in Rio de Janeiro and Porto Alegre, where browns are intermediate to whites and blacks and where participation by all groups is greatest.²³

²³ Telles, *Race in Another America*, 115.

From another table constructed from survey data from the State of Rio de Janeiro, in 2000, Telles discovers that self-identified blacks are significantly more likely than browns and whites to view Afro-Brazilian religious traditions (specifically holding a belief in orixás and wearing white clothes on Friday) as well as other cultural forms associated with blackness, such as capoeira and samba music, as important in their lives.²⁴ It is unfortunate that all of these respondents were not only asked about viewing Afro-Brazilian traditions as important, but also about associating these traditions with any range of negative descriptors.

These findings help us to understand the use of Afro-Brazilian religious symbols in black rights activism throughout Brazil. Stephen Selka expounds that in their struggle for racial equality, “Black activists emphasize the semiotic link between Afro-Brazilian religion and black identity in their mobilization efforts, and the symbolic connection between Candomblé and blackness is strong enough that many equate acts of intolerance against Candomblé with racism.”²⁵ This association between blackness and African religious traditions is widely advertised – it can be assumed that Pentecostals and other evangelicals are aware of it, and that they are aware of the correlation between attacks on these traditions and perceptions of racism.

Conversely, an antagonism and few lines of communication exist between the black movement and the Pentecostal movement. The lack of a Pentecostal presence in black rights activism suggests that blackness is not a salient part of Pentecostal group identity. This seems unusual if we consider that most Pentecostals have some African ancestry (remember that

²⁴ Ibid, 117.

²⁵ Stephen L. Selka. “Ethnoreligious Identity Politics in Bahia, Brazil.” *Latin American Perspectives* 32 (1). Sage Publications, Inc. (2005): 75.

only 41% of evangelicals of Pentecostal origin described themselves as white in the Brazilian census, and this is likely an exaggeration regarding biological ancestry if we consider sociological tendencies to whiten).

John Burdick discusses the antagonism between the black consciousness movement and Pentecostalism, but he sees this antagonism as largely arising out of black activists' rejection of Pentecostalism.²⁶ He cites four sources for this rejection. First, he says, black activists reject Christianity because of its historical ties to slavery. Next, Protestantism in general is regarded by many in the black movement as the religion of ethnic assimilation – conversion is seen as adopting a host of white cultural traits. They criticize black conversion to Protestantism as a process of whitening and self-rejection. Third, Protestantism focuses on the individual and under-emphasizes group identity. It also values universalism, leaving little room for the growth of ethnic identity. Finally, as I have described, black movement activists interpret Pentecostal attacks on religions of African origin as attacks on black ethnic identity.²⁷ Burdick's findings were that black movement activists view black converts to Protestantism and particularly Pentecostalism as forgetting or dismissing their ethnic identity.

As Burdick seems to admit, these perceptions are generally based on observable characteristics of Protestant Christianity and Pentecostalism specifically. While each church has its own characteristic and should be evaluated accordingly, these perceptions are generally legitimate. Pentecostalism preaches the salvation of the individual soul with little emphasis on group characteristics apart from religion. The group identity is that of the universal brotherhood that worships Christ, leaving little room for race or ethnicity-based

²⁶ John Burdick, "What is the Color of the Holy Spirit?"

²⁷ Ibid, 110.

identity. It is in this way that black activists argue that Pentecostalism erodes black identity. For black activism to assert equality and recognition of black rights and dignity, it is necessary to recognize blackness and racial difference. It is necessary to minimally take pride in skin color and encouraged to additionally take pride in ethnic heritage. This heritage includes black roots like African religious traditions, even if or perhaps especially because they have slowly been eroded as dominant practices of black populations. These are things that the universal brotherhood of Christs' followers tend to minimize. Acknowledging ethnic difference in diverse religious populations can be seen as counter-productive to promoting universal camaraderie. And promoting racial pride has the potential to take away from individual relationships to the church and to God.

To be thorough, there are of course evangelical and even Pentecostal churches, leaders, or members that do promote positive salient racial identity. There is even an increasing Christian black rights movement in Brazil. John Burdick challenges the notion of an incompatibility between evangelical Christianity and black rights activism by describing a series of Protestant groups that emerged out of the 1990s dedicated to fighting racism and expressing a black identity.²⁸ Most of the groups described are small and non-Pentecostal (e.g. Lutherans – typically not thought of as evangelical – and Baptists and Methodists – often described as evangelical). Members of a couple of major Pentecostal organizations have been active in the black rights arena, namely coming from the Assembly of God church and the Foursquare Church. But both of these are more closely associated with traditional Pentecostalism than neo-Pentecostalism. While both categories have had problems with

²⁸ John Burdick. "Why is the Black Evangelical Movement Growing in Brazil?." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 37, no. 02 (2005), 311-332.

intolerance against Afro-Brazilian traditions, neo-Pentecostalism is much more correlated with intolerance specifically targeted at Candomblé and Umbanda. To my knowledge, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, an emblematic neo-Pentecostal church, has not been active in black rights activism. It has reportedly printed articles in its newspaper condemning racism, but these articles often go hand-in-hand with ethnocentric language, which I will discuss later.

Burdick argues for a few conditions that have allowed the black evangelical movement to grow. First, the emergence of new political opportunities created by the state, which has increasingly supported racial equality measures, including affirmative action. Burdick explains that evangelical Christianity teaches followers to adhere to secular authority and operate within the law and suggests that a lack of state support explains a lack of evangelical support for racial equality in the past. But now that the state expresses anti-racist sentiments, evangelicals can as well.²⁹ Second, according to Burdick, the appearance of new technological and social resources, including the conversion of black activists to evangelical churches, has fostered a push for racial equality, because those activists are then able to spread their ideas to the congregations.³⁰ Third, the introduction into the repertoire of evangelical activists of interpretive frames that have been enormously resonant for evangelical audiences, such as texts pointing to the presence of blacks in the bible.³¹ Finally, a shift in the 1990s of the class structure of Afro-Brazilians which produced upwardly mobile black evangelical activists.³²

²⁹ Burdick, "Why is the Black Evangelical Movement Growing?" 319.

³⁰ Ibid, 322.

³¹ Ibid, 325.

³² Ibid, 329.

While most of this is descriptive and seems reasonable, I take issue with the first point. It is crucial to note that the Brazilian state also generally promotes religious tolerance and freedom, as described in the introduction, and that many groups of evangelicals fail to adhere to that element of secular authority. As I explained in the introduction, Brazil's Racial Equality Act protects free expression of the "religious cults" of African origin, making oppression of Afro-Brazilian religious practices a violation of anti-racism law. Note that accounting for these religions under racial equality law does not necessarily deem the motivations for the attacks as racist, but it does suggest that in the eyes of the government, the recipients of the attacks are experiencing some sort of racism or racial prejudice, and that the outcome of the attacks is racial disharmony. The extremist kinds of evangelicals that I am discussing throughout this project illegally attack Afro-Brazilian religions and therefore violate racial equality measures under the law. They also undermine secularity in general with their various presences in the public sphere. It is thus slightly too simplistic to generalize evangelicalism as supporting secular authority and operating within the law.³³

To return to Burdick's argument, he asserts that the failure of the black movement to connect with Protestant Christianity has stemmed from black activists' insistence on the centrality of non-Christian religion to black identity. He sees the small but significant and growing black evangelical movement as having the potential to "[break] this bottleneck, by

³³ Which is not to say that it always undermines secular authority or operates outside of the law, either, of course. It is feasible that many or most evangelicals/Pentecostals are law-abiding citizens, and that some of them have mobilized in black activism because the state now supports it. But the claim that evangelical Christianity in general specifically teaches followers to operate within the law and uphold secular authority, suggesting that evangelical Christians held back from black activism in the past because it was not supported by the state, overlooks the correlation between the rising popularity of evangelicalism and Pentecostalism and illegal intolerance and violence against Afro-Brazilian minorities (not to mention homosexuals and other groups that are protected under the law as well). I simply wish to note that there are numerous exceptions to Burdick's statement.

reaching out to a new, demographically large constituency.” In this line of thinking, evangelical Christianity can be a positive force for social change, while the Afro-Brazilian religions connections to black activism might actually hinder the black rights movement.

But even if an evangelical Christian black rights movement has a wider audience, is it truly promoting racial equality if it does not fully promote religious tolerance? How can we say that such a movement is helping eliminate racism if some of its members denounce all of the religious and spiritual traditions that were brought over by black Africans before they began converting to the religion of white masters? Embracing equality for members of dark skin color labels while supporting the spread of hate toward beliefs associated with these skin colors does not equate to powerful positive social change.³⁴ Black activist and Candomblé practitioner Jana Guinond argues that the legacy of slavery can still be felt in Brazil, and that “protecting Afro-Brazilian religious heritage” is part of the ongoing fight for equality.³⁵ It is reasonable that black activists like Guinond interpret attacks on that religious heritage as racism, as the violence and hateful discourse surrounding Afro-Brazilian religions have historically been the essence of racism. As Guinond argues, “It’s important to highlight the huge importance of the black movements in pushing for the appreciation of diversity or

³⁴ This is of course not intended to dismiss efforts made by Christians who embrace both racial equality and religious tolerance, for example the tolerance promoted by the Council of Christian Churches of the State of Rio de Janeiro, as discussed in chapter 1. There are multiple overlapping social movements at play here, and it is difficult to account for all. But Burdick criticizes the link between Afro-Brazilian religions and black activism, and he does not justify this with a push for evangelical black movements to at least promote religious tolerance if not wholly support African traditions.

³⁵ Lourdes Garcia-Navarro. "Brazilian Believers Of Hidden Religion Step Out Of Shadows." NPR. NPR, 16 Sept. 2013. Web. 1 May 2016.

religious plurality.”³⁶ Even Christian forms of black activism need to promote tolerance of African traditions above and beyond the embracing of black identity at the skin color level.

What light does this discussion shed on the questions outlined in this project? Like most religions and various social groups, Pentecostalism is capable of fostering great intolerance but also positive social ideals. How do we reconcile the tensions between the overlapping, interrelated, and distinct groups and movements that are interacting? I assert that while motivations (conscious and unconscious) are hard to get it, the assaults on Afro-Brazilian religions point to racial prejudice. The attacks violate Brazil’s Racial Equality Act and mimic behaviors that were thoroughly racist from the past, so, minimally, it is legitimate that Candomblecistas and Umbandanistas perceive racism. Perhaps a brief examination of related issues in African countries can illuminate some of the contradictions and provide further insight into motivations for intolerance.

2.3 Parallel Tensions in Sub-Saharan Africa

Not only has evangelical Christianity been accused of intolerance toward African beliefs, practices and peoples in Brazil, but this association also exists on the African continent. Terrence Ranger argues that Christianity in Africa is unique from in other non-Western regions. “In Africa, all Christianities have engaged with the cultures, and with the politics, of the strong African peoples,” and while Christianity has tolerated and even adopted local practices and politics in some cases, it has outright condemned and demonized them in others.³⁷ Christianity has been extensively criticized for its imperialistic behaviors,

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Terrence Ranger. “Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Africa.” *Transformation* 19.4 (2002), 267.

violence, and erosion of local identity on the African continent in the past. Much has evolved over the centuries, and contemporarily, each sect and even each church needs to be individually evaluated regarding positive or negative contributions to tolerance and religious pluralism. At present, though, Terrence Ranger observes, “Evangelicals of all kinds “demonize” African religion and seek to expel it both from the private and the public sphere.”³⁸ I am concerned with the ways in which some evangelical groups continue to clash with African religions and traditions.

Paralleling the situation in Brazil, a common narrative is that Pentecostal religion can save local citizens from demonic entities connected to African religion, and that it can destroy these entities. This is a tactic used in numerous and diverse Sub-Saharan countries, from Nigeria to South Africa. In some cases Pentecostal attacks on local Africans lead to violence, particularly regarding accusations of witchcraft:

Witchcraft is hardly new, but it has taken on new life recently partly because of a rapid growth in evangelical Christianity. Campaigners against the practice [of witchcraft] say around 15,000 children have been accused in two of Nigeria's 36 states over the past decade and around 1,000 have been murdered. In the past month alone, three Nigerian children accused of witchcraft were killed and another three were set on fire. Nigeria is one of the heartlands of abuse, but hardly the only one: the United Nations Children's Fund says tens of thousands of children have been targeted throughout Africa... The Mount Zion Lighthouse — [named by multiple families] as the accuser of their children — is part of the powerful Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria. The Fellowship's president, Ayo Oritsejafor, said the Fellowship was the fastest-growing religious group in Nigeria, with more than 30 million members. "We have grown so much in the past few years we cannot keep an eye on everybody," he explained.³⁹

³⁸ Terrence Ranger. *Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Africa* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2008), 30.

³⁹ "Nigerian Children Deemed Witches Tortured." CBSNews. CBS Interactive, 17 Oct. 2009. Web. 01 June 2016.

This abhorrent violence does not immediately appear to be aimed at specific Nigerian religious traditions. In many cases, the accused, especially children, have done nothing unusual beyond crying for too many hours in the night. But the dialogue of witchcraft has evolved out of the historical demonization of African religious practices. In one case, the Nigeria Apostolic Church accused an eight-year-old girl of being a witch because she liked to sleep outside on hot nights, and they feared she was sneaking off to join a coven.⁴⁰ While she was only a child and not a member of an indigenous African religion, the church connected her to a narrative of African witchcraft that professes hate towards indigenous religion in order to call for an exorcism to be carried out.

The most popular interpretation that I have found in the media regarding witch hunting has been competition – evangelical Africans are seen as racing against competitor congregations to weed out the most sin from local communities. The ability to exorcize witches or demons gives the churches credibility in the eyes of their communities, and parents pay hefty sums for the exorcisms, increasing churches’ income.⁴¹ But, the attackers use a language that was borne out of demonizing time-honored African practices, as “witchcraft” (which has been used to describe most indigenous forms of African religion) has a long and rich history across Sub-Saharan Africa. It is interesting that it is often local Africans accusing each other of witchcraft, as it is mostly Nigerians that run and operate the churches discussed above.⁴² The discourse on witchcraft was operationalized by western

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² However, it is interesting to note that many of these churches are offshoots of Western churches that were transplanted there. For example, the Mount Zion Lighthouse is a branch of a Californian church by the same name. The Californian church reportedly claimed to “have no idea” that the violence against children was going on.

missionaries in the past and is now used to spread fear and hate on a local scale, somewhat similar to the ways in which Afro-Brazilians support Pentecostal churches in Brazil that attack Afro-Brazilian traditions.

Apart from the hysteria surrounding witchcraft, there are, as mentioned, evangelicals that target African religions more directly. Rosalind Hackett asserts that “deliverance-oriented” Pentecostal movements in countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa, “are prone to violent condemnations of other (competing) religious options, in particular, traditional African religions.”⁴³ She connects the local expressions of ‘spiritual warfare’ to globalizing discourses of demonism and Satanism, pointing to “a deleterious effect for civil society, religious pluralism and freedom of religion.”⁴⁴ To expand beyond Hackett’s regional focus, discourses of satanism are also common in countries where Brazilian missionaries have had enormous success, including the lusophone countries, Mozambique and Angola, in addition to South Africa. Paul Freston explains that for Brazilian Pentecostalism, when transplanted to Africa, “The demonic is reinterpreted from the Afro-Brazilian categories into local conceptions of suffering and of the spirit world.”⁴⁵ Evangelicals undoubtedly demonize African traditions and spirits in attempts to bolster their own numbers and to increase power, representation, and income. They also surely see many African traditions, religious or not, as genuinely sinful or even satanic.⁴⁶ But, racial elements are ever present.

⁴³ Rosalind IJ Hackett. "Discourses of Demonization in Africa and Beyond." *Diogenes* 50.3 (2003), 61.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Paul Freston. “The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God: A Brazilian Church Finds Success in Southern Africa”. *Journal of Religion in Africa* 35.1 (BRILL, 2005), 45.

⁴⁶ Christianity tends to bring with it Western values like heterosexuality, abstinence and monogamy, clashing with African practices such as polygyny, for example.

More Universal Church Controversies - Accusations of Racism

In its magazine, *Plenitude*, the Universal Church details its missionary activities for Brazilian readers. It reportedly claims to have been the first church to effectively bring Christianity to many African countries. In a 2002 magazine article, it published: “The work of evangelization in South Africa began in 1992 in the midst of apartheid. And, ever since, many Africans have been rejecting primitive religious practices and beginning to glorify Jesus.”⁴⁷ In response to this, religious scholar Laura Premack writes, “As if these are the only two options in South Africa – primitive religions or *Universal* – when the truth of the matter is that South Africa has been a site of Christian missionary activity since the late 1800s.”⁴⁸ Premack criticizes another *Plenitude* publication from 1999 that describes Africans as primitive:

Beyond the beating of the drums, a new sound echoes... in South Africa: the praising of the Lord Jesus Christ. Despite being a country traditionally oriented toward witchcraft, voodoo and spirit worship, the reality is that many Africans have converted to the Gospel, leaving behind these tribal and primitive practices. It hasn't been easy, but determination hasn't failed Universal's pastors and workers who have, over time, developed an intensive evangelization work. Many natives are converting to the Word... The African is by nature humble and simple, and has been the victim of abuse and oppression for many years.⁴⁹

Premack calls this an “ahistorical, racist narrative” that paints Africa as either the ancient Africa of slaves and Candomblé, or a modern Africa of famine and violence.⁵⁰ In this

⁴⁷ Laura Premack, “‘The Coca-Cola of Churches Arrives’: Nigeria’s Redeemed Christian Church of God in Brazil,” in *The Public Face of African New Religious Movements in Diaspora: Imagining the Religious ‘Other,’* 215-232. Edited by Afe Adogame. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., (2014): 221.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

case the Church condemns African religious traditions in the same context as it employs racialized descriptions of inferiority towards Africans.

There are several other examples of the UCKG's negative depictions of Africa in their various proselytizing platforms. Paul Freston cites a few of them:

The continent needs evangelizing... Besides the superstition of the blacks, it has been invaded by the Hindu and Muslim religions, which have nothing to do with African traditions and customs (TV Record 11/10/97). The continent is the victim of deceiving spirits [who] disguise themselves as ancestors (*Folha Universal* 11/10/98). Africans live under the dominion of spiritual forces, worshipping demonic beings... Their pagan teachings lead to conformism, indifference, and what we might call a "culture of submission" ... (*Folha Universal* 9/8/98).⁵¹

The list goes on. Freston cites other examples of UCKG claims against African people, such as that they have a lesser concept of marriage and family than Brazilians do and that this explains why Africa suffers from AIDS.⁵²

The conversation is always that the UCKG can save Africans, that it embraces them, and that it wants to spread the love of Christ and the Church. It generally paints Africans as victims more than criminals, placing the blame on evil spirits, cultural mistakes, and occasionally ruthless leaders.⁵³ The UCKG actively takes pride in gaining black African converts. It also denounces racism in its publications. But it describes the converts' race negatively. There is a sense that the Church can save black people not only from their

⁵¹ Paul Freston. "The Changing Face of Christian Proselytizing: New Actors from the Global South Transforming Old Debates." *Proselytization Revisited: Rights Talk, Free Markets and Culture Wars* (2008), 128.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid, 109-130.

religious traditions, but from their Africanness more generally (e.g. their simplicity and victimhood, their incorrect understanding of marriage, etc.).

Outside of academic literature, the Universal Church has been accused of racism and other crimes at the grass roots level in some African countries, especially in South Africa. South African pastors have made accusations that the UCKG is racist because it allegedly discriminates against them and favors Portuguese pastors. In 2009, six ex-pastors came out alleging that the Portuguese pastors could get away with misdeeds (such as adultery) freely, while black South African pastors were humiliated in front of larger groups of pastors for any wrongdoings. The South African pastors claimed to be paid less, to receive less money for their funerals, and to have fewer opportunities in leadership than their Brazilian counterparts.⁵⁴

Earlier, in 2007, the Universal Church made South African news headlines when it distributed condoms specifically to black men in order to stem the HIV/AIDS pandemic in South Africa: “The HIV/AIDS campaigners were outraged by the crude racial and sexist stereotypes employed by the UCKG’s campaign. The church refused to comment on the controversy and quietly dropped its targeted dissemination of condoms.”⁵⁵

Paul Freston argues that that Universal Church’s paternalistic and insulting depictions of African people does not actually stem from racial prejudice. He explains that the UCKG has insulted host populations made up of various races, from Indians to Luxembourgers. Because the Church’s overgeneralizations are not limited to blacks/Africans, Freston argues

⁵⁴ Ilana Van Wyk, *The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God in South Africa: A Church of Strangers*. Vol. 47. Cambridge University Press, 2014. p 17

⁵⁵ Ibid.

that its attitudes stem from Brazilian pastors' "ethnocentrism and lack of empathy with ... host populations, whoever they may be" instead of racism.⁵⁶

First, exhibiting intolerance toward multiple groups across multiple races does not rule out racism. Second, at this point we are debating the definition of racism, and while I will not thoroughly define it here, I would argue that there is not a clear line between ethnocentrism and racial prejudice. I have not come across issues of the Universal Church and other Pentecostal groups demonizing blackness per se, whether in Africa or Brazil. But they have demonized Africanness, for lack of a better term, including African culture, traditions, and religious beliefs and practices more specifically. These things are certainly connected to ethnicity. Can a person's ethnic prejudice be totally separate and exclusive of racism? To debate whether this is separate from race in order to rule out racism seems like splitting hairs.⁵⁷

2.4 Concluding Remarks on Race

The incidents discussed in the final section of this chapter are mere samples of the religious clashes going on in very diverse Sub-Saharan African countries. These surely do not constitute a full picture of the relationship of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, or Pentecostalism, or evangelical Christianity even more broadly, to local African

⁵⁶ Freston, "The Changing Face of Christian Proselytizing," 129.

⁵⁷ Most definitions of ethnicity include cultural and religious traditions as shared by the group in question. I recognize that I am leaving race and ethnicity partly undefined. I am not seeking to define these terms explicitly and technically in order to try to prove racism. The African continent houses so many different linguistic, cultural, religious, etc. groups with diverse physical characteristics anyways that to define race and ethnicity would not clarify very much for this conversation. Rather, the point is that Africans, particularly Sub-Saharan Africans residing in countries with substantial Pentecostal presence in the public sphere, have been depicted as inferior.

religions and citizens. I have chosen to focus on largely negative instances, despite some of the profoundly good things that can be connected to missionary Christianity in Africa.⁵⁸ But the examples that I have given demonstrate that the correlation between Pentecostalism / evangelical Christianity and hatred of Africanness holds up, at least for some extreme or militant groups.

In an additional citation of a UCKG newspaper publication, Paul Freston explains that the Universal Church calls for a change in mentality surrounding black weakness. Bishop Macedo reportedly said on a trip to Africa that the African “must believe that he was born to grow.”⁵⁹ The problem is that Macedo wants the African to grow away from his own culture toward the culture of Brazilian missionary Pentecostalism: “People here think the black man was born to die like a dog. That is their mentality. We are changing this.”⁶⁰ Black men and women are given little or no autonomy as Macedo sets his church up as the savior in a push to change almost everything about them. Whether we want to call this ethnocentrism or racism, like Paul Freston and Laura Premack respectively do, or whatever else, there is a connection between the Universal Church and other Pentecostal and evangelic groups’ targeting of African-derived religious and other traditions, and race. It is almost certainly the case that the groups discussed in this thesis are operating with competition and moral superiority in mind. Also, though, whether the various actors at play have race in mind or not, it cannot be dismissed as a factor in this intolerance and violence.

⁵⁸ E.g. The charity work and social services, the uniting of communities, the empowering of women in church congregations, etc. (which are also things that are difficult to generalize across the diverse African continent).

⁵⁹ See f.n. 56.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

Conclusion

When Kailane Campos was attacked by bible-waving men in 2015, it was emblematic of the kinds of intolerance and violence that Afro-Brazilian religions have increasingly experienced throughout Brazil. Based on the tense religious climate that had been worsening in recent years, Brazilians assumed the attackers were evangelical Christians. When Brazilians accuse evangelicals of intolerance and associate them with violence against Afro-Brazilian religions, they often mean to single out Pentecostalism and specifically militant groups of neo-Pentecostals as the perpetrators. Many evangelicals themselves tend to identify neo-Pentecostals as the problem (which is not to say that there have not been problems with other evangelical sects or churches). While not directly connected to Kailane Campos (as far as is known), the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God is perhaps the most accused of promoting intolerance overall, and understandably so, because it has spread so much hate against Afro-Brazilian religions in such public ways.

I have demonstrated that the Universal Church utilizes and perpetuates its immense presence in the public sphere to target Afro-Brazilian religious groups and practices. It also teaches its congregations that a cosmic war is occurring. To borrow the concept from Mark Juergensmeyer, in the eyes of the Church a worldly battle between religion and irreligion, and especially between good and evil, is occurring. As Juergensmeyer explains, “concepts of cosmic war are accompanied by strong claims of moral justification and an enduring absolutism that transforms worldly struggles into sacred battles.”¹ Accordingly, Brazilian Universal Church pastors urge their followers to go to battle against ambiguous enemies.

¹ Mark Juergensmeyer. “Terror in the Name of God,” in *Thinking Globally: A Global Studies Reader* (Univ of California Press, 2013), 298.

They also describe Afro-Brazilian spirits and deities as absolutely evil in a binary system of good and bad. The Church carries out exorcisms more than other Pentecostal groups, acting on its condemnation of African spirits. Furthermore, the Church provides an “army” of altar boys to set an example of fervent proselytism, and many see this as militarization and preparation for battle. When condemned for this behavior, and accused of inciting violence in the streets, the Universal Church defensively calls itself the victim. How dare the world condemn it for exercising its right to condemn others? This inside-out notion of tolerance puts the Church at the center of a narrative that reduces the attention placed on the victims of the intolerance. Regardless as to who was responsible for Campos’ attack, hate and war narratives like those promoted by the Universal Church are at least partly responsible for the climate that fostered it.

While the motives for such attacks are various and vary across groups, there are almost certainly elements of religious and territorial competition, pursuit of wealth, moral superiority, and condemnation of sin at play. Beyond this, though, Afro-Brazilian religious leaders have spoken out with the perception that they are racially targeted. I cannot presume to know if targets are selected based on race (which of course needs further research, as will be discussed below). There are undoubtedly different motivations for different persons, and the level of consciousness and self-reflection on these motivations varies as well. I do, however, assert that racial undertones cannot and should not be dismissed. Much of what I have discussed in this paper points to racism.

Black activists emphasize Candomblé as a symbol of black identity and interpret attacks on Afro-Brazilian religions as attacks on blackness, which has been widely advertised throughout Brazil. It is safe to assume that many Brazilian evangelical attackers are also

aware of Brazil's Racial Equality Act and the fact that it protects Afro-Brazilian religious groups and practices, making attacks on them violations of the law. Even the government associates Candomblé and Umbanda with African ancestry and race, positioning attacks on these groups as assaults on racial equality.

There are also the assaults on African culture and religion in African countries. I have given a couple of small but important examples in Chapter 2 to illustrate this issue. The topic warrants a much more thorough discussion, of course. I must emphasize that I expressly do not argue that all evangelical Christianity always targets indigenous African religion and/or culture. However, I have demonstrated that there is a correlation between evangelicalism (and specifically Pentecostalism) and discourses of demonism and Satanism. This is written on fairly often by scholars of African religion. Such discourses set African religious practices and spirits up as demonic in opposition to morally and even culturally superior Christianity.

In the realm of Africa, perhaps most illuminating with regard to the research questions in this thesis is the intolerance carried out by the UCKG in South Africa and other Sub-Saharan countries, persistently describing Africans as inferior. Paul Freston calls these behaviors "ethnocentric" as opposed to exhibiting racial prejudice. But there is a clear preferencing of Christian (and in this case Brazilian) identity over the indigenous identity of the "simple" African who exists in a "culture of submission." I do not agree that ethnic prejudice can be separated out so easily from racial prejudice. Moreover, the depictions of Africans are insulting and essentialist, and the assaults on indigenous religions undermine tolerance and plurality, regardless as to whether we label the Church's behaviors as ethnocentric or racist or whatever else.

What is at stake surrounding these tensions? Where do we go from here? In this section I will briefly examine some broader implications of this research and provide some suggestions for further research.

I. The Death of Secularization Theory and Pentecostalism in Politics

Much like other modern vehement forms of religion, such as global political Islam, Hindu nationalism in India, radical Buddhists in Asia, etc., neo-Pentecostalism is part of a large trend of increasing religious fervor that defies secular notions of modernity. As discussed in the introduction, Jose Casanova describes three prongs of modern secularization theory – decline in belief (regarding the number of believers), increase in plurality or differentiation as mainline religions lose numerical dominance, and relegation of religion to the private sphere. While the first two prongs are not challenged by my work and are arguably descriptive of the world in general, the third prong is largely disproven by religiosity in the global public sphere. In my case, the notion of the privatization of religion is entirely opposite of evangelical, Pentecostal, and especially neo-Pentecostal success in Brazil and globally. Commenting on larger global trends, Juergensmeyer explains that “[today’s] radical religious movements refuse to observe the boundaries that secular society has set around religion – keeping it private rather than allowing it to intrude into public spaces.”² Pentecostals and especially neo-Pentecostals embrace the public sphere in ways that would shock secular theorists like Weber, Marx, and Durkheim.

In this thesis I have examined neo-Pentecostal and wider evangelical uses of the public sphere to advertise, proselytize, entertain, and to spread hate against Afro-Brazilian

² Ibid, 299.

and African traditions. The use of the public sphere to push conversion and evangelical morality undermines secularity, and more importantly, the expression of hate undermines religious pluralism and religious tolerance. Where religion is tied to ethnicity, with specific attention to connections between Afro-Brazilian religions and African ethnic or racial heritage, this spread of hate in the public sphere also has grave consequences for race relations. I have demonstrated these issues with attention to the media and other proselytizing platforms, but I have not sufficiently addressed the politicization of religion.

Juergensmeyer explains that in reaction to increasing favor toward secularization by mainstream society and politics, resurgent religious activists have “dismissed the efforts of secular culture and its forms of nationalism to replace religion.”³ Accordingly, these activists have “challenged the idea that secular society and the modern nation-state are able to provide the moral fiber that unites national communities or give the ideological strength to sustain states buffeted by [failures].”⁴ This is accompanied by radical religious groups becoming increasingly political.

Beyond spreading messages to the Brazilian public (and citizens of numerous other countries), the Universal Church and other morally conservative evangelical groups have begun to increasingly participate in politics. They have amassed representation in and formed alliances with government in ways that parallel the rise of the religious right in the United States. Furthermore, because the number of evangelical voters is increasing in Brazilian elections, Brazilian politicians pander to the evangelical vote to increase their likelihood of election and reelection. While I have not detailed the political aspect of evangelical presence

³ Juergensmeyer. “Terror in the Mind of God,” 349.

⁴ Ibid.

in the public sphere in this thesis, it is worth briefly mentioning here to reemphasize the extent of evangelical power and representation outside of the private sphere.

In a detailed description of the Universal Church's presence in the Brazilian political sphere, Ari Oro describes the participation of the UCKG and other evangelical churches in local and federal government. He cites specific elections to illustrate the growth of an "evangelical block" in congress. Furthermore, he explains that the UCKG is a leader in encouraging high evangelical participation rates in elections:

Due to the efficacy of its institutional charisma, the [UCKG] has given, within its own religious group, a new meaning to the specific act of voting and to the general perception of politics in general, putting both of them in its own religious logic. This is an important explanatory key for the high level of loyalty in voting and the growing political success verified in every new election. Furthermore, the political practice of the UCKG is producing a mimetic effect on other evangelic churches, which tend to imitate its way of doing politics. Its political insertion, mainly through the Liberal Party, has not remained unnoticed by the political parties, making the fact a relevant actor in the current Brazilian political conjuncture.⁵

In relation to this, evangelicals have used their representation in politics and alliances with politicians to further their assaults on Afro-Brazilian religions. In fact, when Vagner Gonçalves da Silva sorts evangelical attacks on Afro-Brazilian religious groups into six categories, one of the categories is "attacks arising from alliances between Evangelical churches and politicians."⁶ To illustrate this, Gonçalves da Silva gives examples where such alliances have resulted in Brazilian states attempting to ban any religious practices or ceremonies resulting in the death of animals, in spite of the fact that Afro-Brazilian religions

⁵ Ari Pedro Oro. "The Politics of the Universal Church and its Consequences on Religion and Politics in Brazil." *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais* 1, no. SE (2005): 0-0.

⁶ Vagner Gonçalves da Silva. *Neo-Pentecostalism and Afro-Brazilian Religions: Explaining the Attacks on Symbols of the African Religious Heritage in Contemporary Brazil*. Mana, Rio de Janeiro, vol. 3, Selected Edition, 2007. Web.

often emphasize animal sacrifice as a key requirement for building relationships with the orixás. This use of the law to ban Afro-Brazilian religious animal sacrifice is but one of numerous examples where an evangelical presence in politics is impacting the Afro-Brazilian religions.

Apart from African-derived religions, the politicization of Christianity and especially Pentecostalism impacts numerous other groups as well. I have given a very short and limited set of examples to demonstrate an evangelical presence in Brazilian politics, and a much larger conversation is warranted in other projects. While there is not space in this thesis to discuss the many details of evangelical participation in politics, it is crucial to note that such a participation does exist, and that it has large implications for Brazilian politics and society more generally.⁷

II. Further Implications

The reasons behind a growing evangelical presence in Brazilian politics and politics in other countries of the world are varied. Difficult questions such as religious pluralism and the secular state, abortion, homosexuality, and the death penalty have politicized many Christians in many countries. These issues are both political and religious, and religious groups behave politically to weigh in on them. As I used Juergensmeyer to explain previously, many religious groups feel that secular politics lack the morality to govern

⁷ Pentecostals have entered politics with mixed results. In general, Pentecostal politics are morally conservative and not socially progressive. However, as briefly touched on throughout this thesis, some Pentecostal and wider evangelical groups are promoting religious tolerance and/or racial equality. For example, Benedita da Silva, a Pentecostal woman that served as Rio's vice governor and later governor from 1998 to 2002, formed a "tense coalition" with Pentecostal political organizations and dared to face down "massive police corruption and brutality while simultaneously going after the commandos' stranglehold of black favelas." Paul Amar. *The Security Archipelago: Human-Security States, Sexuality Politics, and the End of Neoliberalism* (Duke University Press, 2013), 148.

properly. These issues are playing out in Brazilian local and national politics, putting much at stake even beyond the tolerance and respect that should be designated to the Afro-Brazilian religions.

For example, above and beyond the scope of this project, there is much at stake in the realm of homosexual and women's rights. Pentecostals in Brazil and globally denounce homosexuality and oppose abortion and other women's reproductive rights. While I have chosen to focus on the Afro-Brazilian religions in this paper, a much larger conversation needs to be had with respect to the rights of other vulnerable groups, minorities or otherwise.

Finally, as I have demonstrated here and previously, the most concerning aspect of the spread of intolerance and hate on the part of militant Pentecostals is the massive growth and reach of the movement. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God has approximately 12 million members worldwide and this membership is growing quickly. Pentecostalism is rapidly gaining success around the world with specific concentrations in the Global South, and if militant versions of Pentecostalism are fundamentally connected to religious intolerance, or racism, or homophobia, etc. it is crucial to understand this. It is further crucial to understand the implications of the politicization of this religious movement.

III. Future Research

There is much more work that needs to be done to understand the growth and the depth of evangelicalism, and Pentecostalism and neo-Pentecostalism more specifically. The ramifications of this movement are global and need to be studied on a global scale. However, the local context in each case is immensely important, and it is crucial to beware of overgeneralizing the actors at play. While

it is necessary to describe trends for the sake of making comparisons and drawing meaningful conclusions, each church should be studied individually on the ground before it is praised or condemned. Relatedly, more attention must be given to each of the more specific themes in this paper. For example, more evidence and analysis are needed regarding the connections between militant Pentecostalism and intolerance, hate speech, violence, racism, etc. To sum this up, in his discussion on the relationships between Pentecostalism, Afro-Brazilian religions, and black rights activism, John Burdick asserts, “A great deal more listening and analysis is required at the grassroots level.”⁸

Furthermore, while social processes are complex and difficult to fully characterize with quantitative modeling, this discussion relies perhaps to largely on anecdotal evidence and qualitative analysis. Quantitative studies would greatly improve the depth of the research. For example, it is important to look at different Candomblé and Umbanda temples according to their racial composition and compare this with the frequency of attacks on each temple. Are white Umbanda houses as subject to intolerance as Umbanda houses with large black populations? Do the frequencies of attacks vary according to region/neighborhood? These are just a couple of examples of countless studies that could benefit an understanding of the changing religious landscape in Brazil and its impacts on race relations. This project, along with those detailed in the sources used in this paper, are only the beginning of a much larger conversation.

⁸ John Burdick. “What Is the Color of the Holy Spirit? Pentecostalism and Black Identity in Brazil”. *Latin American Research Review* 34.2 (1999). Latin American Studies Association: 109–31.

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Appendix A



Tabela 1.4.1 - População residente, por situação do domicílio e sexo, segundo os grupos de religião - Brasil - 2010

(continua)

Grupos de religião	População residente								
	Total	Homens	Mulheres	Situação do domicílio					
				Urbana			Rural		
				Total	Sexo		Total	Sexo	
Homens	Mulheres	Homens	Mulheres						
Total (1)	190 755 799	93 406 990	97 348 809	160 934 649	77 715 676	83 218 972	29 821 150	15 691 314	14 129 837
Católica Apostólica Romana	123 280 172	61 180 316	62 099 856	100 055 896	48 872 817	51 183 078	23 224 277	12 307 499	10 916 778
Católica Apostólica Brasileira	560 781	282 011	278 770	442 244	218 107	224 137	118 537	63 904	54 633
Católica Ortodoxa	131 571	65 727	65 844	113 301	55 942	57 359	18 270	9 785	8 485
Evangélicas	42 275 440	18 782 831	23 492 609	37 824 089	16 663 271	21 160 818	4 451 350	2 119 560	2 331 791
Evangélicas de Missão	7 686 827	3 409 082	4 277 745	6 795 167	2 978 485	3 816 682	891 659	430 597	461 063
Igreja Evangélica Luterana	999 498	482 382	517 116	686 349	321 395	364 954	313 149	160 987	152 162
Igreja Evangélica Presbiteriana	921 209	405 424	515 785	853 864	373 752	480 112	67 345	31 673	35 672
Igreja Evangélica Metodista	340 938	149 047	191 891	325 652	142 148	183 504	15 286	6 899	8 387
Igreja Evangélica Batista	3 723 853	1 605 823	2 118 029	3 466 862	1 488 390	1 978 472	256 991	117 434	139 557
Igreja Evangélica Congrega- cional	109 591	48 243	61 348	94 270	40 878	53 392	15 321	7 365	7 957
Igreja Evangélica Adventista	1 561 071	704 376	856 695	1 341 018	599 837	741 182	220 053	104 539	115 513
Outras Evangélicas de Missão	30 666	13 786	16 880	27 151	12 085	15 066	3 514	1 701	1 814
Evangélicas de origem pentecostal	25 370 484	11 273 195	14 097 289	22 371 352	9 855 098	12 516 253	2 999 132	1 418 097	1 581 035
Igreja Assembleia de Deus	12 314 410	5 586 520	6 727 891	10 366 497	4 662 726	5 703 772	1 947 913	923 794	1 024 119
Igreja Congregação Cristá do Brasil	2 289 634	1 060 218	1 229 416	2 006 550	924 354	1 082 196	283 083	135 863	147 220
Igreja o Brasil para Cristo	196 665	85 768	110 897	177 634	77 173	100 461	19 031	8 595	10 436
Igreja Evangelho Quadrangular	1 808 389	774 696	1 033 693	1 706 628	727 634	978 994	101 761	47 062	54 699
Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus	1 873 243	756 203	1 117 040	1 766 246	708 533	1 057 713	106 998	47 670	59 328
Igreja Casa da Benção	125 550	52 274	73 276	118 659	49 177	69 483	6 890	3 097	3 793
Igreja Deus é Amor	845 383	365 250	480 133	723 155	308 092	415 063	122 228	57 159	65 069
Igreja Maranata	356 021	156 185	199 835	339 526	148 657	190 869	16 485	7 529	8 966
Igreja Nova Vida	90 568	37 026	53 542	88 898	36 342	52 556	1 670	684	986
Evangélica renovada não deter- minada	23 461	10 412	13 049	21 605	9 549	12 056	1 856	863	993
Comunidade Evangélica	180 130	77 890	102 240	174 584	75 456	99 128	5 546	2 533	3 013
Outras igrejas Evangélicas de origem pentecostal	5 267 029	2 310 653	2 956 377	4 881 988	2 127 405	2 753 963	385 661	183 247	202 414
Evangélica não determinada	9 218 129	4 100 554	5 117 575	8 657 570	3 829 688	4 827 883	560 559	270 866	289 693



Tabela 1.4.1 - População residente, por situação do domicílio e sexo, segundo os grupos de religião - Brasil - 2010

(conclusão)

Grupos de religião	População residente								
	Total	Homens	Mulheres	Situação do domicílio					
				Urbana			Rural		
				Total	Sexo		Total	Sexo	
					Homens	Mulheres		Homens	Mulheres
Outras religiosidades cristãs	1 461 495	666 772	794 723	1 350 719	613 118	737 601	110 776	53 654	57 122
Igreja de Jesus Cristo dos Santos dos Últimos Dias	226 509	107 144	119 366	222 224	104 957	117 266	4 286	2 186	2 099
Testemunhas de Jeová	1 393 208	579 466	813 742	1 328 406	550 262	778 144	64 801	29 204	35 598
Espiritualista	61 739	24 857	36 882	59 131	23 702	35 429	2 608	1 155	1 453
Espírita	3 848 876	1 581 701	2 267 176	3 776 857	1 546 013	2 230 843	72 020	35 687	36 332
Umbanda	407 331	182 119	225 213	398 506	177 546	220 960	8 825	4 572	4 253
Candomblé	167 363	80 733	86 630	163 115	78 584	84 531	4 248	2 149	2 099
Outras declarações de religiosidades afro brasileira	14 103	6 636	7 467	13 816	6 484	7 332	287	152	135
Judaísmo	107 329	53 885	53 444	105 342	52 821	52 520	1 987	1 063	924
Hinduismo	5 675	2 942	2 733	5 598	2 899	2 699	77	43	33
Budismo	243 966	110 403	133 563	235 649	106 116	129 533	8 316	4 287	4 030
Novas Religiões Orientais	155 951	63 813	92 139	150 597	61 261	89 336	5 355	2 552	2 803
Igreja messiânica mundial	103 716	41 980	61 736	100 221	40 326	59 895	3 496	1 654	1 842
Outras novas religiões orientais	52 235	21 833	30 402	50 376	20 935	29 441	1 859	898	961
Outras Religiões Orientais	9 675	4 502	5 173	9 491	4 401	5 090	185	101	83
Islamismo	35 167	21 042	14 124	34 894	20 849	14 044	273	193	80
Tradições Esotéricas	74 013	42 095	31 918	70 878	40 219	30 659	3 136	1 876	1 259
Tradições Indígenas	63 082	32 095	30 987	19 366	9 832	9 534	43 716	22 263	21 453
Outras Religiosidades	11 306	5 135	6 171	9 925	4 426	5 500	1 380	709	671
Sem religião	15 335 510	9 082 507	6 253 004	13 742 551	8 103 211	5 639 340	1 592 960	979 296	613 664
Sem religião	14 595 979	8 582 492	6 003 486	13 043 340	7 640 022	5 403 318	1 552 638	952 470	600 168
Ateu	615 096	411 397	203 699	577 994	386 643	191 351	37 102	24 753	12 348
Agnóstico	124 436	78 618	45 818	121 216	76 545	44 671	3 220	2 072	1 147
Não determinada e múltiplo pertencimento	643 598	302 807	340 791	591 792	276 476	315 315	51 807	26 331	25 475
Religiosidade não determinada/ mal definida	628 219	295 713	332 506	578 347	270 469	307 878	49 872	25 244	24 628
Declaração de múltipla religiosidade	15 379	7 094	8 284	13 445	6 007	7 438	1 934	1 087	847

Fonte: IBGE, Censo Demográfico 2010.

(1) Inclusive as pessoas sem declaração de religião e não sabiam.

Appendix B

	Candomblé	Umbanda	“Evangelicals of Pentecostal Origin”
Total	167,363	407,331	25,370,484
“White”	50,670 (30%)	220,526 (54%)	10,470,009 (41%)
“Brown”	65,777 (39%)	112,435 (27%)	12,401,216 (49%)
“Black”	48,849 (29%)	70,927 (17%)	2,144,556 (8.5%)
“Yellow”	1,214	2,158	237,121
“Indigenous”	853	1,286	117,538



Tabela 1.4.6 - População residente, por cor ou raça, segundo os grupos de religião - Brasil - 2010

(continua)

Grupos de religião	População residente						
	Total	Cor ou raça					
		Branca	Preta	Amorela	Parda	Indígena	Sem declaração
Total (1)	190 755 799	90 621 281	14 351 162	2 105 353	82 820 452	821 501	36 051
Católica Apostólica Romana	123 280 172	60 189 864	8 348 310	1 261 350	53 064 179	416 201	269
Católica Apostólica Brasileira	560 781	217 427	54 275	7 418	275 862	5 798	-
Católica Ortodoxa	131 571	70 043	9 360	2 020	48 925	222	-
Evangélicas	42 275 440	18 867 446	3 461 646	413 261	19 323 780	209 259	48
Evangélicas de Missão	7 686 827	3 964 315	533 181	75 877	3 060 776	52 678	-
Igreja Evangélica Luterana	999 498	904 636	13 255	3 105	77 077	1 424	-
Igreja Evangélica Presbiteriana	921 209	531 597	45 375	11 495	327 465	5 277	-
Igreja Evangélica Metodista	340 938	184 852	27 233	4 114	123 736	1 004	-
Igreja Evangélica Batista	3 723 853	1 591 525	326 331	39 334	1 731 109	35 554	-
Igreja Evangélica Congregacional	109 591	58 532	6 271	783	43 926	79	-
Igreja Evangélica Adventista	1 561 071	671 414	113 464	16 297	750 577	9 319	-
Outras Evangélicas de Missão	30 686	21 759	1 252	749	6 885	22	-
Evangélicas de origem pentecostal	25 370 484	10 470 009	2 144 552	237 121	12 401 216	117 538	48
Igreja Assembleia de Deus	12 314 410	4 584 114	1 047 167	117 688	6 500 792	64 621	28
Igreja Congregação Cristã do Brasil	2 289 634	1 257 980	130 327	15 823	879 929	5 575	-
Igreja o Brasil para Cristo	196 685	94 960	14 279	1 664	85 216	547	-
Igreja Evangelho Quadrangular	1 808 389	877 080	142 289	15 263	768 412	5 365	-
Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus	1 873 243	700 669	205 177	19 126	943 248	5 023	-
Igreja Casa da Bênção	125 550	43 312	13 903	1 373	66 652	310	-
Igreja Deus é Amor	845 383	296 418	81 701	6 962	451 247	9 056	-
Igreja Maranata	356 021	153 257	26 130	3 272	172 408	953	-
Igreja Nova Vida	90 588	40 836	9 426	1 106	38 997	203	-
Evangélica renovada não determinada	23 461	11 353	1 857	201	9 997	53	-



Tabela 1.4.6 - População residente, por cor ou raça, segundo os grupos de religião - Brasil - 2010

(conclusão)

Grupos de religião	População residente						
	Total	Cor ou raça					
		Branca	Preta	Amarola	Parda	Indígena	Sem declaração
Comunidade Evangélica	180 130	89 688	14 134	1 880	74 103	324	-
Outras igrejas Evangélicas de origem pentecostal	5 267 029	2 320 343	458 182	52 762	2 410 216	25 507	20
Evangélica não determinada	9 218 129	4 433 122	783 912	100 264	3 861 788	39 043	-
Outras religiosidades cristãs	1 461 495	677 081	141 707	19 104	617 605	5 998	-
Igreja de Jesus Cristo dos Santos dos Últimos Dias	226 509	122 332	17 072	1 776	84 605	725	-
Testemunhas de Jeová	1 393 208	659 783	129 115	15 303	585 535	3 472	-
Espiritualista	61 739	41 927	2 842	638	16 145	188	-
Espirita	3 848 876	2 645 559	254 432	40 546	901 485	6 843	12
Umbanda	407 331	220 526	70 927	2 158	112 435	1 286	-
Candomblé	167 363	50 670	48 849	1 214	65 777	853	-
Outras declarações de religiosidades afro brasileira	14 103	5 954	4 739	37	3 002	372	-
Judaísmo	107 329	94 575	1 690	492	10 429	143	-
Hinduismo	5 675	4 113	133	146	1 181	102	-
Budismo	243 966	103 387	15 455	76 896	47 886	342	-
Novas Religiões Orientais	155 951	86 192	9 364	22 491	37 597	306	-
Igreja messiânica mundial	103 716	60 001	7 540	6 137	29 831	207	-
Outras novas religiões orientais	52 235	26 191	1 824	16 354	7 766	99	-
Outras Religiões Orientais	9 675	4 525	414	2 224	2 474	37	-
Islamismo	35 167	29 248	1 336	268	4 300	15	-
Tradições Esotéricas	74 013	41 974	5 355	713	25 457	516	-
Tradições Indígenas	63 082	11 018	1 154	307	7 458	43 144	-
Outras Religiosidades	11 306	7 271	701	15	3 290	29	-
Sem religião	15 335 510	6 075 781	1 698 719	224 333	7 217 638	118 877	163
Sem religião	14 595 979	5 658 282	1 637 657	207 658	6 978 144	114 142	97
Ateu	615 096	335 890	53 575	13 535	208 185	3 910	-
Agnóstico	124 436	81 608	7 487	3 140	31 309	825	67
Não determinada e múltiplo pertencimento	643 598	310 588	49 498	9 255	288 651	5 605	-
Religiosidade não determinada/mal definida	628 219	301 666	48 660	8 834	264 856	4 203	-
Declaração de múltipla religiosidade	15 379	8 922	838	422	3 795	1 402	-

Fonte: IBGE, Censo Demográfico 2010.

(1) Inclusive as pessoas sem declaração de religião e não sabiam.